test(P03): coverage uplift — engine/transport/proxmox/audit ≥50% + dispatch.go EOF fix (REQ-055)

94 new tests across 4 packages. Coverage: engine 8.3%→65.1%, transport
26.3%→84.6%, proxmox 5.1%→82.7%, audit 0%→100%. Bug fix: dispatch.go
bytesReadCloser.Read returned fmt.Errorf("EOF") instead of io.EOF —
broke HTTP request body transmission (latent since v0.2 P02).

---ci---
project: orca
phase: 3
milestone: v0.7
status: verify
requirements:
  covered: [REQ-055]
  partial: []
---/ci---

.ciagent/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -526,3 +526,115 @@ orca CLI                     orca daemon                      orca daemon
 For v0.2, one node must be the CA holder (`orca cert init` was run
 on it). The CA holder's `ca.crt` is copied to each peer manually by
 the operator; peers do not auto-fetch it.
+
+## v0.6 Architecture Addendum — Node Bootstrap & Proxmox
+
+### `orca init` Full Bootstrap (REQ-047, REQ-048, REQ-049)
+
+`orca init` transforms from a bare `mkdir` into a full single-node
+cluster bootstrap. The sequence (idempotent per D-036):
+
+```
+orca init
+  1. MkdirAll(certpaths.Dir(), 0o755)              # namespace dir
+  2. store.Open(certpaths.DBPath())                # runs migrations 0001..0006
+  3. security.CAInit(dir, "orca-internal-ca")      # idempotent fast-path
+  4. if !exists(server.crt):
+       GenerateCSR("localhost", ["localhost","127.0.0.1"])
+       ca.SignCSR(csr) → WriteCert + WriteKey      # server cert (skip if present)
+  5. os := detectOS()                              # /etc/os-release ID=
+  6. node := Node{kind:"localhost", os:os, name:"localhost", addr:"localhost:8443"}
+     if GetByName("localhost") exists:
+       UpdateLastSeenAndOS(id, os)                 # refresh, keep id/joined_at
+     else:
+       NodeRepo.Insert(node)                       # first-run insert
+  7. print summary (CA fp, server cert fp, os, node id)
+```
+
+After `orca init`, `orca doctor` MUST pass with zero FAILs.
+
+### Node Schema Extension (REQ-049)
+
+Migration 0006 adds two nullable columns to `nodes`:
+
+```sql
+ALTER TABLE nodes ADD COLUMN kind TEXT;  -- localhost | linux | proxmox
+ALTER TABLE nodes ADD COLUMN os TEXT;    -- ubuntu | debian | alpine | pve | linux
+```
+
+Existing rows get SQL NULL → mapped to `""` in Go (`sql.NullString`).
+`Node` struct gains `Kind string` + `OS string` fields (JSON tags
+`kind,omitempty` / `os,omitempty`). `NodeRepo` extends all
+INSERT/SELECT/scanNode calls; adds `GetByName(ctx, name)` and
+`UpdateLastSeenAndOS(ctx, id, os)` helpers.
+
+### Proxmox SSH Bootstrap (REQ-050, REQ-051)
+
+```
+orca node join --type proxmox --host <addr> --user root --password <pw>
+  │ password from --password or $ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD (never persisted, D-031)
+  ▼
+internal/proxmox.BootstrapProxmox(ctx, opts)
+  1. GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(certpaths.Dir())         # Ed25519, ~/.orca/orca_ssh_key{,.pub}
+  2. SSH dial (password auth, knownhosts.New TOFU) # capture host key on first connect
+  3. Deploy pubkey → ~orca/.ssh/authorized_keys    # via session heredoc (no SFTP dep)
+  4. useradd -m orca                                # create Linux system user (config-overridable name)
+  5. pveum role add OrcaOperator --privs "VM.Audit Datastore.AllocateSpace SDN.Use"
+     (idempotent: probe pveum role list first)
+  6. pveum user add orca@pam -comment "Orca automation user"
+     (idempotent: probe pveum user list first)
+  7. pveum acl modify / -user orca@pam -role OrcaOperator
+     (idempotent: modify creates or updates)
+  8. Write /etc/sudoers.d/orca (mode 0440):
+       orca ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: NOEXEC: /usr/bin/pct, /usr/bin/qm
+       orca ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/apt-get, /usr/bin/dpkg
+  9. visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/orca                 # validate; abort on error
+  10. NodeRepo.Insert(Node{kind:"proxmox", os:"pve", name:host, addr:host})
+  11. Audit log: proxmox.bootstrap_ok (host, user, role, fp)
+```
+
+**`pvesh` excluded from sudoers** — `pvesh` can trigger the API
+`/nodes/{node}/execute` endpoint which spawns shell commands
+server-side, bypassing sudo's `NOEXEC` tag. API access is via the
+`OrcaOperator` PVE role + `orca@pam` user (PVE RBAC), not sudo'd `pvesh`.
+
+### Doctor Extensions (REQ-052)
+
+- **`doctor os`**: re-runs `detectOS()` from `/etc/os-release`, compares
+  to the stored localhost node's `os` field. Drift = WARN (OS upgraded
+  since init? re-run `orca init` to refresh). Match = PASS.
+- **`doctor proxmox`**: iterates `kind=proxmox` nodes, SSH-probes each
+  with `pveversion` (3s timeout per peer, clones `doctor.Network()`
+  pattern). PASS = reachable + pveversion exits 0. WARN = zero proxmox
+  nodes (single-node cluster is legitimate). FAIL = any node
+  unreachable or pveversion fails.
+
+### SSH Key Handling (D-037)
+
+- **Location**: `~/.orca/orca_ssh_key` (0600) + `~/.orca/orca_ssh_key.pub` (0644)
+- **Algorithm**: Ed25519 (smaller, faster, more secure than RSA for SSH)
+- **Generation**: lazy — on first `orca node join --type proxmox`, NOT at `orca init` (localhost doesn't need SSH)
+- **Format**: PKCS8 PEM (consistent with `ca.key`/`server.key`; `ssh.ParsePrivateKey` accepts it)
+- **TOFU host keys**: `~/.orca/known_hosts` (OpenSSH format via `knownhosts.New`)
+
+### Dependency Map (v0.6 addition)
+
+```
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0        # SSH (ssh + ssh/knownhosts + ed25519)
+  └─ golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0      # indirect (bumped from v0.42.0)
+  └─ golang.org/x/term v0.45.0     # indirect (pulled by ssh for PTY)
+```
+
+Total direct deps: 5 (was 4). One new direct dep (`x/crypto`). Matches
+D-030 minimal-deps rationale. No SFTP module (file upload via session
+heredoc).
+
+### v0.6 Architectural Decisions (AD-017..AD-021)
+
+| ID | Decision | Rationale |
+|----|----------|-----------|
+| AD-017 | `orca init` = full bootstrap (CA + cert + db + localhost node) | Single command produces a working cluster; `orca doctor` passes post-init. Idempotent (D-036). |
+| AD-018 | Proxmox join via SSH (golang.org/x/crypto/ssh), not PVE REST API | SSH is the universal Proxmox management entry point; REST API would require API token bootstrap (chicken-and-egg). One new direct dep (D-030). |
+| AD-019 | `orca@pam` realm (not `orca@pve`) | SSH creates a Linux system user; PAM realm maps it to PVE RBAC without a separate PVE password. `@pve` requires interactive password prompt over non-PTY SSH (hangs). |
+| AD-020 | Exclude `pvesh` from sudoers; NOEXEC on `pct`/`qm` | `pvesh` can trigger API execute endpoint bypassing NOEXEC. `pct`/`qm` are Perl scripts via dynamically-linked perl → NOEXEC effective. `apt-get`/`dpkg` need exec for maintainer scripts → no NOEXEC. |
+| AD-021 | TOFU host-key via `knownhosts.New` | Avoids deprecated `ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey`. Capture-on-first-connect, verify-on-subsequent. Fail closed on mismatch (operator runs key-reset). |

.ciagent/CHECKPOINT.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "phase": 2,
+  "stage": "complete",
+  "milestone": "v0.7",
+  "milestone_slug": "hardening-completion",
+  "phase_role": "execution",
+  "attempts": 0,
+  "updated_at": "2026-08-04T00:10:00Z",
+  "milestone_complete": false,
+  "next_milestone": null
+}

.ciagent/GRILL_v0.3.md

@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
+# Grill Report: Orca v0.3 — scheduling-streaming
+
+**Date:** 2026-08-01
+**Reviewer:** ci-griller (red-team, adversarial)
+**Plan under review:** `.ciagent/PLAN_v0.3.md` (commit 89fa172)
+**Branch:** `phase/00-pre-execution`
+**Mode:** Full autonomy
+
+---
+
+## Methodology
+
+Every claim in `PLAN_v0.3.md` and `RESEARCH_v0.3.md` was cross-checked against
+the actual codebase (the 7 source files listed in the task, plus `migrate.go`,
+`store.go`, `doctor_test.go`, `security/integration_test.go`, `security/ca.go`,
+`security/csr.go`, `model/node.go`, `model/job.go`, and `cli/doctor.go`).
+Findings are scored on 9 axes. Binding verdicts are ACCEPT (plan must change),
+REJECT (concern noted, plan stands), or DEFER (address during execution).
+
+---
+
+## Summary Verdict
+
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|-------|
+| CRITICAL | 2 |
+| HIGH | 2 |
+| MEDIUM | 5 |
+| LOW | 3 |
+| **Total** | **12** |
+
+**Overall verdict: PROCEED WITH CHANGES**
+
+The plan is fundamentally sound — the scope is right-sized, the requirements
+coverage is complete, the persona territories are respected, and the
+no-new-dependencies promise holds. However, two CRITICAL findings require plan
+changes before execution begins. Neither is a scope expansion; both are
+correctness fixes to the design as written. With the 2 ACCEPT changes applied,
+this plan is ready to execute.
+
+---
+
+## Per-Axis Findings
+
+### Axis 1 — Feasibility (can each task actually be implemented?)
+
+#### F-01 [CRITICAL] — Watch yields per-row but CLI table mode requires full-snapshot-per-tick
+
+**Severity:** CRITICAL
+**Axis:** Feasibility / Vertical slice integrity
+**Binding verdict:** ACCEPT (plan must change)
+
+**Finding:**
+The plan is internally contradictory about what `Watch` yields.
+
+- D-028 (RESEARCH:88) says Watch "yields the **full current snapshot** (one
+  element per row)."
+- Task 01-01-01 (PLAN:30) says Watch "yields one `*model.Job` per row via
+  `scanJob`" — i.e., `iter.Seq[*model.Job]`, one element per row per tick.
+- Task 01-02-02 (PLAN:42) says the CLI table render "collect the full snapshot
+  from `seq` into a `[]*model.Job`" then compares against the previous
+  snapshot's rendered table.
+
+These are incompatible. `iter.Seq[*model.Job]` yields individual jobs with **no
+tick-boundary signal**. The CLI ranging `for job := range seq` receives a flat
+stream of jobs and cannot know when a tick's snapshot is complete. It cannot
+collect "the full snapshot" because it cannot detect the end of a tick.
+
+The JSON mode (01-02-03) can work without tick boundaries (per-element dedup
+via `map[string][]byte`), but the **table mode cannot**. Table mode needs the
+complete snapshot to render the table, clear the screen, and compare against the
+previous frame.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `RESEARCH_v0.3.md:106-142` — implementation yields `yield(j)` per row inside
+  `for rows.Next()`, not `yield(allJobs)` per tick.
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:30` — "yields one `*model.Job` per row"
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:42` — "collect the full snapshot from `seq` into a `[]*model.Job`"
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:44` (01-02-04) — nodeListCmd watch bypasses registry, same
+  per-row yield.
+- D-028 says "full current snapshot" but the code yields per-row.
+
+**Required change:**
+Change the `Watch` element type from `iter.Seq[*model.Job]` to
+`iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]` (and `iter.Seq[[]*model.Node]` analogously). Each tick
+yields the **full snapshot as a single slice**. This:
+
+1. Makes D-028 ("yields the full current snapshot") literally true.
+2. Makes table mode trivial: `for snapshot := range seq { render(snapshot) }`.
+3. Makes JSON mode cleaner: per-tick, diff the snapshot against the previous
+   one, emit one JSON line per changed element. This also enables a natural
+   `"delete"` event for elements that disappeared (not possible with per-row
+   yield).
+4. Simplifies the test contract: `TestWatch_YieldsSnapshots` ranges over
+   `iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]` and each yield is a complete tick — no timing
+   ambiguity about "did I get all rows for this tick?"
+
+**Impact on plan:**
+- Tasks 01-01-01, 01-01-02: signature changes to
+  `iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]` / `iter.Seq[[]*model.Node]`. Implementation
+  collects all rows into a slice per tick, then `yield(slice)`.
+- Task 01-02-02 (table): `for snapshot := range seq { ... }` — direct, no
+  collection needed.
+- Task 01-02-03 (JSON): per-tick diff against previous snapshot's
+  `map[string][]byte`. Emit `"init"`/`"update"`/`"delete"` events.
+- Task 01-01-04 (tests): assert each yield is a complete snapshot slice.
+- D-026, D-028, D-046: update to reflect slice-per-tick semantics.
+- Must-have criteria for 01-01-01/01-01-02: update signature assertions.
+
+This is a mechanical change to the plan, not a scope change. The implementation
+is simpler (no tick-boundary detection needed).
+
+**Confidence:** 0.92
+
+---
+
+#### F-02 [CRITICAL] — First-tick delay: Watch waits a full interval before first yield
+
+**Severity:** CRITICAL
+**Axis:** Feasibility / UX correctness
+**Binding verdict:** ACCEPT (plan must change)
+
+**Finding:**
+The Watch implementation (RESEARCH:110-116) has this structure:
+
+```go
+ticker := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Second)
+defer ticker.Stop()
+for {
+    select {
+    case <-ctx.Done(): return
+    case <-ticker.C:   // <-- waits 1s BEFORE first query
+    }
+    // query + yield
+}
+```
+
+The `select` waits for the first ticker pulse **before** running the first
+query. With a 1s default interval, `orca job list --watch` shows **nothing for
+1 full second**, then the first snapshot appears. For a CLI tool, a 1s blank
+screen is a poor UX and looks broken. The user expects immediate output, then
+refreshes every 1s.
+
+The tests (01-01-04) use `watchInterval=10ms`, so the delay is only 10ms and
+the test passes — but the test does NOT catch this UX bug because the interval
+is tiny. In production (1s), the bug is visible.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `RESEARCH_v0.3.md:110-116` — `select` before first query.
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:30` — "pull-based inline polling loop on a 1s ticker" — no
+  mention of immediate first yield.
+- Standard `top`-like tools yield immediately, then tick.
+
+**Required change:**
+Add to tasks 01-01-01 and 01-01-02: the polling loop must **query and yield
+immediately on the first iteration**, then `select` on the ticker for
+subsequent ticks. Implementation shape:
+
+```go
+for {
+    // query + yield (runs immediately on first iteration)
+    rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, ...)
+    // ... yield snapshot ...
+    select {
+    case <-ctx.Done(): return
+    case <-ticker.C:
+    }
+}
+```
+
+Or equivalently, query once before the loop, then loop with select-first. The
+must-have criteria should add: "first yield occurs immediately (no
+`watchInterval` delay before first snapshot)."
+
+**Impact on plan:**
+- Tasks 01-01-01, 01-01-02: add "immediate first yield" to description +
+  must-have.
+- Task 01-01-04 (tests): add assertion that the first snapshot appears within
+  a short deadline (e.g., <50ms) even with `watchInterval=10ms` — proving the
+  first yield is not tick-gated.
+
+**Confidence:** 0.95
+
+---
+
+#### F-03 [HIGH] — P01 and P02 both modify `internal/cli/node.go` (file-disjoint claim is false)
+
+**Severity:** HIGH
+**Axis:** Feasibility / Timeline (parallelism)
+**Binding verdict:** ACCEPT (plan must change)
+
+**Finding:**
+D-042 (PLAN:133, RESEARCH:489) claims "P01 and P02 are file-disjoint — no file
+is modified by both." This is **false**.
+
+- P01 task 01-02-04 (PLAN:44) modifies `internal/cli/node.go` — adds `--watch`
+  flag + render modes to `nodeListCmd`.
+- P02 task 02-01-01 (PLAN:76) modifies `internal/cli/node.go` — removes the
+  `dbPath` function and updates `openDB` to call `certpaths.DBPath()`.
+
+Both phases touch `internal/cli/node.go`. If developed in parallel (as D-042
+permits), this causes merge conflicts.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:44` — 01-02-04 files: `internal/cli/node.go`
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:76` — 02-01-01 files: `internal/cli/node.go` (remove old
+  `dbPath`)
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:133` — "P01 and P02 are file-disjoint"
+- Actual code: `internal/cli/node.go:22-28` defines `dbPath`; `:30-36`
+  defines `openDB` which calls `dbPath()`. `openDB` is used by 14 call sites
+  across `job.go`, `daemon.go`, `node_capacity.go`, `audit.go`, `node.go`.
+
+**Required change:**
+Update D-042 and the cross-phase notes (PLAN:131-133) to acknowledge the
+overlap. Two options (pick one):
+
+1. **Serialize:** P02 Wave 1 (02-01-01) runs before P01 Wave 2 (01-02-04).
+   P02 Wave 1 is a prerequisite for P01 Wave 2 on the `node.go` file. P01
+   Wave 1 (store layer) and P02 Wave 1 can still run in parallel.
+2. **Merge the changes:** task 02-01-01 is folded into P01 Wave 2's
+   `node.go` modification (the cli-engineer updates `openDB` to use
+   `certpaths.DBPath()` while also adding `--watch`).
+
+Recommended: Option 1 (serialize P02 Wave 1 before P01 Wave 2). It preserves
+the wave structure and persona assignments. Update the cross-phase note to say:
+"P02 Wave 1 (02-01-01) must complete before P01 Wave 2 (01-02-04) due to shared
+`internal/cli/node.go` modification. P01 Wave 1 and P02 Wave 1 may run in
+parallel."
+
+**Confidence:** 0.90
+
+---
+
+#### F-04 [HIGH] — D-037 ServerName = node.Name assumption is fragile and unverified against real join flow
+
+**Severity:** HIGH
+**Axis:** Feasibility / Security
+**Binding verdict:** DEFER (address in execution, with documentation)
+
+**Finding:**
+D-037 (RESEARCH:261, confidence 0.80) assumes `serverName = node.Name` for the
+mTLS health probe. The TLS client's `ServerName` must match a SAN entry on the
+peer's server cert. But `GenerateCSR(commonName, sans)` (csr.go:24) takes the
+commonName and SANs as **separate arguments**. The commonName becomes the cert
+Subject CN, but `ServerName` in `tls.Config` is matched against **SANs**
+(DNSNames/IPAddresses), not the CN (per Go's `crypto/tls` behavior since Go
+1.15).
+
+If a node joined with `--name node-b` but its cert SAN is `localhost` (or an
+IP), `serverName = "node-b"` will **fail the TLS handshake** with a
+"certificate is valid for localhost, not node-b" error — even though the peer
+is perfectly healthy.
+
+The research (RESEARCH:261) says "confirmed in `integration_test.go:41`
+`GenerateCSR("test-server", ...)`" — but that test uses `serverName =
+"localhost"` (integration_test.go:83), which matches the SAN `localhost`, not
+the commonName `test-server`. The test proves SAN-matching, not CN-matching.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `internal/security/csr.go:24` — `GenerateCSR(commonName, sans)` — CN and
+  SANs are separate.
+- `internal/security/integration_test.go:41` — `GenerateCSR("test-server",
+  []string{"localhost", "127.0.0.1"})` — CN is "test-server", SANs are
+  localhost/127.0.0.1.
+- `internal/security/integration_test.go:83` — `ClientTLSConfig(...,
+  "localhost", ...)` — serverName = "localhost" (a SAN), NOT "test-server"
+  (the CN).
+- `internal/transport/mtls.go:49-51` — `serverName` is required and set as
+  `tls.Config.ServerName` (matched against SANs).
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:88` — 02-02-03: `serverName = n.Name`.
+
+**Mitigation (DEFER to execution):**
+1. Document the assumption in the `Network()` check message: "probing
+   <name> at <addr> (assuming cert SAN = node name)".
+2. If the handshake fails with a SAN mismatch error, the FAIL message should
+   include the cert's actual SANs (parsed from the error) so the operator can
+   diagnose. This is a refinement, not a plan blocker.
+3. The test 02-02-05(e) uses `Name = "localhost"` which matches the SAN — so
+   the test passes, but it doesn't prove the general case. Add a test comment
+   noting this assumption.
+
+**Why DEFER not ACCEPT:** The assumption is documented (D-037, 0.80
+confidence), the failure mode is graceful (FAIL with handshake error, not a
+crash), and fixing it properly (storing SANs in the nodes table) is a scope
+expansion beyond v0.3. The plan should note the limitation; execution should
+add diagnostic context to the error message.
+
+**Confidence:** 0.78
+
+---
+
+#### F-05 [MEDIUM] — `store.Open` runs migrations before integrity_check can run
+
+**Severity:** MEDIUM
+**Axis:** Feasibility / Testing
+**Binding verdict:** REJECT (concern noted, plan stands)
+
+**Finding:**
+The DB check (02-02-01) calls `store.Open(path)` which runs `migrate(db)` (store
+.go:39) before the integrity_check executes. On a truly corrupt DB, `store.Open`
+fails at `Ping()` or `migrate()` — the integrity_check never runs. The check
+returns FAIL with the open/migrate error, which is the correct outcome (a DB
+that can't be opened is broken), but the message says "open <path>: <error>"
+not "integrity_check failed."
+
+The plan's `TestDBCheck_Corrupt` (RESEARCH:469) is explicitly called "brittle"
+and made optional. The plan accepts that integrity_check is somewhat redundant
+with `store.Open`'s own validation.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `internal/store/store.go:37-41` — `db.Ping()` then `migrate(db)` inside
+  `Open`.
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:86` — 02-02-01: `db, err := store.Open(path)`.
+- `RESEARCH_v0.3.md:455-456` — pitfall table acknowledges this.
+
+**Why REJECT:** The failure surfaces correctly (FAIL with error message). The
+integrity_check adds value for the case where the DB opens but has logical
+corruption (e.g., foreign key violations, orphaned pages) that Ping/migrate
+don't catch. The plan's approach is acceptable for v0.3. The optional corrupt
+test is correctly deferred.
+
+**Confidence:** 0.85
+
+---
+
+### Axis 2 — Scope
+
+#### F-06 [MEDIUM] — No "delete" event in JSON watch mode (with per-row yield)
+
+**Severity:** MEDIUM
+**Axis:** Scope / Completeness
+**Binding verdict:** DEFER (address in execution)
+
+**Finding:**
+With the current per-row `iter.Seq[*model.Job]` design (F-01), the JSON watch
+mode (01-02-03) emits `"init"` and `"update"` events but has no way to emit
+`"delete"` events — a job that disappears from the snapshot simply stops being
+yielded, and the CLI has no tick boundary to detect "this ID was in the
+previous tick but not this one."
+
+With the F-01 fix (`iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]`, full snapshot per tick), `"delete"`
+events become trivially possible: diff the previous snapshot's ID set against
+the current snapshot's ID set. The plan should add `"delete"` event semantics
+to D-046.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:43` — 01-02-03: only `"init"` and `"update"` events.
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:139` — D-046: only `"init"` and `"update"`.
+- Neither jobs nor nodes are hard-deleted in the current CLI (`node leave` sets
+  state to `left`, doesn't delete the row), so `"delete"` events are not
+  strictly needed for v0.3. But the `NodeRepo.Delete` method exists and could
+  be used by future code.
+
+**Mitigation (DEFER):** If F-01 is accepted (slice-per-tick), add `"delete"`
+event to D-046 as a natural extension. If F-01 is not accepted, document the
+no-delete-event limitation explicitly.
+
+**Confidence:** 0.70
+
+---
+
+### Axis 3 — Testing
+
+#### F-07 [MEDIUM] — Test timing fragility: 10ms tick + 30ms insert + 80ms cancel
+
+**Severity:** MEDIUM
+**Axis:** Testing
+**Binding verdict:** DEFER (address in execution)
+
+**Finding:**
+The store-layer tests (01-01-04) use `watchInterval=10ms` with timing-based
+assertions: "insert a 2nd job from a goroutine after ~30ms, cancel ctx after
+~80ms." Under CI load (especially with `-race` overhead), 10ms ticks can be
+missed or delayed. A 10ms ticker pulse is not guaranteed to fire within 10ms
+under load — the Go runtime scheduler may delay it. If the 2nd job is inserted
+at 30ms but the 2nd tick fires at 45ms, the test might see the 2nd job in the
+3rd tick (at ~55ms) which is still before the 80ms cancel — so it likely
+passes, but it's fragile.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:33` — 01-01-04: "after ~30ms", "after ~80ms".
+- `time.NewTicker` does not guarantee exact timing under load.
+
+**Mitigation (DEFER):** Use more generous margins (e.g., 50ms insert, 200ms
+cancel) or a synchronization mechanism (e.g., insert the 2nd job, then poll
+the collected slice with a 500ms timeout). The test hook (`watchInterval`)
+already enables fast tests; the margins just need to be wider. Execution
+should validate the tests pass reliably under `-race` in CI before marking
+Wave 1 complete.
+
+**Confidence:** 0.75
+
+---
+
+#### F-08 [LOW] — `-race` does not detect goroutine leaks; the plan claims it does
+
+**Severity:** LOW
+**Axis:** Testing
+**Binding verdict:** REJECT (concern noted, plan stands)
+
+**Finding:**
+The plan (01-01-04 must-have, PLAN:33) says "`-race` reports no leaks/data
+races." `go test -race` detects **data races**, not **goroutine leaks**.
+Goroutine leak detection requires `goleak` or explicit goroutine-count
+assertions. The claim is technically incorrect.
+
+However, the actual risk is negligible: Watch does not spawn a goroutine
+(D-032, inline pull loop). `time.NewTicker` spawns an internal goroutine, but
+`defer ticker.Stop()` terminates it. There is nothing to leak. The
+`no-goroutine-leak` constraint (data-engineer persona) is satisfied by
+design, not by testing.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:33` — "`-race` reports no leaks/data races"
+- `RESEARCH_v0.3.md:92` — D-032: "No goroutine is spawned by Watch."
+- Go `-race` detector documentation: detects concurrent access, not leaks.
+
+**Why REJECT:** The claim is imprecise but the risk is zero by design.
+Execution may optionally add `runtime.NumGoroutine()` before/after assertions
+for belt-and-suspenders, but it's not required.
+
+**Confidence:** 0.90
+
+---
+
+### Axis 4 — Security
+
+#### F-09 [MEDIUM] — Doctor network check probes peers using the local server cert as client cert (confirmed valid, but undocumented)
+
+**Severity:** MEDIUM
+**Axis:** Security
+**Binding verdict:** DEFER (document in execution)
+
+**Finding:**
+The plan (02-02-03, PLAN:88) uses `certpaths.ServerCertPath()`/`ServerKeyPath()`
+as the client cert for the mTLS health probe. I verified this is **valid**:
+`security/ca.go:255` signs server certs with
+`ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}`
+— the server cert has both ServerAuth and ClientAuth EKUs, so it can be
+presented as a client cert. The daemon's `RequireAndVerifyClientCert`
+(security/tls_config.go:92) will accept it.
+
+This is correct and feasible. The finding is that this cross-use (server cert
+as client cert) is not documented in the plan or the security architecture. A
+security auditor might flag it as "server cert used for client auth — is this
+intended?"
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `internal/security/ca.go:255` — `ExtKeyUsage: ServerAuth, ClientAuth`.
+- `internal/security/tls_config.go:92` — `ClientAuth: RequireAndVerifyClientCert`.
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:88` — 02-02-03 uses `ServerCertPath()`/`ServerKeyPath()`.
+- `RESEARCH_v0.3.md:261` — D-037: "presents the local node's client cert."
+
+**Mitigation (DEFER):** Add a code comment in `probeHealthz` and a note in
+ARCHITECTURE.md §5 explaining that the local server cert doubles as the client
+cert for doctor probes (justified by the dual EKU). This is documentation, not
+a code change.
+
+**Confidence:** 0.88
+
+---
+
+### Axis 5 — Performance
+
+#### F-10 [LOW] — 1s poll ticker re-runs full List query every second; no concern but worth noting
+
+**Severity:** LOW
+**Axis:** Performance
+**Binding verdict:** REJECT (concern noted, plan stands)
+
+**Finding:**
+The 1s ticker (D-019) re-runs `SELECT ... FROM jobs ORDER BY created_at DESC`
+every second. For a CLI tool run by a human watching a terminal, this is
+fine — the query is cheap (single table, no joins, indexed by `created_at` if
+an index exists). For an AI agent tailing `--watch --json` for hours, this is
+1 query/second × 3600 = 3600 queries/hour. SQLite handles this trivially in
+WAL mode (store.go:36).
+
+The cadence is correct for a "top-like" refresh. Faster (e.g., 100ms) would
+waste CPU; slower (e.g., 5s) would feel sluggish. 1s is the right default.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `PROJECT.md:116` — D-019: "Poll-based, 1s ticker" (confidence 0.90).
+- `internal/store/store.go:36` — WAL mode enabled.
+
+**Why REJECT:** The cadence is justified. No change needed.
+
+**Confidence:** 0.92
+
+---
+
+### Axis 6 — Maintainability
+
+#### F-11 [LOW] — `watchInterval` package var is mutable global state (test hook)
+
+**Severity:** LOW
+**Axis:** Maintainability
+**Binding verdict:** REJECT (concern noted, plan stands)
+
+**Finding:**
+D-043 (PLAN:136) uses an unexported package var `watchInterval = 1 * time.Second`
+in `internal/store`, overridable from `_test.go`. This is mutable global state —
+if tests run in parallel within the `internal/store` package and one test sets
+`watchInterval=10ms` while another expects `1s`, they interfere.
+
+However, Go tests within a single package run **sequentially** by default
+unless `t.Parallel()` is called. I verified no test in `internal/store` calls
+`t.Parallel()` (grep found 0 matches). So the global var is safe as long as
+no Watch test calls `t.Parallel()`. The plan should note this constraint.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:32` — 01-01-03: "unexported package var `watchInterval`"
+- `PLAN_v0.3.md:136` — D-043.
+- grep for `t.Parallel()` in `internal/`: 0 matches.
+
+**Why REJECT:** The approach is pragmatic and safe given sequential test
+execution. The alternative (a `WatchWithInterval` constructor or an option
+pattern) would leak test-only API into production, which D-043 explicitly
+avoids. Execution should add a comment: "do not call t.Parallel() in Watch
+tests — they share the watchInterval package var."
+
+**Confidence:** 0.85
+
+---
+
+### Axis 7 — Completeness
+
+#### F-12 [MEDIUM] — Plan does not address `openDB()` being the single chokepoint for dbPath relocation
+
+**Severity:** MEDIUM
+**Axis:** Completeness / Feasibility
+**Binding verdict:** DEFER (clarify in execution)
+
+**Finding:**
+Task 02-01-01 (PLAN:76) says "Update `internal/cli/node.go` (and any other
+`internal/cli` caller of the old unexported `dbPath`) to call
+`certpaths.DBPath()`." This is imprecise. `dbPath()` is defined in
+`node.go:22` and called only by `openDB()` in `node.go:31`. `openDB()` is
+then called by 14 sites across `job.go`, `daemon.go`, `node_capacity.go`,
+`audit.go`, `node.go`. The correct change is:
+
+1. Add `certpaths.DBPath()`.
+2. Change `openDB()` body from `store.Open(dbPath())` to
+   `store.Open(certpaths.DBPath())`.
+3. Delete the `dbPath()` function from `node.go`.
+
+No other caller needs changing — they all go through `openDB()`. The plan's
+"any other `internal/cli` caller" language suggests a broader scan that isn't
+needed. This is a clarity issue, not a correctness issue.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `internal/cli/node.go:22-28` — `dbPath()` definition.
+- `internal/cli/node.go:30-36` — `openDB()` calls `dbPath()`.
+- grep `openDB()`: 14 call sites, all in `internal/cli/`.
+- grep `dbPath()`: only in `node.go:31` (inside `openDB`).
+
+**Mitigation (DEFER):** Execution should note that `openDB()` is the single
+chokepoint — update its body and delete `dbPath()`. No other file needs
+changes. The plan's must-have ("`internal/cli` no longer defines `dbPath`")
+is correct.
+
+**Confidence:** 0.88
+
+---
+
+### Axis 8 — Vertical Slice Integrity
+
+Covered by F-01 (the tick-boundary problem breaks the Wave 1 → Wave 2
+vertical slice: Wave 1 produces `iter.Seq[*model.Job]` which Wave 2's table
+mode cannot consume correctly). With F-01's fix (`iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]`),
+the vertical slice is clean: Wave 1 yields full snapshots, Wave 2 renders
+them.
+
+### Axis 9 — Risk
+
+**Highest-risk task:** 02-02-05(e) `TestNetworkCheck_PeerReachable` —
+integration test requiring CA bootstrap, server cert signing with correct
+SAN, httptest TLS server with `RequireAndVerifyClientCert`, node row insert,
+and mTLS probe. Has the most moving parts and the most assumptions (D-037
+ServerName, dual-EKU client cert, httptest HTTP/1.1 vs h2c quirks per
+integration_test.go:100-126). If D-037 is wrong in production (not in test,
+since the test uses `Name = "localhost"` matching the SAN), the network check
+fails for real deployments but the test passes — a false-positive.
+
+**What could go catastrophically wrong:** The F-01 tick-boundary issue, if
+not caught, would cause `orca job list --watch` (table mode) to either hang
+(trying to collect a "full snapshot" that never completes) or render
+incomplete tables (rendering after each row instead of after a full tick).
+This is a user-visible broken feature shipped as "complete."
+
+---
+
+## Binding Decisions (G-series)
+
+| ID | Decision | Rationale | Confidence | Verdict |
+|----|----------|-----------|------------|---------|
+| G-001 | Change `Watch` to `iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]` / `iter.Seq[[]*model.Node]` (full snapshot per tick) | F-01: per-row yield has no tick boundary; table mode needs full snapshot. Slice-per-tick makes D-028 literally true and simplifies both render modes. | 0.92 | ACCEPT |
+| G-002 | Watch must yield immediately on first iteration, then tick | F-02: current design waits 1s before first output. Unacceptable UX. | 0.95 | ACCEPT |
+| G-003 | P02 Wave 1 (02-01-01) must complete before P01 Wave 2 (01-02-04) — shared `internal/cli/node.go` | F-03: D-042 file-disjoint claim is false for `node.go`. | 0.90 | ACCEPT |
+| G-004 | D-037 ServerName = node.Name assumption is deferred; execution must add diagnostic context to handshake-fail errors | F-04: assumption is documented (0.80), failure is graceful, proper fix is out of v0.3 scope. | 0.78 | DEFER |
+| G-005 | `store.Open` runs migrations before integrity_check — acceptable | F-05: failure surfaces correctly as FAIL. | 0.85 | REJECT |
+| G-006 | Add `"delete"` event to JSON watch mode if G-001 is accepted | F-06: slice-per-tick makes delete events trivial. | 0.70 | DEFER |
+| G-007 | Widen test timing margins (10ms tick → generous insert/cancel margins) | F-07: 10ms ticker under CI load is fragile. | 0.75 | DEFER |
+| G-008 | `-race` does not detect goroutine leaks — claim is imprecise but risk is zero by design | F-08: no goroutine spawned. | 0.90 | REJECT |
+| G-009 | Document dual-EKU (server cert as client cert) in `probeHealthz` + ARCHITECTURE.md | F-09: valid but undocumented. | 0.88 | DEFER |
+| G-010 | 1s poll ticker cadence is correct | F-10: justified by D-019. | 0.92 | REJECT |
+| G-011 | `watchInterval` package var is safe (no `t.Parallel` in store tests) | F-11: pragmatic, avoids leaking test API. | 0.85 | REJECT |
+| G-012 | `openDB()` is the single chokepoint for dbPath relocation — clarify in execution | F-12: plan is imprecise but correct. | 0.88 | DEFER |
+
+---
+
+## Escalations
+
+None. All 12 findings are resolved with confidence ≥ 0.60 (either ACCEPT,
+REJECT, or DEFER). No axis requires human escalation.
+
+---
+
+## Overall Verdict
+
+**PROCEED WITH CHANGES**
+
+The plan is approved for execution **after** the 3 ACCEPT binding verdicts
+(G-001, G-002, G-003) are applied to `PLAN_v0.3.md`:
+
+1. **G-001:** Change `Watch` element type to `iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]` /
+   `iter.Seq[[]*model.Node]` (full snapshot per tick). Update tasks
+   01-01-01, 01-01-02, 01-02-02, 01-02-03, 01-02-04, 01-01-04, and decisions
+   D-026, D-028, D-046.
+2. **G-002:** Add "immediate first yield" to tasks 01-01-01, 01-01-02 and
+   must-have criteria + test assertion in 01-01-04.
+3. **G-003:** Update D-042 and cross-phase notes: P02 Wave 1 (02-01-01)
+   precedes P01 Wave 2 (01-02-04) due to shared `internal/cli/node.go`.
+
+The 5 DEFER items (G-004, G-006, G-007, G-009, G-012) are execution-time
+refinements that do not block the plan.
+
+The scope is right-sized (21 tasks across 5 waves, 2 execution phases + 1
+review phase). No requirements gaps exist between REQ-022/030/032 and the plan
+tasks. The no-new-dependencies promise holds. The persona territories are
+respected. The test strategy is adequate (with the timing-margin note in
+G-007). The plan does not violate the minimalist pillar.
+
+**Confidence in verdict:** 0.88

.ciagent/IDEATION_v0.7.md

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# Ideation: Orca v0.7 — Hardening & Completion
+
+Full autonomy mode: all ideas with confidence >= 0.60 are auto-accepted.
+The RESEARCH stage (commit `7c4b603`) surfaced 5 codebase gaps which are
+assessed below alongside 8 additional ideas generated by the 3-tier
+ideation process.
+
+Total generated: 13 ideas (5 Tier 1 + 5 Tier 2 + 3 Tier 3) plus 5
+inherited research findings = 18 considered. 13 accepted (all >= 0.60),
+0 skipped, 0 deferred. 4 of the accepted ideas are implementation
+refinements with no new REQ; 4 map to the v0.7 REQs (REQ-053..056)
+already declared in SPECIFY; the research findings confirmed the v0.7
+scope.
+
+## Tier 1: Mechanical Analysis (git + filesystem)
+
+### 1.1 Git-Native Pattern Mining
+
+- `git log --all --grep="lessons:"` — 1 lesson found (orch-engine P00
+  config.json schema reference). No repeated lessons in orca's own
+  history → no systemic process gap.
+- `git log --all --grep="escalation:"` — 0 escalations. The pipeline
+  has run clean across v0.1–v0.6.
+- `git log --all --grep="compound:"` — 0 compound learnings.
+- Low-confidence decisions (confidence < 0.7): none in `---ci---`
+  blocks. The lowest-confidence v0.7 decision is D-040 (pprof) at 0.85,
+  above threshold.
+
+### 1.2 Coverage Gap Analysis
+
+| ID | Idea | Source | Confidence | Status | Maps to |
+|----|------|--------|------------|--------|---------|
+| I-401 | `orca cert` command tree is unreachable — `NewCommand` in `internal/cli/cert.go` is never AddCommand'd to `rootCmd` | research §1.1 + `grep -rn "rootCmd.AddCommand"` (cert absent) | 0.98 | Accepted | REQ-053 |
+| I-402 | `internal/store/cert_repo.go` has no test file — every other repo has one | research §1.2 + `ls internal/store/*_test.go` | 0.95 | Accepted | REQ-053 (P01 companion) |
+| I-403 | `internal/engine` coverage 8.3% — only `scheduler_test.go` exists; executor, dispatcher, peer untested | research §1.3 + `go test -cover` | 0.90 | Accepted | REQ-055 |
+| I-404 | `internal/transport` coverage 26.3% — only `idempotency_test.go`; mtls, dispatch, handshake_log untested | research §1.3 | 0.90 | Accepted | REQ-055 |
+| I-405 | `internal/audit` has no test files — Emit, EmitWithErr, LogHandshake* untested | research §1.3 + `ls internal/audit/*_test.go` | 0.88 | Accepted | REQ-055 |
+
+### 1.3 Verification Layer Inversion (missing items)
+
+- **Structural**: `internal/cli/cert.go` defines a command that is
+  never wired in — a "documented but unreachable" component (I-401).
+- **Behavioral**: 4 packages below 50% coverage (I-403/404/405 + proxmox).
+- **Security**: no STRIDE gap — v0.7 adds no new trust boundary (pprof
+  is operator-only, addr-gated; cert registration exposes existing
+  security code).
+- **Quality**: no unresolved P1/P2 findings from v0.6 final review.
+
+## Tier 2: Backend-Enriched Analysis
+
+| ID | Idea | Source | Confidence | Status | Maps to |
+|----|------|--------|------------|--------|---------|
+| I-406 | HCL config file parser — `internal/config` package reusing `hclsimple.Decode` pattern from jobspec; D-009 promised it, never built | research §1.4 + D-009 | 0.92 | Accepted | REQ-054 |
+| I-407 | `--pprof <addr>` opt-in on `orca daemon` — I-308 deferred since v0.2; stdlib only, separate mux | research §1.5 + I-308 | 0.82 | Accepted | REQ-056 |
+| I-408 | Config precedence flag>env>file>default — table-driven test covering all 4 layers | backend-enriched (D-039) | 0.90 | Accepted | (refinement of REQ-054; no new REQ) |
+| I-409 | pprof on separate `*http.Server` + `*http.ServeMux`, never on mTLS daemon listener | backend-enriched (AD-024) | 0.90 | Accepted | (refinement of REQ-056; no new REQ) |
+| I-410 | CI coverage gate: `go test -cover ./internal/engine ./internal/transport ./internal/proxmox ./internal/audit` assert each ≥ 50% | backend-enriched (AD-025) | 0.85 | Accepted | (refinement of REQ-055; no new REQ) |
+
+## Tier 3: Cross-Project Pattern Transfer
+
+| ID | Idea | Source | Confidence | Status | Maps to |
+|----|------|--------|------------|--------|---------|
+| I-411 | `orca version --json` already outputs structured `{version, commit, go_version, build_time}` (I-307 accepted v0.2) — verify still works, no new REQ | cross-project (carry-forward from v0.2 I-307) | 0.80 | Accepted (verification only) | (no new REQ; confirm in P03) |
+| I-412 | `orca cert` registration via `init()` co-located in `cert.go` — matches the self-registering pattern in `daemon.go`/`audit.go` | cross-project (orca's own convention) | 0.88 | Accepted | (refinement of REQ-053; no new REQ) |
+| I-413 | No new direct dependencies in v0.7 — `net/http/pprof` (stdlib), `hashicorp/hcl/v2` (already direct) | cross-project (minimal-deps ethos) | 0.95 | Accepted | (constraint; no new REQ) |
+
+## Research-stage findings (assessed)
+
+| Finding | Verdict | Maps to |
+|---------|---------|---------|
+| cert command unreachable (§1.1) | **Accepted** (I-401) | REQ-053 (P01) |
+| cert_repo has no test (§1.2) | **Accepted** (I-402) | REQ-053 (P01) |
+| low coverage: engine/transport/proxmox/audit (§1.3) | **Accepted** (I-403/404/405) | REQ-055 (P03) |
+| no HCL config parser (§1.4) | **Accepted** (I-406) | REQ-054 (P02) |
+| pprof deferred since v0.2 (§1.5) | **Accepted** (I-407) | REQ-056 (P04) |
+
+All 5 findings map to the v0.7 REQs declared in SPECIFY. The IDEATE
+stage confirms the scope and adds 8 implementation refinements
+(I-408..I-413) that inform the PLAN stage.
+
+## Dropped ideas (confidence < 0.60)
+
+None. The lowest-confidence accepted idea is I-407 (pprof) at 0.82.
+
+## Accepted Ideas (auto-accepted, full autonomy)
+
+13 ideas accepted (5 Tier 1 + 5 Tier 2 + 3 Tier 3). 4 map to net-new
+REQs (REQ-053..056, already declared in SPECIFY); 9 are implementation
+refinements recorded for the PLAN stage's benefit.
+
+## Resulting REQ additions
+
+| New REQ | Title | Phase | Source ideas |
+|---------|-------|-------|--------------|
+| REQ-053 | `orca cert` command tree registered + cert_repo tests | P01 | I-401, I-402, I-412 |
+| REQ-054 | HCL config file parsing (`internal/config`) | P02 | I-406, I-408 |
+| REQ-055 | Test coverage uplift — engine/transport/proxmox/audit ≥ 50% | P03 | I-403, I-404, I-405, I-410 |
+| REQ-056 | `--pprof <addr>` opt-in on `orca daemon` | P04 | I-407, I-409 |
+
+**Total net-new REQs**: 4 (REQ-053..056). All declared in SPECIFY;
+IDEATE confirms mapping and adds implementation refinements.
+
+## Deferred (recorded but not v0.7)
+
+None. I-308 (pprof) is no longer deferred — it is REQ-056 in P04.
+
+## Followup notes for PLAN stage
+
+- **P01** is the highest-impact, lowest-effort phase: a 1-line
+  `rootCmd.AddCommand` + a regression test + cert_repo_test.go. The
+  smoke test should run `cert ca-init` + `cert gen` + `cert show` +
+  `cert fingerprint` against a temp `ORCA_HOME` to catch any latent
+  bugs in the never-exercised cert subcommands.
+- **P02** config package must be a pure function (`Load(paths) ->
+  *Config`) with no package-level state. The `--config` flag on root
+  command loads the file and passes the merged `*Config` down via
+  cobra's `cmd.SetContext` or a struct field on the command.
+- **P03** coverage: target the interface seams (SSH dialer, peer
+  client) for mocks; use `httptest.NewTLSServer` for transport. Any
+  races uncovered by `-race` get fixed in P03, not deferred.
+- **P04** pprof: keep the daemon's mTLS listener untouched; start a
+  second `http.Server` only when `--pprof` is non-empty. Log a WARN
+  that the endpoint is unauthenticated.

.ciagent/PERSONAS.md

@@ -3,36 +3,29 @@ active_personas:
   - lead-developer
   - backend-engineer
   - data-engineer
-  - cli-engineer
-  - security-engineer
-  - network-engineer
 deactivated_personas:
-  - frontend-engineer
-  - devops-sre
-phase_specific:
-  - security-engineer
-  - network-engineer
   - cli-engineer
+  - security-engineer
+  - devops-engineer
+  - network-engineer
+  - frontend-engineer
+phase_specific: []
 reason: |
-  Orca is a CLI-first, offline-first orchestration engine with no web UI and
-  a single-binary distribution model. The persona roster reflects this:
+  Orca v0.7 is an NFR hardening & completion milestone. The work is CLI
+  registration (cert command), a new internal/config package, test
+  coverage uplift across engine/transport/proxmox/audit, and an opt-in
+  pprof endpoint on the daemon. No schema changes, no new security
+  surface, no packaging/distribution, no UI.
 
-  - lead-developer: coordination and task decomposition
-  - backend-engineer: core engine and API handlers
-  - data-engineer: SQLite state store and migrations
-  - cli-engineer: Cobra subcommands and CLI UX
-  - security-engineer: mTLS, cert lifecycle, audit logging, input validation
-  - network-engineer: transport layer, dispatcher, peer-to-peer resilience
-
-  Deactivated:
-  - frontend-engineer: no web UI in v0.1
-  - devops-sre: no container/cloud integrations; release flow is
-    handled by CoreCI (not a persona territory)
-
-  Phase-specific (v0.2):
-  - security-engineer: P01 (mTLS/CA) + P02 (peer transport hardening)
-  - network-engineer: P02 only (multi-node scheduling & dispatch)
-  - cli-engineer: P04 only (--watch flag is a CLI concern)
+  Roster changes vs v0.6:
+  - data-engineer: RETAINED — owns cert_repo tests + store coverage.
+  - security-engineer: DEACTIVATED — v0.7 adds no new security surface
+    (pprof is operator-only, addr-gated; cert registration exposes
+    existing security code, does not add new).
+  - cli-engineer: DEACTIVATED — merged into lead-developer for v0.7
+    (the cert registration is a 1-line AddCommand; config --config flag
+    is root-command wiring, not a new CLI subsystem).
+  - devops-engineer: DEACTIVATED — no packaging/distribution in v0.7.
 ---
 
 # Personas: Orca
@@ -45,82 +38,67 @@ reason: |
 - **Constraints**: `boundary-enforcement`, `offline-first`, `no-redundant-implementations`
 - **Territory**: `**/*.go`, `cmd/**`, `internal/**`
 - **Active**: true
+- **Reason**: Coordination across P01/P02/P03. SSH/bootstrap touches security + cli + store + doctor — territory overlaps need adjudication (proxmox package boundary, doctor Proxmox check scaffolding).
 
 ### backend-engineer
 - **Domain**: backend
-- **Frameworks**: `cobra`, `net/http`
-- **Constraints**: `API-first`, `error-handling`, `minimal-dependencies`, `security-first`
-- **Territory**: `**/api/**`, `**/*_handler*`, `**/*_handler.go`, `internal/daemon/**`
+- **Frameworks**: `cobra`, `net/http`, `golang.org/x/crypto/ssh`
+- **Constraints**: `API-first`, `error-handling`, `minimal-dependencies`, `security-first`, `idempotent-bootstrap`
+- **Territory**: `**/api/**`, `**/*_handler*`, `**/*_handler.go`, `internal/daemon/**`, `internal/proxmox/**`, `internal/cli/init.go`
 - **Active**: true
+- **Reason**: Owns the `orca init` full-bootstrap orchestration (CA + cert + db + localhost node, idempotent) and the `internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go` SSH session sequence (dial, deploy pubkey, useradd, pveum, sudoers, visudo validate). Added `idempotent-bootstrap` constraint (D-036 — re-run must be skip-and-refresh) and `golang.org/x/crypto/ssh` to frameworks.
 
 ### data-engineer
 - **Domain**: data
-- **Frameworks**: `modernc/sqlite`
-- **Constraints**: `schema-first`, `migration-safe`, `local-storage-only`
-- **Territory**: `**/store/**`, `**/model.go`, `**/migration*`, `migrations/**`, `internal/store/migrations/0004_certs.sql`
+- **Frameworks**: `modernc/sqlite`, `iter`
+- **Constraints**: `schema-first`, `migration-safe`, `local-storage-only`, `no-goroutine-leak`, `nullable-column-handling`
+- **Territory**: `**/store/**`, `**/model.go`, `**/migration*`, `migrations/**`, `internal/store/migrations/**`, `internal/model/node.go`
 - **Active**: true
+- **Reason**: Reactivated for v0.6. Owns migration `0006_node_kind_os.sql` (REQ-049 — nullable `kind`/`os` columns, backward-compatible) and `NodeRepo` schema extension (Insert/Get/List/Watch/scanNode column additions + new `GetByName`/`UpdateLastSeenAndOS` helpers). Added `nullable-column-handling` constraint (NULL → `""` in Go struct, not nil-deref).
 
-### cli-engineer (custom)
+### cli-engineer
 - **Domain**: CLI/UX
 - **Frameworks**: `cobra`, `pflag`
-- **Constraints**: `discoverable-help`, `consistent-flag-naming`, `human-readable-output`, `machine-readable-json-flag`
+- **Constraints**: `discoverable-help`, `consistent-flag-naming`, `human-readable-output`, `machine-readable-json-flag`, `signal-handling`, `password-flag-redaction`
 - **Territory**: `cmd/**`, `internal/cli/**`, `internal/commands/**`
 - **Active**: true
-- **Reason**: Orca is CLI-first; this persona ensures CLI quality and discoverability.
+- **Reason**: Owns `orca init` multi-step bootstrap output UX (progress lines per step), `orca node join --type/--host/--user/--password/--proxmox-user/--proxmox-role` flag wiring, and `doctor os`/`doctor proxmox` subcommand wiring. Added `password-flag-redaction` constraint (D-031 — `--password` never echoed, prefer `$ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD`, zero after use).
 
-### security-engineer (custom)
+### security-engineer
 - **Domain**: security
-- **Frameworks**: `crypto/tls`, `crypto/x509`, `slog`
-- **Constraints**: `no-panic-in-production`, `structured-audit-logging`, `no-secret-in-logs`, `input-validation`, `least-privilege`
-- **Territory**: `**/auth/**`, `**/audit/**`, `internal/security/**`, `internal/transport/**` (TLS config only)
+- **Frameworks**: `crypto/tls`, `crypto/x509`, `crypto/ed25519`, `golang.org/x/crypto/ssh`, `slog`
+- **Constraints**: `no-panic-in-production`, `structured-audit-logging`, `no-secret-in-logs`, `input-validation`, `least-privilege`, `tofu-host-key-pinning`, `noexec-sudoers`
+- **Territory**: `**/auth/**`, `**/audit/**`, `internal/security/**`, `internal/transport/**` (TLS config only), `internal/proxmox/**` (SSH + sudoers + PVE role)
 - **Active**: true
-- **Reason**: mTLS, audit logging, and input validation are first-class concerns.
-- **Phase scope**: P01 (mTLS + internal CA), P02 (transport hardening for peer handshakes). Deactivates after P02 ships — P03/P04 have lighter security needs.
+- **Reason**: Reactivated for v0.6. Owns `internal/security/sshkey.go` (Ed25519 keygen, 0600/0644 mode enforcement per REQ-033 spirit), TOFU host-key pinning via `knownhosts.New`, sudoers least-privilege design (NOEXEC on pct/qm, exclude pvesh, no NOEXEC on apt-get/dpkg), password redaction (D-031), and audit logging of all bootstrap/join actions (REQ-052). Added `tofu-host-key-pinning` and `noexec-sudoers` constraints. Co-owns `internal/proxmox/**` with backend-engineer (security owns SSH auth + sudoers content; backend owns the session orchestration).
 
-### network-engineer (custom, NEW in v0.2)
-- **Domain**: networking
-- **Frameworks**: `net/http`, `crypto/tls` (via `internal/security`), `iter`
-- **Constraints**: `connection-resilience`, `retry-with-backoff`, `graceful-disconnect`, `context-propagation`
-- **Territory**: `**/transport/**`, `**/engine/dispatcher*`, `**/engine/peer*`, `internal/engine/dispatcher.go`, `internal/transport/**`
-- **Active**: true
-- **Reason**: v0.2 introduces cross-node dispatch and peer-to-peer transport. This persona owns the transport layer, dispatcher, and peer lifecycle concerns that are distinct from the API-handler territory of `backend-engineer`.
-- **Phase scope**: P02 only. Deactivates after P02 ships.
+### devops-engineer
+- **Active**: false (v0.6)
+- **Reason**: Deactivated — v0.6 has no install.sh, Dockerfile, .coreci.yml, or release-pipeline surface. The Proxmox SSH bootstrap is backend + security work, not devops. Was active in v0.5 (distribution milestone).
+
+### network-engineer
+- **Active**: false (v0.6)
+- **Reason**: v0.6 has no transport/mTLS surface. SSH is point-to-point bootstrap, not the mTLS mesh network-engineer owns.
 
 ### frontend-engineer
-- **Active**: false
-- **Reason**: No web UI in v0.1.
-
-### devops-sre
-- **Active**: false
-- **Reason**: No container/cloud integrations. Release flow is handled by CoreCI.
+- **Active**: false (v0.6)
+- **Reason**: No web UI in Orca (unchanged from v0.1 onward).
 
 ## Territory Enforcement
 
 - **Mode**: `warn` (per `config.json`)
 - **Behavior**: Out-of-territory file changes log a warning but do not block.
-- **Rationale**: Allows flexibility during early development; tighten to `strict` post-v0.1.
+- **Key overlaps in v0.6** (lead-developer adjudicates):
+  - `internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go` — security-engineer (SSH auth, sudoers, PVE role) + backend-engineer (session orchestration, error handling). Boundary: security package exposes `BootstrapProxmox(ctx, opts) error`; the function lives in `internal/proxmox` but imports `internal/security` for SSH key handling.
+  - `internal/doctor/doctor.go` `Proxmox()` — reuses `internal/proxmox` SSH client (security) but check scaffolding clones `doctor.Network()` pattern. Backend-engineer adjudicates (network-engineer deactivated).
+  - `internal/store/node_repo.go` — data-engineer territory, but the `UpdateLastSeenAndOS` caller is `internal/cli/init.go` (backend). Standard repo-consumer boundary.
 
-## Phase-Specific Personas (v0.2)
+## v0.6 vs v0.5 Persona Diff
 
-| Persona | Active in | Reason |
-|---------|-----------|--------|
-| `security-engineer` | P01, P02 | mTLS/CA in P01, transport hardening in P02. Lighter security needs in P03 (CI scanning) and P04 (streaming UX). |
-| `network-engineer` | P02 | Multi-node dispatch is a P02 concern only. P01 builds the transport primitives but P02 wires them into cross-node scheduling. |
-| `cli-engineer` | P04 | The `--watch` flag is a CLI surface; P01-P03 don't add new CLI commands. |
-
-In full-autonomy mode, all personas are auto-accepted and the phase-scope
-assignments are applied automatically when a phase is committed.
-
-## Migration from v0.1
-
-- `backend-engineer` territory unchanged: `internal/daemon/**` still owns HTTP
-  handlers. The new `internal/transport/**` package is shared with
-  `network-engineer` but `transport` owns the *connection lifecycle* (dial,
-  retry, close) while `daemon` owns the *request handlers*.
-- `data-engineer` territory expanded to include the new
-  `internal/store/migrations/0004_certs.sql` migration in P01.
-- `security-engineer` territory extended from `internal/security/**` to
-  include the TLS-config portion of `internal/transport/**` (the
-  `NewServerTLSConfig` / `NewClientTLSConfig` helpers).
-- `cli-engineer` territory unchanged; the new `orca cert` subcommands in P01
-  fall under the existing `internal/cli/**` glob.
+| Change | Rationale |
+|--------|-----------|
+| `data-engineer` reactivated | Owns migration 0006 + NodeRepo schema extension (kind/os columns). |
+| `security-engineer` reactivated | Owns SSH keygen, TOFU host-key, sudoers, PVE role — first-class security surface. |
+| `devops-engineer` deactivated | v0.6 has no packaging/distribution surface. |
+| `network-engineer` remains deactivated | No transport/mTLS surface. |
+| `frontend-engineer` remains deactivated | No web UI. |

.ciagent/PHASE1_VERIFICATION.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# Phase 1 Verification: Namespace Unification (v0.5 P1)
+
+**Phase**: 1 (namespace unification)
+**Milestone**: v0.5 Distribution
+**Requirements covered**: REQ-041, REQ-042
+**Date**: 2026-08-03
+
+## Structural Layer
+
+- `gofmt -l .` → clean (no files need formatting).
+- `go vet ./...` → clean (no warnings).
+- `go build ./...` → succeeds.
+- New files: `internal/cli/namespace_test.go`, `docs/namespace.md`.
+- Modified files: `internal/cli/root.go`, `internal/cli/init.go`, `internal/store/store.go`.
+
+## Behavioral Layer
+
+### Unit tests (new)
+- `TestNamespaceDefaultsToUserHome` ✓ — empty `ORCA_HOME` → `~/.orca`.
+- `TestNamespaceHonorsORCAHOME` ✓ — `ORCA_HOME=/tmp/x` → `Dir()=/tmp/x`, `DBPath()=/tmp/x/orca.db`.
+- `TestInitHonorsORCAHOME` ✓ — `init` creates `$ORCA_HOME` dir.
+- `TestSystemFlagSetsORCAHOME` ✓ — `--system` sets `ORCA_HOME=/root/.orca`.
+- `TestSystemFlagConflictsWithORCAHOME` ✓ — `--system` + `ORCA_HOME=/custom` → error.
+- `TestInitJSONOutput` ✓ — `init --json` returns `{"path":"...","status":"initialized"}`.
+- `TestSystemFlagIsPersistent` ✓ — `--system` registered as persistent flag on `rootCmd`.
+
+### Unit tests (regression — all pass)
+- `internal/cli/` (9.8s) ✓
+- `internal/store/` ✓
+- `internal/doctor/` ✓
+- `internal/daemon/` ✓
+- `internal/security/` ✓
+- `internal/engine/` ✓
+- `internal/jobspec/` ✓
+- `internal/transport/` ✓
+
+### Manual e2e
+- `ORCA_HOME=/tmp/orca-test-user ./bin/orca init` → creates `/tmp/orca-test-user` ✓
+- `./bin/orca --system init` → creates `/root/.orca` ✓
+- `ORCA_HOME=/custom ./bin/orca --system init` → error "conflicts with ORCA_HOME" ✓
+- `./bin/orca version --json` → `{"version":"v0.4.1",...}` ✓
+
+## Security Layer
+
+- No new secret handling. The namespace unification moves path resolution
+  but does not change cert/key file modes (0600/0644 per REQ-033 unchanged).
+- `--system` flag does not escalate privileges — it only changes the
+  namespace root path. Running as non-root with `--system` will fail at
+  `os.MkdirAll("/root/.orca")` with a permission error (expected).
+- No new network surface.
+
+## Quality Layer
+
+- **Backward compatibility**: empty `ORCA_HOME` + no `--system` → `~/.orca`
+  (identical to pre-v0.5 behavior). All existing tests pass unmodified.
+- **Single source of truth**: `certpaths.Dir()` is the only namespace root
+  resolver. `store.Open("")` and `init` both route through it.
+- **No redundant implementations**: the `--system` flag maps to `ORCA_HOME`
+  rather than introducing a parallel path mechanism.
+- **Documentation**: `docs/namespace.md` covers default, `ORCA_HOME`, and
+  `--system` with examples and resolution order.
+
+## Must-Haves Checklist
+
+- [x] `go test ./...` passes (including new namespace_test.go).
+- [x] `ORCA_HOME=/tmp/x orca init` creates `/tmp/x` (not `~/.orca`).
+- [x] `orca --system init` creates `/root/.orca` (when run as root).
+- [x] Empty `ORCA_HOME` + no `--system` → `~/.orca` (backward compat).
+- [x] `orca version --json` works (needed by install.sh in P2).
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS** — all 4 verification layers pass. REQ-041 and REQ-042 are
+satisfied. Ready to ship as `v0.4.2`.

.ciagent/PHASE1_VERIFICATION_v0.6.md

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# Phase 1 Verification — Orca v0.6 P01
+
+**Phase**: P01 — `orca init` Full Bootstrap + Schema 0006
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-047, REQ-048, REQ-049
+**Verification date**: 2026-08-03
+**Result**: ✅ PASS (all 4 layers)
+
+## Structural Verification
+
+- ✅ `go build ./...` — PASS (no compile errors)
+- ✅ `go vet ./...` — PASS (no vet warnings)
+- ✅ `gofmt -l .` — PASS (all changed Go files formatted)
+- ✅ `make lint` — PASS (golangci-lint clean)
+- ✅ Migration 0006 follows existing naming convention (`0006_*.sql`)
+- ✅ `model.Node` struct follows existing field/tag conventions
+- ✅ `NodeRepo` methods follow existing error-wrapping + `scanner` pattern
+
+## Behavioral Verification
+
+### REQ-047: `orca init` auto-provisions CA + server cert + DB + localhost node
+- ✅ `TestInit_FullBootstrap`: init creates namespace dir, CA (ca.crt 0644 + ca.key 0600), server cert, DB (migrations 0001..0006), localhost node
+- ✅ `TestInit_IdempotentReRun`: re-running init does NOT regenerate CA/server cert (D-036), does NOT duplicate localhost node, refreshes last_seen, preserves id + joined_at
+- ✅ E2E smoke test: `orca init` → CA provisioned (fp shown), server cert provisioned (fp shown), DB initialized, localhost node registered
+
+### REQ-048: `orca init` registers localhost node with auto-detected OS
+- ✅ `TestInit_FullBootstrap`: localhost node has `kind=localhost`, non-empty `os`, `address=localhost:8443`
+- ✅ `TestParseOSReleaseID_*` (10 tests): ubuntu, debian, alpine, pve, quoted/unquoted values, missing ID, empty content, comments, unknown ID returned verbatim
+- ✅ `TestDetectOS_*` (3 tests): reads /etc/os-release, falls back to /usr/lib/os-release, falls back to "linux"
+- ✅ E2E smoke test: `OS detected: ubuntu` (this host is Ubuntu 24.04)
+
+### REQ-049: Node schema extension (kind + os columns, migration 0006)
+- ✅ `TestMigrationVersion`: version = "0006_node_kind_os.sql"
+- ✅ `TestNodeRepo_KindOS_RoundTrip`: insert with kind/os → get returns them correctly
+- ✅ `TestNodeRepo_NullKindOS_EmptyString`: NULL columns → `""` in Go struct (no nil-deref)
+- ✅ `TestNodeRepo_GetByName`: found by name, ErrNotFound for missing
+- ✅ `TestNodeRepo_UpdateLastSeenAndOS`: refreshes last_seen + os, preserves id + joined_at (D-036)
+- ✅ Existing node tests still pass (backward compatible)
+- ✅ `TestDBCheck_IntegrityOK`: doctor db check reports migration 0006
+
+## Security Verification
+
+- ✅ CA key file mode 0600 enforced (`TestInit_FullBootstrap` checks mode)
+- ✅ CA cert + server cert mode 0644 enforced (via `security.WriteCert`/`writeAtomic`)
+- ✅ No secrets in logs (init output shows fingerprint prefixes, not full keys)
+- ✅ `--json` output excludes private key material (only fingerprints)
+- ✅ No new external dependencies (P1 is pure Go stdlib + existing deps)
+
+## Quality Verification
+
+- ✅ `go test -race -count=1 ./internal/store/... ./internal/cli/... ./internal/model/... ./internal/doctor/...` — all PASS
+- ✅ Test coverage: init idempotency, osdetect parsing (10 cases), kind/os round-trip, NULL handling, GetByName, UpdateLastSeenAndOS, namespace dir creation, JSON output
+- ✅ Error wrapping with `fmt.Errorf("...: %w", err)` (REQ-018 convention)
+- ✅ `context.Context` propagation in all new I/O (REQ-017)
+- ✅ No goroutine leaks (init is synchronous; no new goroutines)
+- ✅ D-036 idempotency verified: 2× init run, no duplicate node, no cert regen
+
+## Must-Have Checklist
+
+- [x] `internal/store/migrations/0006_node_kind_os.sql`
+- [x] `internal/model/node.go` — Kind + OS fields + NodeKind constants
+- [x] `internal/store/node_repo.go` — extended for kind/os + GetByName + UpdateLastSeenAndOS
+- [x] `internal/store/node_repo_test.go` — new tests for kind/os + helpers
+- [x] `internal/cli/osdetect.go` — detectOS() from /etc/os-release
+- [x] `internal/cli/osdetect_test.go` — 13 parsing + detection tests
+- [x] `internal/cli/init.go` — full bootstrap sequence
+- [x] `internal/cli/init_test.go` — idempotency + bootstrap tests
+- [x] `internal/cli/namespace_test.go` — updated for new JSON format
+- [x] `internal/doctor/doctor_test.go` — updated for migration 0006
+- [x] `internal/store/migrate_test.go` — updated for migration 0006
+
+## Escalations
+
+None. All 4 verification layers pass cleanly.

.ciagent/PHASE1_VERIFICATION_v0.7.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Phase 1 Verification Report — v0.7: Register `orca cert` Command Tree
+
+**Phase**: 1  
+**Branch**: `phase/01-cert-register`  
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-053  
+**Milestone**: v0.7 (Hardening & Completion)
+
+## Structural Verification
+
+### Files Modified
+- `internal/cli/cert.go` — added `init()` registering `NewCommand` on `rootCmd` (AD-022)
+- `internal/cli/init_test.go` — updated expected migration version 0006 → 0007
+- `internal/doctor/doctor_test.go` — relaxed DB check assertion to check `"migrations up to"` prefix (migration-version-agnostic)
+- `internal/store/migrate_test.go` — updated expected migration version 0006 → 0007
+
+### Files Created
+- `internal/cli/cert_test.go` — regression test for cert command registration + subcommand tree
+- `internal/cli/cert_smoke_test.go` — end-to-end smoke test (ca-init, gen, show, fingerprint, renew, file modes)
+- `internal/store/cert_repo_test.go` — 11 tests covering Insert/Get/List/ListByNode/LatestForKind/PruneOlderThan/Delete + error paths
+- `internal/store/migrations/0007_certs_serial_unique.sql` — UNIQUE index on `certs.serial_hex` (I-107; migration-driven, not backfilled into 0004)
+
+## Behavioral Verification
+
+### Test Results
+```
+go test ./...               → all PASS (exit 0)
+go test -race ./...         → all PASS (exit 0)
+go vet ./...                → clean
+make build                  → clean (v0.6.0)
+```
+
+### Coverage (store package)
+- Store total: 60.5% (up from 46.9%)
+- `cert_repo.go`: Insert 91.7%, Get 100%, LatestForKind 100%, PruneOlderThan 85.7%, Delete 85.7%, List/ListByNode 81.8%
+
+### CLI Smoke Test (manual)
+```
+./bin/orca cert                    → prints help (was: "unknown command")
+./bin/orca cert ca-init --cn X     → ✓ CA initialized, 0644/0600 modes
+./bin/orca cert fingerprint --which ca → 64-char hex SHA-256
+```
+
+## Security Verification
+
+- `orca cert show` redacts private key material (REQ-035) — verified in smoke test
+- Cert file modes enforced: 0600 keys, 0644 certs (REQ-033) — verified in smoke test
+- No secrets in logs — `cert.ca_init`/`cert.issued`/`cert.renewed` log events contain only fingerprints, never key bytes
+- Migration 0007 is additive (UNIQUE index), backward-compatible — no data loss
+
+## Quality Verification
+
+- No new dependencies added (`go.mod` unchanged)
+- No comments added (per project convention)
+- Test style matches existing `node_repo_test.go` / `root_test.go` patterns
+- All `---ci---` blocks present in commits
+
+## Must-Haves Checklist
+
+- [x] `internal/cli/cert.go` — `init()` with `rootCmd.AddCommand(NewCommand(slog.Default()))`
+- [x] `internal/cli/cert_test.go` — regression test for registration + subcommands
+- [x] `internal/cli/cert_smoke_test.go` — e2e: ca-init, gen, show (redaction), fingerprint, renew, file modes
+- [x] `internal/store/cert_repo_test.go` — 11 tests covering full CRUD + rotation history + duplicate serial
+- [x] `internal/store/migrations/0007_certs_serial_unique.sql` — UNIQUE index (I-107)
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS** — all 4 verification layers (structural, behavioral, security, quality) pass. REQ-053 is fully covered. The `orca cert` command tree is now reachable from the CLI, cert_repo has comprehensive tests, and the serial_hex UNIQUE constraint is enforced via migration.

.ciagent/PHASE2_VERIFICATION.md

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# Phase 2 Verification: install.sh + In-Place Update (v0.5 P2)
+
+**Phase**: 2 (install.sh + in-place update)
+**Milestone**: v0.5 Distribution
+**Requirements covered**: REQ-043, REQ-044, REQ-016 (completion)
+**Date**: 2026-08-03
+
+## Structural Layer
+
+- `gofmt -l .` → clean.
+- `go vet ./...` → clean.
+- `go build ./...` → succeeds.
+- New files: `scripts/install.sh`, `scripts/install_test.sh`, `docs/install.md`.
+- Modified files: `README.md`.
+- `install.sh` is executable (`chmod +x`).
+
+## Behavioral Layer
+
+### install_test.sh — 8/8 tests pass
+
+Run via `timeout 120 bash scripts/install_test.sh`:
+
+1. **Test 1: user-level install (v0.4.1)** ✓
+   - Binary at `~/.local/bin/orca` ✓
+   - `orca version --json` returns `v0.4.1` ✓
+2. **Test 2: in-place update (v0.4.1 → v0.4.2) preserves namespace** ✓
+   - "updated orca from v0.4.1 to v0.4.2" message printed ✓
+   - `~/.orca/orca.db` content preserved ("preserve-me") ✓
+   - Binary version updated to `v0.4.2` ✓
+3. **Test 3: idempotent re-install (v0.4.2 → v0.4.2)** ✓
+   - "reinstalled orca v0.4.2" message printed ✓
+4. **Test 4: --system install (root)** ✓
+   - Binary at `/usr/local/bin/orca` ✓
+   - Reports `namespace root: /root/.orca` ✓
+5. **Test 5: --system without root** — SKIP (running as root)
+
+### Manual e2e (real Gitea releases)
+- `curl -fsSL ... | bash` downloads v0.4.2 tarball, extracts, installs ✓
+- Re-run updates binary; namespace dir untouched ✓
+- `--version v0.4.1` pins to v0.4.1 ✓
+
+### Regression — Go tests
+- `internal/cli/` ✓ (cached, no regressions from P1)
+- `internal/store/` ✓
+- `internal/doctor/` ✓
+
+## Security Layer
+
+- `install.sh` does not `eval` remote content — it downloads a tarball
+  and extracts it with `tar -xzf`.
+- No secrets in the script. `GITEA_TOKEN` is not required (public repo,
+  anonymous download per REQ-045).
+- `.env` is not referenced by install.sh.
+- The script uses `set -euo pipefail` for fail-fast safety.
+- `curl -fsSL` fails on HTTP errors (no silent 404 downloads).
+
+## Quality Layer
+
+- **1-liner install**: `curl -fsSL <url> | bash` works (verified).
+- **--system flag**: installs to `/usr/local/bin`, namespace `/root/.orca`,
+  requires root (errors otherwise).
+- **--version pinning**: `--version vX.Y.Z` queries the specific release tag.
+- **In-place update (REQ-044)**: detects existing binary, reads version via
+  `orca version --json`, prints update message, overwrites binary, preserves
+  namespace dir. Idempotent.
+- **Env-overridable**: `GITEA_URL`, `GITEA_OWNER`, `GITEA_REPO` honor
+  pre-set env vars (`${VAR:-default}`) for testability.
+- **Timeout-guarded**: test harness uses `timeout 30` per test + `timeout 120`
+  overall + `trap 'kill 0' EXIT` to prevent orphaned processes.
+- **Documentation**: `docs/install.md` covers user/system install, version
+  pinning, in-place update, uninstall, and troubleshooting. README quickstart
+  updated with the 1-liner (REQ-016 completion).
+
+## Must-Haves Checklist
+
+- [x] `bash scripts/install_test.sh` passes (8/8).
+- [x] `curl -fsSL <url> | bash` works on a fresh system.
+- [x] `curl -fsSL <url> | bash -s -- --system` installs to `/usr/local/bin` (as root).
+- [x] Re-running updates the binary; `~/.orca/orca.db` preserved.
+- [x] README quickstart documents the 1-liner + `--system` variant.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS** — all 4 verification layers pass. REQ-043, REQ-044, and REQ-016
+(completion) are satisfied. Ready to ship as `v0.4.3`.

.ciagent/PHASE2_VERIFICATION_v0.6.md

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Phase 2 Verification — Orca v0.6 P02
+
+**Phase**: P02 — Proxmox SSH Join
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-050, REQ-051
+**Verification date**: 2026-08-03
+**Result**: ✅ PASS (all 4 layers; integration test against real PVE deferred — unit tests cover all logic)
+
+## Structural Verification
+
+- ✅ `go build ./...` — PASS
+- ✅ `go vet ./...` — PASS
+- ✅ `gofmt -l .` — PASS (all Go files formatted)
+- ✅ `make lint` — PASS
+- ✅ `golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0` added as direct dep (D-030); transitive: x/sys v0.47.0, x/term v0.45.0
+- ✅ `internal/proxmox` new package follows existing package layout conventions
+- ✅ `internal/security/sshkey.go` follows the CAInit pattern (idempotent fast-path, writeAtomic, mode enforcement)
+
+## Behavioral Verification
+
+### REQ-050: Proxmox SSH bootstrap via golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
+- ✅ `TestGenerateOrLoadSSHKey_Generates`: Ed25519 keygen, 0600/0644 modes, ssh-ed25519 pub format, ssh.ParsePrivateKey round-trip
+- ✅ `TestGenerateOrLoadSSHKey_IdempotentLoad`: second call loads existing (D-036)
+- ✅ `TestGenerateOrLoadSSHKey_CreatesDir`: nested dir creation
+- ✅ `TestBootstrapProxmox_Validation`: missing host → error, missing password → error
+- ✅ `TestDefaultOptions`: DefaultProxmoxUser=orca, DefaultProxmoxRole=OrcaOperator, DefaultSSHPort=22
+- ✅ CLI `--type proxmox --host ... --password ...` flag wiring verified via `orca node join --help`
+- ✅ Password from `--password` flag OR `$ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD` env var (D-031)
+- ✅ TOFU host-key via `knownhosts.New` (D-035, avoids deprecated InsecureIgnoreHostKey)
+- ✅ File upload via session heredoc (no SFTP dep — D-030)
+
+### REQ-051: OrcaOperator role + orca@pam user + sudoers
+- ✅ `TestSudoersContent`: NOEXEC on pct/qm, NOPASSWD on apt-get/dpkg (no NOEXEC), pvesh excluded from command lines (AD-020)
+- ✅ `TestSudoersContent_CustomUser`: custom user name works
+- ✅ `TestOrcaOperatorPrivileges`: exactly 3 privileges (VM.Audit, Datastore.AllocateSpace, SDN.Use) space-separated (D-033)
+- ✅ `orca@pam` realm (AD-019 — not @pve)
+- ✅ `pveum` commands use `--privs` (space-separated), probe-then-add idempotency pattern
+- ✅ `visudo -cf` validation step aborts bootstrap on syntax error
+- ✅ Node registered with kind=proxmox, os=pve
+
+## Security Verification
+
+- ✅ SSH private key mode 0600 enforced (TestGenerateOrLoadSSHKey_Generates)
+- ✅ SSH public key mode 0644 enforced
+- ✅ Password never persisted (D-031) — used only for SSH auth, zeroed after use
+- ✅ Password from env var preferred over flag (reduces ps/proc exposure)
+- ✅ pvesh excluded from sudoers (AD-020 — API execute bypasses NOEXEC)
+- ✅ NOEXEC on pct/qm (blocks shell escapes via dynamically-linked perl)
+- ✅ TOFU host-key pinning (D-035) — capture on first connect, verify on subsequent, fail closed on mismatch
+- ✅ No secrets in logs (audit log entries contain host, user, role — never password)
+- ✅ sudoers file mode 0440 enforced (sudo requirement)
+
+## Quality Verification
+
+- ✅ `go test -race -count=1 ./internal/proxmox/... ./internal/security/... ./internal/cli/...` — all PASS
+- ✅ Test coverage: sshkey (4 tests), proxmox (5 tests), sudoers content (2 tests), privileges (1 test), validation (1 test), defaults (1 test)
+- ✅ Error wrapping with `fmt.Errorf("...: %w", err)` (REQ-018)
+- ✅ `context.Context` propagation (REQ-017)
+- ✅ Idempotency: all bootstrap steps probe-before-add (D-036)
+- ✅ New direct dep: 1 (golang.org/x/crypto) — matches D-030 minimal-deps rationale
+
+## Integration Test Note
+
+A live integration test against a real Proxmox VE 8/9 host is out of
+scope for automated CI (requires a PVE host + credentials). The SSH
+bootstrap logic is tested via:
+- Unit tests for command builders (sudoers content, privilege set)
+- Unit tests for validation (missing host/password)
+- Unit tests for SSH key generation (Ed25519, modes, idempotency)
+- Manual verification via `orca node join --help` (flag surface)
+
+A `// +build integration` test against a real PVE host can be added
+in a future phase if a PVE test environment becomes available.
+
+## Must-Have Checklist
+
+- [x] `go.mod` / `go.sum` — golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0
+- [x] `internal/certpaths/certpaths.go` — SSHKeyPath, SSHPubPath, KnownHostsPath
+- [x] `internal/security/sshkey.go` — GenerateOrLoadSSHKey (Ed25519)
+- [x] `internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go` — BootstrapProxmox full SSH dance
+- [x] `internal/cli/node.go` — --type/--host/--password flag wiring + joinProxmox
+- [x] `internal/security/sshkey_test.go` — 4 tests
+- [x] `internal/proxmox/bootstrap_test.go` — 5 tests
+
+## Escalations
+
+None.

.ciagent/PHASE2_VERIFICATION_v0.7.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Phase 2 Verification Report — v0.7: HCL Config File Parsing
+
+**Phase**: 2  
+**Branch**: `phase/02-config-parser`  
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-054  
+**Milestone**: v0.7 (Hardening & Completion)
+
+## Structural Verification
+
+### Files Created
+- `internal/config/config.go` — `Config` struct (HCL tags), `CapacityConfig`, `Flags`, `Environ`, `Load(paths...)`, `(*Config).MergeOverrides(flags, env)`
+- `internal/config/config_test.go` — 11 tests (Load valid/missing/malformed/first-existing, MergeOverrides precedence all 4 layers, NodeCapacity)
+- `internal/config/testdata/config.hcl` — example fixture
+
+### Files Modified
+- `internal/cli/root.go` — added `--config` persistent flag, `configCtxKey`, `configFromCtx` helper; `PersistentPreRunE` loads config if `--config` set (AD-023)
+- `internal/cli/daemon.go` — daemon uses `cfg.ListenAddr` from config when flag is at default (`:8080`) (D-039 precedence: flag > config)
+- `internal/cli/root_test.go` — added `TestConfigFlagRegistered` + `TestConfigFlagLoadsFile`
+
+## Behavioral Verification
+
+### Test Results
+```
+go test ./...               → all PASS (exit 0)
+go test -race ./internal/config/... ./internal/cli/... → all PASS
+go vet ./...                → clean
+make build                  → clean (v0.6.1)
+```
+
+### API Surface
+```go
+func Load(paths ...string) (*Config, error)
+func (c *Config) MergeOverrides(flags Flags, env Environ) *Config
+```
+- `Load` returns zero `&Config{}` if no file exists (no error)
+- `MergeOverrides` precedence: flag > env > file > default (D-039)
+- No package-level state (AD-023)
+
+### CLI Verification
+```
+./bin/orca --help → shows --config string flag
+```
+
+## Security Verification
+
+- Config file is read-only (no writes); parsed via `hclsimple.Decode` (no eval, no external commands)
+- No secrets in config (paths only; no tokens/keys in config.hcl)
+- Config file permissions not enforced (operator's responsibility; config contains no secrets)
+
+## Quality Verification
+
+- No new dependencies (`hashicorp/hcl/v2` already in go.mod for jobspec)
+- No comments added (per project convention)
+- Test style matches existing `jobspec/spec_test.go` + `cli/root_test.go`
+- `go.mod` unchanged
+
+## Must-Haves Checklist
+
+- [x] `internal/config/config.go` — Config struct + Load + MergeOverrides
+- [x] `internal/config/config_test.go` — 11 tests (all 4 precedence layers)
+- [x] `internal/config/testdata/config.hcl` — example fixture
+- [x] `internal/cli/root.go` — `--config` persistent flag + context wiring
+- [x] `internal/cli/daemon.go` — uses `cfg.ListenAddr` (flag still wins)
+- [x] `internal/cli/root_test.go` — config flag registration + load test
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS** — all 4 verification layers pass. REQ-054 is fully covered. The `internal/config` package provides HCL config file parsing with flag > env > file > default precedence, wired into the root command via `--config` and consumed by the daemon.

.ciagent/PHASE3_VERIFICATION.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Phase 3 Verification: Docker Release (v0.5 P3)
+
+**Phase**: 3 (docker release)
+**Milestone**: v0.5 Distribution
+**Requirements covered**: REQ-046
+**Date**: 2026-08-03
+
+## Structural Layer
+
+- `go vet ./...` → clean.
+- `go build ./...` → succeeds.
+- New files: `Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore`, `docs/docker.md`.
+- Modified files: `.coreci.yml` (container-publish step), `scripts/release.sh` (docker publish).
+- `.dockerignore` excludes `.git`, `bin/`, `.env`, `.ciagent/`, `testdata/`, `*.tar.gz`.
+
+## Behavioral Layer
+
+### Docker build
+- `docker build --build-arg VERSION=v0.4.4-test ... -t orca-test:v0.4.4 .` → succeeds.
+- Multi-stage build: `golang:1.25` (builder) → `gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot` (runtime).
+- `CGO_ENABLED=0` guarantees static binary (modernc/sqlite is pure Go).
+
+### Docker run
+- `docker run --rm orca-test:v0.4.4 version` → `orca version v0.4.4-test` ✓
+- `docker run --rm orca-test:v0.4.4 version --json` → valid JSON with version/commit/build_time ✓
+- `docker run --rm -v orca-test-data:/var/lib/orca orca-test:v0.4.4 init` → creates `/var/lib/orca` ✓
+- Volume persistence: state dir created in named volume, verified with alpine container ✓
+
+### Image metrics
+- Image size: 27.9MB (distroless static + Go binary).
+- Runs as `nonroot` user (distroless default).
+- `ENV ORCA_HOME=/var/lib/orca` set for volume-mountable state.
+
+### .coreci.yml release pipeline
+- New `container-publish` step added after `gitea-release`.
+- Uses `docker:24-cli` image with `GITEA_TOKEN` as registry credential.
+- Builds, tags (`<version>` + `latest`), logs in, pushes, logs out.
+
+### scripts/release.sh extension
+- After Gitea release: `docker build` + `docker login` + `docker push`.
+- Skips gracefully if `docker` not on PATH (local dev without docker).
+- Skips push if `GITEA_TOKEN` not set (builds locally only).
+- Env-overridable: `CONTAINER_REGISTRY`, `CONTAINER_OWNER`, `CONTAINER_IMAGE`.
+
+### Regression — Go tests
+- `internal/cli/` ✓ (cached)
+- `internal/store/` ✓ (cached)
+
+## Security Layer
+
+- `.dockerignore` excludes `.env`, `.gitleaks-baseline.json`, `bin/` — no secrets in image.
+- Image runs as `nonroot` (distroless default) — least privilege.
+- `docker login` uses `--password-stdin` (no password in process args / shell history).
+- `docker logout` after push — no credential leakage.
+- No secret material baked into the image — `GITEA_TOKEN` is used at push time only, not in the build.
+
+## Quality Layer
+
+- **Reproducible build**: `--build-arg VERSION/GIT_COMMIT/BUILD_TIME` injected via `-ldflags`.
+- **Minimal image**: distroless static-debian12 — no shell, no package manager, ~28MB total.
+- **Graceful degradation**: `release.sh` skips docker publish when docker is absent.
+- **CI integration**: `.coreci.yml` container-publish step uses `docker:24-cli` (has docker CLI).
+- **Documentation**: `docs/docker.md` covers pull, run, state persistence, local build, manual publish.
+
+## Must-Haves Checklist
+
+- [x] `docker build -t orca-test .` succeeds locally.
+- [x] `docker run --rm orca-test version` prints the version.
+- [x] `scripts/release.sh vX.Y.Z` publishes both the Gitea release AND the container image.
+- [x] `.coreci.yml` release pipeline includes the container-publish step.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS** — all 4 verification layers pass. REQ-046 is satisfied. Ready
+to ship as `v0.4.4`.

.ciagent/PHASE3_VERIFICATION_v0.6.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Phase 3 Verification — Orca v0.6 P03
+
+**Phase**: P03 — Doctor Extensions + Audit Logging
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-052
+**Verification date**: 2026-08-03
+**Result**: ✅ PASS (all 4 layers)
+
+## Structural Verification
+
+- ✅ `go build ./...` — PASS
+- ✅ `go vet ./...` — PASS
+- ✅ `gofmt -l .` — PASS
+- ✅ `make lint` — PASS
+- ✅ `internal/osdetect` new shared package (extracted from cli to avoid import cycle)
+- ✅ `doctor.OS()` and `doctor.Proxmox()` follow existing check pattern (Check struct, Result, Run func)
+- ✅ `doctor.All()` extended with OS + Proxmox in logical order
+
+## Behavioral Verification
+
+### REQ-052: doctor os + doctor proxmox + audit logging
+- ✅ `TestOSCheck_MissingLocalhostNode`: no localhost node → FAIL with clear message
+- ✅ `TestOSCheck_Match`: stored os matches detected → PASS
+- ✅ `TestOSCheck_Drift`: stored os differs from detected → WARN ("OS drift: init=debian, now=ubuntu")
+- ✅ `TestProxmoxCheck_NoProxmoxNodes`: zero proxmox nodes → WARN ("no proxmox nodes registered")
+- ✅ `TestProxmoxCheck_UnreachableNode`: unreachable proxmox node → FAIL with node name
+- ✅ E2E: `orca doctor os` → PASS (os=ubuntu matches)
+- ✅ E2E: `orca doctor proxmox` → WARN (no proxmox nodes)
+- ✅ E2E: `orca doctor os --json` → valid JSON
+- ✅ E2E: `orca doctor` (full) → 6 PASS / 1 WARN / 1 FAIL (network=daemon not running, expected)
+- ✅ osdetect package: 11 tests (ubuntu/debian/alpine/pve parsing, quoted/unquoted, missing ID, comments, fallback)
+- ✅ Audit logging: proxmox.BootstrapProxmox emits `proxmox.bootstrap_ok` (P02); doctor checks are read-only
+
+## Security Verification
+
+- ✅ Doctor checks are strictly read-only (no state changes)
+- ✅ SSH probe uses orca SSH key (not password) — no password in doctor flow
+- ✅ TOFU host-key verification via knownhosts.New (D-035)
+- ✅ 3s timeout per proxmox probe (D-038 bounded-probe-timeout pattern)
+- ✅ No secrets in doctor output (fingerprints only, never private keys)
+
+## Quality Verification
+
+- ✅ `go test -race -count=1 ./...` — all PASS (13 packages)
+- ✅ Test coverage: osdetect (11 tests), doctor OS (3 tests), doctor Proxmox (2 tests)
+- ✅ Error wrapping with `fmt.Errorf("...: %w", err)` (REQ-018)
+- ✅ `context.Context` propagation (REQ-017)
+- ✅ No goroutine leaks (netDialer cleans up on ctx cancellation)
+- ✅ D-036: doctor os handles pre-0006 rows (empty os field → WARN)
+
+## Must-Have Checklist
+
+- [x] `internal/osdetect/osdetect.go` — Detect + ParseID (shared package)
+- [x] `internal/osdetect/osdetect_test.go` — 11 tests
+- [x] `internal/cli/osdetect.go` — thin wrapper
+- [x] `internal/cli/osdetect_test.go` — delegation test
+- [x] `internal/doctor/doctor.go` — OS() + Proxmox() checks, All() extended
+- [x] `internal/doctor/doctor_test.go` — 5 new tests
+- [x] `internal/cli/doctor.go` — doctor os + doctor proxmox subcommands
+
+## Escalations
+
+None.

.ciagent/PHASE3_VERIFICATION_v0.7.md

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# Phase 3 Verification Report — v0.7: Test Coverage Uplift
+
+**Phase**: 3  
+**Branch**: `phase/03-coverage-uplift`  
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-055  
+**Milestone**: v0.7 (Hardening & Completion)
+
+## Structural Verification
+
+### Files Created
+- `internal/engine/peer_test.go` — 8 tests (PeerRegistry Add/Get/Remove/All/Len/UpdateLastSeen + validation)
+- `internal/engine/executor_test.go` — 7 tests (Submit success/missing-command/malformed/failing, Status not-found, Run success, Run context-cancel)
+- `internal/engine/dispatcher_test.go` — 10 tests (empty spec, idempotency hit, local-capacity, explicit-target, no-peers, LocalSubmit/LocalStatus, nil guards, parseInlineSpec)
+- `internal/audit/audit_test.go` — 9 tests (Emit/EmitWithErr persistence, LogHandshakeOK/Failed slog fields, nil-safety, Action/Result String, FormatAction)
+- `internal/transport/handshake_log_test.go` — 8 tests (LogHandshakeOK/Failed/FromCert, FingerprintOfCert, nil-logger, nil-err)
+- `internal/transport/mtls_test.go` — 14 tests (ServerTLSConfig, ClientTLSConfig, NewMTLSClient, Do, VerifyPeerCertificate, DialContext)
+- `internal/transport/dispatch_test.go` — 24 tests (SubmitHandler/StatusHandler, DispatchClient constructor/connection-refused/HTTP/decode/Submit/Status success)
+- `internal/proxmox/ssh_session_test.go` — 14 tests (runRemote, deployPubKey, createLinuxUser, createPVERole, createPVEUser, assignPVEACL, writeSudoers, validateSudoers, full BootstrapProxmox)
+
+### Files Modified
+- `internal/transport/dispatch.go` — **bug fix**: `bytesReadCloser.Read` returned `fmt.Errorf("EOF")` instead of `io.EOF`, breaking HTTP request body transmission. This was a latent bug that prevented any client-side dispatch from working end-to-end.
+- `internal/proxmox/bootstrap_test.go` — extended with 10 new tests (mockSSHDialer, SSH auth failure, dial-addr/port/user propagation, SSH key generation, known_hosts, nil/custom logger, cancelled context, deployPubKey edge cases)
+
+## Behavioral Verification
+
+### Test Results
+```
+go test ./...               → all PASS (exit 0)
+go test -race ./...         → all PASS (exit 0)
+go vet ./...                → clean
+make build                  → clean
+```
+
+### Coverage (D-042 target: ≥ 50% per package)
+
+| Package | Before | After | Target |
+|---------|--------|-------|--------|
+| `internal/engine` | 8.3% | **65.1%** | 50% ✓ |
+| `internal/transport` | 26.3% | **84.6%** | 50% ✓ |
+| `internal/proxmox` | 5.1% | **82.7%** | 50% ✓ |
+| `internal/audit` | 0% | **100.0%** | 50% ✓ |
+
+All 4 packages exceed the 50% floor (AD-025).
+
+### Total new tests: 94 (37 engine+audit + 57 transport+proxmox)
+
+## Security Verification
+
+- The `dispatch.go` bug fix (`io.EOF` vs `fmt.Errorf("EOF")`) is a correctness fix — HTTP request bodies now terminate correctly. No security implications (the bug caused requests to fail, not to leak data).
+- No new dependencies added.
+- Test fixtures use temp dirs (`t.TempDir()`) — no persistent state.
+- No secrets in test code (SSH keys are test-generated Ed25519 pairs).
+
+## Quality Verification
+
+- No comments added (per project convention).
+- Test style matches existing patterns (`scheduler_test.go`, `node_repo_test.go`, `certgen_test.go`).
+- `go.mod` unchanged.
+- Bug fix in `dispatch.go` is minimal (1 line: `return fmt.Errorf("EOF")` → `return io.EOF` + `io` import).
+
+## Must-Haves Checklist
+
+- [x] `internal/engine/executor_test.go` — 7 tests
+- [x] `internal/engine/dispatcher_test.go` — 10 tests
+- [x] `internal/engine/peer_test.go` — 8 tests
+- [x] `internal/transport/mtls_test.go` — 14 tests
+- [x] `internal/transport/dispatch_test.go` — 24 tests
+- [x] `internal/transport/handshake_log_test.go` — 8 tests
+- [x] `internal/audit/audit_test.go` — 9 tests
+- [x] `internal/proxmox/ssh_session_test.go` — 14 tests + extended `bootstrap_test.go` (+10 tests)
+- [x] Bug fix: `dispatch.go` bytesReadCloser EOF (latent bug, root-caused during P03)
+- [x] All 4 target packages ≥ 50% coverage
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS** — all 4 verification layers pass. REQ-055 is fully covered. All 4 target packages exceed the 50% coverage floor (engine 65.1%, transport 84.6%, proxmox 82.7%, audit 100%). A latent bug in `dispatch.go` (non-`io.EOF` return) was found and fixed during coverage uplift.

.ciagent/PLAN_v0.3.md

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+# Plan: Orca v0.3 — scheduling-streaming
+
+Milestone v0.3 (scheduling-streaming) — completion milestone closing the two
+work items deferred from v0.2 (iter.Seq streaming + doctor network/db). Two
+execution phases (P01, P02) followed by one final phase (P03 review + ship).
+
+Branch: `phase/00-pre-execution` (cut from `milestone/v0.3-scheduling-streaming`).
+Go toolchain: `go1.25.0` (`iter` package + range-over-func are stable stdlib).
+No new `go.mod` dependencies (D-041). Source of implementation guidance:
+`.ciagent/RESEARCH_v0.3.md` (D-025..D-042).
+
+---
+
+## Phase P01: iter.Seq streaming for `--watch` flags
+
+**Goal:** Add pull-based `iter.Seq` streaming to `orca job list` and `orca node list` behind a `--watch` flag, with table refresh (default) or streaming one-line JSON per event (`--watch --json`).
+
+**Requirements:** REQ-022 (`iter.Seq` for streaming job lists, Go 1.25+), REQ-030 (`--watch` output format: table default vs streaming one-line JSON per event)
+
+**Milestone:** v0.3
+**Phase tag:** v0.3.1
+**Key decisions:** D-019 (1s poll ticker), D-025 (iter.Seq on store repos), D-026 (`*model.Job`/`*model.Node` element type), D-028 (poll re-runs List, yields full snapshot), D-030 (per-event JSON streaming), D-031 (signal.NotifyContext replaces 5s timeout on watch path), D-032 (inline pull loop, no goroutine).
+
+### Wave 1: Store layer iter.Seq + unit tests (vertical slice)
+
+Wave 1 is independently testable: the two `Watch` methods + the migration-version-less store layer compile and run in isolation. No CLI or doctor code is touched. Running `go test ./internal/store/...` after this wave passes and exercises the `iter.Seq` contracts (yield, ctx cancellation, consumer break, no goroutine leak).
+
+| Task ID | Description | Persona | Files | Must-have | Deps |
+|---------|-------------|---------|-------|-----------|------|
+| 01-01-01 | Add `JobRepo.Watch(ctx) iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]` — pull-based inline polling loop on a 1s ticker; re-runs the List `SELECT ... FROM jobs ORDER BY created_at DESC` each tick, collects ALL rows into a `[]*model.Job` slice via `scanJob`, then yields the **full snapshot as a single slice** (`yield(snapshot)`). **Immediate first yield** before the first ticker wait (G-002): the loop queries+yields on the first iteration, then `select`s on the ticker for subsequent ticks. `defer ticker.Stop()` + `rows.Close()` on every exit path (ctx.Done, yield==false, scan error). No goroutine spawned (D-032). Transient query errors are logged via `slog.Default().Warn` and the loop continues to the next tick (D-034 lite). Imports: add `"iter"` (`"time"` already present). | data-engineer | `internal/store/job_task_repo.go` | `go build ./internal/store/...` succeeds; `Watch` method exists with signature `func (r *JobRepo) Watch(ctx context.Context) iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]`; code path closes rows on ctx.Done and on `yield==false`; first yield is immediate (no `watchInterval` delay before first snapshot — G-002). | - |
+| 01-01-02 | Add `NodeRepo.Watch(ctx) iter.Seq[[]*model.Node]` — analogous to 01-01-01 but against the nodes query `SELECT id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata FROM nodes ORDER BY joined_at ASC`, reusing `scanNode`. Yields the full snapshot as a `[]*model.Node` slice per tick. Same inline-pull / no-goroutine / rows-close-on-all-paths / immediate-first-yield contract (G-001, G-002). | data-engineer | `internal/store/node_repo.go` | `go build ./internal/store/...` succeeds; `Watch` method exists with signature `func (r *NodeRepo) Watch(ctx context.Context) iter.Seq[[]*model.Node]`; immediate first yield. | - |
+| 01-01-03 | Add an unexported test hook for the poll interval so unit tests are deterministic (D-035). Preferred shape: an unexported package var `watchInterval = 1 * time.Second` in `internal/store` that `Watch` reads instead of a literal, overridable from `_test.go` via `watchInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond`. Both `JobRepo.Watch` and `NodeRepo.Watch` reference this var. | data-engineer | `internal/store/job_task_repo.go`, `internal/store/node_repo.go` (optionally a tiny `internal/store/watch_test_helper_test.go` if a shared helper reads cleaner) | `Watch` uses the `watchInterval` var, not a literal `1 * time.Second`; tests can set it to a small value. | 01-01-01, 01-01-02 |
+| 01-01-04 | Write store-layer unit tests for `Watch`. New/append: `internal/store/job_task_repo_test.go` and `internal/store/node_repo_test.go` (mirror). Tests: (a) `TestJobRepoWatch_YieldsSnapshots` — insert 1 job, set `watchInterval=10ms`, range over seq collecting `[]*model.Job` snapshots into a slice, insert a 2nd job from a goroutine after ~30ms, cancel ctx after ~80ms, assert at least one snapshot contains both jobs and the first snapshot contains only the first job (G-001: each yield is a complete tick snapshot). (b) `TestJobRepoWatch_ImmediateFirstYield` (G-002) — assert the first snapshot appears within <50ms even with `watchInterval=10ms` (proving first yield is not tick-gated). (c) `TestJobRepoWatch_StopsOnConsumerBreak` — range and `break` after first yield; assert the range returns (no hang) within a short deadline. (d) `TestJobRepoWatch_StopsOnCtxCancel` — cancel ctx; assert the range loop exits within ~50ms. (e) Mirror all four for `NodeRepo.Watch`. Run `go test -race ./internal/store/...`. | data-engineer | `internal/store/job_task_repo_test.go`, `internal/store/node_repo_test.go` | `go test -race ./internal/store/...` passes; all 8 Watch tests pass; `-race` reports no leaks/data races; immediate-first-yield assertion holds (G-002). | 01-01-03 |
+
+### Wave 2: CLI `--watch` flag + integration
+
+Wave 2 depends on Wave 1's `Watch` methods. It wires the `--watch` flag into both list commands, implements the two output modes, and adds CLI-level smoke tests. After this wave `orca job list --watch` and `orca node list --watch` are runnable end-to-end.
+
+| Task ID | Description | Persona | Files | Must-have | Deps |
+|---------|-------------|---------|-------|-----------|------|
+| 01-02-01 | Add `--watch` flag to `jobListCmd` in `internal/cli/job.go`. Register `jobListCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jobWatch, "watch", false, "stream jobs until Ctrl-C")` (package var `jobWatch bool`). In `RunE`, branch: if `!jobWatch` keep the existing 5s-timeout `List` path unchanged; if `jobWatch`, build `ctx, cancel := signal.NotifyContext(cmd.Context(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM); defer cancel()` (drop the 5s timeout — D-031), then `seq := store.NewJobRepo(db).Watch(ctx)`. Imports: `os/signal`, `syscall`, `iter`. The branch structure is added in this task; the actual rendering (table vs JSON) is filled by 01-02-02 + 01-02-03. | cli-engineer | `internal/cli/job.go` | `go build ./internal/cli/...` succeeds; `orca job list --help` shows `--watch` flag; non-watch path behavior unchanged (existing tests pass); watch path compiles (rendering may be a placeholder `for range seq {}` at this step). | 01-01-01 |
+| 01-02-02 | Implement the **table** watch render in `jobListCmd` (D-029, G-001). Each yielded value is a complete `[]*model.Job` snapshot. Maintain the previous snapshot's rendered-table string (or a hash of it). On each tick, if the new rendered table differs from the previous, emit `"\033[2J\033[H"` (clear screen + home) then the table header + rows (reuse the existing table-rendering code path). Unchanged snapshots produce no output (avoids flicker). | cli-engineer | `internal/cli/job.go` | `orca job list --watch` on a temp DB: inserting a job causes a cleared-screen re-render showing the new job; no output when the snapshot is unchanged. | 01-02-01 |
+| 01-02-03 | Implement the **`--watch --json`** render in `jobListCmd` (D-030, G-001). Each yielded value is a complete `[]*model.Job` snapshot. Maintain `map[string][]byte` of last-seen compact-JSON bytes per job ID. Per tick: diff the current snapshot against the map — for each job in the snapshot, marshal compact JSON; if it differs from stored bytes (or ID unseen), print `{"event":"init","job":{...}}\n` (first sighting) or `{"event":"update","job":{...}}\n` (subsequent change). For IDs in the map but NOT in the current snapshot, print `{"event":"delete","job":{...}}\n` (G-006 DEFER: delete event now natural with snapshot-per-tick). One line per changed element per tick — matches REQ-030. | cli-engineer | `internal/cli/job.go` | `orca job list --watch --json` on a temp DB: inserting/changing a job prints one JSON line per changed job; first tick prints `"init"` lines for existing jobs; deleting a job prints `"delete"`; unchanged jobs on a tick produce no line. | 01-02-01 |
+| 01-02-04 | Add `--watch` flag + both render modes to `nodeListCmd` in `internal/cli/node.go`, mirroring 01-02-01..01-02-03. Package var `nodeWatch bool`; flag `--watch`. For the watch path bypass `engine.NodeRegistry` and call `store.NewNodeRepo(db).Watch(ctx)` directly (D-025 — keeps iter boundary in store; registry adds no value for a read-only stream). Same `signal.NotifyContext` cancellation. Table + JSON renders analogous to job (element type `[]*model.Node` snapshot per tick, event wrapper `{"event":"...","node":{...}}`). **Note (G-003):** This task modifies `internal/cli/node.go`, which P02 task 02-01-01 also modifies (removing old `dbPath`). Task 02-01-01 MUST complete first to avoid merge conflicts. | cli-engineer | `internal/cli/node.go` | `orca node list --watch` and `orca node list --watch --json` behave as specified; non-watch path unchanged. | 01-01-02, 01-02-03, 02-01-01 |
+| 01-02-05 | Add CLI-level watch tests. New files (or append if present): `internal/cli/job_test.go`, `internal/cli/node_test.go`. Smoke-level (store layer is the thorough test home): `TestJobListWatch_JSONStreaming` — temp DB, insert a job, run `jobListCmd.RunE` with `--watch --json` in a goroutine under a cancellable ctx, insert a 2nd job, capture stdout for ~200ms, assert ≥2 JSON lines appear, then cancel ctx and assert the command returns promptly. `TestJobListWatch_TableRefresh` — assert the clear-screen escape `\033[2J\033[H` appears in output on change. Mirror for nodes. Keep deterministic: small `watchInterval` via the test hook, short timeouts. Run `go test -race ./internal/cli/...`. | cli-engineer | `internal/cli/job_test.go`, `internal/cli/node_test.go` | `go test -race ./...` passes (whole repo); the 4 CLI watch smoke tests pass; no goroutine leaks under `-race`. | 01-02-02, 01-02-03, 01-02-04 |
+
+### Test strategy (P01)
+
+- **Store layer (thorough, deterministic):** `internal/store/job_task_repo_test.go` + `internal/store/node_repo_test.go` — three tests per repo (snapshots over time, consumer-break stops, ctx-cancel stops). Uses the `watchInterval` test hook (10ms) for speed. Runs under `go test -race ./internal/store/...`. This is where the `iter.Seq` contract is verified rigorously.
+- **CLI layer (smoke):** `internal/cli/job_test.go` + `internal/cli/node_test.go` — verify the flag is wired, JSON streaming emits one line per changed element, table mode emits the clear-screen escape on change, and the command exits promptly on ctx cancellation. Kept intentionally lightweight; deterministic via the shared `watchInterval` hook + short timeouts.
+- **Non-watch regression:** existing `job list` / `node list` tests must still pass unchanged (the 5s-timeout path is untouched).
+- **Race:** `go test -race ./...` is the gate (REQ-031 already enforces `-race` in CI).
+
+### Vertical slice integrity (P01)
+
+- **Wave 1** produces a runnable, testable artifact: `go build ./internal/store/...` + `go test -race ./internal/store/...`. No CLI or doctor code is modified. The `iter.Seq` contract (pull, cancel, no-leak) is fully verified at this layer.
+- **Wave 2** builds on Wave 1's `Watch` methods to deliver the user-facing `--watch` flag end-to-end. After Wave 2 an operator can demo `orca job list --watch` and `orca node list --watch --json`.
+
+---
+
+## Phase P02: `orca doctor` network + db full implementation
+
+**Goal:** Replace the `NetworkStub` and `DBStub` placeholders with real diagnostics — peer reachability via mTLS `/healthz` probe and SQLite `PRAGMA integrity_check` + migration version — completing REQ-032.
+
+**Requirements:** REQ-032 (completion: network reachability + db integrity)
+**Milestone:** v0.3
+**Phase tag:** v0.3.2
+**Key decisions:** D-027 (closure-capture handles in check constructors), D-033 (`store.MigrationVersion`), D-034 (db check opens its own `*sql.DB`), D-035 (`PRAGMA integrity_check` + migration version), D-036 (peers from `nodes` table, not in-memory registry), D-037 (`ServerName = node.Name`), D-038 (zero peers → WARN, any fail → FAIL, 3s per-probe timeout), D-039 (`dbPath` → `certpaths.DBPath()`), D-040 (delete stubs, no shims).
+
+### Wave 1: Shared infra + store migration-version query (vertical slice)
+
+Wave 1 breaks the would-be `doctor → cli` import cycle (D-039) and adds the public `store.MigrationVersion` query. Both are independently testable: `go test ./internal/store/... ./internal/certpaths/...` passes after this wave, and the foundation for both the db and network checks is in place.
+
+| Task ID | Description | Persona | Files | Must-have | Deps |
+|---------|-------------|---------|-------|-----------|------|
+| 02-01-01 | Move `dbPath()` (the `ORCA_DB`-env-honoring path resolver) from `internal/cli` to `internal/certpaths` as `DBPath()` (D-039). `certpaths` already owns the `ORCA_HOME`-honoring `Dir()`. Add `func DBPath() string` to `internal/certpaths/certpaths.go`: honors `ORCA_DB` env override, else `filepath.Join(Dir(), "orca.db")`. Update `internal/cli/node.go` (and any other `internal/cli` caller of the old unexported `dbPath`) to call `certpaths.DBPath()`; remove the old `dbPath` from `internal/cli`. Territory note: this crosses cli-engineer territory — lead-developer adjudicates (D-039). | lead-developer | `internal/certpaths/certpaths.go`, `internal/cli/node.go` (remove old `dbPath`), any other `internal/cli/*` caller | `go build ./...` succeeds (no import cycle); `certpaths.DBPath()` exists and honors `ORCA_DB`/`ORCA_HOME`; `internal/cli` no longer defines `dbPath`; existing CLI tests pass. | - |
+| 02-01-02 | Add `store.MigrationVersion(ctx, db) (string, error)` to `internal/store/migrate.go` (D-033). SQL: `SELECT name FROM schema_migrations ORDER BY name DESC LIMIT 1`. Returns `("", nil)` on `sql.ErrNoRows` (empty/fresh db). Wraps other errors with `fmt.Errorf("query migration version: %w", err)`. Add `"context"` import if missing (likely already imported). | data-engineer | `internal/store/migrate.go` | `go build ./internal/store/...` succeeds; function is exported; `sql.ErrNoRows` maps to `("", nil)`. | - |
+| 02-01-03 | Test `MigrationVersion`. New/append `internal/store/migrate_test.go`: `TestMigrationVersion` — open a fresh test db via `store.Open` (which runs `migrate`), call `MigrationVersion`, assert it returns `0005_node_capacity.sql` (the highest current migration). Then manually `db.Exec("DELETE FROM schema_migrations")`, call again, assert `("", nil)`. Run `go test -race ./internal/store/...`. | data-engineer | `internal/store/migrate_test.go` | `go test -race ./internal/store/...` passes; both assertions (highest version, empty → `""`) hold. | 02-01-02 |
+
+### Wave 2: doctor DB check + network check + CLI wiring + tests
+
+Wave 2 depends on Wave 1 (`certpaths.DBPath` + `store.MigrationVersion`). It replaces both stubs with real checks, updates `All()` and the CLI subcommands, rewrites the broken stub test, and adds per-check tests. After this wave `orca doctor`, `orca doctor network`, and `orca doctor db` are fully functional.
+
+| Task ID | Description | Persona | Files | Must-have | Deps |
+|---------|-------------|---------|-------|-----------|------|
+| 02-02-01 | Replace `DBStub()` with `DB()` in `internal/doctor/doctor.go` (D-027, D-034, D-035). The `Check.Run` closure: `path := certpaths.DBPath()`; `db, err := store.Open(path)` (defer `db.Close()`); `PRAGMA integrity_check` via `db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "PRAGMA integrity_check").Scan(&integrity)`; FAIL if not `"ok"` (first line of message); then `store.MigrationVersion(ctx, db)` — WARN if `""` (fresh/never-migrated), else PASS with `"... migrations up to <ver>"`. New imports: `strings`, `internal/store`, `internal/certpaths`. | data-engineer | `internal/doctor/doctor.go` | `go build ./internal/doctor/...` succeeds; `doctor.DB()` returns a `Check` with `Name=="db"`; `DBStub` still present (removed in 02-02-04 lockstep). | 02-01-01, 02-01-02 |
+| 02-02-02 | Add `probeHealthz(ctx, caPath, certPath, keyPath, serverName, addr) error` helper in `internal/doctor/doctor.go` (network-engineer territory — connection lifecycle). Builds an mTLS client via `transport.NewMTLSClient(caPath, serverName, certPath, keyPath)` (D-037: `serverName = node.Name`), `http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, GET, "https://"+addr+"/healthz", nil)`, `client.Do(req)`, defer `resp.Body.Close()`, FAIL if status != 200. New imports: `net/http`, `time`, `internal/transport`. | network-engineer | `internal/doctor/doctor.go` | `go build ./internal/doctor/...` succeeds; `probeHealthz` exists with the specified signature; reuses `transport.NewMTLSClient` (no new TLS code — security-engineer territory respected). | 02-01-01 |
+| 02-02-03 | Replace `NetworkStub()` with `Network()` in `internal/doctor/doctor.go` (D-036, D-037, D-038). The `Check.Run` closure: `path := certpaths.DBPath()`; `db, err := store.Open(path)` (defer close); `nodes, err := store.NewNodeRepo(db).List(ctx)`; filter `state != model.NodeStateLeft` into `live`; if `len(live)==0` → `ResultWarn` ("no peers registered; network check skipped (single-node?)"). Else per-peer: `probeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 3*time.Second)`; `probeHealthz(...)`; collect PASS/FAIL lines; aggregate — FAIL if any peer failed, PASS if all OK. `serverName = n.Name`, `caPath = certpaths.CACertPath()`, `certPath/keyPath = certpaths.ServerCertPath()/ServerKeyPath()`. New imports: `internal/model`. | network-engineer | `internal/doctor/doctor.go` | `go build ./internal/doctor/...` succeeds; `doctor.Network()` returns a `Check` with `Name=="network"`; zero-peer → WARN; per-probe 3s timeout enforced. | 02-02-02 |
+| 02-02-04 | Update `All()` in `internal/doctor/doctor.go` to use `Network()` and `DB()` instead of the stubs (D-040). **Delete** `NetworkStub` and `DBStub` (no backward-compat shims — internal only). Update `internal/cli/doctor.go`: `doctorNetworkCmd.RunE` calls `doctor.Network()` (was `NetworkStub()`); `doctorDBCmd.RunE` calls `doctor.DB()` (was `DBStub()`). Ensure per-subcommand render honors `jsonOutput` (minor enhancement, in scope). | cli-engineer | `internal/doctor/doctor.go`, `internal/cli/doctor.go` | `go build ./...` succeeds; `grep -r "NetworkStub\|DBStub" internal/` returns nothing; `orca doctor`, `orca doctor network`, `orca doctor db` run without referencing stubs. | 02-02-01, 02-02-03 |
+| 02-02-05 | Rewrite + add doctor tests in `internal/doctor/doctor_test.go`. (a) Rewrite `TestRunAllChecksWithNoCA` — set `ORCA_HOME` to a temp dir with no CA. Assert per-check by name: `cert.ca` FAIL, `cert.server` FAIL, `cert.expiry` FAIL, `cert.fingerprint` FAIL, `db` PASS (store.Open runs migrations → version 0005), `network` WARN (no peers). Remove the stale "expects WARN (stubs)" comment. (b) `TestDBCheck_IntegrityOK` — fresh db via `store.Open` in temp, run `doctor.DB().Run(ctx)`, expect PASS, message contains "0005". (c) `TestNetworkCheck_NoPeers` — fresh db, no nodes, run `doctor.Network().Run(ctx)`, expect WARN. (d) `TestNetworkCheck_PeerUnreachable` — insert a node with `Address = "127.0.0.1:1"` (nothing listening), run, expect FAIL with the peer name in the message. (e) `TestNetworkCheck_PeerReachable` (integration) — bootstrap a CA via `security.CAInit`-equivalent, generate+sign a server cert with SAN `localhost`, start an `httptest.NewUnstartedServer` with TLS + `ClientAuth=RequireAndVerifyClientCert` (mirror `security/integration_test.go` pattern), insert a node row with `Address = ts.Listener.Addr().String()` and `Name = "localhost"`, set `ORCA_HOME`, run `doctor.Network().Run(ctx)`, expect PASS. Run `go test -race ./internal/doctor/...`. | network-engineer (network tests), data-engineer (db test), cli-engineer (All() rewrite test) | `internal/doctor/doctor_test.go` | `go test -race ./internal/doctor/...` passes; all 5 test cases pass; the stale stub assertion is gone. | 02-02-04 |
+
+### Test strategy (P02)
+
+- **Store layer:** `internal/store/migrate_test.go` — `MigrationVersion` returns highest applied migration (`0005_node_capacity.sql`) and `""` on empty. (`-race`.)
+- **Doctor db check:** `TestDBCheck_IntegrityOK` — fresh db → PASS with version in message. (Optional brittle `TestDBCheck_Corrupt` may be added if a reliable corruption method is found; otherwise rely on the integrity-string parsing logic via the PASS/FAIL branch coverage.)
+- **Doctor network check:** `TestNetworkCheck_NoPeers` (WARN), `TestNetworkCheck_PeerUnreachable` (FAIL, peer name in message), `TestNetworkCheck_PeerReachable` (integration: real mTLS `httptest` server → PASS). The reachable test reuses the proven `TestEndToEndMTLS` pattern from `security/integration_test.go`.
+- **Doctor `All()` regression:** rewritten `TestRunAllChecksWithNoCA` asserts per-check results (certs FAIL, db PASS, network WARN) — no more global "hasWarn" stub assertion.
+- **Race:** `go test -race ./...` is the gate.
+
+### Vertical slice integrity (P02)
+
+- **Wave 1** produces a runnable, testable artifact: `certpaths.DBPath()` (cycle broken) + `store.MigrationVersion` (tested). `go test -race ./internal/store/... ./internal/certpaths/...` passes. No doctor code depends on the stubs being changed yet.
+- **Wave 2** builds on Wave 1 to deliver the real `DB()` and `Network()` checks, wires the CLI, and replaces the stub tests. After Wave 2 an operator can demo `orca doctor` showing real PASS/WARN/FAIL for db and network.
+
+---
+
+## Phase P03 (final): review + ship + audit
+
+**Goal:** Review the v0.3 milestone for completeness against REQ-022/030/032, audit the codebase for leftover stubs/dead code, run the full CI gate (`go test -race ./...`, `gosec`, `govulncheck`, `gitleaks`), tag the milestone release, and ship.
+
+**Requirements:** REQ-022 (verify complete), REQ-030 (verify complete), REQ-032 (verify complete)
+**Milestone:** v0.3
+**Phase tag:** v0.3.3 (= milestone release; target milestone tag `v0.4.0` per ROADMAP next-minor rule)
+
+### Wave 1: Review + audit + ship (single wave)
+
+| Task ID | Description | Persona | Files | Must-have | Deps |
+|---------|-------------|---------|-------|-----------|------|
+| 03-01-01 | Verify REQ coverage: confirm REQ-022 (iter.Seq streaming job lists), REQ-030 (--watch table/JSON modes), REQ-032 (doctor network + db) are fully implemented. Update `REQUIREMENTS.md` status for REQ-022/030/032 from Pending/Partial → **Complete**. Cross-check against the plan's must-have criteria. | lead-developer | `.ciagent/REQUIREMENTS.md` | All three REQs marked Complete with phase references; no remaining "stub" or "Pending" status for v0.3 scope. | P01, P02 complete |
+| 03-01-02 | Codebase audit: `grep -r "NetworkStub\|DBStub" internal/` returns nothing; `grep -r "TODO\|FIXME" internal/` reviewed (no v0.3 leftovers); confirm no `dbPath` duplication remains in `internal/cli`; confirm `iter` import is used (no unused imports); run `go vet ./...`. | lead-developer | (read-only audit; edits only if cleanup needed) | `go vet ./...` clean; no stub references; no leftover TODOs for v0.3 scope. | 03-01-01 |
+| 03-01-03 | Full CI gate: `go build ./...`, `go test -race ./...`, `gosec` (vs baseline JSON), `govulncheck ./...` (offline mode per REQ-027), `gitleaks` (vs baseline per REQ-029). Fix any new findings. | lead-developer | (fixes if needed) | All gates green; no new gosec findings beyond baseline; govulncheck exit 0; gitleaks clean vs baseline. | 03-01-02 |
+| 03-01-04 | Tag + ship: per `.ciagent/RELEASE_POLICY.md`, tag `v0.3.3` (phase tag) and the milestone tag (next-minor per ROADMAP). Produce Gitea release. Update `ROADMAP.md` v0.3 section to mark P01/P02/P03 complete. | lead-developer | `.ciagent/ROADMAP.md` | `v0.3.3` tag exists; Gitea release published; ROADMAP v0.3 checkboxes updated. | 03-01-03 |
+
+### Test strategy (P03)
+
+- No new tests; this phase is review + audit + release.
+- The gate is the existing test suite + security scans all passing under CI.
+
+---
+
+## Cross-phase notes
+
+- **Phase ordering / parallelism (D-042, revised by G-003):** P01 Wave 1 and P02 Wave 1 may run in parallel (file-disjoint: store repos vs certpaths+migrate). **P02 Wave 1 (02-01-01) MUST complete before P01 Wave 2 (01-02-04)** because both modify `internal/cli/node.go` (P01 adds `--watch`, P02 removes old `dbPath`). P01 Wave 2 tasks 01-02-01..01-02-03 (job.go only) are not blocked by P02. Recommended order: P01 W1 + P02 W1 in parallel → P02 W1 02-01-01 completes → P01 W2 (job.go tasks) + P02 W2 in parallel → P01 W2 01-02-04 (node.go) after 02-01-01. P03 is strictly sequential after both phases complete.
+- **No new dependencies (D-041):** `iter` (P01) and the mTLS health probe (P02) use stdlib + existing internal packages only. The 4 direct `go.mod` deps (cobra, hcl/v2, modernc/sqlite, uuid) are unchanged.
+- **Decisions logged during planning (new, this plan):**
+  - **D-043** — `watchInterval` test hook: an unexported package var in `internal/store` (default `1 * time.Second`) referenced by both `Watch` methods, overridable from `_test.go`. Avoids a public `WatchWithInterval` constructor that would leak test-only API into production. Confidence 0.90.
+  - **D-044** — P01 Wave 1 / Wave 2 split: Wave 1 = store-layer `Watch` methods + tests (data-engineer only, fully isolated); Wave 2 = CLI `--watch` flag + renders + CLI tests (cli-engineer). This keeps the `iter.Seq` contract verifiable without the CLI and matches persona territories. Confidence 0.93.
+  - **D-045** — P02 Wave 1 / Wave 2 split: Wave 1 = `certpaths.DBPath()` relocation + `store.MigrationVersion` + tests (breaks the import cycle, data-engineer + lead-developer); Wave 2 = real `DB()`/`Network()` checks + CLI wiring + doctor tests. Wave 1 is the unblock for both checks. Confidence 0.91.
+  - **D-046** — `--watch --json` event wrapper shape: `{"event":"update","job":{...}}` / `{"event":"init","job":{...}}` (and `node` analog). `"init"` on first sighting of an ID, `"update"` on subsequent change. Unchanged IDs on a tick emit nothing. Confidence 0.80 (matches D-030's per-event interpretation of REQ-030).
+
+## Grill amendments (binding ACCEPT verdicts applied)
+
+Three binding changes from `.ciagent/GRILL_v0.3.md` have been applied to this plan:
+
+- **G-001 [CRITICAL]** — `Watch` element type changed from `iter.Seq[*model.Job]` (per-row) to `iter.Seq[[]*model.Job]` (full snapshot per tick). Each tick yields the complete snapshot as a single slice. This makes table render mode correct (clear-screen + re-render needs full snapshot) and enables natural `"delete"` events in JSON mode. Applied to tasks 01-01-01, 01-01-02, 01-02-02, 01-02-03, 01-02-04, 01-01-04.
+- **G-002 [CRITICAL]** — `Watch` must yield immediately on the first iteration, then `select` on the ticker for subsequent ticks. Prevents a 1s blank-screen UX bug in production (tests with 10ms interval missed this). Applied to tasks 01-01-01, 01-01-02; new test `TestWatch_ImmediateFirstYield` added to 01-01-04.
+- **G-003 [HIGH]** — D-042's "file-disjoint" claim corrected: both P01 (01-02-04) and P02 (02-01-01) modify `internal/cli/node.go`. P02 Wave 1 task 02-01-01 is now a dependency of P01 Wave 2 task 01-02-04. Cross-phase ordering updated.
+
+DEFER items (G-004, G-006, G-007, G-009, G-012) are noted in the grill report and will be addressed during execution.
+
+## Summary
+
+- **Phases:** 3 (P01, P02 execution; P03 final review/ship)
+- **Waves:** P01 = 2 waves (4 + 5 tasks); P02 = 2 waves (3 + 5 tasks); P03 = 1 wave (4 tasks). Total = 5 waves.
+- **Tasks:** P01 = 9, P02 = 8, P03 = 4. Total = 21 tasks.
+- **Grill amendments:** G-001 (snapshot-per-tick), G-002 (immediate first yield), G-003 (serialize P02 W1 → P01 W2 on node.go). 3 ACCEPT verdicts applied.
+- **New planning decisions:** D-043 (watchInterval test hook), D-044 (P01 wave split), D-045 (P02 wave split), D-046 (JSON event wrapper shape).
+- **Requirements closed:** REQ-022, REQ-030 (P01); REQ-032 (P02, completion).
+- **No new go.mod dependencies.** No source code written in this plan — implementation begins at P01 Wave 1.

.ciagent/PLAN_v0.5.md

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+---
+milestone: v0.5
+milestone_slug: distribution
+type: feature
+phase_count: 4
+---
+
+# Plan: Orca v0.5 — Distribution
+
+Vertical-slice plan for the v0.5 Distribution milestone. Each phase is a
+vertical slice that ships independently as a patch on the v0.4.x line.
+The final phase (P4) is the milestone release (promoted to v0.5.0).
+
+## Requirement → Phase Mapping
+
+| REQ | Phase | Priority |
+|-----|-------|----------|
+| REQ-045 (public releases) | P0 ship (operational) | High |
+| REQ-041 (ORCA_HOME unified namespace) | P1 | High |
+| REQ-042 (--system flag) | P1 | High |
+| REQ-043 (install.sh 1-liner) | P2 | High |
+| REQ-044 (in-place update) | P2 | High |
+| REQ-046 (docker release) | P3 | Medium |
+| REQ-016 (README quickstart) | P2 | Medium (completion) |
+
+## Phase 1 — Namespace Unification (REQ-041, REQ-042)
+
+**Goal**: Single `ORCA_HOME` env var as namespace root for all
+on-disk state; `--system` flag selects `/root/.orca`.
+
+**Persona**: backend-engineer (store/certpaths routing) + cli-engineer
+(`--system` flag).
+
+**Wave 1** (single wave — no inter-task dependencies):
+
+| Task | File(s) | Persona | REQ |
+|------|---------|---------|-----|
+| T1.1: Route `store.Open("")` through `certpaths.DBPath()` | `internal/store/store.go` | backend-engineer | REQ-041 |
+| T1.2: Route `init` command through `certpaths.Dir()` | `internal/cli/init.go` | backend-engineer | REQ-041 |
+| T1.3: Add `--system` persistent flag on `rootCmd` + `PersistentPreRunE` that sets `ORCA_HOME=/root/.orca` | `internal/cli/root.go` | cli-engineer | REQ-042 |
+| T1.4: Add `namespace_test.go` covering user-level, `ORCA_HOME` override, `--system` | `internal/cli/namespace_test.go` | cli-engineer | REQ-041/042 |
+| T1.5: Update `docs/namespace.md` (paths reference) | `docs/namespace.md` | backend-engineer | REQ-041 |
+
+**Must-haves**:
+- `go test ./...` passes (including new namespace_test.go).
+- `ORCA_HOME=/tmp/x orca init` creates `/tmp/x` (not `~/.orca`).
+- `orca --system init` creates `/root/.orca` (when run as root).
+- Empty `ORCA_HOME` + no `--system` → `~/.orca` (backward compat).
+
+**Verification**: 4-layer (structural: gofmt/vet; behavioral: namespace_test
++ existing doctor_test; security: no new secret surface; quality: no
+regression in existing tests).
+
+**Ship**: tag `v0.4.2`.
+
+## Phase 2 — install.sh + In-Place Update (REQ-043, REQ-044, REQ-016)
+
+**Goal**: 1-liner installer from public Gitea releases; idempotent
+update-in-place; README quickstart.
+
+**Persona**: devops-engineer.
+
+**Wave 1**:
+
+| Task | File(s) | Persona | REQ |
+|------|---------|---------|-----|
+| T2.1: Write `scripts/install.sh` (curl 1-liner, user/system, latest/pinned, in-place update) | `scripts/install.sh` | devops-engineer | REQ-043/044 |
+| T2.2: Write `scripts/install_test.sh` (mocked download, path verification, update-in-place) | `scripts/install_test.sh` | devops-engineer | REQ-043/044 |
+| T2.3: Update README quickstart with 1-liner install + `--system` variant | `README.md` | devops-engineer | REQ-016 |
+| T2.4: Write `docs/install.md` (full install reference, troubleshooting, ORCA_HOME) | `docs/install.md` | devops-engineer | REQ-043 |
+
+**install.sh spec** (per R-006):
+- Default: user-level. Binary → `~/.local/bin/orca`. Namespace → `~/.orca`.
+- `--system`: binary → `/usr/local/bin/orca`, namespace → `/root/.orca`. Requires root (uid 0).
+- `--version vX.Y.Z`: pin version. Default: query `/api/v1/repos/coreci/orca/releases/latest`.
+- Download `orca-{tag}-linux-{arch}.tar.gz` from the release asset.
+- In-place update: if `orca` exists at install path, run `orca version --json`,
+  parse `version`, print "updated from X to Y". Overwrite binary. **Never**
+  touch the namespace dir.
+- Detect arch: `amd64` (x86_64), `arm64` (aarch64).
+- Idempotent: re-running with same version is a no-op (or reinstalls).
+
+**Must-haves**:
+- `bash scripts/install_test.sh` passes (mocked).
+- `curl -fsSL <url> | bash` works on a fresh system (verified in P4 e2e).
+- `curl -fsSL <url> | bash -s -- --system` installs to `/usr/local/bin` (as root).
+- Re-running updates the binary; `~/.orca/orca.db` preserved.
+
+**Verification**: 4-layer (structural: shellcheck; behavioral:
+install_test.sh; security: no secret in script, no eval of remote
+content beyond the script itself; quality: idempotent).
+
+**Ship**: tag `v0.4.3`.
+
+## Phase 3 — Docker Release (REQ-046)
+
+**Goal**: Multi-stage Dockerfile; publish to Gitea container registry
+per release.
+
+**Persona**: devops-engineer.
+
+**Wave 1**:
+
+| Task | File(s) | Persona | REQ |
+|------|---------|---------|-----|
+| T3.1: Write `Dockerfile` (multi-stage: golang:1.25 → distroless/static-debian12) | `Dockerfile` | devops-engineer | REQ-046 |
+| T3.2: Extend `scripts/release.sh` with docker build + login + push | `scripts/release.sh` | devops-engineer | REQ-046 |
+| T3.3: Add `container-publish` step to `.coreci.yml` release pipeline | `.coreci.yml` | devops-engineer | REQ-046 |
+| T3.4: Write `docs/docker.md` (docker run quickstart, volume mounts, ORCA_HOME) | `docs/docker.md` | devops-engineer | REQ-046 |
+| T3.5: Add `.dockerignore` (exclude .git, bin, .env, *.tar.gz) | `.dockerignore` | devops-engineer | REQ-046 |
+
+**Dockerfile spec** (per R-005):
+- Stage 1 (`golang:1.25`): `CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags=... -o /orca ./cmd/orca`.
+- Stage 2 (`gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot`): `COPY --from=builder /orca /orca`, `ENV ORCA_HOME=/var/lib/orca`, `ENTRYPOINT ["/orca"]`.
+- `ARG VERSION` + `ARG GIT_COMMIT` + `ARG BUILD_TIME` for ldflags injection.
+- Image runs as `nonroot` user (distroless default) — `ORCA_HOME=/var/lib/orca` must be volume-mounted.
+
+**release.sh extension**:
+- After Gitea release: `docker build --build-arg VERSION=$VERSION ... -t git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:$VERSION -t git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:latest .`
+- `echo "$GITEA_TOKEN" | docker login git.cloudinit.dev -u cloudinit-bot --password-stdin`
+- `docker push git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:$VERSION` + `docker push git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:latest`
+- Skip gracefully if `docker` not on PATH (local dev without docker).
+
+**.coreci.yml extension**:
+- New step `container-publish` in the `release` pipeline, using an image with docker CLI (e.g., `docker:24-cli` with docker-in-docker service, or a custom image). Per P-001 pitfall.
+
+**Must-haves**:
+- `docker build -t orca-test .` succeeds locally.
+- `docker run --rm orca-test version` prints the version.
+- `scripts/release.sh vX.Y.Z` publishes both the Gitea release AND the container image.
+- `.coreci.yml` release pipeline includes the container-publish step.
+
+**Verification**: 4-layer (structural: Dockerfile lint; behavioral: docker
+build + run; security: no secret in image, .env excluded; quality:
+reproducible build via ARGs).
+
+**Ship**: tag `v0.4.4`.
+
+## Phase 4 — Final Review + Ship + Audit (Milestone Release)
+
+**Goal**: Multi-persona review, audit, milestone ship.
+
+**Tasks**:
+| Task | Persona | Detail |
+|------|---------|--------|
+| T4.1: `ciagent-review` | all | Review P1-P3 changes across personas |
+| T4.2: `ciagent-audit` | lead-developer | Reconstruction test, file/branch/commit discipline |
+| T4.3: End-to-end verification | lead-developer | Unauth curl to releases API (REQ-045 ✓), fresh install.sh (REQ-043 ✓), `--system` (REQ-042 ✓), update-in-place (REQ-044 ✓), docker pull+run (REQ-046 ✓) |
+| T4.4: Milestone ship | lead-developer | Merge phase/04 → milestone/v0.5 → main, tag v0.4.5, create milestone release, build + upload all artifacts |
+| T4.5: Complete milestone | lead-developer | Update REQUIREMENTS.md (REQ-041..046 complete), ROADMAP.md (v0.5 complete), clear CHECKPOINT.json |
+
+**Ship**: tag `v0.4.5` (the milestone release, promoted to `v0.5.0`).
+
+## Wave Ordering Summary
+
+All 4 phases are single-wave (no inter-phase dependencies within a
+phase). Phases execute strictly sequentially: P1 → P2 → P3 → P4.
+
+- **P1** (Wave 1): T1.1..T1.5 — namespace unification.
+- **P2** (Wave 1): T2.1..T2.4 — install.sh.
+- **P3** (Wave 1): T3.1..T3.5 — docker.
+- **P4** (Wave 1): T4.1..T4.5 — review + ship.
+
+## Versioning
+
+- P0 ship: `v0.4.1` (first patch on v0.4.x line after v0.4.0 milestone tag).
+- P1 ship: `v0.4.2`.
+- P2 ship: `v0.4.3`.
+- P3 ship: `v0.4.4`.
+- P4 ship: `v0.4.5` (final phase = milestone release, promoted to `v0.5.0`).
+
+Tags run on the v0.4.x line (previous minor). The milestone branch label
+is `milestone/v0.5-distribution`. No separate minor tag — the final
+phase's patch IS the milestone release per `run.md` versioning logic
+for feature milestones.

.ciagent/PLAN_v0.6.md

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+# Phase Plans: Orca v0.6 — Node Bootstrap & Proxmox
+
+All 3 execution phases + final review with vertical-slice structure,
+wave ordering, and REQ-ID mapping. v0.6 scope: **Node Bootstrap &
+Proxmox** — `orca init` full bootstrap, Proxmox SSH join, doctor
+extensions.
+
+Branching: branches numbered from phase 12 onward (v0.1 used 01-07,
+v0.2 used 08-11, v0.3 used 00+01-03, v0.5 used 00+01-04). v0.6 uses
+`phase/01-*`..`phase/04-*` on the `milestone/v0.6-node-bootstrap-proxmox`
+branch (numbering restarts per milestone per branch-strategy.md).
+
+---
+
+## Phase 1: `orca init` Full Bootstrap + Schema 0006 (Wave 1)
+
+**Branch**: `phase/01-init-bootstrap`
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-047, REQ-048, REQ-049
+**Persona leads**: data-engineer (schema), backend-engineer (init orchestration), cli-engineer (output UX)
+
+### Must-Haves
+
+#### data-engineer territory
+- [ ] `internal/store/migrations/0006_node_kind_os.sql` — `ALTER TABLE nodes ADD COLUMN kind TEXT; ALTER TABLE nodes ADD COLUMN os TEXT;` (nullable, backward-compatible)
+- [ ] `internal/model/node.go` — add `Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"`` + `OS string `json:"os,omitempty"`` fields; add `NodeKind` constants (`NodeKindLocalhost`, `NodeKindLinux`, `NodeKindProxmox`)
+- [ ] `internal/store/node_repo.go` — extend `Insert`/`Get`/`List`/`Watch`/`scanNode` for `kind, os` columns (use `sql.NullString`, map NULL → `""`); add `GetByName(ctx, name) (*Node, error)` and `UpdateLastSeenAndOS(ctx, id, os string) error` helpers
+- [ ] `internal/store/node_repo_test.go` — extend tests for new columns + helpers; assert NULL → `""` mapping; assert `GetByName` returns `ErrNotFound` for missing; assert `UpdateLastSeenAndOS` refreshes `last_seen` + `os` without changing `id`/`joined_at`
+
+#### backend-engineer territory
+- [ ] `internal/cli/init.go` — full bootstrap sequence (replace current 35-line mkdir-only impl):
+  - [ ] MkdirAll(certpaths.Dir(), 0o755) — keep
+  - [ ] store.Open(certpaths.DBPath()) — runs migrations 0001..0006
+  - [ ] security.CAInit(certpaths.Dir(), "orca-internal-ca") — idempotent (existing fast-path)
+  - [ ] if !exists(certpaths.ServerCertPath()): GenerateCSR("localhost", ["localhost","127.0.0.1"]) → ca.SignCSR → WriteCert + WriteKey
+  - [ ] detectOS() from /etc/os-release (see cli-engineer territory)
+  - [ ] localhost node upsert: GetByName("localhost") → if found UpdateLastSeenAndOS; else Insert with kind=localhost, os=<detected>, name="localhost", addr="localhost:8443"
+  - [ ] print summary (CA fp, server cert fp, os, node id, db path)
+- [ ] `internal/cli/init_test.go` — idempotency test: run init twice, assert no duplicate localhost node, last_seen refreshed, os unchanged; assert CA/cert not regenerated on re-run; assert doctor passes after init
+
+#### cli-engineer territory
+- [ ] `internal/cli/osdetect.go` (NEW) — `detectOS() string`: read `/etc/os-release` then fall back to `/usr/lib/os-release`; parse `KEY=VALUE` lines via bufio.Scanner + strings.SplitN; strip surrounding quotes; return `ID` value or `"linux"` fallback. Map ubuntu/debian/alpine → verbatim; unknown values stored verbatim (not masked).
+- [ ] `internal/cli/osdetect_test.go` — test parsing with sample os-release content (ubuntu, debian, alpine, missing file, missing ID=, unknown ID, quoted values)
+- [ ] `internal/cli/init.go` output UX — multi-step progress lines: "✓ Namespace dir: ...", "✓ Database initialized: ...", "✓ CA provisioned: ... (fp=...)", "✓ Server cert provisioned: ... (fp=...)", "✓ OS detected: ubuntu", "✓ Localhost node registered: <id>"; `--json` outputs a single JSON summary object
+
+### Verification
+
+- `go build ./...` PASS
+- `go test ./internal/store/... ./internal/cli/... ./internal/model/...` PASS
+- `go test -race ./...` PASS
+- `orca init` on a fresh namespace → creates dir, db, CA, server cert, localhost node; `orca doctor` passes with zero FAILs
+- `orca init` re-run → no duplicate localhost node, last_seen refreshed, CA/cert not regenerated (idempotent, D-036)
+- `orca init --json` → valid JSON summary
+- `orca node list` shows the localhost node with kind=localhost, os=<detected>
+- Migration 0006 applies cleanly on existing dbs (existing rows get NULL kind/os → scanned as `""`)
+
+---
+
+## Phase 2: Proxmox SSH Join (Wave 1)
+
+**Branch**: `phase/02-proxmox-join`
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-050, REQ-051
+**Persona leads**: security-engineer (SSH key, TOFU, sudoers, PVE role), backend-engineer (SSH session orchestration), cli-engineer (flag wiring)
+**Depends on**: Phase 1 (migration 0006 + Node.Kind/OS fields)
+
+### Must-Haves
+
+#### dependency + security-engineer territory
+- [ ] `go.mod` / `go.sum` — add `golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0`; bump `golang.org/x/sys` to v0.47.0; add `golang.org/x/term v0.45.0` (indirect). Run `go mod tidy`.
+- [ ] `internal/certpaths/certpaths.go` — add `SSHKeyPath() → Dir()/orca_ssh_key`, `SSHPubPath() → Dir()/orca_ssh_key.pub`, `KnownHostsPath() → Dir()/known_hosts`
+- [ ] `internal/security/sshkey.go` (NEW) — `GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(dir string) (keyPEM, pubLine []byte, err error)`:
+  - [ ] If `orca_ssh_key` + `.pub` exist → load + return (idempotent)
+  - [ ] Else: `ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)` → `x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey` → PEM encode → `writeAtomic(keyPath, 0600, keyPEM)`; `ssh.NewPublicKey(pub)` → `ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey` → `writeAtomic(pubPath, 0644, pubLine)`
+  - [ ] Return keyPEM (for `ssh.ParsePrivateKey`) + pubLine (authorized_keys line)
+- [ ] `internal/security/sshkey_test.go` — test generate → load round-trip; test idempotent re-load; test file modes (0600/0644); test `ssh.ParsePrivateKey` accepts the PKCS8 PEM
+
+#### backend-engineer territory (with security-engineer co-own)
+- [ ] `internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go` (NEW package) — `BootstrapProxmox(ctx context.Context, opts Options) (*Result, error)`:
+  - **Options**: `Host, SSHUser, Password, ProxmoxUser (default "orca"), ProxmoxRole (default "OrcaOperator"), Port (default 22)`, `Logger *slog.Logger`
+  - **Step 1**: `security.GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(certpaths.Dir())` → keyPEM, pubLine
+  - **Step 2**: Build `ssh.ClientConfig` with `ssh.Password(opts.Password)` auth + `knownhosts.New(certpaths.KnownHostsPath())` HostKeyCallback (TOFU: captures on first connect, verifies on subsequent)
+  - **Step 3**: `ssh.Dial("tcp", host:port, config)` with 10s timeout
+  - **Step 4**: Deploy pubkey — `session.CombinedOutput("mkdir -p ~orca/.ssh && touch ~orca/.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod 0700 ~orca/.ssh && chmod 0600 ~orca/.ssh/authorized_keys && grep -qF '<publine>' ~orca/.ssh/authorized_keys || echo '<publine>' >> ~orca/.ssh/authorized_keys")` (idempotent append)
+  - **Step 5**: Create orca system user — `session.CombinedOutput("id -u orca 2>/dev/null || useradd -m -s /bin/bash orca")` (idempotent)
+  - **Step 6**: Create PVE role — `session.CombinedOutput("pveum role list 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^OrcaOperator' || pveum role add OrcaOperator --privs 'VM.Audit Datastore.AllocateSpace SDN.Use'")` (idempotent; use opts.ProxmoxRole for the name)
+  - [ ] Step 7: Create PVE user — `session.CombinedOutput("pveum user list 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'orca@pam' || pveum user add orca@pam -comment 'Orca automation user'")` (idempotent; use opts.ProxmoxUser)
+  - [ ] Step 8: Assign ACL — `session.CombinedOutput("pveum acl modify / -user orca@pam -role OrcaOperator")` (idempotent)
+  - [ ] Step 9: Write sudoers — resolve binary paths via `command -v pct` etc.; write `/etc/sudoers.d/orca` (mode 0440) with NOEXEC on pct/qm, no NOEXEC on apt-get/dpkg; exclude pvesh (AD-020)
+  - [ ] Step 10: Validate sudoers — `session.CombinedOutput("visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/orca")`; abort + cleanup if validation fails
+  - [ ] Step 11: Audit log — `logger.Info("proxmox.bootstrap_ok", slog.String("host", opts.Host), slog.String("user", opts.ProxmoxUser), slog.String("role", opts.ProxmoxRole))`
+  - [ ] **Result**: `Node{Kind: "proxmox", OS: "pve", Name: opts.Host, Address: opts.Host + ":8443"}`
+- [ ] `internal/proxmox/bootstrap_test.go` — unit tests with a mock SSH server (`httptest`-style or `net.Pipe` + manual SSH handshake) OR test the command-builder functions in isolation (probe commands, sudoers content, idempotency checks). Integration test against a real Proxmox host is out of scope for unit tests (flagged as `// +build integration`).
+
+#### cli-engineer territory
+- [ ] `internal/cli/node.go` — extend `nodeJoinCmd`:
+  - [ ] Add `--type` flag (values: `localhost` default, `linux`, `proxmox`)
+  - [ ] Add `--host`, `--ssh-user` (default `root`), `--password`, `--proxmox-user` (default `orca`), `--proxmox-role` (default `OrcaOperator`), `--ssh-port` (default `22`) flags
+  - [ ] When `--type proxmox`: validate `--host` + (`--password` or `$ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD`) are set; call `proxmox.BootstrapProxmox(ctx, opts)`; insert the returned node via `NodeRepo.Insert`; print summary
+  - [ ] When `--type localhost` (default): existing flow (fingerprint check + registry.Join)
+  - [ ] Password from `--password` flag OR `$ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD` env var (prefer env var per D-031; never log the password; zero the byte slice after use)
+- [ ] `internal/cli/node_test.go` — test flag wiring; test `--type proxmox` validation (missing host/password → error); test env var fallback
+
+### Verification
+
+- `go build ./...` PASS
+- `go test ./internal/proxmox/... ./internal/security/... ./internal/cli/...` PASS
+- `go test -race ./...` PASS
+- `go mod tidy` leaves no unused deps; `go.sum` has `golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0`
+- `orca node join --type proxmox --host <pve-host> --password <pw>` on a real Proxmox 8/9 host:
+  - Creates orcaOperator role, orca@pam user, ACL, sudoers file
+  - `orca@pam` can `sudo pct list`, `sudo qm list`, `sudo apt-get update` without password
+  - `orca@pam` CANNOT `sudo pvesh` (not in sudoers)
+  - `orca@pam` CANNOT `sudo bash` (not in sudoers)
+  - `visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/orca` passes
+  - Re-running the join command is idempotent (no duplicate role/user/ACL/sudoers/key)
+- `orca node list` shows the proxmox node with kind=proxmox, os=pve
+- Audit log contains `proxmox.bootstrap_ok` entry with host, user, role
+- `~/.orca/orca_ssh_key` is 0600, `.pub` is 0644, `known_hosts` contains the PVE host key
+
+---
+
+## Phase 3: Doctor Extensions + Audit Logging (Wave 2)
+
+**Branch**: `phase/03-doctor-extensions`
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-052
+**Persona leads**: cli-engineer (subcommand wiring), backend-engineer (check logic), security-engineer (audit logging)
+**Depends on**: Phase 1 (localhost node + os field), Phase 2 (proxmox nodes + SSH client)
+
+### Must-Haves
+
+#### backend-engineer territory
+- [ ] `internal/doctor/doctor.go` — add `OS()` check:
+  - Re-run `detectOS()` (from `internal/cli/osdetect.go` — extract to shared package or pass as param)
+  - Load localhost node via `NodeRepo.GetByName("localhost")`
+  - Compare detected OS to stored `node.OS`; drift → WARN ("OS drift: init=ubuntu, now=debian — re-run `orca init` to refresh"); match → PASS
+  - Missing localhost node → FAIL ("no localhost node — run `orca init`")
+- [ ] `internal/doctor/doctor.go` — add `Proxmox()` check (clone `Network()` pattern):
+  - List nodes from `NodeRepo`, filter `kind == "proxmox"`
+  - Zero proxmox nodes → WARN ("no proxmox nodes registered (single-node?)")
+  - Per node: load orca SSH key, build `ssh.ClientConfig` with `ssh.PublicKeys(signer)` + `knownhosts.New`, dial with 3s timeout, run `pveversion` via session
+  - PASS = reachable + pveversion exits 0; FAIL = unreachable or pveversion fails
+  - Accumulate per-node lines (clone `Network()`'s `lines []string` pattern)
+- [ ] `internal/doctor/doctor.go` — extend `All()` to include `OS()` and `Proxmox()`
+- [ ] `internal/doctor/doctor_test.go` — test `OS()` with mock node repo (drift, match, missing); test `Proxmox()` with mock nodes (zero nodes → WARN, reachable → PASS, unreachable → FAIL)
+
+#### cli-engineer territory
+- [ ] `internal/cli/doctor.go` — add `doctorOSCmd` + `doctorProxmoxCmd` subcommands wired to `doctor.OS()` / `doctor.Proxmox()`; add to `doctorCmd.AddCommand(...)`
+- [ ] `internal/cli/doctor.go` — `doctor os` and `doctor proxmox` honor `--json` flag (reuse existing pattern)
+
+#### security-engineer territory
+- [ ] `internal/audit/audit.go` (extend) — emit `proxmox.bootstrap_ok`, `proxmox.bootstrap_fail`, `node.os_drift` events with structured slog fields
+- [ ] Audit log entries for all bootstrap + join actions (REQ-052): `orca init` emits `init.bootstrap_ok` (os, node_id, ca_fp); `orca node join --type proxmox` emits `proxmox.bootstrap_ok` (host, user, role); `doctor os` drift emits `node.os_drift` (init_os, current_os)
+
+### Verification
+
+- `go build ./...` PASS
+- `go test ./internal/doctor/... ./internal/cli/...` PASS
+- `go test -race ./...` PASS
+- `orca doctor` (after `orca init`) → all checks PASS (cert, db, os, network=zero peers WARN, proxmox=zero nodes WARN)
+- `orca doctor os` → PASS (OS matches)
+- `orca doctor proxmox` (no proxmox nodes) → WARN ("no proxmox nodes registered")
+- `orca doctor proxmox` (after joining a PVE host) → PASS per node
+- `orca doctor proxmox` (PVE host down) → FAIL per node with error message
+- Audit log contains `init.bootstrap_ok` and `proxmox.bootstrap_ok` entries
+- `--json` output for `doctor os` and `doctor proxmox` is valid JSON
+
+---
+
+## Phase 4: Final Review + Ship + Audit (Wave 3)
+
+**Branch**: `phase/04-final-review-ship`
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-047, REQ-048, REQ-049, REQ-050, REQ-051, REQ-052 (all)
+**Persona leads**: lead-developer (review + audit), all personas (post-hoc review)
+
+### Must-Haves
+
+- [ ] **Review** (delegate to `ciagent-review`): multi-persona code review across P01-P03
+  - Auto-apply P0 fixes; flag P1+ for post-hoc review
+  - Review territory discipline (warn mode)
+  - Review test coverage for all 6 REQs
+- [ ] **Audit** (delegate to `ciagent-audit`):
+  - Reconstruction test: git log matches `.ciagent/` files
+  - Branch hygiene: phase branches merged cleanly to milestone
+  - Commit discipline: all commits have `---ci---` blocks
+  - File discipline: no stale `.ciagent/` files
+- [ ] **Ship** (delegate to `ciagent-ship`):
+  - Merge `phase/04` → `milestone/v0.6`
+  - Merge `milestone/v0.6` → `main` (rebase-then-fast-forward per config.json)
+  - Tag `v0.5.4` (final phase patch = milestone release per feature-milestone promotion)
+  - Create Gitea release with full milestone summary (all phases, all REQs)
+- [ ] **Complete milestone**:
+  - Update `.ciagent/REQUIREMENTS.md` — mark REQ-047..052 as Complete
+  - Update `.ciagent/ROADMAP.md` — mark v0.6 as complete
+  - Update `.ciagent/CHECKPOINT.json` — `milestone_complete: true`
+  - Commit: `docs(milestone): complete node-bootstrap-proxmox`
+
+### Verification
+
+- `git log --oneline main..milestone/v0.6` shows all phase commits in order
+- `git tag --list v0.5.*` shows v0.5.0..v0.5.4
+- `main` branch contains all v0.6 work (fast-forward merge)
+- `orca init && orca doctor` on a fresh checkout passes end-to-end
+- Gitea release `v0.5.4` exists with milestone summary
+
+---
+
+## Wave Ordering
+
+- **Wave 1** (Phases 1-2): Schema + init bootstrap (P01) is a hard
+  prerequisite for Proxmox join (P02) — P02 depends on the `Node.Kind`/
+  `OS` fields + migration 0006 from P01. `parallelization.enabled=false`
+  → sequential.
+- **Wave 2** (Phase 3): Doctor extensions depend on both P01 (localhost
+  node + os field for `doctor os`) and P02 (proxmox nodes + SSH client
+  for `doctor proxmox`).
+- **Wave 3** (Phase 4): Final review + ship + audit — covers all
+  execution phases.
+
+For v0.6, `parallelization.enabled=false` — phases run sequentially.
+
+## Versioning
+
+- **Milestone type**: `feature` (P01/P02/P03 ship `feat` phases)
+- **Patch per phase**: `v0.5.0` (P0), `v0.5.1` (P01), `v0.5.2` (P02), `v0.5.3` (P03), `v0.5.4` (P04 final = milestone release)
+- Tags run on the previous minor's patch line (v0.5.x) per branch-strategy.md
+- Milestone branch label: `milestone/v0.6-node-bootstrap-proxmox` (uses milestone number, not tag line)
+
+## Requirement Coverage Matrix
+
+| REQ | Phase | Persona lead | Must-haves |
+|-----|-------|-------------|------------|
+| REQ-047 | P01 | backend-engineer | init.go full bootstrap (CA + cert + db + localhost node, idempotent) |
+| REQ-048 | P01 | backend-engineer + cli-engineer | detectOS() from /etc/os-release + localhost node registration |
+| REQ-049 | P01 | data-engineer | migration 0006 + Node.Kind/OS + NodeRepo schema extension |
+| REQ-050 | P02 | security-engineer + backend-engineer | proxmox.BootstrapProxmox SSH dance + sshkey.go + certpaths SSH paths |
+| REQ-051 | P02 | security-engineer | OrcaOperator PVE role + orca@pam user + sudoers NOEXEC design |
+| REQ-052 | P03 | backend-engineer + security-engineer | doctor OS() + Proxmox() + audit logging of all bootstrap/join actions |

.ciagent/PLAN_v0.7.md

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+# Phase Plans: Orca v0.7 — Hardening & Completion
+
+All 4 execution phases + final review with vertical-slice structure, wave
+ordering, and REQ-ID mapping. v0.7 scope: **Hardening & Completion** —
+register the unreachable `orca cert` command, add HCL config file parsing,
+uplift test coverage in core packages, and add the long-deferred pprof
+endpoint.
+
+Branching: `phase/01-cert-register`..`phase/05-final-review-ship` on the
+`milestone/v0.7-hardening-completion` branch (numbering restarts per
+milestone per branch-strategy.md).
+
+Milestone type: **NFR** (all phases are fix/test/chore; no `feat` phases).
+Tags run on the v0.6.x patch line: `v0.6.0` (P0) … `v0.6.5` (P05 =
+milestone release).
+
+---
+
+## Phase 1: Register `orca cert` Command Tree + cert_repo Tests (Wave 1)
+
+**Branch**: `phase/01-cert-register`
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-053
+**Persona leads**: lead-developer (cert registration + smoke test), data-engineer (cert_repo tests)
+**Source ideas**: I-401, I-402, I-412
+
+### Must-Haves
+
+#### lead-developer territory
+- [ ] `internal/cli/cert.go` — add `init()` that calls `rootCmd.AddCommand(NewCommand(slog.Default()))`. This is the one-line fix that makes the entire `cert ca-init | gen | show | renew | fingerprint` tree reachable. (AD-022)
+- [ ] `internal/cli/cert_test.go` (NEW) — regression test asserting `rootCmd.Commands()` contains a child whose `Use == "cert"`; assert each subcommand (`ca-init`, `gen`, `show`, `renew`, `fingerprint`) is present on the cert child.
+- [ ] `internal/cli/cert_smoke_test.go` (NEW) — end-to-end smoke test against a temp `ORCA_HOME`:
+  - [ ] `orca cert ca-init --cn test-ca` → succeeds, `ca.crt` + `ca.key` exist with modes 0644/0600
+  - [ ] `orca cert gen --cn test-server --san localhost --san 127.0.0.1` → succeeds, `server.crt` + `server.key` exist with modes 0644/0600
+  - [ ] `orca cert show` → outputs PEM with no `PRIVATE KEY` blocks (REQ-035 redaction)
+  - [ ] `orca cert fingerprint --which ca` → outputs a 64-char hex SHA-256
+  - [ ] `orca cert fingerprint --which server` → outputs a 64-char hex SHA-256
+  - [ ] `orca cert renew` → succeeds, server cert file mtime updates
+- [ ] `internal/cli/root_test.go` — extend the existing root test to assert `orca cert` is in the command tree (belt-and-suspenders with cert_test.go)
+
+#### data-engineer territory
+- [ ] `internal/store/cert_repo_test.go` (NEW) — table-driven tests for `CertRepo`:
+  - [ ] `Insert` a cert row → `Get` by serial returns matching row
+  - [ ] `Insert` duplicate `serial_hex` → returns error (UNIQUE constraint, I-107)
+  - [ ] `List` returns certs ordered by `issued_at desc`
+  - [ ] Rotation history: Insert 4 certs for the same node → only last N=3 retained (REQ-025); oldest is pruned
+  - [ ] `GetActive` returns the most-recent cert for a node
+  - [ ] `Delete` removes a cert by serial
+
+### Verification
+
+- `go build ./...` PASS
+- `go vet ./...` PASS
+- `go test ./internal/cli/... ./internal/store/...` PASS
+- `go test -race ./...` PASS
+- `./bin/orca cert` → prints help (no longer "unknown command")
+- `./bin/orca cert ca-init` on a temp `ORCA_HOME` → succeeds
+- `./bin/orca cert show` → no private key material in output (REQ-035)
+- cert_repo_test.go covers Insert/Get/List/rotation-prune/duplicate-serial
+
+---
+
+## Phase 2: HCL Config File Parsing (Wave 1)
+
+**Branch**: `phase/02-config-parser`
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-054
+**Persona leads**: backend-engineer (config package), lead-developer (root command --config flag wiring)
+**Source ideas**: I-406, I-408
+**Depends on**: Phase 1 (cert registration lands first so the CLI surface is complete before config extends it)
+
+### Must-Haves
+
+#### backend-engineer territory
+- [ ] `internal/config/config.go` (NEW package) — `Config` struct with HCL tags:
+  - [ ] `DBPath string `hcl:"db_path,optional"``
+  - [ ] `ListenAddr string `hcl:"listen_addr,optional"``
+  - [ ] `CAPath string `hcl:"ca_path,optional"``
+  - [ ] `ServerCertPath string `hcl:"server_cert_path,optional"``
+  - [ ] `ServerKeyPath string `hcl:"server_key_path,optional"``
+  - [ ] `NodeCapacity *CapacityConfig `hcl:"node_capacity,block"` (optional block)
+  - [ ] `Load(paths ...string) (*Config, error)` — loads the first existing file from `paths` via `hclsimple.Decode` (reuse the jobspec pattern, `internal/jobspec/spec.go:40`); returns a zero-value `Config` if no file exists (no error)
+  - [ ] `(*Config).MergeOverrides(flags Flags, env Environ) *Config` — applies precedence flag > env > file > default (D-039). Only non-zero flag values override; only set env vars override; file values are the base; missing fields fall back to `certpaths.*` defaults.
+  - [ ] No package-level state (AD-023). `Load` is a pure function.
+- [ ] `internal/config/config_test.go` (NEW) — table-driven tests:
+  - [ ] Load from a valid HCL file → all fields populated
+  - [ ] Load from a missing file → zero Config, no error
+  - [ ] Load from a malformed HCL file → error
+  - [ ] MergeOverrides: flag wins over env wins over file wins over default (all 4 layers exercised)
+  - [ ] MergeOverrides: empty flag does NOT override a set env value
+  - [ ] MergeOverrides: empty env does NOT override a set file value
+  - [ ] Optional `node_capacity` block parsed correctly
+
+#### lead-developer territory
+- [ ] `internal/cli/root.go` — add `--config string` persistent flag (default `""`). In `PersistentPreRunE`, if `--config` is set, call `config.Load(flag)` and stash the `*Config` in `cmd.Context()` via a context key. If `--config` is empty, `config.Load` is not called (zero overhead; existing flag/env behavior unchanged).
+- [ ] `internal/cli/daemon.go` — in the daemon command, if a `*Config` is present in the context, use `cfg.ListenAddr` as the default addr (flag still overrides per D-039).
+- [ ] `internal/cli/root_test.go` — extend with `--config <tmpfile>` test: pass a config file, assert the merged values reach the daemon command.
+- [ ] `testdata/config.hcl` (NEW) — example config file for tests:
+  ```hcl
+  db_path       = "/tmp/orca/test.db"
+  listen_addr   = "127.0.0.1:9999"
+  ca_path       = "/tmp/orca/ca.crt"
+  server_cert_path = "/tmp/orca/server.crt"
+  server_key_path  = "/tmp/orca/server.key"
+  ```
+
+### Verification
+
+- `go build ./...` PASS
+- `go vet ./...` PASS
+- `go test ./internal/config/... ./internal/cli/...` PASS
+- `go test -race ./...` PASS
+- `./bin/orca --config testdata/config.hcl daemon --help` → no error
+- Precedence test: flag value overrides config file value for the same key
+- No new direct deps (`hashicorp/hcl/v2` already in go.mod)
+
+---
+
+## Phase 3: Test Coverage Uplift (Wave 1)
+
+**Branch**: `phase/03-coverage-uplift`
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-055
+**Persona leads**: lead-developer (engine/transport/audit tests), data-engineer (store coverage)
+**Source ideas**: I-403, I-404, I-405, I-410
+**Depends on**: Phase 1 + Phase 2 (tests build on the now-reachable cert tree + config package)
+
+### Must-Haves
+
+#### lead-developer territory — internal/engine
+- [ ] `internal/engine/executor_test.go` (NEW) — test `Executor.Start`/`Wait` lifecycle:
+  - [ ] Start a command (`/bin/echo hello`) → Wait → exit code 0, stdout captured
+  - [ ] Start a failing command (`/bin/false`) → exit code non-zero
+  - [ ] Cancel via ctx → process killed, `WaitDelay` honored (REQ-021)
+  - [ ] Env propagation: `Env=["FOO=bar"]` → child process sees `FOO=bar`
+- [ ] `internal/engine/dispatcher_test.go` (NEW) — test `Dispatcher.Submit`/`Dispatch`:
+  - [ ] Submit a job → dispatched to the correct peer (mock peer client)
+  - [ ] Idempotency key present → retry on transient failure (mock returns error twice then succeeds)
+  - [ ] Idempotency key absent → no retry (REQ-037)
+  - [ ] Bounded queue backpressure: fill the channel → Submit blocks (with timeout assertion)
+- [ ] `internal/engine/peer_test.go` (NEW) — test the peer HTTP client:
+  - [ ] `httptest.NewTLSServer` mock → peer client POSTs a dispatch request
+  - [ ] TLS handshake failure → structured error with `peer` + `err` fields
+
+#### lead-developer territory — internal/transport
+- [ ] `internal/transport/mtls_test.go` (NEW) — test mTLS handshake:
+  - [ ] `httptest.NewTLSServer` with a test CA → client with valid cert handshakes OK
+  - [ ] Client with expired cert → handshake fails with `event=mtls.handshake` log assertion
+  - [ ] Client with wrong CA → handshake fails
+- [ ] `internal/transport/dispatch_test.go` (NEW) — test `Dispatch` RPC:
+  - [ ] Successful dispatch → 200 OK
+  - [ ] Dispatch with `X-Orca-Idempotency-Key` → idempotent
+  - [ ] Dispatch without key → 400 (per REQ-037)
+- [ ] `internal/transport/handshake_log_test.go` (NEW) — assert `LogHandshakeOK`/`LogHandshakeFailed` emit the correct slog fields (`event`, `peer`, `cert_fp`, `err`)
+
+#### lead-developer territory — internal/audit
+- [ ] `internal/audit/audit_test.go` (NEW) — test the `Audit` wrapper:
+  - [ ] `Emit` with `ActionCertIssued` + `ResultSuccess` → `engine.Record` called with correct args (mock `engine.Audit`)
+  - [ ] `EmitWithErr` → `engine.Record` called with `result=failure` + err in metadata
+  - [ ] `LogHandshakeOK` → slog output contains `event=mtls.handshake`, `result=ok`, `peer`, `cert_fp`
+  - [ ] `LogHandshakeFailed` → slog output contains `result=failed` + `err`
+  - [ ] Nil-safe: `(*Audit)(nil).Emit(...)` → no panic
+
+#### data-engineer territory — internal/proxmox
+- [ ] `internal/proxmox/bootstrap_test.go` — extend the existing test:
+  - [ ] Mock the `sshDialer` interface (already present at `bootstrap.go:211`) → assert the full bootstrap sequence calls the right shell commands in order (user create, role create, role assign, sudoers drop, pubkey deploy)
+  - [ ] Idempotent re-run: mock returns "already exists" for user create → bootstrap succeeds without re-creating
+  - [ ] SSH auth failure → bootstrap returns wrapped error
+  - [ ] Assert no password is logged (D-031)
+
+#### CI gate (I-410)
+- [ ] `.coreci.yml` — add a `coverage-gate` step in the `test` pipeline that runs `go test -cover ./internal/engine ./internal/transport ./internal/proxmox ./internal/audit` and fails if any package < 50% (AD-025). Use a small shell snippet + `awk`/`grep` to parse coverage percentages.
+
+### Verification
+
+- `go build ./...` PASS
+- `go test -race ./...` PASS
+- `go test -cover ./internal/engine` → ≥ 50% (was 8.3%)
+- `go test -cover ./internal/transport` → ≥ 50% (was 26.3%)
+- `go test -cover ./internal/proxmox` → ≥ 50% (was 5.1%)
+- `go test -cover ./internal/audit` → ≥ 50% (was 0%)
+- CI coverage gate step passes
+- Any races uncovered by `-race` are fixed in this phase (not deferred)
+
+---
+
+## Phase 4: `--pprof` Opt-in on `orca daemon` (Wave 1)
+
+**Branch**: `phase/04-pprof-daemon`
+**REQ Coverage**: REQ-056
+**Persona leads**: lead-developer (daemon flag + pprof server)
+**Source ideas**: I-407, I-409
+**Depends on**: Phase 3 (daemon tests exist; pprof adds a new daemon path)
+
+### Must-Haves
+
+#### lead-developer territory
+- [ ] `internal/daemon/pprof.go` (NEW) — `StartPprof(addr string, log *slog.Logger) (*http.Server, error)`:
+  - [ ] Create a dedicated `*http.ServeMux` (NOT `http.DefaultServeMux`)
+  - [ ] `import _ "net/http/pprof"` → register `pprof.Index`, `pprof.Cmdline`, `pprof.Profile`, `pprof.Symbol`, `pprof.Trace`, `pprof.Handler` on the dedicated mux
+  - [ ] Return a `*http.Server` listening on `addr` with the dedicated mux
+  - [ ] Log a WARN: `pprof endpoint exposed unauthenticated on <addr> — operator-only, do not expose publicly`
+  - [ ] Never touch the mTLS daemon listener (AD-024)
+- [ ] `internal/daemon/server.go` — add a `pprofAddr string` field to `Options` (default `""` = disabled). In `Start`, if `pprofAddr != ""`, call `StartPprof` and store the `*http.Server` for `Shutdown`.
+- [ ] `internal/daemon/pprof_test.go` (NEW) — test:
+  - [ ] `StartPprof("127.0.0.1:0", ...)` → server starts, GET `/debug/pprof/` returns 200
+  - [ ] GET `/debug/pprof/cmdline` returns the cmdline
+  - [ ] `Shutdown` stops the pprof server
+  - [ ] The mTLS daemon server (if running) is unaffected by pprof start/stop
+- [ ] `internal/cli/daemon.go` — add `--pprof string` flag (default `""` = disabled). Pass it into `daemon.Options.PprofAddr`. Document in `--help`: "enable pprof endpoint on <addr> (e.g. :6060); unauthenticated, operator-only".
+- [ ] `internal/cli/daemon_test.go` — extend: `--pprof 127.0.0.1:0` → daemon starts with pprof; flag absent → no pprof server.
+
+### Verification
+
+- `go build ./...` PASS
+- `go vet ./...` PASS
+- `go test -race ./internal/daemon/...` PASS
+- `./bin/orca daemon --pprof 127.0.0.1:0` (in background) → `curl http://127.0.0.1:<port>/debug/pprof/` returns 200
+- `./bin/orca daemon` (no `--pprof`) → no pprof listener, `/debug/pprof/` not reachable on the daemon port
+- pprof mux is separate from the mTLS daemon mux (asserted in test)
+
+---
+
+## Phase 5: Final Review + Ship + Audit (Wave 1)
+
+**Branch**: `phase/05-final-review-ship`
+**REQ Coverage**: all (REQ-053..056)
+**Persona leads**: lead-developer (review + audit + ship)
+
+### Must-Haves
+
+- [ ] Multi-persona code review across all v0.7 phases (ciagent-review)
+- [ ] Audit: reconstruction test (git log matches `.ciagent/` files), branch hygiene, commit discipline (ciagent-audit)
+- [ ] Fix any P0 issues found by review; record P1+ in `.ciagent/` for post-hoc
+- [ ] Merge `phase/05` → `milestone/v0.7-hardening-completion`
+- [ ] Merge `milestone/v0.7` → `main` (rebase-then-fast-forward per config)
+- [ ] Tag `v0.6.5` (final phase patch = milestone release)
+- [ ] Create Gitea release with full milestone summary (all phases, all REQs)
+- [ ] Update `.ciagent/REQUIREMENTS.md` — mark REQ-053..056 complete
+- [ ] Update `.ciagent/ROADMAP.md` — mark v0.7 complete
+- [ ] Write checkpoint: `{phase: 5, stage: "complete", phase_role: "final", milestone_complete: true}`
+- [ ] Clear checkpoint (milestone complete; next run starts a new milestone)
+
+### Verification
+
+- `make build` PASS
+- `make test` PASS
+- `make lint` PASS
+- `go vet ./...` PASS
+- `git log` on main shows all v0.7 phase commits
+- `git tag --list 'v0.6.*'` shows v0.6.0..v0.6.5
+- REQUIREMENTS.md shows REQ-053..056 as Complete
+- ROADMAP.md shows v0.7 as COMPLETE

.ciagent/PROJECT.md

@@ -104,3 +104,230 @@ auto-resolved under full autonomy and are summarized here:
   (pull-based, ctx cancellation, ctrl-c via `signal.NotifyContext`).
 - **D-018: Bin-packing by CPU/memory with FIFO within node; JSON-over-HTTP
   orca.v1.Dispatch for cross-node** (no ConnectRPC dep).
+
+## v0.3 Clarified Decisions (D-series, full autonomy)
+
+v0.3 is a lean 2-execution-phase milestone completing the streaming and
+doctor work deferred from v0.2. The 6 v0.3 decisions (D-019..D-024)
+were auto-resolved under full autonomy:
+
+| ID | Question | Decision | Rationale | Confidence |
+|----|----------|----------|-----------|------------|
+| D-019 | Watch refresh mechanism? | **Poll-based, 1s ticker** | Simpler than event channel; no daemon coupling for CLI; matches offline-first. | 0.90 |
+| D-020 | Watch output format (REQ-030)? | **Table by default; `--watch --json` streams one-line JSON per event** | Consistent with D-005 `--json` convention; serves humans + AI agents. | 0.92 |
+| D-021 | Doctor network check scope? | **Probe configured peer addresses via mTLS `/healthz` handshake; PASS/WARN/FAIL per peer** | Reuses existing transport client; read-only. | 0.85 |
+| D-022 | Doctor db check scope? | **`PRAGMA integrity_check` + migration version query** | Already specced in ARCHITECTURE.md §5; minimal surface. | 0.95 |
+| D-023 | iter.Seq cancellation? | **`signal.NotifyContext` on SIGINT/SIGTERM** | Per D-017 + ARCHITECTURE Flow 4. | 0.95 |
+| D-024 | `--watch` applies to job list only, or node list too? | **Both `orca job list --watch` and `orca node list --watch`** | Per ARCHITECTURE.md CLI layer + D-017. | 0.92 |
+
+## v0.3 Scope Summary
+
+v0.3 is a focused 2-execution-phase milestone completing the work
+deferred from v0.2 that was NOT already shipped in P08-P10. A codebase
+audit during re-init SPECIFY confirmed that REQ-014, REQ-027, REQ-028,
+REQ-029, REQ-031, REQ-037, REQ-039, REQ-040 all shipped in P08-P10
+despite stale REQUIREMENTS.md marking them Pending. The remaining work:
+
+- **P01 — `iter.Seq` streaming for `--watch` flags.** Go 1.25+
+  range-over-func semantics, pull-based `iter.Seq[Job]` /
+  `iter.Seq[Node]`, `context.Context` cancellation,
+  `signal.NotifyContext` on ctrl-c. Applies to both `orca job list
+  --watch` and `orca node list --watch`. Covers REQ-022, REQ-030.
+- **P02 — `orca doctor` network + db full implementation.** Replaces
+  the P01 stubs (`NetworkStub`, `DBStub`) with real checks: peer
+  reachability via mTLS `/healthz` probe; SQLite `PRAGMA
+  integrity_check` + migration version. Covers REQ-032 (completion).
+
+The vision ("minimalist, offline-first, CLI-first orchestration
+engine") is unchanged. v0.3 is a completion milestone, not a direction
+change.
+
+## v0.5 Scope Summary — Distribution
+
+v0.5 is a 3-execution-phase milestone that makes Orca installable,
+distributable, and containerized. The engine functionality from
+v0.1–v0.3 is unchanged; this milestone is purely about **delivery
+surface**:
+
+- **P01 — Namespace unification.** A single `ORCA_HOME` environment
+  variable becomes the namespace root for *all* on-disk state (db,
+  certs, init, daemon). A `--system` flag on the root command selects
+  the system-level namespace root `/root/.orca`. Backward compatible:
+  empty `ORCA_HOME` → `~/.orca`. Covers REQ-041, REQ-042.
+- **P02 — `install.sh` + in-place update.** A 1-liner installer pulls
+  the release binary from the public Gitea release URL, installs at
+  user level by default (`~/.local/bin/orca`) or system level
+  (`/usr/local/bin/orca`) with `--system`. Re-running updates the
+  binary in place while preserving config/db/certs in the namespace
+  dir. Idempotent. Covers REQ-043, REQ-044. Also updates README
+  quickstart (REQ-016 completion).
+- **P03 — Docker release.** A multi-stage `Dockerfile` builds a
+  distroless image; `scripts/release.sh` and `.coreci.yml` publish the
+  image to the Gitea container registry per release. Covers REQ-046.
+- **P04 — Final review + ship + audit.** Milestone release.
+
+The vision ("minimalist, offline-first, CLI-first orchestration
+engine") is unchanged. v0.5 is a distribution milestone, not a
+direction change.
+
+## v0.5 Clarified Decisions (D-series, full autonomy)
+
+The 5 v0.5 decisions (D-025..D-029) were auto-resolved under full
+autonomy during the CLARIFY stage:
+
+| ID | Question | Decision | Rationale | Confidence |
+|----|----------|----------|-----------|------------|
+| D-025 | System-level namespace path layout? | **`/root/.orca`** (mirror of user-level `~/.orca`) | Consistent shape with user-level; just a different root. Matches the user's "starts at /root" wording. Single dir keeps it simple. | 0.90 |
+| D-026 | Namespace override mechanism at runtime? | **Unify on `ORCA_HOME`** as single namespace root for all components (db, certs, init, daemon). Add `--system` flag that sets root to `/root/.orca`. | `ORCA_HOME` already exists for certs; extend to all components. Backward compatible (empty → `~/.orca`). One knob, not many. | 0.92 |
+| D-027 | Docker registry target? | **Gitea built-in container registry** (`git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca`) | Keeps everything in one forge; uses Gitea's native registry. Consistent with REQ-045 (public repo → public image pulls). | 0.88 |
+| D-028 | How to make releases publicly accessible (REQ-045)? | **Flip repo visibility to public** via `tea repos edit coreci/orca --private=false` during P0 ship | Simplest path to anonymous downloads; enables both install.sh pulls and docker pulls. Pre-existing `.env` leak already suppressed via gitleaks baseline + rotate-forward (commit 00127ce). | 0.85 |
+| D-029 | install.sh default version? | **Latest release** (query Gitea releases API), optional `--version vX.Y.Z` to pin | Matches typical 1-liner installer UX; users get newest by default, can pin for reproducibility. | 0.92 |
+
+### v0.5 Operational prerequisite (P0 ship)
+
+The Gitea repo `coreci/orca` is currently **private** (returns 404
+unauthenticated). P0 ship flips visibility to public via `tea repos
+edit coreci/orca --private=false` so that `install.sh` can pull
+release binaries unauthenticated (REQ-045). This is an operational
+step performed during the P0 ship, verified by an unauth `curl`
+against the releases API.
+
+## v0.6 Scope Summary — Node Bootstrap & Proxmox
+
+v0.6 is a 3-execution-phase milestone that turns `orca init` from a
+bare `mkdir` into a full single-node cluster bootstrap, and adds
+Proxmox 8 & 9 as a first-class remote node type joined over SSH with
+least-privilege role delegation. The engine functionality from
+v0.1–v0.5 is unchanged; this milestone is about **bootstrap
+ergonomics** and **heterogeneous node support**:
+
+- **P01 — `orca init` full bootstrap.** A single `orca init` call now:
+  (a) creates the namespace dir (`~/.orca` or `/root/.orca` with
+  `--system`); (b) runs all DB migrations including the new 0006
+  (`nodes.kind`, `nodes.os` — backward-compatible nullable columns);
+  (c) bootstraps the internal CA via `security.CAInit` if `ca.crt` is
+  absent; (d) generates the server cert via `security.GenerateCSR` +
+  `ca.SignCSR` if `server.crt` is absent; (e) auto-detects the local
+  OS via `/etc/os-release` `ID=` field (ubuntu/debian/alpine); (f)
+  registers a `localhost` node with `kind=localhost`, `os=<detected>`,
+  `addr=localhost:8443` if no localhost node exists yet. After
+  `orca init`, `orca doctor` MUST pass with zero FAILs. Idempotent:
+  re-running `orca init` is a no-op (or refresh) for already-provisioned
+  artifacts. Covers REQ-047, REQ-048, REQ-049.
+- **P02 — Proxmox SSH join.** `orca node join --type proxmox --host
+  <addr> --user root --password <pw>` (password via flag or
+  `$ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD`, **never persisted**) bootstraps a remote
+  Proxmox 8/9 host via `golang.org/x/crypto/ssh` (new direct dep).
+  Steps: (1) SSH password-auth; (2) generate or load orca's SSH
+  keypair (`~/.orca/orca_ssh_key` / `.pub`, 0600/0644); (3) deploy
+  pubkey to remote `~orca/.ssh/authorized_keys`; (4) create `orca`
+  user (config-overridable name via `--proxmox-user`, default `orca`);
+  (5) create PVE custom role `OrcaOperator` (config-overridable via
+  `--proxmox-role`) with privileges `VM.Audit`,
+  `Datastore.AllocateSpace`, `SDN.Use`; (6) assign role to `orca`
+  user on `/`; (7) drop `/etc/sudoers.d/orca` allowlist (`pct`, `qm`,
+  `pvesh`, `apt-get`, `dpkg` — no shell-escape commands); (8) record
+  node row `kind=proxmox`, `os=pve`, audit log. Idempotent re-run.
+  Covers REQ-050, REQ-051.
+- **P03 — `doctor os` + `doctor proxmox`.** Extends `orca doctor`
+  with two new checks: `doctor os` re-runs `/etc/os-release` detection
+  and verifies it matches the stored localhost node row's `os` field
+  (drift = WARN); `doctor proxmox` iterates `kind=proxmox` nodes and
+  SSH-probes each with `pveversion` / `pvecmd status` (3s timeout per
+  peer per D-038 pattern), reporting PASS/WARN/FAIL per node. All
+  bootstrap + join actions emit structured audit-log entries. Covers
+  REQ-052.
+- **P04 — Final review + ship + audit.** Milestone release.
+
+The vision ("minimalist, offline-first, CLI-first orchestration
+engine") is unchanged. v0.6 is a bootstrap-ergonomics + heterogeneous-
+nodes milestone, not a direction change.
+
+## v0.6 Clarified Decisions (D-series, full autonomy)
+
+The 8 v0.6 decisions (D-030..D-037) were resolved during the CLARIFY
+stage — D-030..D-034 confirmed by the operator in plan mode, D-035..D-037
+auto-resolved at full autonomy within the `clarify_budget`:
+
+| ID | Question | Decision | Rationale | Confidence |
+|----|----------|----------|-----------|------------|
+| D-030 | SSH library for Proxmox join? | **`golang.org/x/crypto/ssh`** | Stdlib-adjacent, well-maintained, single new direct dep. Matches orca's minimal-deps ethos. Shell-out to `/usr/bin/ssh` would require openssh-client on the orca host and complicate password-auth + idempotent pubkey deploy. | 0.92 (operator-confirmed) |
+| D-031 | Proxmox join password handling? | **Flag/env only, never persisted** | `--password` flag or `$ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD` is used once to deploy the orca pubkey + create the `orca` user; the password is never written to SQLite. Subsequent orca→Proxmox access uses the deployed SSH key. | 0.95 (operator-confirmed) |
+| D-032 | Localhost OS auto-detect signal? | **`/etc/os-release` `ID=` field** | Parse `ID=` from `/etc/os-release`; map `ubuntu`/`debian`/`alpine` → node `os`. Falls back to `linux` (unknown) if none match. Simplest reliable signal across the three target distros. | 0.93 (operator-confirmed) |
+| D-033 | Least-privilege Proxmox role granularity? | **Custom PVE role `OrcaOperator`** with `VM.Audit`, `Datastore.AllocateSpace`, `SDN.Use` + `/etc/sudoers.d/orca` allowlist (`pct`, `qm`, `pvesh`, `apt-get`, `dpkg`) | Config-overridable role + user names. Sufficient for "manage the host, VMs/CTs, storage, packages" without granting root shell. Built-in `PVEAuditor` is too read-only; full `Administrator` is too broad. | 0.88 (operator-confirmed) |
+| D-034 | Node kind/os schema? | **Add `nodes.kind` + `nodes.os` columns via migration 0006** | Schema-first, queryable, doctor can branch on kind. Nullable with `localhost`/`""` defaults for existing rows (backward-compatible). data-engineer owns the migration. | 0.94 (operator-confirmed) |
+| D-035 | SSH host-key verification on first Proxmox connect? | **TOFU: pin on first connect, refuse on mismatch thereafter** | First connect uses `ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey` to capture the host key; it is then persisted to `~/.orca/known_hosts` (or the nodes metadata) and all subsequent connects require a match. Balances first-run ergonomics against MITM risk on subsequent runs. Switching to pre-pinned keys is a future enhancement. | 0.82 (auto) |
+| D-036 | `orca init` idempotency semantics for already-provisioned artifacts? | **Skip-and-refresh, never overwrite** | If `ca.crt` exists → load it (no regen). If `server.crt` exists → keep it (no reissue). If a localhost node row exists → update `last_seen` + re-detect `os`, never insert a duplicate. If DB migrations are ahead → no-op. If `~/.orca` exists → MkdirAll is a no-op. Idempotent re-run is a hard requirement (REQ-047). | 0.95 (auto) |
+| D-037 | orca SSH keypair location + algorithm? | **`~/.orca/orca_ssh_key` (0600) + `~/.orca/orca_ssh_key.pub` (0644), Ed25519** | Ed25519 keys are smaller, faster, and more secure than RSA for SSH auth. Stored in the orca namespace dir alongside ca.crt/server.crt so `ORCA_HOME` relocation works. File modes mirror the cert file-mode discipline (REQ-033 spirit). Generated lazily on first `orca node join --type proxmox`, not at `orca init` (localhost doesn't need SSH). | 0.90 (auto) |
+
+### v0.6 clarification notes
+
+- **D-035 TOFU caveat**: TOFU (trust-on-first-use) is the standard SSH
+  UX and matches the operator-mediated model from D-012 (CA cert
+  distribution). The operator is expected to verify the host key
+  fingerprint out-of-band on first connect if the network is
+  untrusted. A future milestone may add `--host-key-fingerprint` pin
+  flag to `orca node join --type proxmox` for pre-pinned deployments.
+- **D-036 idempotency**: re-running `orca init` on a node that already
+  has a localhost row updates `last_seen` and re-detects `os` (in case
+  the host OS was upgraded) but does NOT change the node `ID` or
+  `joined_at`. This makes `orca init` safe to put in a systemd
+  ExecStartPre or a config-management runbook.
+- **D-037 Ed25519**: `golang.org/x/crypto/ssh` + `golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519`
+  are in the same module; no additional direct dep beyond D-030.
+
+## v0.7 Clarified Decisions (D-series, full autonomy)
+
+The 5 v0.7 decisions (D-038..D-042) were auto-resolved at full autonomy
+within the `clarify_budget` (10):
+
+| ID | Question | Decision | Rationale | Confidence |
+|----|----------|----------|-----------|------------|
+| D-038 | Config file format — HCL or YAML? | **HCL** | D-009 already specced `config.hcl`. HCL is already a direct dep (hashicorp/hcl/v2 for jobspec). Adding YAML would introduce a second parser dep — violates minimal-deps. Use the existing `hclparse` pkg from jobspec. | 0.93 |
+| D-039 | Config precedence order (flag vs env vs file vs default)? | **flag > env > file > default** | Standard layered config: the most explicit (flag) wins, then the runtime (env), then the persisted (file), then the built-in default. Matches cobra/viper convention without the viper dep. | 0.92 |
+| D-040 | pprof security — bind to localhost only, or operator-chosen addr? | **Operator-chosen `--pprof <addr>` (default disabled)** | Default disabled keeps the minimalist posture. Operator picks the addr — localhost for dev, unix socket for prod. Separate mux so it never touches the mTLS daemon listener. No auth (pprof is operator-only, addr is the gate). | 0.85 |
+| D-041 | cert command registration — where in root command order? | **After `cert` is unreachable today, append after `node` in rootCmd.AddCommand order** | Alphabetical-ish with the existing cluster (audit, daemon, doctor, init, job, node, cert, status, version). No behavior change to existing commands. | 0.88 |
+| D-042 | Coverage target — 50% floor or higher? | **50% floor per package, 70% target for new packages** | 50% is achievable for the concurrent packages (engine, transport) without heroic mock effort; 70% is the floor for new code in P02/P04. Avoids a "raise coverage everywhere" rathole. | 0.85 |
+
+## v0.7 Scope Summary — Hardening & Completion
+
+v0.7 is a 4-execution-phase **NFR milestone** that closes out gaps
+surfaced by the v0.7 IDEATE stage: an unreachable command tree, a
+missing config file layer, low test coverage in core packages, and the
+long-deferred pprof endpoint. The engine functionality from v0.1–v0.6
+is unchanged; this milestone is purely about **correctness, coverage,
+and operability**:
+
+- **P01 — Register `orca cert` command tree + cert_repo tests.** The
+  `internal/cli/cert.go` command (`cert ca-init`, `cert gen`, `cert
+  show`, `cert renew`, `cert fingerprint`) is fully implemented but
+  never wired into `rootCmd`. This phase adds the missing
+  `rootCmd.AddCommand(newCertCmd(...))` and adds the missing
+  `internal/store/cert_repo_test.go`. Covers REQ-053.
+- **P02 — HCL config file parsing (`config.hcl`).** D-009 specified
+  `~/.orca/config.hcl` and `/etc/orca/orca.hcl` as config locations,
+  but no HCL config-file parser exists — the CLI relies entirely on
+  flags and env vars. This phase adds a minimal `internal/config`
+  package that loads `config.hcl` (keys: `db_path`, `listen_addr`,
+  `ca_path`, `server_cert_path`, `server_key_path`, `node_capacity`),
+  merges with env/flag overrides (flag > env > file > default), and
+  surfaces it via `--config` flag on the root command. Covers
+  REQ-054.
+- **P03 — Test coverage uplift.** Adds tests for the lowest-coverage
+  packages: `internal/engine` (executor, dispatcher, peer — currently
+  8.3%), `internal/transport` (mtls, dispatch, handshake_log —
+  currently 26.3%), `internal/proxmox` (bootstrap SSH path —
+  currently 5.1%), and `internal/audit` (no tests). Target: every
+  package ≥ 50% coverage. Covers REQ-055.
+- **P04 — `--pprof` opt-in on `orca daemon`.** Adds the long-deferred
+  I-308 pprof endpoint behind an opt-in `--pprof <addr>` flag (default
+  disabled). `net/http/pprof` mounted on a separate mux so it never
+  touches the mTLS daemon listener. Covers REQ-056.
+- **P05 — Final review + ship + audit.** Milestone release.
+
+The vision ("minimalist, offline-first, CLI-first orchestration
+engine") is unchanged. v0.7 is a hardening milestone, not a direction
+change. Milestone type: NFR (all phases are fix/test/chore); the final
+phase's progressive patch IS the deliverable per `run.md` versioning
+logic. Tags run on the v0.6.x patch line: `v0.6.0` (P0) … `v0.6.5` (P05
+= milestone release).

.ciagent/REQUIREMENTS.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ earlier versions of this file.
 | REQ-011 | mTLS for inter-node communication | Medium | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** (P01 shipped v0.2.1) |
 | REQ-012 | `~/.orca/config.hcl` and `/etc/orca/orca.hcl` config locations | Low | v0.1 P01 | **Complete** (CLI uses `~/.orca/` + `ORCA_DB` env) |
 | REQ-013 | Pre-push git hook triggers CoreCI on every push | High | v0.1 P01 | **Complete** |
-| REQ-014 | `gosec` + `govulncheck` in CI pipeline | High | v0.2 P03 | Pending (P03) |
+| REQ-014 | `gosec` + `govulncheck` in CI pipeline | High | v0.2 P03 | **Complete** (P10 shipped v0.2.3) |
 | REQ-015 | MIT LICENSE | Low | v0.1 P01 | **Complete** |
 | REQ-016 | README.md with quickstart | Medium | v0.1 P01 | **Complete** |
 | REQ-017 | `context.Context` propagation in all I/O | High | v0.1 | **Complete** |
@@ -29,25 +29,31 @@ earlier versions of this file.
 | REQ-019 | Cobra CLI framework | High | v0.1 P01 | **Complete** |
 | REQ-020 | HCL parser integration (`hashicorp/hcl`) | Medium | v0.1 P03 | **Complete** |
 | REQ-021 | `os/exec` with `WaitDelay` (Go 1.25+) | Medium | v0.1 P03 | **Complete** |
-| REQ-022 | `iter.Seq` for streaming job lists (Go 1.25+) | Low | v0.2 P04 | Pending (P04) |
+| REQ-022 | `iter.Seq` for streaming job lists (Go 1.25+) | Low | **v0.3 P01** | **Complete** (v0.3 P01 shipped v0.3.1) |
 | REQ-023 | Self-signed mTLS cert generation | Medium | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** (P01 shipped v0.2.1) |
 | REQ-024 | `Makefile` with standard targets | High | v0.1 P01 | **Complete** |
 | REQ-025 | Bounded cert rotation history: retain last N=3 server certs per node for rollback | Medium | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** (P01 shipped v0.2.1) |
 | REQ-026 | Trusted-CA fingerprint pinned in config; daemon refuses to start on mismatch | High | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** (P01 shipped v0.2.1) |
-| REQ-027 | `govulncheck` runs in offline mode in CI (no `vuln.go.dev` calls; pre-mirrored DB or `-format json` + `jq` gate) | High | v0.2 P03 | Pending (P03) |
-| REQ-028 | HCL/YAML schema for `NodeCapacity` declaration (`orca node join` flag and/or `~/.orca/node.hcl`) | High | v0.2 P02 | Pending (P02) |
-| REQ-029 | `gitleaks` baseline file committed to repo to suppress pre-existing `.env` SHA-1 leak in git history | Medium | v0.2 P03 | Pending (P03) |
-| REQ-030 | `--watch` output format mode: table (default) vs streaming one-line JSON per event | Low | v0.2 P04 | Pending (P04) |
-| REQ-031 | `go test -race` enabled in CI for all v0.2 packages | High | v0.2 P01–P04 | **Complete** for P01 (cross-cutting, verified P01); P02–P04 ongoing |
-| REQ-032 | `orca doctor` subcommand for diagnostics (CA/cert health, db integrity, peer reachability) | Medium | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** for cert checks (P01); network/db are stubs, full impl in P02 |
+| REQ-027 | `govulncheck` runs in offline mode in CI (no `vuln.go.dev` calls; pre-mirrored DB or `-format json` + `jq` gate) | High | v0.2 P03 | **Complete** (P10 shipped v0.2.3) |
+| REQ-028 | HCL/YAML schema for `NodeCapacity` declaration (`orca node join` flag and/or `~/.orca/node.hcl`) | High | v0.2 P02 | **Complete** (P09 shipped v0.2.2; `orca node capacity` CLI) |
+| REQ-029 | `gitleaks` baseline file committed to repo to suppress pre-existing `.env` SHA-1 leak in git history | Medium | v0.2 P03 | **Complete** (P10 shipped v0.2.3) |
+| REQ-030 | `--watch` output format mode: table (default) vs streaming one-line JSON per event | Low | **v0.3 P01** | **Complete** (v0.3 P01 shipped v0.3.1) |
+| REQ-031 | `go test -race` enabled in CI for all v0.2 packages | High | v0.2 P01–P04 | **Complete** (P10; `.coreci.yml` test pipeline runs `-race`) |
+| REQ-032 | `orca doctor` subcommand for diagnostics (CA/cert health, db integrity, peer reachability) | Medium | **v0.2 P01 / v0.3 P02** | **Complete** (cert checks P01 v0.2.1; network + db P02 v0.3.2) |
 | REQ-033 | Cert file mode enforcement: 0600 for keys, 0644 for certs (refuses to start on violation) | High | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** (P01 shipped v0.2.1) |
 | REQ-034 | Cert proactive rotation alarm: structured slog WARN 30 days before `not_after` | Medium | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** (P01 shipped v0.2.1) |
 | REQ-035 | `orca cert show` redacts private key material from default and `--json` output | High | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** (P01 shipped v0.2.1) |
 | REQ-036 | Server cert SAN validation: SAN entries (DNS + IP) populated at sign-time; refuses to sign a CSR without them | High | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** (P01 shipped v0.2.1) |
-| REQ-037 | `X-Orca-Idempotency-Key` header on cross-node POST; dispatcher retries only when header is present | Medium | v0.2 P02 | Pending (P02) |
+| REQ-037 | `X-Orca-Idempotency-Key` header on cross-node POST; dispatcher retries only when header is present | Medium | v0.2 P02 | **Complete** (P09 shipped v0.2.2; `internal/transport/idempotency.go`) |
 | REQ-038 | Structured slog fields for mTLS failures: `event=mtls.handshake`, `peer`, `cert_fp`, `err` | Medium | **v0.2 P01** | **Complete** (P01 shipped v0.2.1) |
-| REQ-039 | `.gitleaks.toml` extended with stopwords for test data paths and CA cert PEM blocks | Medium | v0.2 P03 | Pending (P03) |
-| REQ-040 | `.golangci.yml` unified lint config superseding per-tool invocations | Low | v0.2 P03 | Pending (P03) |
+| REQ-039 | `.gitleaks.toml` extended with stopwords for test data paths and CA cert PEM blocks | Medium | v0.2 P03 | **Complete** (P10 shipped v0.2.3) |
+| REQ-040 | `.golangci.yml` unified lint config superseding per-tool invocations | Low | v0.2 P03 | **Complete** (P10 shipped v0.2.3) |
+| REQ-041 | Unified namespace root via `ORCA_HOME` for all components (db, certs, init, daemon) | High | **v0.5 P1** | **Complete** (P1 shipped v0.4.2) |
+| REQ-042 | `--system` flag selects system-level namespace root `/root/.orca` | High | **v0.5 P1** | **Complete** (P1 shipped v0.4.2) |
+| REQ-043 | `install.sh` 1-liner pulling release binary from public Gitea URL; user-level default, `--system` for system-level | High | **v0.5 P2** | **Complete** (P2 shipped v0.4.3) |
+| REQ-044 | `install.sh` in-place update preserves config/state; idempotent re-run | High | **v0.5 P2** | **Complete** (P2 shipped v0.4.3) |
+| REQ-045 | Gitea repo + releases publicly accessible (unauthenticated download) | High | **v0.5 P0** | **Complete** (P0 ship: repo + org visibility public) |
+| REQ-046 | Docker image published to Gitea container registry per release | Medium | **v0.5 P3** | **Complete** (P3 shipped v0.4.4) |
 
 ## v0.1 Milestone Summary
 
@@ -62,13 +68,66 @@ Plus REQ-025..REQ-040 (16 net-new) added by v0.2 IDEATE stage.
 
 ## v0.2 Milestone Summary
 
-**Status: In Progress** — P01 (mTLS) shipped (v0.2.1). 3 phases remain
-(P02 multi-node scheduling, P03 gosec+govulncheck+gitleaks, P04 iter.Seq).
-P01 covered REQ-011, REQ-023, REQ-025, REQ-026, REQ-031, REQ-032 (partial),
-REQ-033, REQ-034, REQ-035, REQ-036, REQ-038 (10 REQs complete; REQ-032
-complete for cert checks only).
+**Status: Functionally Complete (pending merge to main)** — P08 (mTLS),
+P09 (scheduling), P10 (security scan) all shipped to the
+`milestone/v0.2-networking-observability-security` branch as v0.2.1,
+v0.2.2, v0.2.3. The milestone branch has NOT been merged to main yet.
+REQ-022/030 (iter.Seq streaming) and REQ-032 (doctor network/db) were
+deferred to v0.3.
 
-## Deferred to v0.3
+## v0.3 Milestone Summary
+
+**Status: Complete** — P01 (iter.Seq streaming, v0.3.1) and P02 (doctor
+network+db, v0.3.2) both shipped. REQ-022, REQ-030, REQ-032 all complete.
+Re-init SPECIFY audit confirmed all other v0.2-deferred REQs (014, 027,
+028, 029, 031, 037, 039, 040) already shipped in P08-P10.
+
+## Deferred to v0.4
 
 - pprof endpoint on `orca daemon` (idea I-308, 0.70 confidence): deferred
   to keep v0.2 lean; revisit in v0.3 once P02's dispatcher is stable.
+
+## v0.5 Milestone Summary
+
+**Status: Complete** — all 3 execution phases + final review shipped.
+P0 (v0.4.1), P1 (v0.4.2), P2 (v0.4.3), P3 (v0.4.4), P4 final (v0.4.5).
+REQ-041..046 all complete. Repo + releases publicly accessible (REQ-045).
+Docker image published to Gitea container registry (REQ-046).
+
+- **P0** (v0.4.1): pre-execution + repo visibility flipped to public (REQ-045).
+- **P1** (v0.4.2): namespace unification — `ORCA_HOME` + `--system` (REQ-041/042).
+- **P2** (v0.4.3): `install.sh` 1-liner + in-place update (REQ-043/044) + README quickstart (REQ-016).
+- **P3** (v0.4.4): Docker release — distroless image + Gitea container registry (REQ-046).
+- **P4** (v0.4.5): final review + audit + milestone release.
+
+## v0.6 Requirements — Node Bootstrap & Proxmox
+
+| ID | Requirement | Priority | Phase | Status |
+|----|-------------|----------|-------|--------|
+| REQ-047 | `orca init` auto-provisions CA + server cert + DB migrations + localhost node (idempotent; safe re-run) | High | **v0.6 P1** | **Complete** (P1 shipped v0.5.1) |
+| REQ-048 | `orca init` registers a default `localhost` node with auto-detected OS via `/etc/os-release ID` | High | **v0.6 P1** | **Complete** (P1 shipped v0.5.1) |
+| REQ-049 | Node schema extension: `nodes.kind` (localhost\|linux\|proxmox) + `nodes.os` columns (migration 0006, backward-compatible) | High | **v0.6 P1** | **Complete** (P1 shipped v0.5.1) |
+| REQ-050 | `orca node join --type proxmox` SSH bootstrap via `golang.org/x/crypto/ssh` (new direct dep); password auth, deploy orca pubkey, create `orca` user (config-overridable), assign PVE role, drop sudoers allowlist; idempotent | High | **v0.6 P2** | **Complete** (P2 shipped v0.5.2) |
+| REQ-051 | Proxmox least-privilege `OrcaOperator` PVE role (VM.Audit, Datastore.AllocateSpace, SDN.Use) + `orca` user + `/etc/sudoers.d/orca` allowlist (pct, qm, pvesh, apt-get, dpkg); config-overridable user/role names | High | **v0.6 P2** | **Complete** (P2 shipped v0.5.2; refined: pvesh excluded per AD-020, orca@pam per AD-019) |
+| REQ-052 | `orca doctor` extensions: `doctor os` (verify localhost OS detection matches stored node row) + `doctor proxmox` (SSH-probe each `kind=proxmox` node with `pveversion`/`pvecmd status`, 3s timeout, PASS/WARN/FAIL); audit log all bootstrap + join actions | Medium | **v0.6 P3** | **Complete** (P3 shipped v0.5.3) |
+
+## v0.6 Milestone Summary
+
+**Status: Complete** — all 3 execution phases + final review shipped.
+P0 (v0.5.0), P1 (v0.5.1), P2 (v0.5.2), P3 (v0.5.3), P4 final (v0.5.4).
+REQ-047..052 all complete.
+
+- **P0** (v0.5.0): pre-execution (specify → clarify → research → plan). 8 decisions (D-030..D-037).
+- **P1** (v0.5.1): `orca init` full bootstrap + schema 0006 (REQ-047/048/049).
+- **P2** (v0.5.2): Proxmox SSH join + OrcaOperator role + sudoers (REQ-050/051).
+- **P3** (v0.5.3): `doctor os` + `doctor proxmox` + audit logging (REQ-052).
+- **P4** (v0.5.4): final review + audit + milestone release.
+
+## v0.7 Requirements — Hardening & Completion
+
+| ID | Requirement | Priority | Phase | Status |
+|----|-------------|----------|-------|--------|
+| REQ-053 | `orca cert` command tree registered on root command (`cert ca-init`, `cert gen`, `cert show`, `cert renew`, `cert fingerprint`) — code exists in `internal/cli/cert.go` but is never AddCommand'd; unreachable today | High | **v0.7 P1** | **Complete** (P1 shipped v0.6.1) |
+| REQ-054 | HCL config file parsing: `internal/config` package loads `~/.orca/config.hcl` / `/etc/orca/orca.hcl` (keys: db_path, listen_addr, ca_path, server_cert_path, server_key_path, node_capacity); merge precedence flag > env > file > default; `--config` flag on root command | High | **v0.7 P2** | **Complete** (P2 shipped v0.6.2) |
+| REQ-055 | Test coverage uplift: every package ≥ 50% — adds tests for `internal/engine` (executor, dispatcher, peer), `internal/transport` (mtls, dispatch, handshake_log), `internal/proxmox` (bootstrap SSH path), `internal/audit` | Medium | **v0.7 P3** | Pending |
+| REQ-056 | `--pprof <addr>` opt-in flag on `orca daemon` (default disabled); `net/http/pprof` mounted on a separate mux, never on the mTLS daemon listener | Low | **v0.7 P4** | Pending |

.ciagent/RESEARCH_v0.3.md

@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+# Research: Orca v0.3 — scheduling-streaming
+
+Phase: 0 (research) for milestone v0.3 (scheduling-streaming).
+Branch: `phase/00-pre-execution` (cut from `milestone/v0.3-scheduling-streaming`).
+Go toolchain: `go1.25.0` (confirmed via `go version`; `go.mod` declares `go 1.25.0`).
+
+This document provides concrete, file-level implementation guidance for the
+two v0.3 execution phases:
+
+- **P01** — `iter.Seq` streaming for `--watch` flags (REQ-022, REQ-030)
+- **P02** — `orca doctor` network + db full implementation (REQ-032 completion)
+
+All assumptions are logged as decisions (D-025..D-038) with confidence scores.
+Full autonomy mode — no items flagged for human validation.
+
+---
+
+## Codebase Audit Summary
+
+### Current state (commit ba5ffd7 + phase docs)
+
+| Area | File | Key finding |
+|------|------|-------------|
+| CLI `job list` | `internal/cli/job.go:112-143` | `jobListCmd.RunE` calls `store.NewJobRepo(db).List(ctx)`, prints a fixed-width table; `--json` via `printJSON(jobs)`. No `--watch` flag exists. |
+| CLI `node list` | `internal/cli/node.go:155-186` | `nodeListCmd.RunE` calls `registry.List(ctx)` → `repo.List(ctx)`. Table + `--json`. No `--watch` flag. |
+| CLI root | `internal/cli/root.go` | `jsonOutput` is a package-level `bool` set by `--json` persistent flag. `printJSON` uses `json.NewEncoder` with 2-space indent. |
+| Job repo | `internal/store/job_task_repo.go` | `JobRepo.List(ctx) ([]*model.Job, error)` — single-shot query, closes rows. `scanJob` helper is reusable. |
+| Node repo | `internal/store/node_repo.go` | `NodeRepo.List(ctx) ([]*model.Node, error)`. `scanNode` helper is reusable. `scanner` interface defined here (`Scan(dest ...any) error`) — shared by `*sql.Row` and `*sql.Rows`. |
+| Store open | `internal/store/store.go` | `store.Open(path)` opens with `?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)&_pragma=foreign_keys(ON)` and runs `migrate(db)`. |
+| Migrations | `internal/store/migrate.go` | `migrate` is unexported, runs at `Open` time. `schema_migrations` table tracks applied migrations by filename. Migrations are embedded via `//go:embed migrations/*.sql`. No public API to query migration version. |
+| Migrations on disk | `internal/store/migrations/` | `0001_nodes.sql`, `0002_jobs_tasks.sql`, `0003_audit_log.sql`, `0004_certs.sql`, `0005_node_capacity.sql`. Highest = 0005. |
+| Doctor | `internal/doctor/doctor.go` | `NetworkStub()` and `DBStub()` return WARN stubs. `All()` aggregates 6 checks. `Run(ctx)` iterates checks. `Check.Run` signature: `func(ctx context.Context) (Result, string)`. `Result` is `PASS|WARN|FAIL`. No DB or transport imports — cert-only. |
+| Doctor CLI | `internal/cli/doctor.go` | `doctorNetworkCmd`/`doctorDBCmd` call `doctor.NetworkStub()`/`doctor.DBStub()` directly. |
+| Doctor tests | `internal/doctor/doctor_test.go` | Two tests: `TestRunAllChecksWithNoCA` (expects FAIL + WARN for stubs), `TestRunWithCAAndServerCert` (cert checks PASS). Uses `t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)`. **The "expects WARN" assertion will break when stubs become real checks** — must be updated in P02. |
+| Transport mTLS client | `internal/transport/mtls.go` | `NewMTLSClient(caPath, serverName, certPath, keyPath)` builds an `http.Client` with a TLS-1.3-only config from `security.ClientTLSConfig`. `MTLSClient.Do(req)`. `DialContext` for low-level TLS dial. |
+| Transport dispatch client | `internal/transport/dispatch.go` | `NewDispatchClient(caPath, serverName, peerAddr)` wraps `MTLSClient`. `PeerAddr` is `http://` or `https://`. `Submit`/`Status` POST to `/orca.v1.Dispatch/*`. No `/healthz` GET helper. |
+| Daemon health | `internal/daemon/health.go` | `handleHealthz` → 200 `{"status":"alive"}`. `handleReadyz` → 200/503 with db ping. Mounted at `mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", ...)` in `server.go:104`. |
+| Daemon TLS | `internal/daemon/tls.go` | `StartMTLS(state)` sets `httpServer.TLSConfig` with `ClientAuth = RequireAndVerifyClientCert`. The daemon **requires client certs** in mTLS mode. |
+| Peer registry | `internal/engine/peer.go` | `PeerRegistry` is **in-memory only** (`map[string]*Peer` under `sync.RWMutex`). `NewPeerRegistry()` returns empty. `Peer` has `NodeID, Address, ServerName, CAPath, LastSeen, Capacity`. **Not persisted to SQLite.** |
+| Peer registry usage | `internal/cli/job.go:70`, `internal/cli/daemon.go:47` | Both create a **fresh empty** `NewPeerRegistry()` per process. No code ever calls `peers.Add(...)`. The registry is currently a structural placeholder. |
+| Node registry | `internal/engine/registry.go` | `NodeRegistry` wraps `store.NodeRepo` + `Audit`. `List(ctx)` → `repo.List(ctx)`. Persisted to `nodes` table. |
+| Node model | `internal/model/node.go` | `Node{ID, Name, Address, State, JoinedAt, LastSeen, Metadata}`. **No `ServerName` or `CAPath` field** — `model.Node` differs from `engine.Peer`. |
+| Cert paths | `internal/certpaths/certpaths.go` | `Dir()` honors `ORCA_HOME`; `CACertPath()`, `ServerCertPath()`, `ServerKeyPath()`. |
+| Security client TLS | `internal/security/tls_config.go:106` | `ClientTLSConfig(caPath, serverName, certPath, keyPath)` — TLS 1.3 only, AEAD allowlist, `RootCAs` = single CA. Both-or-neither for cert/key. |
+| Go version | `go.mod` + `go version` | `go 1.25.0` — `iter` package and range-over-func are stable stdlib. |
+| Deps | `go.mod` | cobra, hcl/v2, modernc/sqlite, uuid. **No new deps needed for v0.3.** `iter` is stdlib. |
+
+### Critical gap analysis
+
+1. **`PeerRegistry` is non-persistent and always empty at CLI time.** The
+   doctor network check cannot rely on it — there is no code path that populates
+   it. The `nodes` table IS persisted and has `Address`, but lacks the
+   `ServerName`/`CAPath` needed for an mTLS probe. **Resolution: doctor network
+   reads the `nodes` table via `NodeRepo.List`, and derives `ServerName` +
+   `CAPath` from local config (`certpaths.CACertPath()` + node name/addr).**
+   See D-029.
+
+2. **`doctor.Run` / `Check.Run` do not plumb a `*sql.DB` or transport client.**
+   The cert checks are filesystem-only. P02 must extend the check constructors
+   to accept a DB handle and (for network) a transport client factory. The
+   `Check.Run` signature (`func(ctx) (Result, string)`) is preserved by
+   closure-capturing the handles in the constructor. See D-027, D-031.
+
+3. **No public migration-version query.** `migrate()` is unexported and writes
+   to `schema_migrations(name, applied_at)`. P02 adds a public
+   `store.MigrationVersion(ctx, db)` (or method on a repo) that selects the max
+   applied migration name. See D-033.
+
+4. **Doctor test `TestRunAllChecksWithNoCA` asserts a WARN from stubs.** This
+   will break when stubs become real (the db check will PASS with a fresh test
+   DB, and the network check will WARN/FAIL on zero peers). Must be updated.
+   See D-036.
+
+---
+
+## P01: iter.Seq Streaming for `--watch` Flags
+
+Covers REQ-022 (`iter.Seq` for streaming job lists), REQ-030 (`--watch` output
+format: table default vs streaming one-line JSON per event).
+
+### Decisions
+
+| ID | Decision | Confidence |
+|----|----------|------------|
+| **D-025** | `iter.Seq` lives on the store repos, not the engine registry. `JobRepo.Watch(ctx) iter.Seq[*model.Job]` and `NodeRepo.Watch(ctx) iter.Seq[*model.Node]`. Rationale: repos already own the `*sql.DB` and the `scanJob`/`scanNode` helpers; engine.Registry.List just delegates to repo. Keeping Watch in the store layer matches the data-engineer territory and avoids a new engine→store iter dependency. | 0.90 |
+| **D-026** | Element type is `*model.Job` / `*model.Node` (pointer), matching the existing `[]*model.Job` return of `List`. This keeps `printJSON` and table rendering identical between one-shot and watch paths. | 0.88 |
+| **D-027** | The `Check.Run` signature in `doctor` is unchanged; P02 captures DB/transport handles in closure at constructor time (`Network(db)`, `DB(db)`). This is the established pattern (cert checks already closure-capture `certpaths`). | 0.92 |
+| **D-028** | Watch refresh = poll-based 1s ticker (per D-019). No event channel, no daemon coupling. Each tick re-runs the existing `List` query and yields the **full current snapshot** (one element per row). The CLI dedupes by detecting snapshot equality before re-rendering (see D-030). Rationale: simpler than NOTIFY/LISTEN, no daemon dependency, matches offline-first. | 0.90 |
+| **D-029** | `--watch` output: default = re-print the table on every changed snapshot (clear screen via ANSI `\033[2J\033[H` then table); `--watch --json` = one compact JSON line **per snapshot** (an array on each line, OR one line per element — see D-030). The CLI tracks the previous snapshot's hash to avoid spamming identical frames. | 0.85 |
+| **D-030** | `--watch --json` emits **one JSON object per element per tick where the element changed**, i.e. streaming one-line JSON per event (per REQ-030 wording). Implementation: on each tick, for each element, if its JSON bytes differ from the previous snapshot's bytes for that ID, print `{"event":"update","job":{...}}\n`. On first tick, print all as `{"event":"init",...}`. This is the most useful for AI agents tailing the stream. Confidence lower because REQ-030 is ambiguous between "array per tick" and "object per event"; the per-event interpretation matches "streaming one-line JSON per event" literally. | 0.72 |
+| **D-031** | Cancellation: `signal.NotifyContext(ctx, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)` at the CLI command layer, **replacing** the current `context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 5*time.Second)` for the watch path only. The non-watch `list` path keeps its 5s timeout. The `iter.Seq` receives this ctx and stops yielding on `ctx.Done()`. | 0.93 |
+| **D-032** | The `iter.Seq` implementation **must not leak goroutines**: the polling loop runs **inline in the yield callback's caller goroutine** (the `range` loop), not a separate goroutine. `for range seq { ... }` drives the pull; inside `Watch`, we loop `for { select { <-ticker.C: query+yield each; <-ctx.Done(): return } }` and call `yield(item)` directly. When `yield` returns false (consumer broke the loop), we stop and return. **No goroutine is spawned by Watch.** This is the cleanest Go 1.25 iter pattern and avoids leak surface entirely. | 0.95 |
+
+### Implementation approach — store layer
+
+**File: `internal/store/job_task_repo.go`** — add method:
+
+```go
+// Watch yields the current snapshot of jobs on a 1-second ticker until
+// ctx is cancelled or the consumer stops pulling (yield returns false).
+// It does not spawn a goroutine; the polling loop runs in the caller's
+// goroutine via the range-over-func pull protocol.
+//
+// Each tick re-runs the List query and yields one *model.Job per row.
+// The caller is responsible for deduping across ticks if desired.
+func (r *JobRepo) Watch(ctx context.Context) iter.Seq[*model.Job] {
+    return func(yield func(*model.Job) bool) {
+        ticker := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Second)
+        defer ticker.Stop()
+        for {
+            select {
+            case <-ctx.Done():
+                return
+            case <-ticker.C:
+            }
+            // Reuse the existing List query + scanJob helper.
+            rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
+                `SELECT id, name, spec, status, exit_code, created_at, started_at, ended_at
+                 FROM jobs ORDER BY created_at DESC`)
+            if err != nil {
+                // Surfacing errors from inside iter.Seq is awkward; the
+                // CLI layer cannot receive a returned error. Log via slog
+                // (the repo doesn't hold a logger today — see D-034) and
+                // continue to next tick rather than terminating the
+                // stream. A transient DB blip should not kill the watch.
+                continue
+            }
+            for rows.Next() {
+                j, err := scanJob(rows)
+                if err != nil {
+                    rows.Close()
+                    return
+                }
+                if !yield(j) {
+                    rows.Close()
+                    return // consumer stopped
+                }
+            }
+            rows.Close()
+        }
+    }
+}
+```
+
+**File: `internal/store/node_repo.go`** — add analogous `Watch`:
+
+```go
+func (r *NodeRepo) Watch(ctx context.Context) iter.Seq[*model.Node] {
+    return func(yield func(*model.Node) bool) {
+        ticker := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Second)
+        defer ticker.Stop()
+        for {
+            select {
+            case <-ctx.Done():
+                return
+            case <-ticker.C:
+            }
+            rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
+                `SELECT id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata
+                 FROM nodes ORDER BY joined_at ASC`)
+            if err != nil {
+                continue
+            }
+            for rows.Next() {
+                n, err := scanNode(rows)
+                if err != nil {
+                    rows.Close()
+                    return
+                }
+                if !yield(n) {
+                    rows.Close()
+                    return
+                }
+            }
+            rows.Close()
+        }
+    }
+}
+```
+
+Imports: add `"iter"` and `"time"` (time already present in both files). The
+`iter` package is imported only for the return type; `yield` is the callback.
+
+**Note on the existing `scanner` interface:** `scanJob`/`scanNode` accept the
+`scanner` interface (`Scan(dest ...any) error`) satisfied by both `*sql.Row`
+and `*sql.Rows`, so they are directly reusable in `Watch` — no refactor needed.
+
+### Implementation approach — CLI layer
+
+**File: `internal/cli/job.go`** — modify `jobListCmd`:
+
+1. Add a package var `jobWatch bool` and register `jobListCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jobWatch, "watch", false, "stream jobs until Ctrl-C")`.
+2. In `RunE`, branch on `jobWatch`:
+   - If `!jobWatch`: keep the existing 5s-timeout `List` path.
+   - If `jobWatch`:
+     - `ctx, cancel := signal.NotifyContext(cmd.Context(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM); defer cancel()` (drop the 5s timeout).
+     - `seq := store.NewJobRepo(db).Watch(ctx)`
+     - If `jsonOutput`: stream one-line JSON per event (D-030). Maintain a `map[string][]byte` of last-seen JSON per job ID. On each yielded job, marshal compact JSON; if it differs from the stored bytes (or ID unseen), print `{"event":"update","job":{...}}\n` and update the map.
+     - Else (table): on each tick, after collecting the full snapshot, compare against the previous snapshot (by hashing the rendered table string or by comparing the slice of `[]*model.Job` via reflect/cmp). If changed, emit `"\033[2J\033[H"` (clear) then the table header + rows. This gives a "top-like" refresh.
+
+   Because `iter.Seq` does not return an error, the watch path swallows
+   per-tick query errors inside `Watch` (D-034). The CLI relies on `ctx.Done()`
+   for termination.
+
+**File: `internal/cli/node.go`** — analogous change to `nodeListCmd`:
+- Add `nodeWatch bool`, register `--watch` flag.
+- Branch in `RunE`; `seq := store.NewNodeRepo(db).Watch(ctx)` (open a fresh `openDB()` for the watch path; `registry.List` is not used for watch — go straight to the repo to get the iter).
+
+**Note:** `nodeListCmd` currently goes through `nodeRegistry()` which wraps
+`NodeRepo` in `engine.NodeRegistry`. For watch, bypass the registry and use
+`store.NewNodeRepo(db).Watch(ctx)` directly — the registry adds no value for a
+read-only stream and would require a `Watch` passthrough method. This keeps the
+iter boundary clean in the store layer (D-025).
+
+### Pitfalls & mitigations (P01)
+
+| Pitfall | Mitigation |
+|---------|------------|
+| **Goroutine leak** if Watch spawned a goroutine. | It doesn't — the polling loop is inline in the pull callback (D-032). `defer ticker.Stop()` + `rows.Close()` on every exit path. |
+| **Rows cursor held open across yield** — if `yield` blocks (e.g. slow consumer), the `*sql.Rows` stays open and holds a SQLite read lock. | Yield is called per-row inside the `rows.Next()` loop; the consumer (`range`) is fast (prints to stdout). For safety, close rows immediately after the loop or on `yield==false`. The 1s tick cadence bounds how long a cursor is held. WAL mode (set in `store.Open`) allows concurrent reads, so this does not block writers. |
+| **No error channel from iter.Seq** — a transient DB error is invisible to the CLI. | Log inside Watch via a package-level slog default (`slog.Default().Warn(...)`) since the repo has no logger field today (D-034: add an optional `logger *slog.Logger` to JobRepo/NodeRepo, defaulting to `slog.Default()` in the constructors — minimal change). Continue to next tick rather than terminating. |
+| **ctx cancellation mid-query** — `QueryContext` returns an error; `rows.Next()` returns false. | Handled: the `select` on `ctx.Done()` returns before the next tick; an in-flight query is cancelled by the ctx. |
+| **Rapid re-render flicker** in table mode. | Clear-screen + full re-render on changed snapshot only (hash compare). Unchanged snapshots produce no output. |
+| **`--watch` + `--json` interleaving with slog stderr.** | slog writes to stderr; CLI output to stdout — no interleaving on stdout. Safe. |
+| **Test determinism** — ticker is 1s, tests would be slow/flaky. | Provide a test-only constructor `WatchWithInterval(ctx, d time.Duration)` OR make the interval a field on the repo set via an unexported option. Preferred: an unexported `watchInterval` package var defaulting to 1s, overridable from `internal/store` tests. See D-035. |
+| **Signal handling clobbers root signal handler.** | `signal.NotifyContext` with `os.Interrupt` returns a fresh ctx; the root `cobra.Command` does not install its own SIGINT handler, so no conflict. `defer cancel()` restores default behavior on exit. |
+
+### Test strategy (P01)
+
+**`internal/store/job_task_repo_test.go` (new file or appended):**
+- `TestJobRepoWatch_YieldsSnapshots`: insert 1 job, call `Watch` with a 10ms interval (via test hook), range over `seq` collecting into a slice, insert a 2nd job from a goroutine after 30ms, cancel ctx after 80ms, assert the 2nd job appeared in the collected slice. Use `context.WithTimeout` for cancellation.
+- `TestJobRepoWatch_StopsOnConsumerBreak`: range over `seq` and `break` after the first yield; assert the function returns (no hang) within a short deadline. This validates the `yield==false` path.
+- `TestJobRepoWatch_StopsOnCtxCancel`: cancel ctx; assert the range loop exits within 50ms.
+- `TestNodeRepoWatch_*`: mirror the above for nodes.
+
+**`internal/cli/job_test.go` (new) / `node_test.go` (new) — if CLI tests exist; otherwise add:**
+- `TestJobListWatch_JSONStreaming`: spin a temp DB, insert a job, invoke the `jobListCmd.RunE` with `--watch --json` in a goroutine, insert a 2nd job, capture stdout for ~200ms, assert two JSON lines appear. Cancel via ctx.
+- `TestJobListWatch_TableRefresh`: assert clear-screen escape + table re-render on change.
+- These CLI tests are harder to make deterministic; prefer testing the store-layer Watch thoroughly and keep CLI watch tests to a smoke-level "produces output, exits on ctx.Done".
+
+### Dependency check (P01)
+
+- `iter` — Go 1.25 stdlib (`go.mod` declares `go 1.25.0`). ✅ no new dep.
+- `time`, `context`, `os/signal`, `syscall`, `encoding/json` — stdlib. ✅
+- No new go.mod dependencies required.
+
+---
+
+## P02: `orca doctor` network + db full implementation
+
+Covers REQ-032 completion (network + db checks replacing `NetworkStub`/`DBStub`).
+
+### Decisions
+
+| ID | Decision | Confidence |
+|----|----------|------------|
+| **D-033** | Add a public `store.MigrationVersion(ctx, db) (string, error)` function (in `migrate.go` or a new `internal/store/migrate_query.go`) that returns the **highest applied migration filename** from `schema_migrations`. SQL: `SELECT name FROM schema_migrations ORDER BY name DESC LIMIT 1`. This is the source of truth for "migration version" — it reflects what `migrate()` actually applied. Returns `("", nil)` if no migrations applied (fresh empty table) and `("", sql.ErrNoRows)` is treated as empty. | 0.90 |
+| **D-034** | The doctor DB check opens its own `*sql.DB` via `store.Open(dbPath())` (reusing the CLI's `dbPath`) inside the check constructor closure, rather than receiving a shared handle. Rationale: doctor should be runnable whether the daemon is up or down; `store.Open` uses WAL so a concurrent daemon is fine. The check `defer db.Close()`. This avoids threading a `*sql.DB` through `doctor.Run`/`All()` and keeps the `Check.Run` signature stable. | 0.86 |
+| **D-035** | The doctor DB check runs `PRAGMA integrity_check` via `db.QueryRow("PRAGMA integrity_check")`. SQLite returns a single row with a TEXT value: `"ok"` on success, or a multi-line error description on failure. PASS if the value is `"ok"`; FAIL otherwise (with the first line of the message). Plus query the migration version (D-033); WARN if `schema_migrations` is empty (fresh/never-migrated db) — this is suspicious but not corrupt. | 0.92 |
+| **D-036** | Doctor network check sources peer addresses from the **`nodes` table** (`NodeRepo.List`), NOT from `engine.PeerRegistry` (which is in-memory and always empty at CLI time — see gap #1). For each node with `state != 'left'`, probe `https://<address>/healthz` over mTLS. | 0.88 |
+| **D-037** | For each peer, the network check builds an mTLS client via `transport.NewMTLSClient(certpaths.CACertPath(), serverName, certpaths.ServerCertPath(), certpaths.ServerKeyPath())`. `serverName` is derived as the node's `Name` (the SAN on a peer's server cert is its node name, per `security.GenerateCSR(nodeName, sans)` — confirmed in `integration_test.go:41` `GenerateCSR("test-server", ...)`. If the SAN uses a different value the probe will fail handshake, which is itself a useful diagnostic). `CAPath` is the local `ca.crt` (all peers share one CA per D-011). This presents the local node's client cert, satisfying the daemon's `RequireAndVerifyClientCert`. | 0.80 |
+| **D-038** | Network check result semantics: **zero peers registered** → `WARN` ("no peers registered; network check skipped") — not FAIL, because a single-node install legitimately has no peers. **A peer unreachable / handshake failed** → `FAIL` for that peer, aggregated to a single `network` check result that is FAIL if any peer failed, PASS if all peers probed OK, WARN if zero peers. Each peer's per-line outcome is folded into the message string (e.g. `PASS — 2/2 peers reachable; FAIL — peer node-b (host:port): tls handshake error`). | 0.85 |
+
+### Implementation approach — db check
+
+**File: `internal/store/migrate.go`** — add:
+
+```go
+// MigrationVersion returns the filename of the most recently applied
+// migration, or "" if no migrations have been applied (empty db or
+// schema_migrations table missing). Used by `orca doctor db`.
+func MigrationVersion(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) (string, error) {
+    var name string
+    err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+        `SELECT name FROM schema_migrations ORDER BY name DESC LIMIT 1`).Scan(&name)
+    if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+        return "", nil
+    }
+    if err != nil {
+        return "", fmt.Errorf("query migration version: %w", err)
+    }
+    return name, nil
+}
+```
+
+(Add `"context"` import — already imported in migrate.go.)
+
+**File: `internal/doctor/doctor.go`** — replace `DBStub()` with `DB()`:
+
+```go
+// DB checks SQLite integrity and migration version (REQ-032).
+// It opens its own *sql.DB so it can run whether or not the daemon is up.
+func DB() Check {
+    return Check{
+        Name:        "db",
+        Description: "SQLite PRAGMA integrity_check + migration version",
+        Run: func(ctx context.Context) (Result, string) {
+            path := dbPath() // dbPath currently lives in internal/cli; see D-039
+            db, err := store.Open(path)
+            if err != nil {
+                return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("open %s: %v", path, err)
+            }
+            defer db.Close()
+
+            // 1. integrity_check
+            var integrity string
+            if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "PRAGMA integrity_check").Scan(&integrity); err != nil {
+                return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("integrity_check query: %v", err)
+            }
+            if integrity != "ok" {
+                first := strings.SplitN(integrity, "\n", 2)[0]
+                return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("integrity_check: %s", first)
+            }
+
+            // 2. migration version
+            ver, err := store.MigrationVersion(ctx, db)
+            if err != nil {
+                return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("migration version: %v", err)
+            }
+            if ver == "" {
+                return ResultWarn, "integrity ok; no migrations applied (fresh db?)"
+            }
+            return ResultPass, fmt.Sprintf("integrity ok; migrations up to %s", ver)
+        },
+    }
+}
+```
+
+**D-039 (assumption, confidence 0.78):** `dbPath()` currently lives in
+`internal/cli/node.go` and is unexported. The `doctor` package cannot import
+`internal/cli` (would create a cycle: `cli` imports `doctor`). **Resolution:**
+move `dbPath()` (and the `ORCA_DB` env logic) into `certpaths` (rename the
+package conceptually, or add a sibling `internal/paths` package) OR duplicate
+the ~5-line `dbPath` function inside `internal/doctor`. The cleanest is to add
+`func DBPath() string` to `internal/certpaths/certpaths.go` (it already owns
+`Dir()` honoring `ORCA_HOME`) and have both `cli` and `doctor` call it.
+`cli.dbPath` becomes a thin wrapper or is replaced. This is a small refactor
+within P02's scope. Logged as D-039, confidence 0.78 (territory overlap between
+cli-engineer and the doctor package; lead-developer adjudicates).
+
+### Implementation approach — network check
+
+**File: `internal/doctor/doctor.go`** — replace `NetworkStub()` with `Network()`:
+
+```go
+// Network probes each registered peer's /healthz over mTLS (REQ-032).
+// Peers are sourced from the nodes table. Zero peers => WARN (single-node
+// install is legitimate). Any peer unreachable => FAIL.
+func Network() Check {
+    return Check{
+        Name:        "network",
+        Description: "peer reachability via mTLS /healthz probe",
+        Run: func(ctx context.Context) (Result, string) {
+            // 1. Load registered nodes (skip 'left').
+            path := certpaths.DBPath() // same resolution as D-039
+            db, err := store.Open(path)
+            if err != nil {
+                return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("open db for node list: %v", err)
+            }
+            defer db.Close()
+            nodes, err := store.NewNodeRepo(db).List(ctx)
+            if err != nil {
+                return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("list nodes: %v", err)
+            }
+            // filter out left nodes
+            var live []*model.Node
+            for _, n := range nodes {
+                if n.State != model.NodeStateLeft {
+                    live = append(live, n)
+                }
+            }
+            if len(live) == 0 {
+                return ResultWarn, "no peers registered; network check skipped (single-node?)"
+            }
+
+            caPath := certpaths.CACertPath()
+            certPath := certpaths.ServerCertPath()
+            keyPath := certpaths.ServerKeyPath()
+            // Short per-probe timeout so one slow peer doesn't stall doctor.
+            var lines []string
+            overall := ResultPass
+            for _, n := range live {
+                probeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 3*time.Second)
+                err := probeHealthz(probeCtx, caPath, certPath, keyPath, n.Name, n.Address)
+                cancel()
+                if err != nil {
+                    overall = ResultFail
+                    lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("FAIL %s (%s): %v", n.Name, n.Address, err))
+                } else {
+                    lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("PASS %s (%s)", n.Name, n.Address))
+                }
+            }
+            if overall == ResultPass {
+                return ResultPass, fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d peers reachable: %s", len(live), len(live), strings.Join(lines, "; "))
+            }
+            return ResultFail, strings.Join(lines, "; ")
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+// probeHealthz does a GET https://addr/healthz over mTLS.
+func probeHealthz(ctx context.Context, caPath, certPath, keyPath, serverName, addr string) error {
+    client, err := transport.NewMTLSClient(caPath, serverName, certPath, keyPath)
+    if err != nil {
+        return fmt.Errorf("build mTLS client: %w", err)
+    }
+    req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, "https://"+addr+"/healthz", nil)
+    if err != nil {
+        return fmt.Errorf("build request: %w", err)
+    }
+    resp, err := client.Do(req)
+    if err != nil {
+        return fmt.Errorf("probe: %w", err)
+    }
+    defer resp.Body.Close()
+    if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+        return fmt.Errorf("healthz status %d", resp.StatusCode)
+    }
+    return nil
+}
+```
+
+New imports in `doctor.go`: `net/http`, `strings`, `time`, `git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store`, `git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/transport`, `git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model`.
+
+**File: `internal/doctor/doctor.go`** — update `All()`:
+```go
+func All() []Check {
+    return []Check{
+        CertCA(), CertServer(), CertExpiry(), CertFingerprint(),
+        Network(),  // was NetworkStub()
+        DB(),       // was DBStub()
+    }
+}
+```
+Keep `NetworkStub`/`DBStub` exported functions for one release as thin
+wrappers that call the new ones? **No** — delete them; the CLI doctor.go
+references them and must be updated in lockstep (they are internal). See D-040.
+
+**File: `internal/cli/doctor.go`** — update `doctorNetworkCmd` and `doctorDBCmd`:
+```go
+doctorNetworkCmd.RunE: c := doctor.Network()  // was doctor.NetworkStub()
+doctorDBCmd.RunE:      c := doctor.DB()       // was doctor.DBStub()
+```
+Also: the per-subcommand render should honor `jsonOutput` (currently it only
+prints text). Minor enhancement, in scope.
+
+### Pitfalls & mitigations (P02)
+
+| Pitfall | Mitigation |
+|---------|------------|
+| **`model.Node` has no `ServerName`/`CAPath`** — mTLS needs `ServerName` to match the cert SAN. | Derive `ServerName = node.Name` (D-037). This assumes peer server certs are issued with SAN = node name, which matches `GenerateCSR(nodeName, sans)`. If a deployment uses DNS SANs instead, the probe fails — which is itself a diagnostic. Document this assumption in the check message. |
+| **No local client cert/key** — doctor can't present a client cert if `server.crt`/`server.key` are missing. | The check should FAIL with a clear message if `certpaths.ServerCertPath()` doesn't exist, BEFORE attempting probes. Reuse `os.Stat`. This also covers the single-node-never-joined case. |
+| **Daemon down** — peer's `/healthz` unreachable. | Per-probe 3s timeout (D-038). Surfaces as FAIL per peer with the dial/handshake error in the message. Doctor is designed to run with daemon up or down, so this is expected behavior, not a crash. |
+| **Self-probe** — the local node is likely in the `nodes` table too. Doctor will probe itself over mTLS. This is fine (validates the local daemon's mTLS stack) but requires the local daemon to be running. If the daemon is down, the self-probe fails → FAIL, which is the correct signal. | Document; no special-casing. |
+| **DB file doesn't exist** — `store.Open` creates the dir + file + runs migrations (so a missing db becomes a fresh empty db). The db check would then PASS with "no migrations applied" WARN. | This is acceptable: `store.Open` is idempotent. If the operator expected an existing db, the WARN surfaces the surprise. Could additionally `os.Stat` the path before `Open` and WARN if it didn't exist pre-open — optional refinement. |
+| **`PRAGMA integrity_check` can return multiple rows** in rare cases (when there are multiple errors). `QueryRow` only reads the first. | For `integrity_check`, a single row containing `"ok"` or the first error is the documented SQLite behavior for the common case. Use `QueryRow` + `Scan`; if it's not `"ok"`, that's already a FAIL. Acceptable. |
+| **Doctor test `TestRunAllChecksWithNoCA`** asserts WARN from stubs. | Update the test: with real checks, a no-CA scenario yields FAIL on cert.ca (unchanged) AND FAIL on db (open succeeds, integrity ok, but no migrations if fresh — actually WARN) AND WARN on network (no peers). Rewrite assertions to check each check by name rather than "hasWarn globally". See test strategy. |
+| **Import cycle:** `doctor` → `cli` (for `dbPath`). | Resolved by D-039: move `dbPath` to `certpaths` (or a new `internal/paths`); both `cli` and `doctor` import it. No cycle. |
+| **`store.Open` runs migrations on every open** — doctor opening the db to run integrity_check would also (re)migrate. | `migrate()` is idempotent (checks `schema_migrations` per name). Re-opening is safe; no-op if already migrated. Acceptable. |
+
+### Test strategy (P02)
+
+**`internal/store/migrate_test.go` (new or appended):**
+- `TestMigrationVersion`: open a fresh test db (which runs migrate), call `MigrationVersion`, assert it returns `0005_node_capacity.sql` (the highest current migration). Then manually delete all rows from `schema_migrations`, assert returns `""` with nil error.
+
+**`internal/doctor/doctor_test.go` (update):**
+- Update `TestRunAllChecksWithNoCA`: set `ORCA_HOME` to temp dir (no CA). Expect: cert.ca FAIL, cert.server FAIL, cert.expiry FAIL, cert.fingerprint FAIL, **db WARN** (fresh db, no migrations — actually `store.Open` runs migrations, so db will PASS with version 0005; adjust: db PASS), **network WARN** (no peers). Rewrite to assert per-check rather than "hasWarn/hasFail globally". Remove the stale "expected WARN (stubs)" comment.
+- New `TestDBCheck_IntegrityOK`: open a fresh db via `store.Open` in temp, run `doctor.DB().Run(ctx)`, expect PASS and message contains "0005".
+- New `TestDBCheck_Corrupt`: open db, manually `db.Exec("DROP TABLE jobs")` to introduce inconsistency, run integrity_check — but `integrity_check` mostly detects corruption, not missing tables. More reliable: write garbage to the db file via raw file write, then open — `store.Open` may fail at Ping. Assert FAIL. (This test is brittle; prefer a unit test on the integrity string-parsing logic with a stub.)
+- New `TestNetworkCheck_NoPeers`: fresh db, no nodes, run `doctor.Network().Run(ctx)`, expect WARN.
+- New `TestNetworkCheck_PeerReachable`: this is an integration test — bootstrap a CA (`security.CAInit`), generate+sign a server cert with SAN `localhost`, start an `httptest.NewUnstartedServer` with `ts.TLS = serverTLS` and `ClientAuth = RequireAndVerifyClientCert` (mirror `security/integration_test.go:88-108`), generate+sign a client cert, insert a node row with `Address = ts.Listener.Addr().String()` and `Name = "localhost"`, set `ORCA_HOME` to the temp dir holding the CA + client cert, run `doctor.Network().Run(ctx)`, expect PASS. This reuses the proven pattern from `TestEndToEndMTLS`.
+- New `TestNetworkCheck_PeerUnreachable`: insert a node with `Address = "127.0.0.1:1"` (nothing listening), run, expect FAIL with the peer name in the message.
+
+### Dependency check (P02)
+
+- `net/http`, `crypto/tls` (via transport), `strings`, `time`, `context` — stdlib. ✅
+- `internal/transport`, `internal/store`, `internal/model`, `internal/certpaths` — existing internal packages. ✅
+- No new go.mod dependencies required.
+
+---
+
+## Cross-cutting decisions
+
+| ID | Decision | Confidence |
+|----|----------|------------|
+| **D-039** | Move `dbPath()` (the `ORCA_DB`-honoring path resolver) from `internal/cli` to `internal/certpaths` as `DBPath()`, to break the would-be `doctor→cli` import cycle. Both `cli` and `doctor` then import `certpaths`. `certpaths` already owns the `ORCA_HOME`-honoring `Dir()`. Territory: this is a shared infra concern; `lead-developer` adjudicates. | 0.78 |
+| **D-040** | Delete `doctor.NetworkStub` and `doctor.DBStub` (no backward-compat shims). They are internal, referenced only by `internal/cli/doctor.go` which is updated in the same phase. Keeping dead stub code violates `no-redundant-implementations`. | 0.95 |
+| **D-041** | No new go.mod dependencies for v0.3. `iter` (P01) and mTLS health probe (P02) use stdlib + existing internal packages only. The 4 existing direct deps (cobra, hcl, modernc/sqlite, uuid) are unchanged. | 0.97 |
+| **D-042** | Phase ordering: P01 (iter.Seq) and P02 (doctor) are **independent** — no file is modified by both (P01 touches cli/job.go, cli/node.go, store repos; P02 touches doctor.go, cli/doctor.go, store/migrate.go, certpaths). They can be developed in either order or in parallel. Recommend P01 first only because it's the lower-risk change. | 0.85 |
+
+---
+
+## Summary of assumptions logged
+
+All assumptions below are logged as decisions with confidence scores; none are
+flagged for human validation (full autonomy). Low-confidence (<0.80) items that
+warrant normal decision-flow attention:
+
+- **D-030** (0.72): `--watch --json` emits one JSON object per changed element
+  per tick (vs. one array per tick). REQ-030 wording is ambiguous; this
+  interpretation matches "streaming one-line JSON per event" literally.
+- **D-037** (0.80): peer `ServerName` = node `Name` (SAN convention).
+- **D-039** (0.78): `dbPath` relocation to `certpaths` — territory overlap.
+
+These three are escalated through the normal decision flow (DecisionEngine) per
+the researcher protocol, NOT flagged for human validation.

.ciagent/RESEARCH_v0.5.md

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+# Research: Orca v0.5 — Distribution
+
+Research findings for the v0.5 Distribution milestone (install, namespace,
+docker, public releases). Conducted during P0 RESEARCH under full autonomy.
+
+## R-001: Gitea Container Registry
+
+**Source**: https://docs.gitea.com/usage/packages/container (Gitea 1.27.1 docs)
+
+**Findings**:
+- Gitea ships a built-in OCI-compliant container registry.
+- Image naming convention: `{registry}/{owner}/{image}:{tag}`.
+  For orca: `git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:{tag}`.
+- Auth: `docker login git.cloudinit.dev` with username + personal access
+  token (or password if no 2FA). The `GITEA_TOKEN` env var already used
+  for release publishing works as the password.
+- Push: `docker push git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4`.
+- Pull: anonymous pull works **if the repo is public** (REQ-045 flips
+  this). For private repos, pull requires auth.
+- Tags are case-insensitive — use lowercase image names.
+- The registry supports multi-arch manifests via `docker buildx`.
+
+**Implication for P03**: `scripts/release.sh` must add a `docker build`
++ `docker login` + `docker push` step. The `.coreci.yml` release
+pipeline needs a `container-publish` step. Credential is `GITEA_TOKEN`
+(reused from the existing release flow — no new secret needed).
+
+## R-002: `tea repos edit` — Repo Visibility
+
+**Source**: `tea repos edit --help` (tea 0.14.1 installed locally)
+
+**Findings**:
+- Command: `tea repos edit --private false --repo coreci/orca`
+- The `--private` flag accepts `true`/`false` (string, not bool).
+- Default login `bot` (cloudinit-bot) is already configured and is the
+  default login. No extra auth needed.
+- The change is immediate and reversible (re-run with `--private true`).
+
+**Implication for P0 ship**: Run this as an operational step during the
+P0 ship. Verify with unauth `curl` against the releases API afterward.
+
+## R-003: Gitea Releases API — Asset Download URLs
+
+**Source**: `/api/v1/repos/coreci/orca/releases/latest` (authed probe)
+
+**Findings**:
+- Auth header format: `Authorization: token <GITEA_TOKEN>` (NOT basic
+  auth — basic auth returns "invalid username, password or token").
+- Latest release endpoint: `GET /api/v1/repos/coreci/orca/releases/latest`
+  → JSON with `tag_name`, `name`, `body`, `assets[]`.
+- Each asset has `browser_download_url` — the direct download URL.
+- **Public access**: once the repo is public (R-002), the releases API
+  and asset downloads work **without authentication**. This is what
+  `install.sh` relies on (REQ-043).
+- Asset naming convention from existing releases:
+  `orca-{version}-linux-amd64.tar.gz` (per `scripts/release.sh`).
+
+**Implication for P02 install.sh**:
+1. Query `GET /api/v1/repos/coreci/orca/releases/latest` (unauth, post-R-002).
+2. Parse `tag_name` for the version.
+3. Find the asset with `name` matching `orca-{tag}-linux-{arch}.tar.gz`.
+4. Download `browser_download_url` with `curl -fsSL`.
+5. Extract and install.
+
+## R-004: ORCA_HOME Propagation Points (Codebase Audit)
+
+**Source**: `grep` for `UserHomeDir|os.Getenv("ORCA|\.orca` across `*.go`
+
+**Findings** — exactly 3 production code sites determine the namespace
+root today:
+
+| File | Current behavior | Needs change? |
+|------|-----------------|----------------|
+| `internal/certpaths/certpaths.go:21-26` | `Dir()` honors `ORCA_HOME` → `~/.orca` | **No** — this is the single source of truth. Already correct. |
+| `internal/store/store.go:13-19` | `Open("")` hardcodes `~/.orca/orca.db` (ignores `ORCA_HOME`) | **Yes** — route through `certpaths.DBPath()` instead. |
+| `internal/cli/init.go:16-22` | Hardcodes `~/.orca` via `os.UserHomeDir()` | **Yes** — route through `certpaths.Dir()`. |
+
+All other call sites (`node.go:openDB`, `daemon.go`, `job.go`, `doctor.go`,
+`cert.go`) already go through `certpaths.DBPath()` or `certpaths.Dir()`
+indirectly. **No other files need changes for REQ-041.**
+
+**For REQ-042 (`--system`)**: Add a `--system` persistent flag on
+`rootCmd`. When set, `rootCmd.PersistentPreRunE` sets
+`os.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", "/root/.orca")` before any subcommand runs.
+This is the minimal-touch approach — all downstream code already
+honors `ORCA_HOME`. The flag is a CLI convenience that maps to the
+env var, not a parallel mechanism.
+
+**Backward compatibility**: empty `ORCA_HOME` + no `--system` →
+`~/.orca` (unchanged). Existing tests that `t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", ...)`
+continue to work.
+
+## R-005: Distroless Base Image for CGO-free Go Binaries
+
+**Source**: Go module audit — `modernc.org/sqlite` (pure Go, CGO-free),
+`go.mod` has no CGO dependencies.
+
+**Findings**:
+- `gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12` is the correct base for static
+  Go binaries with no CGO and no libc dependency. ~2MB image.
+- orca uses `modernc.org/sqlite` (pure Go) — no CGO, no libc. ✓
+- Multi-stage Dockerfile:
+  - Stage 1 (`golang:1.25`): build with `-trimpath -ldflags` (same as
+    Makefile), output `bin/orca`.
+  - Stage 2 (`gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12`): `COPY bin/orca /orca`,
+    `ENTRYPOINT ["/orca"]`.
+- `CGO_ENABLED=0` must be set in the build stage to guarantee a static
+  binary (Go defaults to CGO_ENABLED=1 on platforms with a C compiler).
+- The image runs as `nonroot` user by default in distroless — but orca
+  writes to `~/.orca` (or `/root/.orca` for `--system`). For the
+  container image, default `ORCA_HOME=/var/lib/orca` and document
+  volume mount at that path.
+
+**Implication for P03**: Dockerfile is ~15 lines. The `.coreci.yml`
+release pipeline adds a `docker build --build-arg VERSION=$VERSION -t
+git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:$VERSION .` step + login + push.
+
+## R-006: install.sh Conventions (curl|sh pattern)
+
+**Source**: Common patterns from deno, rustup, homebrew installers.
+
+**Findings**:
+- 1-liner: `curl -fsSL <url> | bash` (or `| bash -s -- --system`).
+- The script must be downloadable from a stable URL. orca's script
+  lives at `scripts/install.sh` in the repo, accessible via
+  `https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/raw/branch/main/scripts/install.sh`
+  (once repo is public per R-002).
+- Args passed via `bash -s -- --system --version v0.4.4`.
+- In-place update: detect existing binary at install path, read its
+  version via `orca version --json` (parse `version` field), print
+  "updated from X to Y", overwrite binary. **Never** touch the
+  namespace dir (`~/.orca` or `/root/.orca`) — that's user state.
+- User-level default: `~/.local/bin/orca` (XDG-ish, on PATH on most
+  modern distros). System-level: `/usr/local/bin/orca` (requires root).
+
+**Implication for P02**: install.sh is ~80-100 lines of bash. Idempotent.
+Tested via a `scripts/install_test.sh` that mocks the download and
+verifies path selection + update-in-place.
+
+## Pitfalls (P-001..P-003)
+
+- **P-001**: `docker` may not be available in the CoreCI release
+  pipeline container. The `.coreci.yml` release step uses
+  `image: golang:1.25` which does NOT include docker. **Mitigation**:
+  the release pipeline must use a `docker:dind` sidecar or a step image
+  that has the docker CLI. Alternatively, `scripts/release.sh` handles
+  docker publish only when run locally or in a CI step that has docker.
+  The `.coreci.yml` container step must use an image with docker CLI
+  (e.g., `catthehacker/docker:docker-latest` or a custom image).
+
+- **P-002**: Making the repo public exposes git history including the
+  pre-existing `.env` SHA-1 leak (commit `00127ce` documented the
+  rotate-forward decision; `.gitleaks-baseline.json` suppresses it for
+  scanning). The leak is a **non-secret** (the token was rotated). This
+  is an accepted risk per the existing decision — no new action needed,
+  but document it in the P0 ship commit.
+
+- **P-003**: `CGO_ENABLED=0` must be explicit in the Dockerfile build
+  stage. Without it, `go build` in `golang:1.25` may produce a
+  dynamically-linked binary that won't run in distroless. Verified:
+  orca has no CGO deps, but `CGO_ENABLED=0` is belt-and-suspenders.

.ciagent/RESEARCH_v0.6.md

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+# Research: Orca v0.6 — Node Bootstrap & Proxmox
+
+Findings grounded in codebase analysis (8 key files read) + verified
+against `golang.org/x/crypto` v0.54.0 (probe built clean), Proxmox VE
+9.2.3 admin guide (§14.7-14.8 pveum + privileges), sudoers(5) man
+page (NOEXEC/NOPASSWD), and freedesktop.org os-release spec.
+
+## A. SSH library — `golang.org/x/crypto/ssh`
+
+### A.1 go.mod addition
+
+```
+require golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0
+```
+
+Latest available, compatible with go 1.25. Transitive deps (verified
+by probe build):
+- `golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0` (direct)
+- `golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0` (indirect — bumps from v0.42.0)
+- `golang.org/x/term v0.45.0` (indirect — pulled by ssh for PTY)
+
+**3 module entries, 0 new heavy deps.** Matches D-030 minimal-deps
+rationale. `go.sum` gains ~6 lines.
+
+### A.2 Minimal API surface
+
+```go
+import (
+    "crypto/ed25519"
+    "crypto/rand"
+    "crypto/x509"
+    "encoding/pem"
+    "net"
+    "time"
+    "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+    "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts"
+)
+```
+
+Key functions:
+- `ssh.Dial(network, addr, config) (*ssh.Client, error)` — high-level dialer
+- `(*ssh.Client).NewSession() (*ssh.Session, error)`
+- `(*ssh.Session).CombinedOutput(cmd) ([]byte, error)` — run + capture
+- `ssh.ClientConfig{User, Auth, HostKeyCallback, Timeout}`
+- `ssh.Password(secret) ssh.AuthMethod` — password auth
+- `ssh.PublicKeys(signer) ssh.AuthMethod` — pubkey auth
+- `ssh.ParsePrivateKey(pem) (ssh.Signer, error)` — parse PKCS8 PEM (works with orca's existing key format)
+- `ssh.NewPublicKey(pub) (ssh.PublicKey, error)` + `ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(pub) []byte` — authorized_keys line
+- `ssh.FixedHostKey(key) ssh.HostKeyCallback` — strict pin (subsequent connects)
+- `knownhosts.New(path) (ssh.HostKeyCallback, error)` — TOFU via known_hosts file (cleaner than custom callback; avoids deprecated `InsecureIgnoreHostKey`)
+
+### A.3 Ed25519 keygen (D-037)
+
+Verified end-to-end: `ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)` →
+`x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(priv)` → PEM encode → `ssh.ParsePrivateKey`
+round-trips cleanly. `ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey` produces valid
+`ssh-ed25519 AAAA...` line. **PKCS8 PEM (orca's existing format)
+parses with `ssh.ParsePrivateKey` — no OpenSSH-format marshaller
+needed.** Reuse `security.WriteKey`/`writeAtomic` for persistence.
+
+### A.4 File upload — `cat > file` via session, NOT SFTP
+
+SFTP lives in separate module `github.com/pkg/sftp` — would add a 4th
+direct dep beyond D-030. The only files orca uploads are:
+- `~orca/.ssh/authorized_keys` (1-line append)
+- `/etc/sudoers.d/orca` (few lines)
+
+Both are text. Use `session.CombinedOutput` with heredoc / `tee -a`.
+Keeps everything within `x/crypto/ssh`.
+
+### A.5 TOFU host-key handling (D-035)
+
+Use `golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts.New(path)` as the
+`HostKeyCallback`. On first connect, the callback writes the host key
+to `~/.orca/known_hosts` (OpenSSH format). On subsequent connects, it
+verifies and returns an error on mismatch. **Avoids
+`ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey` deprecation** — `knownhosts.New` handles
+both capture and verify in one callback. On host-key change
+(reinstall), fail closed with a clear error; operator runs
+`orca node key-reset <node>` (future) or manually edits `known_hosts`.
+
+## B. `/etc/os-release` parsing (D-032)
+
+### B.1 Confirmed `ID=` values
+
+| Distro | `ID=` | `ID_LIKE=` | Verified |
+|--------|-------|-----------|----------|
+| Ubuntu | `ubuntu` | `debian` | ✅ (this host: Ubuntu 24.04) |
+| Debian | `debian` | — | ✅ (freedesktop spec) |
+| Alpine | `alpine` | — | ✅ (Alpine policy) |
+| Proxmox VE | `pve` | `debian` | ✅ (PVE ships own os-release) |
+
+`VARIANT_ID` absent on all four target distros — not worth capturing
+for v0.6.
+
+### B.2 Parsing approach
+
+No Go stdlib helper. Trivial: `bufio.Scanner` +
+`strings.SplitN(line, "=", 2)` + strip surrounding quotes. ~15 lines.
+Returns `map[string]string`; read `ID` field. Fallback `"linux"` if
+file missing or `ID` absent (D-032). Read `/etc/os-release` first;
+fall back to `/usr/lib/os-release` for minimal containers. Unknown `ID`
+values stored verbatim (not masked) — `doctor os` can warn.
+
+## C. Proxmox VE role & user management
+
+### C.1 Realm: `orca@pam` (NOT `orca@pve`)
+
+Confirmed by both researchers + PVE User Management docs: since
+`orca node join` SSHes in and creates a Linux system user via
+`useradd`, the PVE user must be `orca@pam` (PAM realm maps to host
+system users). `orca@pve` would require a separate PVE-internal
+password and interactive `-password` prompt over non-PTY SSH (hangs).
+`@pam` sidesteps both issues. **D-033 refined: `orca@pam`.**
+
+### C.2 OrcaOperator PVE role — privilege set
+
+Per D-033 (operator-confirmed): `VM.Audit`, `Datastore.AllocateSpace`,
+`SDN.Use`. This is a **minimal API-level role** — the actual management
+capability comes from the sudoers allowlist (sudo runs as root, bypassing
+PVE RBAC). The PVE role governs non-sudo API access (future REST client).
+
+**Refinement from research**: `VM.Audit` covers containers (CTs) as well
+as VMs (both live under `/vms/{vmid}` path; no separate `CT.*` family).
+PVE 8→9: privilege set valid on both (no breaking changes to pveum or
+the core privilege names).
+
+Researcher 2 proposed an expanded 21-privilege set for fuller API-level
+management. **Decision: keep D-033's 3-priv minimal set for v0.6** — the
+operator explicitly confirmed it, and the sudoers allowlist is the
+primary management path. The expanded set is noted as a v0.7+
+enhancement option if orca adds a direct PVE REST client.
+
+### C.3 pveum command sequence (idempotent)
+
+```bash
+# 1. Role — probe-then-add (pveum role add fails if exists)
+pveum role list | grep -q '^OrcaOperator' || \
+  pveum role add OrcaOperator --privs "VM.Audit Datastore.AllocateSpace SDN.Use"
+
+# 2. User — probe-then-add (maps to existing Linux system user)
+pveum user list | grep -q 'orca@pam' || \
+  pveum user add orca@pam -comment "Orca automation user"
+
+# 3. ACL — modify is idempotent (creates or updates)
+pveum acl modify / -user orca@pam -role OrcaOperator
+```
+
+Flag syntax: both `-privs` and `--privs` work (Perl Getopt::Long). Use
+`--privs` (canonical). Privs are **space-separated** inside quotes
+(NOT comma-separated).
+
+### C.4 sudoers file `/etc/sudoers.d/orca` (D-033 refined)
+
+**Research refinement**: exclude `pvesh` from sudoers — `pvesh` can
+reach the `/nodes/{node}/execute` API endpoint which spawns shell
+commands server-side, bypassing sudo's `NOEXEC` tag. Keep `pct`/`qm`
+with `NOEXEC`; `apt-get`/`dpkg` without `NOEXEC` (they need to spawn
+child processes for maintainer scripts).
+
+```
+# /etc/sudoers.d/orca — mode 0440, owner root:root
+# Orca automation: VM/CT management + package management, no shell escape
+orca ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: NOEXEC: /usr/bin/pct, /usr/bin/qm
+orca ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/apt-get, /usr/bin/dpkg
+```
+
+`NOEXEC` works via Linux seccomp (sudoers man page). `pct`/`qm` are
+Perl scripts run via dynamically-linked `/usr/bin/perl` → NOEXEC
+effective. `apt-get`/`dpkg` need exec for postinst scripts → no
+NOEXEC. File mode **0440** or sudo refuses to load. Validate with
+`visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/orca` after writing; abort bootstrap on
+validation failure.
+
+**Resolve binary paths at runtime** via `command -v pct` etc. before
+writing the sudoers file (cheap insurance against non-standard installs).
+
+### C.5 PVE 8 vs 9
+
+No breaking changes to pveum, privilege names, or sudo defaults
+between 8 and 9. `VM.Monitor` removed in 9.0 (OrcaOperator doesn't
+use it). Privileged container creation needs `Sys.Modify` in 9.0
+(OrcaOperator doesn't have it → intended). Both versions: `orca@pam`
+flow identical. Binary paths identical (`/usr/bin/{pct,qm,pvesh}`).
+
+## D. Codebase integration points (confirmed by reading files)
+
+### D.1 Files to modify/create per requirement
+
+| File | Change | REQ |
+|------|--------|-----|
+| `go.mod` / `go.sum` | Add `golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0`; bump sys, add term | REQ-050 |
+| `internal/model/node.go` | Add `Kind`, `OS` string fields + `NodeKind` constants | REQ-049 |
+| `internal/store/migrations/0006_node_kind_os.sql` | **NEW**: `ALTER TABLE nodes ADD COLUMN kind TEXT; ADD COLUMN os TEXT;` (nullable, backward-compatible) | REQ-049 |
+| `internal/store/node_repo.go` | Extend INSERT/SELECT/scanNode for `kind, os`; add `GetByName`, `UpdateLastSeenAndOS` helpers | REQ-049 |
+| `internal/cli/init.go` | Full bootstrap: MkdirAll → store.Open (runs migrations) → CAInit → server cert gen (if absent) → detectOS → localhost node upsert | REQ-047,048 |
+| `internal/cli/node.go` | Add `--type`, `--host`, `--user`, `--password`, `--proxmox-user`, `--proxmox-role` flags; `bootstrapProxmox` branch | REQ-050,051 |
+| `internal/security/sshkey.go` | **NEW**: `GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(dir)` — Ed25519 keygen, PKCS8 PEM, 0600/0644 modes | REQ-050 |
+| `internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go` | **NEW package**: `BootstrapProxmox(ctx, opts)` — SSH dial, pubkey deploy, useradd, pveum role/user/acl, sudoers write, visudo validate | REQ-050,051 |
+| `internal/doctor/doctor.go` | Add `OS()` and `Proxmox()` checks; extend `All()` | REQ-052 |
+| `internal/cli/doctor.go` | Add `doctor os` + `doctor proxmox` subcommands | REQ-052 |
+| `internal/certpaths/certpaths.go` | Add `SSHKeyPath`, `SSHPubPath`, `KnownHostsPath` | REQ-050 |
+
+### D.2 Reuse opportunities (confirmed)
+
+- `security.CAInit` (ca.go:63) — **already idempotent** (fast-path loads existing). `orca init` calls it directly.
+- `security.GenerateCSR` (csr.go) — signature fits: `GenerateCSR("localhost", []string{"localhost","127.0.0.1"})`.
+- `security.WriteCert`/`WriteKey` (ca.go:292) — enforce 0644/0600 via `writeAtomic`; reuse for SSH key.
+- `store.Open` (migrate.go) — runs migrations on open; calling it in `orca init` auto-applies 0006.
+- Migration runner — FS-embedded, sorts lexicographically, idempotent per-file. Adding `0006_*.sql` is the entire change.
+- `doctor.Network()` (doctor.go:222) — exact pattern to clone for `doctor.Proxmox()` (list nodes, filter by kind, 3s timeout per peer, PASS/WARN/FAIL).
+
+### D.3 No changes needed
+
+- `internal/security/ca.go`, `csr.go` — idempotent already, signatures fit.
+- `internal/store/migrate.go` — runner is generic.
+- `internal/transport/*` — mTLS transport not involved in SSH bootstrap.
+- `internal/engine/*` — NodeRegistry.Join works; new fields are metadata.
+
+## E. Pitfalls & gotchas
+
+1. **`pveum` flag is `--privs` (space-separated)**, not `--privs "a,b,c"`. Confirmed by both researchers + official docs.
+2. **`orca@pam` not `orca@pve`** — PVE-internal realm requires interactive password prompt over non-PTY SSH (hangs). PAM realm maps to the Linux system user orca creates.
+3. **Exclude `pvesh` from sudoers** — `pvesh` can trigger API `execute` endpoint spawning shell commands server-side, bypassing `NOEXEC`. Use PVE API via OrcaOperator role for API access instead.
+4. **`NOEXEC` only on dynamically-linked binaries** — `pct`/`qm` are Perl scripts via dynamically-linked `/usr/bin/perl` → effective. `apt-get`/`dpkg` need exec → no NOEXEC.
+5. **sudoers file mode 0440** — or sudo silently refuses to load it. `chmod 0440` + `visudo -cf` validate after write.
+6. **Migration 0006 NULL handling** — `scanNode` must use `sql.NullString` for `kind`/`os` and map NULL → `""` (Go struct fields are `string`, not `*string`).
+7. **localhost node idempotency** — `NodeRepo.Insert` fails on UNIQUE constraint if `orca init` re-runs. Need `GetByName("localhost")` check first; if found, `UpdateLastSeenAndOS` instead of `Insert`. Don't change `id` or `joined_at` (D-036).
+8. **`orca init` must not regenerate server cert** (D-036) — check `certpaths.ServerCertPath()` existence before `GenerateCSR`. `CAInit` has a fast-path; server cert gen needs an explicit existence check.
+9. **Password handling (D-031)** — `--password` flag visible in `ps`/`/proc` briefly. Prefer `$ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD` env var. Never log the password (slog redaction). Zero the byte slice after use.
+10. **`knownhosts.New` for TOFU** — avoids deprecated `ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey`. Handles both capture and verify in one callback.
+11. **PKCS8 PEM parses with `ssh.ParsePrivateKey`** — no need for OpenSSH-format marshaller. Consistent with `ca.key`/`server.key` format.
+12. **`/etc/os-release` is a symlink** on most distros → `os.ReadFile` follows it. Fall back to `/usr/lib/os-release` for minimal containers.
+
+## F. Persona recommendations (v0.6 roster)
+
+| Persona | Active | Reason |
+|---------|--------|--------|
+| `lead-developer` | ✅ | Coordination across P01/P02/P03; SSH/bootstrap touches security + cli + store + doctor |
+| `backend-engineer` | ✅ | Owns `internal/cli/init.go` full-bootstrap orchestration + `internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go` SSH logic |
+| `cli-engineer` | ✅ | Owns `--type`/`--host`/`--password` flag wiring, `doctor os`/`doctor proxmox` subcommands, init output UX |
+| `data-engineer` | ✅ **REACTIVATE** | Owns migration 0006 + `NodeRepo` schema extension (kind/os columns, new helpers) |
+| `security-engineer` | ✅ **REACTIVATE** | Owns `internal/security/sshkey.go`, TOFU host-key, sudoers design, password redaction, audit logging |
+| `devops-engineer` | ❌ **DEACTIVATE** | No install.sh/Dockerfile/.coreci.yml surface in v0.6 |
+| `network-engineer` | ❌ | No transport/mTLS surface (SSH is point-to-point bootstrap, not mesh) |
+| `frontend-engineer` | ❌ | No web UI |
+
+**Territory overlaps to adjudicate (lead-developer)**:
+- `internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go` (security-engineer SSH/sudoers logic) vs `internal/cli/node.go` (cli-engineer flag wiring) — boundary: security package exposes `BootstrapProxmox(ctx, opts) error`, CLI just calls it.
+- `internal/doctor/doctor.go` `Proxmox()` reuses SSH client from `internal/proxmox` (security) but check scaffolding clones `doctor.Network()` pattern (backend adjudicates since network-engineer deactivated).

.ciagent/RESEARCH_v0.7.md

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+# Research: Orca v0.7 — Hardening & Completion
+
+## 1. Codebase audit findings (RESEARCH stage)
+
+A full codebase audit surfaced the gaps that define the v0.7 scope.
+Each finding is grounded in a specific file/coverage measurement.
+
+### 1.1 `orca cert` command tree is unreachable (critical)
+
+- `internal/cli/cert.go:44` exports `NewCommand(log *slog.Logger)
+  *cobra.Command` which builds the full `cert ca-init | gen | show |
+  renew | fingerprint` tree (5 subcommands, all implemented, all
+  spec-compliant per REQ-033/035/036).
+- **No file in the repo calls `NewCommand` or registers it on
+  `rootCmd`.** `grep -rn "rootCmd.AddCommand" internal/cli/` lists
+  daemon, init, audit, version, job, node, doctor, status — `cert` is
+  absent. `./bin/orca cert` returns `error: unknown command "cert"`.
+- The function is named `NewCommand` (not `newCertCmd`), so it is not
+  picked up by any init-based registration convention.
+- **Impact**: every cert operation the spec promises (REQ-023, REQ-025,
+  REQ-033, REQ-035, REQ-036) is unreachable from the CLI. Operators
+  cannot bootstrap a CA, issue a server cert, or rotate one without
+  hand-crafting calls into the `security` package. This is the single
+  highest-impact bug in the v0.1–v0.6 line.
+- **Fix**: one-line `rootCmd.AddCommand(NewCommand(log))` in
+  `internal/cli/cert.go` (or a new `init()`), plus a regression test
+  that asserts `rootCmd.Commands()` contains a child whose `Use ==
+  "cert"`.
+
+### 1.2 `internal/store/cert_repo.go` has no test file
+
+- `internal/store/cert_repo.go` exists (the `certs` table from
+  migration 0004) but `internal/store/cert_repo_test.go` does not.
+- Every other repo in `internal/store/` has a `_test.go`:
+  `node_repo_test.go`, `job_task_repo_test.go`, `capacity_repo_test.go`,
+  `audit_repo_test.go`, `migrate_test.go`.
+- **Fix**: add `cert_repo_test.go` covering Insert/Get/List/rotation
+  history (N=3 per REQ-025) + serial_hex uniqueness.
+
+### 1.3 Low test coverage in core packages
+
+| Package | Coverage | Missing tests for |
+|---------|----------|-------------------|
+| `internal/engine` | 8.3% | `executor.go`, `dispatcher.go`, `peer.go` (only `scheduler_test.go` exists) |
+| `internal/transport` | 26.3% | `mtls.go`, `dispatch.go`, `handshake_log.go` (only `idempotency_test.go` exists) |
+| `internal/proxmox` | 5.1% | `bootstrap.go` SSH path (only `bootstrap_test.go` exists, exercises the no-op dry-run) |
+| `internal/audit` | no test files | `audit.go` (Emit, EmitWithErr, LogHandshake*) |
+
+- Target per D-042: 50% floor per package, 70% for new code in P02/P04.
+- Strategy: table-driven tests + `httptest.NewTLSServer` for transport;
+  interface-based mocks for the SSH dialer (already an interface in
+  `proxmox/bootstrap.go:211` `defaultSSHDialer` with `DialContext`).
+
+### 1.4 No HCL config file parser
+
+- D-009 specified `~/.orca/config.hcl` and `/etc/orca/orca.hcl` as
+  config locations. `find . -name "*.hcl"` returns only testdata
+  (`testdata/hello.hcl`, `testdata/fail.hcl`) used by jobspec tests.
+- The CLI relies entirely on flags + env vars (`ORCA_HOME`,
+  `ORCA_DB`, `ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD`). There is no `internal/config`
+  package.
+- `internal/jobspec/spec.go:40` already uses
+  `hclsimple.Decode(filename, data, nil, &spec)` — the exact same
+  pattern works for a `Config` struct. No new dep required (hashicorp/hcl/v2
+  is already a direct dep).
+- **Fix**: new `internal/config` package with a `Config` struct (HCL
+  tags: `db_path`, `listen_addr`, `ca_path`, `server_cert_path`,
+  `server_key_path`, `node_capacity`), a `Load(paths ...string)`
+  function, and a `--config` flag on the root command. Precedence per
+  D-039: flag > env > file > default.
+
+### 1.5 pprof endpoint (I-308, deferred since v0.2)
+
+- I-308 was deferred in v0.2 IDEATE ("keep v0.2 lean") and never
+  revisited. The daemon (`internal/daemon/server.go`) has no pprof
+  surface today.
+- `net/http/pprof` is stdlib — zero new deps. Mount on a separate
+  `*http.ServeMux` so it never touches the mTLS daemon listener.
+- **Fix**: `--pprof <addr>` flag on `orca daemon` (default disabled).
+  If set, start a second `http.Server` on `<addr>` with
+  `pprof.Index`/`pprof.Cmdline`/etc. registered. Log a WARN that the
+  endpoint is unauthenticated + operator-only.
+
+## 2. Prior art & patterns
+
+### 2.1 HCL config in HashiCorp tools
+
+Nomad, Consul, and Terraform all use HCL for config with the same
+`hclsimple.Decode` + struct-tag pattern. The precedence model (flag >
+env > file > default) is the de-facto standard; Viper implements it but
+adds a large dep. Orca's `internal/config` will implement the 4-layer
+merge by hand (~80 LOC) to stay minimal-deps.
+
+### 2.2 pprof in Go daemons
+
+Standard pattern: `import _ "net/http/pprof"` registers handlers on
+`http.DefaultServeMux`. Best practice for production daemons is a
+**separate listener** (not DefaultServeMux) so pprof is never exposed
+on the public port. Orca will use a dedicated `*http.ServeMux` +
+`http.Server` on the `--pprof` addr, default disabled.
+
+### 2.3 Test coverage for concurrent Go
+
+`internal/engine` (executor, dispatcher) and `internal/transport`
+(mtls, dispatch) are concurrent. Coverage strategy:
+- `httptest.NewTLSServer` for transport — exercise real TLS handshakes
+  against an in-process server.
+- Interface-based mocks for the SSH dialer (proxmox) and the peer
+  client (transport) — both already have interface seams.
+- `sync.WaitGroup` + channel assertions for executor/dispatcher
+  lifecycle.
+- `-race` is already on in CI (REQ-031) — new tests inherit it.
+
+## 3. v0.7 Architectural Decisions (AD-022..AD-026)
+
+| ID | Decision | Rationale |
+|----|----------|-----------|
+| AD-022 | `orca cert` registered via `init()` in `cert.go` calling `rootCmd.AddCommand(NewCommand(slog.Default()))` | Keeps registration co-located with the command definition; matches the pattern in `daemon.go`/`audit.go` where each command file self-registers. Avoids a central registration function that would drift. |
+| AD-023 | `internal/config` package: `Config` struct + `Load(paths ...string) (*Config, error)`; no global singleton | Config is passed explicitly to `daemon.NewServer`, `cli` commands, etc. No package-level state — testable, no init-order surprises. |
+| AD-024 | pprof on a separate `*http.Server` + `*http.ServeMux`, default disabled | Never co-mingles with the mTLS daemon listener. Operator opts in via `--pprof :6060`. Matches Go daemon best practice. |
+| AD-025 | Coverage floor measured per-package via `go test -cover ./<pkg>` | No aggregate threshold (aggregates hide low-coverage packages). CI gate added in P03: `go test -cover ./internal/engine ./internal/transport ./internal/proxmox ./internal/audit` and assert each ≥ 50%. |
+| AD-026 | No new direct dependencies in v0.7 | `net/http/pprof` (stdlib), `hashicorp/hcl/v2` (already direct). v0.7 preserves the minimal-deps ethos. |
+
+## 4. PERSONAS assessment
+
+v0.7 is an NFR milestone touching CLI, config, tests, and daemon. The
+default 3-persona roster (lead-developer, backend-engineer,
+data-engineer) is sufficient:
+
+- **lead-developer**: owns P01 (cert registration) + P04 (pprof) — CLI/
+  daemon territory.
+- **backend-engineer**: owns P02 (config package) — internal/config +
+  CLI integration.
+- **data-engineer**: owns P01 cert_repo tests + P03 store coverage —
+  `internal/store` territory.
+- **lead-developer** also owns P03 engine/transport/proxmox/audit
+  coverage (test-only phase, no schema changes).
+
+No new personas needed. No phase-specific personas. Territory
+enforcement stays `warn`. See `.ciagent/PERSONAS.md` (updated).
+
+## 5. Dependencies
+
+v0.7 adds **zero** new direct dependencies:
+- HCL parsing: `hashicorp/hcl/v2` (already direct, used by jobspec).
+- pprof: `net/http/pprof` (stdlib).
+- Tests: `net/http/httptest` (stdlib), existing interfaces.
+
+`go.mod` is unchanged by v0.7.
+
+## 6. Risks
+
+- **P01 cert registration** may surface latent bugs in the cert
+  subcommands (they've never been exercised end-to-end). Mitigation:
+  P01 includes a smoke test that runs `cert ca-init` + `cert gen` +
+  `cert show` + `cert fingerprint` against a temp `ORCA_HOME`.
+- **P02 config precedence** is easy to get wrong (flag/env/file/default
+  merge order). Mitigation: table-driven test covering all 4 layers.
+- **P03 coverage** on concurrent packages may reveal race conditions
+  (already hidden by the 8.3% coverage). Mitigation: `-race` is on; P03
+  fixes any races it uncovers as part of the same phase.

.ciagent/ROADMAP.md

@@ -20,62 +20,115 @@
 - `iter.Seq` streaming job lists (REQ-022)
 - Frontend / devops personas (no web UI; CoreCI handles release)
 
-## Milestone v0.2: Networking, Observability, Security Hardening — **IN PROGRESS**
+## Milestone v0.2: Networking, Observability, Security Hardening — **COMPLETE (merged to main via v0.3)**
 
 Scope: extend v0.1 with secure cross-node transport, multi-node scheduling,
 richer CI security scanning, and streaming I/O.
 
-- [ ] Phase 8: mTLS handshake + internal CA with CSR join (Wave 1)
-- [ ] Phase 9: Multi-node scheduling & job dispatch (Wave 1)
-- [ ] Phase 10: `gosec` + `govulncheck` + gitleaks in CI (Wave 2)
-- [ ] Phase 11: `iter.Seq` streaming job/node lists (Wave 2)
+- [x] Phase 8: mTLS handshake + internal CA with CSR join (Wave 1) — shipped v0.2.1
+- [x] Phase 9: Multi-node scheduling & job dispatch (Wave 1) — shipped v0.2.2
+- [x] Phase 10: `gosec` + `govulncheck` + gitleaks in CI (Wave 2) — shipped v0.2.3
+- [x] Phase 11: `iter.Seq` streaming job/node lists (Wave 2) — **completed in v0.3 P01** (shipped v0.3.1)
 
-**Target milestone tag**: `v0.3.0` (next-minor per feature-milestone promotion rule).
+**Milestone tag**: `v0.4.0` (shipped — v0.2 work merged to main via v0.3 milestone).
 
-Per-phase tags: `v0.2.1` (P01), `v0.2.2` (P02), `v0.2.3` (P03), `v0.2.4` (P04).
+Per-phase tags: `v0.2.1` (P01), `v0.2.2` (P02), `v0.2.3` (P03) — all shipped.
+
+## Milestone v0.3: Scheduling & Streaming Completion — **COMPLETE**
+
+Scope: complete the two work items deferred from v0.2 that were not
+already shipped in P08-P10. A re-init SPECIFY codebase audit confirmed
+that REQ-014/027/028/029/031/037/039/040 all shipped in P08-P10 despite
+stale REQUIREMENTS.md marking them Pending. The remaining work is lean:
+
+- [x] Phase 0: Pre-execution (specify → clarify → research → plan → grill) — shipped v0.3.0
+- [x] Phase 1: `iter.Seq` streaming for `--watch` flags (REQ-022, REQ-030) — shipped v0.3.1
+- [x] Phase 2: `orca doctor` network + db full implementation (REQ-032 completion) — shipped v0.3.2
+- [x] Phase 3: Final review + ship + audit (milestone release) — shipped v0.3.3
+
+**Milestone tag**: `v0.4.0` (next-minor per feature-milestone promotion rule).
+
+Per-phase tags: `v0.3.0` (P0), `v0.3.1` (P01), `v0.3.2` (P02), `v0.3.3` (P03 final = milestone release).
 Per `.ciagent/RELEASE_POLICY.md`, every phase tag produces a Gitea release.
 
-### Per-phase REQ coverage (post-IDEATE)
+### Per-phase REQ coverage
 
-- **P01 — mTLS handshake + internal CA with CSR join** (Wave 1)
-  - REQ-011, REQ-023 (carried over from v0.1)
-  - REQ-025 (cert rotation history), REQ-026 (CA fingerprint pinning),
-    REQ-033 (file mode enforcement), REQ-034 (rotation alarm),
-    REQ-035 (cert show redaction), REQ-036 (SAN validation),
-    REQ-038 (mTLS failure log fields)
-  - REQ-032 (orca doctor — initial implementation; checks CA/cert state)
+- **P01 — `iter.Seq` streaming for `--watch` flags**
+  - REQ-022 (`iter.Seq` for streaming job lists, Go 1.25+)
+  - REQ-030 (`--watch` output format mode: table default vs streaming JSON per event)
+  - Applies to both `orca job list --watch` and `orca node list --watch`
+    (D-024, per ARCHITECTURE.md CLI layer + D-017)
 
-- **P02 — Multi-node scheduling & job dispatch** (Wave 1)
-  - REQ-028 (NodeCapacity HCL schema — P02 enabler; lands first)
-  - REQ-037 (X-Orca-Idempotency-Key on cross-node POST)
+- **P02 — `orca doctor` network + db full implementation**
+  - REQ-032 (completion: network reachability via mTLS `/healthz` probe,
+    db integrity via `PRAGMA integrity_check` + migration version)
+  - Replaces `NetworkStub` and `DBStub` from v0.2 P01
 
-- **P03 — `gosec` + `govulncheck` + gitleaks in CI** (Wave 2)
-  - REQ-014 (carried over)
-  - REQ-027 (govulncheck offline mode — new in v0.2 IDEATE, per REQ-cand-C;
-    this changes P03's scope: CI must not call `vuln.go.dev` by default;
-    resolve via pre-mirrored DB or `-format json` + `jq` wrapper. PLAN
-    stage decides between the two options.)
-  - REQ-029 (gitleaks baseline for pre-existing `.env` leak in history,
-    per REQ-cand-E)
-  - REQ-039 (`.gitleaks.toml` stopwords), REQ-040 (`.golangci.yml`)
+### v0.3 is a completion milestone, not a direction change
 
-- **P04 — `iter.Seq` streaming job/node lists** (Wave 2)
-  - REQ-022 (carried over)
-  - REQ-030 (`--watch --json` streaming output mode, per REQ-cand-F)
+The vision ("minimalist, offline-first, CLI-first orchestration
+engine") is unchanged. v0.3 closes out the v0.2 deferrals and merges
+the accumulated v0.2 work to main.
 
-- **Cross-cutting (P01–P04)**
-  - REQ-031 (`go test -race` enabled in CI for all v0.2 packages)
+## Milestone v0.5: Distribution — **COMPLETE**
 
-### P03 scope change (vs. pre-IDEATE plan)
+Scope: make Orca installable, distributable, and containerized. The
+engine functionality from v0.1–v0.3 is unchanged; this milestone is
+purely about delivery surface.
 
-REQ-027 (govulncheck offline mode) adds explicit work to P03: the CI
-job must be configured to NOT make outbound calls to `vuln.go.dev`
-(default `govulncheck` behavior). Two implementation paths are viable;
-PLAN chooses:
-- Pre-mirror the vulnerability database inside the CoreCI image
-  (`GOVULNCHECK_DB=/path/to/local.db`).
-- Use `govulncheck -format json` (which always exits 0) and gate
-  merges via a wrapper that parses the JSON and returns non-zero on
-  unsuppressed findings.
+- [x] Phase 0: Pre-execution (specify → clarify → research → plan) — shipped `v0.4.1` (+ repo public)
+- [x] Phase 1: Namespace unification (`ORCA_HOME` + `--system`) (REQ-041, REQ-042) — shipped `v0.4.2`
+- [x] Phase 2: `install.sh` + in-place update + README quickstart (REQ-043, REQ-044) — shipped `v0.4.3`
+- [x] Phase 3: Docker release (Dockerfile + Gitea container registry) (REQ-046) — shipped `v0.4.4`
+- [x] Phase 4: Final review + ship + audit (milestone release) — shipped `v0.4.5`
 
-Either path keeps the offline-first invariant (REQ-003) intact.
+**Operational prerequisite (P0 ship)**: repo + org visibility flipped to
+public (REQ-045) — unauth releases API + asset download + docker pull all
+verified HTTP 200.
+
+**Milestone tag**: `v0.4.5` (final phase patch = milestone release per
+feature-milestone promotion rule). Per-phase tags: `v0.4.1`…`v0.4.5`.
+
+## Milestone v0.6: Node Bootstrap & Proxmox
+
+## Milestone v0.6: Node Bootstrap & Proxmox — **COMPLETE**
+
+Scope: make `orca init` produce a fully working single-node cluster
+(CA + server cert + DB + localhost node registered with auto-detected
+OS), and add Proxmox 8 & 9 as a first-class remote node type joined
+over SSH with least-privilege role delegation.
+
+- [x] Phase 0: Pre-execution (specify → clarify → research → plan → grill) — tag `v0.5.0`
+- [x] Phase 1: `orca init` full bootstrap + localhost node + schema 0006 (REQ-047, REQ-048, REQ-049) — tag `v0.5.1`
+- [x] Phase 2: Proxmox SSH join + OrcaOperator role + sudoers allowlist (REQ-050, REQ-051) — tag `v0.5.2`
+- [x] Phase 3: `doctor os` + `doctor proxmox` SSH probe + audit logging (REQ-052) — tag `v0.5.3`
+- [x] Phase 4: Final review + ship + audit (milestone release) — tag `v0.5.4`
+
+**Milestone type**: feature (P1/P2/P3 ship `feat` phases).
+**Milestone tag**: `v0.5.4` (final phase patch = milestone release per
+feature-milestone promotion rule). Per-phase tags: `v0.5.0`…`v0.5.4`.
+
+Tags run on the previous minor's patch line (v0.5.x) per
+branch-strategy.md. The milestone branch label uses the milestone
+number (`milestone/v0.6-node-bootstrap-proxmox`); no separate minor
+tag is created.
+
+## Milestone v0.7: Hardening & Completion
+
+Scope: NFR milestone closing gaps surfaced by the v0.7 IDEATE stage —
+an unreachable command tree, a missing config file layer, low test
+coverage in core packages, and the long-deferred pprof endpoint.
+
+- [x] Phase 0: Pre-execution (specify → clarify → research → ideate → plan) — tag `v0.6.0` (shipped)
+- [x] Phase 1: Register `orca cert` command tree + cert_repo tests (REQ-053) — tag `v0.6.1` (shipped)
+- [x] Phase 2: HCL config file parsing — `internal/config` package (REQ-054) — tag `v0.6.2` (shipped)
+- [ ] Phase 3: Test coverage uplift — engine/transport/proxmox/audit ≥ 50% (REQ-055) — tag `v0.6.3`
+- [ ] Phase 4: `--pprof` opt-in on `orca daemon` (REQ-056) — tag `v0.6.4`
+- [ ] Phase 5: Final review + ship + audit (milestone release) — tag `v0.6.5`
+
+**Milestone type**: NFR (all phases are fix/test/chore; no `feat` phases).
+**Milestone tag**: `v0.6.5` (final phase patch = milestone release per
+NFR-milestone progressive-patch rule). Per-phase tags: `v0.6.0`…`v0.6.5`.
+Tags run on the previous minor's patch line (v0.6.x) per
+branch-strategy.md. The milestone branch label uses the milestone
+number (`milestone/v0.7-hardening-completion`); no separate minor tag.

.ciagent/config.json

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
       "slug": "orca",
       "name": "Orca",
       "description": "Offline/CLI-first orchestration engine (Orca) — Nomad-inspired, far simpler than Kubernetes",
-      "milestone": "v0.1",
+      "milestone": "v0.7",
       "phase": 0,
-      "milestone_type": "feature",
+      "milestone_type": "nfr",
       "default_branch": "main",
       "tech_stack": {
         "language": "go",
@@ -24,12 +24,18 @@
   ],
   "active_project": "orca",
   "active_projects": ["orca"],
+  "ship": {
+    "per_phase": true,
+    "allow_skip": false,
+    "max_release_retries": 3
+  },
   "autonomy": {
     "level": "full",
     "decision_confidence_threshold": 0.60,
     "max_revision_iterations": 3,
     "max_verification_retries": 2,
-    "escalation_hooks": ["delete", "drop", "force", "reset --hard"]
+    "clarify_budget": 10,
+    "escalation_hooks": ["deploy", "delete_data", "merge_to_main"]
   },
   "workflow": {
     "no_hitl": true,
@@ -114,6 +120,31 @@
     "url": "https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca.git",
     "main_branch": "main"
   },
+  "release": {
+    "forge": "gitea",
+    "gitea": {
+      "base_url": "https://git.cloudinit.dev",
+      "owner": "coreci",
+      "repo": "orca",
+      "token_env": "GITEA_TOKEN"
+    },
+    "container_registry": {
+      "forge": "gitea",
+      "registry": "git.cloudinit.dev",
+      "owner": "coreci",
+      "image": "orca",
+      "credential_env": "GITEA_TOKEN"
+    }
+  },
+  "secrets": {
+    "scopes": [
+      {
+        "name": "gitea",
+        "vars": ["GITEA_TOKEN", "GITEA_USER"],
+        "env_file": ".env"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
   "commands": {
     "test": "make test",
     "build": "make build",

.coreci.yml

@@ -8,10 +8,17 @@ description: Orca — offline/CLI-first orchestration engine. Full release flow
 # All four pipelines (validate, build, test, release) must pass before a tag
 # can be published. The release pipeline is gated on the existence of a
 # semver tag (vX.Y.Z) and is the only pipeline that touches the Gitea API.
+#
+# P03 (v0.2) added three security-scanning stages to the `validate` pipeline:
+#   - gosec        (REQ-014, REQ-040)  Static analysis for Go security smells
+#   - govulncheck  (REQ-014, REQ-027)  Offline vuln scan of dependencies
+#   - gitleaks     (REQ-039)          Pre-commit-style secret scan
+# The `test` pipeline runs with -race (REQ-031).
+# See docs/security-scanning.md for operator-facing details.
 
 pipelines:
   validate:
-    description: Validate Go toolchain and code formatting
+    description: Validate Go toolchain, formatting, and security scans
     steps:
       - name: go-version
         image: golang:1.25
@@ -20,6 +27,29 @@ pipelines:
           - gofmt -l .
           - go vet ./...
 
+      - name: gosec
+        image: golang:1.25
+        commands:
+          - go install github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@v2.18.2
+          - gosec -fmt text -quiet ./...
+
+      - name: govulncheck
+        image: golang:1.25
+        env:
+          # REQ-027: offline mode. GOFLAGS=-mod=mod ensures module mode;
+          # GOVULNCHECK_DB (when present) overrides the bundled DB.
+          GOFLAGS: -mod=mod
+        commands:
+          - go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.1.3
+          - govulncheck -mode binary ./...
+
+      - name: gitleaks
+        image: golang:1.25
+        commands:
+          - apk add --no-cache curl
+          - sh -c "$(curl -fsSL https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/latest/download/install.sh)"
+          - gitleaks detect --source . --config .gitleaks.toml --baseline-path .gitleaks-baseline.json --no-banner
+
   build:
     description: Build the orca binary with version injection
     steps:
@@ -40,7 +70,7 @@ pipelines:
           - ./bin/orca version
 
   test:
-    description: Run all tests with race detection and coverage
+    description: Run all tests with race detection and coverage (REQ-031)
     steps:
       - name: test
         image: golang:1.25
@@ -78,6 +108,27 @@ pipelines:
           - apk add --no-cache curl tar
           - sh -c "$(curl -fsSL https://gitea.com/gitea/tea/releases/latest/download/install.sh)"
           - tea releases create ${VERSION}
+              --repo coreci/orca
               --title "Orca ${VERSION}"
               --note-file CHANGELOG.md
               --asset orca-${VERSION}-linux-amd64.tar.gz
+      - name: container-publish
+        description: Build and publish OCI image to Gitea container registry (REQ-046)
+        image: docker:24-cli
+        env:
+          GITEA_TOKEN: ${GITEA_TOKEN}
+          VERSION: ${CI_COMMIT_TAG}
+          GIT_COMMIT: ${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
+          BUILD_TIME: ${CI_BUILD_TIME}
+        commands:
+          - docker build
+              --build-arg VERSION=${VERSION}
+              --build-arg GIT_COMMIT=${GIT_COMMIT}
+              --build-arg BUILD_TIME=${BUILD_TIME}
+              -t git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:${VERSION}
+              -t git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:latest
+              .
+          - echo "${GITEA_TOKEN}" | docker login git.cloudinit.dev -u cloudinit-bot --password-stdin
+          - docker push git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:${VERSION}
+          - docker push git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:latest
+          - docker logout git.cloudinit.dev

.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+.git
+.githooks
+.bin
+bin/
+*.tar.gz
+*.tar.gz.asc
+.env
+.env.*
+.gitleaks-baseline.json
+.gitleaks.toml
+.golangci.yml
+.ciagent/
+testdata/
+docs/
+*.md
+!README.md
+LICENSE
+coverage.out
+orca
+orca-v*

.githooks/pre-commit

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# .githooks/pre-commit — gitleaks pre-commit gate (P03, REQ-039).
+#
+# Runs `gitleaks protect --staged` on every commit. If gitleaks is
+# not installed, the hook is a no-op (the commit proceeds). CI
+# catches the same findings via `.coreci.yml` `validate` pipeline.
+#
+# Install: `git config core.hooksPath .githooks`
+
+set -e
+
+if ! command -v gitleaks >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "  (gitleaks not installed; skipping pre-commit secret scan; CI will catch it)"
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+# Find the repo root (this hook lives in .githooks/).
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$REPO_ROOT"
+
+# Run gitleaks on staged content. The --baseline-path suppresses
+# pre-existing findings (REQ-029 — the v0.1 .env leak).
+gitleaks protect --staged --config .gitleaks.toml --baseline-path .gitleaks-baseline.json

.gitignore

@@ -10,4 +10,6 @@ orca
 *.db-shm
 .env
 .env.local
+.env.secrets
+.env.*
 *.tar.gz

.gitleaks-baseline.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+[
+  {
+    "Op": "skip",
+    "RuleID": "orca-pre-existing-env-leak",
+    "Commit": "0cba1aa5feef9564f8b9a2a97ae735dc859a8a84",
+    "Entropy": 0,
+    "Secret": "REDACTED-AT-BASELINE-CREATION-TIME",
+    "File": ".env",
+    "SymlinkFile": "",
+    "CheckEntropy": false,
+    "Match": "GITEA_TOKEN=<redacted — pre-existing v0.1 leak; rotated in 00127ce>"
+  }
+]

.gitleaks.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# gitleaks config for orca (v0.2 P03, REQ-039)
+#
+# Allowlist CA cert PEM blocks (-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----) and test
+# data paths under internal/security/testdata/. Stopwords for both
+# the v0.1 historical `.env` leak (mitigated forward; baseline file
+# .gitleaks-baseline.json handles the historical case) and the
+# `.gitleaks-baseline.json` file itself.
+
+title = "orca gitleaks config"
+
+[extend]
+useDefault = true
+
+[allowlist]
+description = "Global allowlist for orca repo"
+paths = [
+  '''\.gitleaks-baseline\.json$''',
+  '''\.gitleaks\.toml$''',
+  '''\.golangci\.yml$''',
+  '''\.coreci\.yml$''',
+  '''\.ciagent/.*\.md$''',
+  '''CHANGELOG\.md$''',
+  '''internal/security/testdata/.*''',
+  '''docs/security-scanning\.md$''',
+]
+
+# Stopwords for cert PEM blocks (REQ-039): allow the cert headers,
+# but not the private-key headers. We rely on gitleaks' built-in
+# private-key detector for the latter; the allowlist here suppresses
+# the cert-PEM false-positive on `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----`.
+stopwords = [
+  '''-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----''',
+  '''-----END CERTIFICATE-----''',
+]
+
+[[rules]]
+id = "orca-cert-pem"
+description = "CA and leaf cert PEM blocks (allowlisted, not flagged)"
+regex = '''-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |)CERTIFICATE-----'''
+keywords = ["-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"]
+allowlist = true

.golangci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+# golangci-lint unified config for orca (v0.2 P03, REQ-040).
+# Supersedes per-tool invocations. The linters here are picked for
+# the minimalist pillar: only what's needed to catch real bugs and
+# security issues, nothing cosmetic.
+
+linters:
+  disable-all: true
+  enable:
+    - gosec       # security; integrated with .coreci.yml validate
+    - govet       # standard go vet
+    - ineffassign # unreachable error returns
+    - misspell    # common typos
+    - gocritic    # opinionated style/lint checks (subset below)
+
+linters-settings:
+  gosec:
+    # Severity filter: don't fail on LOW; HIGH is a blocker.
+    # The P03 plan asks for hardcoded-credential (G101) to be a
+    # build-breaking finding; the gosec default severity is HIGH
+    # for G101, so the default config satisfies that.
+    severity: high
+    confidence: medium
+
+issues:
+  # Exclude generated or vendored paths.
+  exclude-rules:
+    - path: "_test\\.go"
+      linters: [gosec]
+      text: "G404" # Insecure random number source (math/rand) is fine in tests
+    - path: "internal/security/testdata/"
+      linters: [gosec, misspell]
+
+run:
+  # golangci-lint uses .golangci.yml by default; we keep the
+  # timeout short because the codebase is small. CI overrides
+  # this in .coreci.yml.
+  timeout: 5m
+  tests: true

Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# Dockerfile — multi-stage build for orca
+#
+# Stage 1: build the static binary with golang:1.25
+# Stage 2: distroless static runtime (CGO-free, ~2MB image)
+#
+# Build args:
+#   VERSION     — semver tag injected via -ldflags (e.g. v0.4.4)
+#   GIT_COMMIT  — short commit hash
+#   BUILD_TIME  — ISO 8601 build timestamp
+#
+# Build:
+#   docker build --build-arg VERSION=v0.4.4 -t git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4 .
+#
+# Run:
+#   docker run --rm git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4 version
+#   docker run --rm -v orca-data:/var/lib/orca git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4 init
+
+ARG VERSION=dev
+ARG GIT_COMMIT=unknown
+ARG BUILD_TIME=unknown
+
+# --- Stage 1: build -------------------------------------------------------
+
+FROM golang:1.25 AS builder
+
+ARG VERSION
+ARG GIT_COMMIT
+ARG BUILD_TIME
+
+WORKDIR /src
+
+# Cache module downloads — copy go.mod/go.sum first, download, then copy source.
+COPY go.mod go.sum ./
+RUN go mod download
+
+COPY . .
+
+# CGO_ENABLED=0 guarantees a static binary (modernc/sqlite is pure Go).
+RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
+      -ldflags="-s -w \
+        -X git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/cli.version=${VERSION} \
+        -X git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/cli.gitCommit=${GIT_COMMIT} \
+        -X git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/cli.buildTime=${BUILD_TIME}" \
+      -o /orca ./cmd/orca
+
+# --- Stage 2: runtime -----------------------------------------------------
+
+FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot
+
+# ORCA_HOME points to a volume-mountable path inside the container.
+# Mount a volume at /var/lib/orca to persist state across container restarts.
+ENV ORCA_HOME=/var/lib/orca
+
+COPY --from=builder /orca /orca
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/orca"]

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: build test lint fmt clean run release version changelog help
+.PHONY: build test test-race lint fmt clean run release version changelog help security-scan
 
 BINARY := bin/orca
 GOFLAGS := -trimpath
@@ -19,15 +19,17 @@ LDFLAGS := -s -w \
 
 help:
 	@echo "orca — make targets"
-	@echo "  build       Build binary to $(BINARY) (injects version via -ldflags)"
-	@echo "  test        Run tests with race detection"
-	@echo "  lint        Run gofmt + go vet"
-	@echo "  fmt         Format code"
-	@echo "  clean       Remove build artifacts"
-	@echo "  run         Build and run with args (use: make run ARGS='version')"
-	@echo "  version     Print the version string that would be injected"
-	@echo "  changelog   Generate CHANGELOG.md from ---ci--- commit blocks"
-	@echo "  release     Run scripts/release.sh [VERSION] — build, tar, publish"
+	@echo "  build           Build binary to $(BINARY) (injects version via -ldflags)"
+	@echo "  test            Run tests"
+	@echo "  test-race       Run tests with race detection (REQ-031)"
+	@echo "  lint            Run gofmt + go vet"
+	@echo "  fmt             Format code"
+	@echo "  clean           Remove build artifacts"
+	@echo "  run             Build and run with args (use: make run ARGS='version')"
+	@echo "  version         Print the version string that would be injected"
+	@echo "  changelog       Generate CHANGELOG.md from ---ci--- commit blocks"
+	@echo "  release         Run scripts/release.sh [VERSION] — build, tar, publish"
+	@echo "  security-scan   Run gosec+govulncheck+gitleaks (P03, REQ-014/027/039)"
 
 build:
 	@mkdir -p bin
@@ -35,6 +37,11 @@ build:
 	go build $(GOFLAGS) -ldflags="$(LDFLAGS)" -o $(BINARY) $(PKG)
 
 test:
+	go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...
+
+# test-race runs the full test suite under the race detector (REQ-031).
+# Wired into the .coreci.yml `test` pipeline as well.
+test-race:
 	go test -race -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...
 
 lint:
@@ -83,3 +90,11 @@ release:
 	  exit 1; \
 	fi
 	./scripts/release.sh $(VERSION)
+
+# security-scan runs the three tools integrated in P03 (REQ-014,
+# REQ-027, REQ-039). Local equivalent of the .coreci.yml `validate`
+# security stages. Exits non-zero on any unsuppressed finding.
+# The script handles tool detection (silently skips tools not on PATH
+# in a developer's local environment; CI requires all three).
+security-scan:
+	./scripts/security_scan.sh

README.md

@@ -18,16 +18,43 @@ Offline/CLI-first orchestration engine inspired by HashiCorp Nomad, far simpler
 
 ## Quickstart
 
+### Install (1-liner)
+
 ```bash
-# Build
-make build
+# User-level install (binary at ~/.local/bin/orca, state at ~/.orca)
+curl -fsSL https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/raw/branch/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
 
-# Run
-./bin/orca version
-./bin/orca --help
+# System-level install (binary at /usr/local/bin/orca, state at /root/.orca)
+curl -fsSL https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/raw/branch/main/scripts/install.sh | sudo bash -s -- --system
 
-# Initialize local state
-./bin/orca init
+# Pin a specific version
+curl -fsSL https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/raw/branch/main/scripts/install.sh | bash -s -- --version v0.4.2
+```
+
+Then initialize local state and verify:
+
+```bash
+orca init          # creates ~/.orca/ (or /root/.orca with --system)
+orca version       # prints version info
+orca --help        # show all subcommands
+```
+
+### Build from source
+
+```bash
+make build         # Build binary to ./bin/orca
+./bin/orca init    # Initialize local state
+./bin/orca version # Verify
+```
+
+### Update in place
+
+Re-running the installer updates the binary while preserving your
+config, database, and certificates in the namespace dir:
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/raw/branch/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
+# → "updated orca from v0.4.1 to v0.4.2"
 ```
 
 ## Subcommands

docs/docker.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Docker Guide
+
+Orca is available as a container image on the Gitea container registry.
+The image is a minimal distroless static build (~2MB runtime layer)
+that runs the orca binary directly.
+
+## Image
+
+```
+git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:<version>
+git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:latest
+```
+
+The image is built from the `Dockerfile` in the repo root:
+- **Build stage**: `golang:1.25` — compiles a static binary with
+  `CGO_ENABLED=0` (modernc/sqlite is pure Go, no CGO).
+- **Runtime stage**: `gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot` —
+  ~2MB, no shell, runs as `nonroot` user.
+
+## Pull
+
+```bash
+docker pull git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:latest
+# or pin a version
+docker pull git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4
+```
+
+The repo is public (REQ-045), so anonymous pull works without login.
+
+## Run
+
+```bash
+# Print version
+docker run --rm git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4 version
+
+# Initialize state (creates /var/lib/orca/ inside the container)
+docker run --rm -v orca-data:/var/lib/orca git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4 init
+
+# Run the daemon (persist state via volume)
+docker run -d --name orca \
+  -p 8080:8080 \
+  -v orca-data:/var/lib/orca \
+  git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4 daemon --addr=:8080
+```
+
+## State Persistence
+
+The image sets `ENV ORCA_HOME=/var/lib/orca`. All orca state (SQLite
+database, CA certs, server certs) is written under this path. To
+persist state across container restarts, mount a volume:
+
+```bash
+docker volume create orca-data
+docker run --rm -v orca-data:/var/lib/orca git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4 init
+docker run -d --name orca -p 8080:8080 -v orca-data:/var/lib/orca git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4 daemon
+```
+
+Without a volume, state is lost when the container exits.
+
+## System-Level Namespace Inside Containers
+
+The `--system` flag is not needed inside containers — the image already
+sets `ORCA_HOME=/var/lib/orca`. Use `--system` only if you want a
+different namespace root (e.g., `/root/.orca`), which requires running
+as root (the distroless image runs as `nonroot` by default).
+
+## Build Locally
+
+```bash
+docker build --build-arg VERSION=v0.4.4 -t orca-local:v0.4.4 .
+docker run --rm orca-local:v0.4.4 version
+```
+
+Build args:
+- `VERSION` — semver tag (injected via `-ldflags`)
+- `GIT_COMMIT` — short commit hash
+- `BUILD_TIME` — ISO 8601 build timestamp
+
+## Publish (for maintainers)
+
+The `.coreci.yml` release pipeline includes a `container-publish` step
+that builds and pushes the image on every tag release. To publish
+manually:
+
+```bash
+export GITEA_TOKEN=<token>
+docker build --build-arg VERSION=v0.4.4 -t git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4 -t git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:latest .
+echo "$GITEA_TOKEN" | docker login git.cloudinit.dev -u cloudinit-bot --password-stdin
+docker push git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:v0.4.4
+docker push git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca:latest
+```
+
+## See Also
+
+- [Install Guide](install.md) — binary install (alternative to Docker).
+- [Namespace and Paths](namespace.md) — `ORCA_HOME` and `--system` flag.

docs/install.md

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+# Install Guide
+
+Orca is distributed as a single binary via a 1-liner installer that
+pulls from the public Gitea release artifacts. This guide covers
+user-level install, system-level install, in-place updates, version
+pinning, and troubleshooting.
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+- A Linux system with `curl` and `tar` installed.
+- For user-level install: write access to `~/.local/bin/`.
+- For system-level install: root (`sudo`) access.
+
+## User-Level Install (Default)
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/raw/branch/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
+```
+
+This installs:
+- Binary: `~/.local/bin/orca`
+- Namespace root: `~/.orca/` (created by `orca init`)
+
+If `~/.local/bin` is not on your `PATH`, add it:
+```bash
+echo 'export PATH="$PATH:$HOME/.local/bin"' >> ~/.bashrc
+source ~/.bashrc
+```
+
+## System-Level Install
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/raw/branch/main/scripts/install.sh | sudo bash -s -- --system
+```
+
+This installs:
+- Binary: `/usr/local/bin/orca`
+- Namespace root: `/root/.orca/` (created by `orca --system init`)
+
+The `--system` flag requires root (uid 0). It errors if `ORCA_HOME` is
+already set to a conflicting value.
+
+## Initialize State
+
+After installing, initialize the local state directory:
+
+```bash
+# User-level
+orca init
+
+# System-level
+orca --system init
+```
+
+This creates the namespace root directory (`~/.orca` or `/root/.orca`).
+
+## Version Pinning
+
+By default, the installer fetches the **latest** release. To pin a
+specific version:
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/raw/branch/main/scripts/install.sh | bash -s -- --version v0.4.2
+```
+
+## In-Place Update
+
+Re-running the installer updates the binary in place while **preserving**
+your config, database, and certificates in the namespace dir:
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/raw/branch/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
+```
+
+Output:
+```
+install: ✓ updated orca from v0.4.1 to v0.4.2 at /home/user/.local/bin/orca
+```
+
+The installer:
+1. Detects the existing binary at the install path.
+2. Reads its version via `orca version --json`.
+3. Downloads the new release.
+4. Overwrites the binary.
+5. **Never touches** the namespace dir (`~/.orca` or `/root/.orca`).
+
+## Uninstall
+
+```bash
+# Remove the binary
+rm ~/.local/bin/orca          # user-level
+sudo rm /usr/local/bin/orca   # system-level
+
+# Optionally remove state (THIS DELETES YOUR DATABASE + CERTS)
+rm -rf ~/.orca                # user-level
+sudo rm -rf /root/.orca       # system-level
+```
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+### `install: error: --system requires root`
+
+The `--system` flag requires root. Re-run with `sudo`:
+```bash
+curl -fsSL ... | sudo bash -s -- --system
+```
+
+### `install: error: --system conflicts with ORCA_HOME=...`
+
+`ORCA_HOME` is set to a non-system path. Either unset it or drop `--system`:
+```bash
+unset ORCA_HOME
+curl -fsSL ... | sudo bash -s -- --system
+```
+
+### `install: error: could not find asset orca-vX.Y.Z-linux-amd64.tar.gz`
+
+The requested version does not have a Linux release asset. Check
+available releases at
+`https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/releases`.
+
+### `install: error: unsupported architecture: ...`
+
+The installer supports `amd64` (x86_64), `arm64` (aarch64), and `armv7`.
+Contact the maintainers if you need another architecture.
+
+### `~/.local/bin is not on your PATH`
+
+Add it to your shell profile:
+```bash
+echo 'export PATH="$PATH:$HOME/.local/bin"' >> ~/.bashrc
+source ~/.bashrc
+```
+
+## See Also
+
+- [Namespace and Paths](namespace.md) — `ORCA_HOME`, `--system`, path layout.
+- [Docker Guide](docker.md) — running orca in a container.
+- [Development](../README.md#development) — building from source.

docs/namespace.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Namespace and Paths
+
+Orca stores all on-disk state (SQLite database, CA certs, server certs,
+config) under a single **namespace root** directory. This document
+describes how that root is resolved and how to override it.
+
+## Default: User-Level (`~/.orca`)
+
+By default, the namespace root is `~/.orca` (i.e., `$HOME/.orca`).
+All orca state lives under this directory:
+
+| Path | Contents |
+|------|----------|
+| `~/.orca/orca.db` | SQLite database (jobs, nodes, tasks, audit log, capacity) |
+| `~/.orca/ca.crt` | CA certificate (PEM, mode 0644) |
+| `~/.orca/ca.key` | CA private key (PEM, mode 0600) |
+| `~/.orca/server.crt` | Server certificate (PEM, mode 0644) |
+| `~/.orca/server.key` | Server private key (PEM, mode 0600) |
+
+## Override: `ORCA_HOME` Environment Variable (REQ-041)
+
+Set the `ORCA_HOME` environment variable to change the namespace root
+for **all** orca components (database, certs, init, daemon):
+
+```bash
+export ORCA_HOME=/var/lib/orca
+orca init          # creates /var/lib/orca/
+orca daemon        # reads /var/lib/orca/orca.db
+orca cert ca-init  # writes CA to /var/lib/orca/
+```
+
+This is the single source of truth for the namespace root. Every
+component that reads or writes on-disk state resolves the root via
+`ORCA_HOME` (falling back to `~/.orca` when unset).
+
+### Use cases
+
+- **Testing**: point `ORCA_HOME` at a temp directory.
+- **Multi-instance**: run multiple orca daemons on the same host with
+  different `ORCA_HOME` values.
+- **Custom layout**: store state on a mounted volume
+  (`ORCA_HOME=/mnt/orca-data`).
+
+## System-Level: `--system` Flag (REQ-042)
+
+The `--system` persistent flag selects the system-level namespace root
+`/root/.orca`. This is intended for root-owned system deployments
+(where orca runs as a system service under root):
+
+```bash
+sudo orca --system init          # creates /root/.orca/
+sudo orca --system daemon        # reads /root/.orca/orca.db
+sudo orca --system cert ca-init  # writes CA to /root/.orca/
+```
+
+The `--system` flag is equivalent to setting `ORCA_HOME=/root/.orca`,
+but it is a CLI convenience that does not require exporting an env var.
+If `ORCA_HOME` is already set to a different value, `--system` returns
+an error (to avoid silent namespace mismatches).
+
+### Path layout
+
+System-level uses the same directory shape as user-level, just under
+`/root/.orca` instead of `~/.orca`:
+
+| Path | Contents |
+|------|----------|
+| `/root/.orca/orca.db` | SQLite database |
+| `/root/.orca/ca.crt` | CA certificate |
+| `/root/.orca/ca.key` | CA private key |
+| `/root/.orca/server.crt` | Server certificate |
+| `/root/.orca/server.key` | Server private key |
+
+## Resolution Order
+
+1. If `--system` flag is passed → root is `/root/.orca` (errors if
+   `ORCA_HOME` is set to a conflicting value).
+2. Else if `ORCA_HOME` is set → root is `$ORCA_HOME`.
+3. Else → root is `~/.orca` (`$HOME/.orca`).
+
+## `ORCA_DB` Override
+
+For finer-grained control, `ORCA_DB` overrides **only** the database
+path (not the cert paths). This is primarily a testing affordance. When
+`ORCA_DB` is set, certs still resolve under `ORCA_HOME` (or `~/.orca`).
+
+```bash
+export ORCA_DB=/tmp/test.db
+orca daemon   # uses /tmp/test.db for the DB, ~/.orca/ for certs
+```
+
+## See Also
+
+- [Install Guide](install.md) — 1-liner install with `install.sh`.
+- [Docker Guide](docker.md) — running orca in a container (uses
+  `ORCA_HOME=/var/lib/orca` inside the image).

docs/security-scanning.md

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+# Security Scanning in Orca
+
+This document describes the three security scanning tools integrated
+in v0.2 P03 (Phases 10): `gosec`, `govulncheck`, and `gitleaks`. All
+three run in the `.coreci.yml` `validate` pipeline and are also
+available locally via `make security-scan`.
+
+## TL;DR
+
+```bash
+# Run all three tools locally (silently skips tools not on PATH).
+make security-scan
+
+# Strict mode: require all three to be installed.
+./scripts/security_scan.sh --strict
+```
+
+The `.coreci.yml` `validate` pipeline runs the same three tools in
+the canonical order: **gosec → govulncheck → gitleaks**. A failure
+at any stage blocks merges to `main`.
+
+## Tools
+
+### gosec
+
+[gosec](https://github.com/securego/gosec) is a static analyzer for
+Go that catches common security smells: hardcoded credentials (G101),
+SQL injection (G201), weak random (G404), insecure TLS (G402), etc.
+
+**Configuration**: `gosec -fmt text -quiet ./...` — text output, quiet
+mode (only summary + findings). The plan calls for an empty
+`gosec.json` baseline at the start; new G101 findings fail the build.
+
+**What gets caught**:
+- G101: hardcoded credentials (e.g., `apiKey := "abc123"`)
+- G102: bind to all interfaces (`0.0.0.0`)
+- G201/G202: SQL string concatenation
+- G404: weak random number generator (`math/rand` instead of `crypto/rand`)
+- G501-G505: weak crypto primitives
+
+**Exclusions**: `_test.go` files for G404 (math/rand is fine in
+tests), `internal/security/testdata/` (cert PEM fixtures).
+
+### govulncheck (offline mode, REQ-027)
+
+[govulncheck](https://golang.org/x/vuln) walks the dependency graph
+and reports known CVEs in modules you actually call. REQ-027 requires
+**offline mode** — the default invocation calls `vuln.go.dev` to
+fetch the latest vulnerability database. To honor offline-first:
+
+- **`GOFLAGS=-mod=mod`** forces module mode (avoids surprise network
+  fetches during the build).
+- The `GOVULNCHECK_DB` environment variable, when set, points to a
+  pre-mirrored copy of the vuln database. The CI image bundles a
+  daily-mirrored DB at `/var/lib/orca/vulndb/`. Operators mirror
+  locally with `govulncheck -show=verbose` once per week on a
+  machine that has network access, then commit the resulting
+  `vulndb` artifact to a private registry (out of scope for v0.2
+  OSS; documented as a follow-up).
+- Until the mirror is in place, `govulncheck -mode binary ./...`
+  uses its bundled DB. The bundled DB is updated on every
+  `govulncheck` release; in CI we pin to `v1.1.3` for reproducibility.
+
+**What gets caught**: any CVE that affects a Go module you call
+(direct or transitive). Output is the govulncall symbol + CVE ID.
+
+### gitleaks (REQ-039)
+
+[gitleaks](https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks) scans the working
+tree (and git history, if asked) for hardcoded secrets: API keys,
+private keys, tokens, passwords. REQ-039 specifies a project-local
+`.gitleaks.toml` to allowlist `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` PEM
+blocks (which are not secrets) while still flagging
+`-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----` and similar.
+
+**Configuration**:
+- `.gitleaks.toml` — custom allowlist (cert PEM, test data paths,
+  baseline file itself) and a stopword list.
+- `.gitleaks-baseline.json` — REQ-029. Suppresses the pre-existing
+  `.env` SHA-1 leak from v0.1 history (rotated forward; the
+  baseline gates future re-leaks of the same SHA).
+- **Pre-commit hook** (`.githooks/pre-commit`) — runs
+  `gitleaks protect --staged` on every commit. Commits are still
+  allowed when gitleaks is not installed (the `if command -v` gate
+  is in the hook).
+
+## Pipeline Integration
+
+`.coreci.yml` `validate` pipeline:
+
+```yaml
+- name: gosec
+  image: golang:1.25
+  commands:
+    - go install github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@v2.18.2
+    - gosec -fmt text -quiet ./...
+
+- name: govulncheck
+  image: golang:1.25
+  env:
+    GOFLAGS: -mod=mod
+  commands:
+    - go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.1.3
+    - govulncheck -mode binary ./...
+
+- name: gitleaks
+  image: golang:1.25
+  commands:
+    - apk add --no-cache curl
+    - sh -c "$(curl -fsSL https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/latest/download/install.sh)"
+    - gitleaks detect --source . --config .gitleaks.toml --baseline-path .gitleaks-baseline.json --no-banner
+```
+
+The `test` pipeline runs with `-race` (REQ-031):
+
+```yaml
+- name: test
+  image: golang:1.25
+  commands:
+    - go test -race -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...
+    - go tool cover -func=coverage.out | tail -1
+```
+
+## Local development
+
+```bash
+# Install the three tools (one-time).
+go install github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@v2.18.2
+go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.1.3
+# gitleaks: see https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks#installation
+
+# Run all three.
+make security-scan
+
+# Run with strict mode (all three required).
+./scripts/security_scan.sh --strict
+```
+
+## Adding a baseline entry
+
+If a new (intentional) finding appears:
+
+1. **gosec**: regenerate the baseline with
+   `gosec -fmt json -no-fail ./... > gosec.json`. Inspect for
+   false positives; document the suppression in the JSON's
+   `suppressions` field.
+2. **govulncheck**: wait for the upstream fix; if you must pin
+   a vulnerable dep, document the pin in a `//nolint:govulncheck`
+   comment and create a tracking issue.
+3. **gitleaks**: add a fingerprint to `.gitleaks-baseline.json`
+   with `gitleaks detect --baseline-path .gitleaks-baseline.json
+   --report-path new-findings.json` first to see what would be
+   flagged without the baseline, then merge the fingerprint.
+
+## Why offline mode matters
+
+Default `govulncheck` calls `vuln.go.dev` on every run. That violates
+REQ-003 (offline-first). The fix in P03 is:
+
+1. `GOFLAGS=-mod=mod` ensures module mode (no surprise module
+   downloads).
+2. The pre-mirrored DB mechanism is a follow-up; the bundled DB
+   in the pinned `govulncheck` binary is the immediate fallback.
+3. CI runs in a controlled environment (CoreCI runner) where the
+   `GOVULNCHECK_DB` env var points to a registry-mirrored copy.
+
+For dev machines with intermittent network, the bundled DB is good
+enough. For air-gapped CI runners, set `GOVULNCHECK_DB` to a
+known-good DB file.

go.mod

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
 	github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2 v2.24.0
 	github.com/spf13/cobra v1.8.1
+	golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0
 	modernc.org/sqlite v1.51.0
 )
 
@@ -21,11 +22,11 @@ require (
 	github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect
 	github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.5 // indirect
 	github.com/zclconf/go-cty v1.16.3 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/mod v0.33.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.42.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/tools v0.42.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/mod v0.37.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/tools v0.47.0 // indirect
 	modernc.org/libc v1.72.3 // indirect
 	modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 // indirect
 	modernc.org/memory v1.11.0 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -38,17 +38,21 @@ github.com/zclconf/go-cty v1.16.3 h1:osr++gw2T61A8KVYHoQiFbFd1Lh3JOCXc/jFLJXKTxk
 github.com/zclconf/go-cty v1.16.3/go.mod h1:VvMs5i0vgZdhYawQNq5kePSpLAoz8u1xvZgrPIxfnZE=
 github.com/zclconf/go-cty-debug v0.0.0-20240509010212-0d6042c53940 h1:4r45xpDWB6ZMSMNJFMOjqrGHynW3DIBuR2H9j0ug+Mo=
 github.com/zclconf/go-cty-debug v0.0.0-20240509010212-0d6042c53940/go.mod h1:CmBdvvj3nqzfzJ6nTCIwDTPZ56aVGvDrmztiO5g3qrM=
-golang.org/x/mod v0.33.0 h1:tHFzIWbBifEmbwtGz65eaWyGiGZatSrT9prnU8DbVL8=
-golang.org/x/mod v0.33.0/go.mod h1:swjeQEj+6r7fODbD2cqrnje9PnziFuw4bmLbBZFrQ5w=
-golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 h1:e0PTpb7pjO8GAtTs2dQ6jYa5BWYlMuX047Dco/pItO4=
-golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0 h1:YLIA59K4fiNzHzjnZt2tUJQjQtUWfWbeHBqKtk3eScw=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0/go.mod h1:KWL8ny2AZdGR2cWmzeHrp2azQPGogOv+HeQaVEXC2dk=
+golang.org/x/mod v0.37.0 h1:vF1DjpVEshcIqoEaauuHebaLk1O1forxjxBaVn884JQ=
+golang.org/x/mod v0.37.0/go.mod h1:m8S8VeM9r4dzDwjrKO0a1sZP3YjeMamRRlD+fmR2Q/0=
+golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
+golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.42.0 h1:omrd2nAlyT5ESRdCLYdm3+fMfNFE/+Rf4bDIQImRJeo=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.42.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
-golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 h1:qVyWApTSYLk/drJRO5mDlNYskwQznZmkpV2c8q9zls4=
-golang.org/x/text v0.25.0/go.mod h1:WEdwpYrmk1qmdHvhkSTNPm3app7v4rsT8F2UD6+VHIA=
-golang.org/x/tools v0.42.0 h1:uNgphsn75Tdz5Ji2q36v/nsFSfR/9BRFvqhGBaJGd5k=
-golang.org/x/tools v0.42.0/go.mod h1:Ma6lCIwGZvHK6XtgbswSoWroEkhugApmsXyrUmBhfr0=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
+golang.org/x/term v0.45.0 h1:NwWyBmoJCbfTHpxrWoZ9C6/VxOf7ic219I8xZZFdrf0=
+golang.org/x/term v0.45.0/go.mod h1:9aqxs0blBcrm/n0L9QW0aRVD+ktan8ssZromtqJC43w=
+golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 h1:Ub2Z6/xjgF1WrYQz2nuITOEegKFtiIy+rieRJ5lHZKs=
+golang.org/x/text v0.40.0/go.mod h1:hpnzDAfGV753zIKo+wk3u1bVKCGPbrnF7+7LBF/UHVY=
+golang.org/x/tools v0.47.0 h1:7Kn5x/d1svx/PzryTsqeoZN4TZwqeH5pGWjefhLi/1Q=
+golang.org/x/tools v0.47.0/go.mod h1:dFHnyTvFWY212G+h7ZY4Vsp/K3U4/7W9TyVaAul8uCA=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
 modernc.org/cc/v4 v4.28.2 h1:3tQ0lf2ADtoby2EtSP+J7IE2SHwEJdP8ioR59wx7XpY=

internal/audit/audit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/engine"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+func newTestAudit(t *testing.T) (*Audit, *store.AuditRepo, func()) {
+	t.Helper()
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db")
+	db, err := store.Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	repo := store.NewAuditRepo(db)
+	eng := engine.NewAudit(repo, nil)
+	return New(eng), repo, func() { _ = db.Close() }
+}
+
+func TestAudit_Emit(t *testing.T) {
+	a, repo, cleanup := newTestAudit(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	a.Emit(ctx, ActionCertIssued, "cert:node-1", ResultSuccess, map[string]any{"cn": "node-1"})
+
+	entries, err := repo.List(ctx, 10)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("List: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(entries) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 1 audit entry, got %d", len(entries))
+	}
+	e := entries[0]
+	if e.Action != string(ActionCertIssued) {
+		t.Errorf("action: got %q, want %q", e.Action, ActionCertIssued)
+	}
+	if e.Result != string(ResultSuccess) {
+		t.Errorf("result: got %q, want %q", e.Result, ResultSuccess)
+	}
+	if e.Resource != "cert:node-1" {
+		t.Errorf("resource: got %q, want cert:node-1", e.Resource)
+	}
+	if e.Actor != "security" {
+		t.Errorf("actor: got %q, want security", e.Actor)
+	}
+	if e.Error != "" {
+		t.Errorf("error: got %q, want empty", e.Error)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAudit_EmitWithErr(t *testing.T) {
+	a, repo, cleanup := newTestAudit(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	a.EmitWithErr(ctx, ActionNodeHandshakeFail, "hs:node-2", errors.New("bad cert"), nil)
+
+	entries, err := repo.List(ctx, 10)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("List: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(entries) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 1 audit entry, got %d", len(entries))
+	}
+	e := entries[0]
+	if e.Result != string(ResultFailure) {
+		t.Errorf("result: got %q, want %q", e.Result, ResultFailure)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(e.Error, "bad cert") {
+		t.Errorf("error: got %q, want it to contain 'bad cert'", e.Error)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAudit_LogHandshakeOK(t *testing.T) {
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&buf, nil))
+	LogHandshakeOK(logger, "peer-1", "AA:BB:CC")
+	out := buf.String()
+	for _, want := range []string{"event=mtls.handshake", "result=ok", "peer=peer-1", "cert_fp=AA:BB:CC"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
+			t.Errorf("LogHandshakeOK: output missing %q\noutput: %s", want, out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAudit_LogHandshakeFailed(t *testing.T) {
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&buf, nil))
+	LogHandshakeFailed(logger, "peer-2", "", errors.New("tls: handshake"))
+	out := buf.String()
+	for _, want := range []string{"event=mtls.handshake", "result=failed", "peer=peer-2", "err=\"tls: handshake\""} {
+		if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
+			t.Errorf("LogHandshakeFailed: output missing %q\noutput: %s", want, out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAudit_LogHandshake_NilLogger(t *testing.T) {
+	LogHandshakeOK(nil, "p", "fp")
+	LogHandshakeFailed(nil, "p", "fp", errors.New("x"))
+}
+
+func TestAudit_NilSafe(t *testing.T) {
+	var a *Audit
+	a.Emit(context.Background(), ActionCertIssued, "x", ResultSuccess, nil)
+	a.EmitWithErr(context.Background(), ActionCertIssued, "x", errors.New("y"), nil)
+}
+
+func TestAction_String(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ActionCertIssued.String(); got != "cert.issued" {
+		t.Errorf("ActionCertIssued.String(): got %q, want cert.issued", got)
+	}
+	if got := ActionNodeHandshakeOK.String(); got != "node.handshake_ok" {
+		t.Errorf("ActionNodeHandshakeOK.String(): got %q, want node.handshake_ok", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResult_String(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ResultSuccess.String(); got != "success" {
+		t.Errorf("ResultSuccess.String(): got %q, want success", got)
+	}
+	if got := ResultFailure.String(); got != "failure" {
+		t.Errorf("ResultFailure.String(): got %q, want failure", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFormatAction(t *testing.T) {
+	got := FormatAction(ActionCertIssued, ResultSuccess)
+	want := "action=cert.issued result=success"
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("FormatAction: got %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}

internal/certpaths/certpaths.go

@@ -36,3 +36,29 @@ func ServerCertPath() string { return filepath.Join(Dir(), "server.crt") }
 
 // ServerKeyPath returns the path to server.key.
 func ServerKeyPath() string { return filepath.Join(Dir(), "server.key") }
+
+// DBPath returns the path to the orca SQLite database. Honors $ORCA_DB
+// for testability and explicit override; otherwise defaults to
+// ~/.orca/orca.db under the same Dir() as the cert files.
+func DBPath() string {
+	if p := os.Getenv("ORCA_DB"); p != "" {
+		return p
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(Dir(), "orca.db")
+}
+
+// SSHKeyPath returns the path to the orca SSH private key (Ed25519,
+// D-037). Used by `orca node join --type proxmox` to authenticate
+// to remote Proxmox hosts after the initial password-based bootstrap.
+// File mode 0600 (enforced by security.WriteKey).
+func SSHKeyPath() string { return filepath.Join(Dir(), "orca_ssh_key") }
+
+// SSHPubPath returns the path to the orca SSH public key (authorized_keys
+// format). Deployed to remote Proxmox hosts during `orca node join`.
+// File mode 0644 (enforced by security.WriteCert).
+func SSHPubPath() string { return filepath.Join(Dir(), "orca_ssh_key.pub") }
+
+// KnownHostsPath returns the path to the SSH known_hosts file used for
+// TOFU host-key pinning (D-035). Captured on first connect, verified
+// on all subsequent connects via golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts.
+func KnownHostsPath() string { return filepath.Join(Dir(), "known_hosts") }

internal/cli/cert.go

@@ -253,3 +253,7 @@ func parseFirstCertDER(pemBytes []byte) []byte {
 	}
 	return block.Bytes
 }
+
+func init() {
+	rootCmd.AddCommand(NewCommand(slog.Default()))
+}

internal/cli/cert_smoke_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func runCertArgs(t *testing.T, args []string) (string, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	rootCmd.SetOut(&buf)
+	rootCmd.SetErr(&buf)
+	rootCmd.SetArgs(args)
+	defer func() {
+		rootCmd.SetArgs(nil)
+		rootCmd.SetOut(os.Stdout)
+		rootCmd.SetErr(os.Stderr)
+	}()
+	err := rootCmd.Execute()
+	return buf.String(), err
+}
+
+func TestCertSmoke(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", t.TempDir())
+
+	t.Run("ca-init", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out, err := runCertArgs(t, []string{"cert", "ca-init", "--cn", "test-ca"})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("ca-init: %v\n%s", err, out)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(out, "CA initialized") {
+			t.Errorf("ca-init output unexpected: %s", out)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("gen", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out, err := runCertArgs(t, []string{"cert", "gen", "--cn", "test-server", "--san", "localhost", "--san", "127.0.0.1"})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("gen: %v\n%s", err, out)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(out, "Server cert generated") {
+			t.Errorf("gen output unexpected: %s", out)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("show", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out, err := runCertArgs(t, []string{"cert", "show"})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("show: %v\n%s", err, out)
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(out, "PRIVATE KEY") {
+			t.Errorf("show leaked private key material (REQ-035):\n%s", out)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("fingerprint_ca", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out, err := runCertArgs(t, []string{"cert", "fingerprint", "--which", "ca"})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("fingerprint ca: %v\n%s", err, out)
+		}
+		fp := strings.TrimSpace(out)
+		if len(fp) != 64 || !isHex(fp) {
+			t.Errorf("ca fingerprint = %q, want 64 hex chars", fp)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("fingerprint_server", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out, err := runCertArgs(t, []string{"cert", "fingerprint", "--which", "server"})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("fingerprint server: %v\n%s", err, out)
+		}
+		fp := strings.TrimSpace(out)
+		if len(fp) != 64 || !isHex(fp) {
+			t.Errorf("server fingerprint = %q, want 64 hex chars", fp)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("renew", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out, err := runCertArgs(t, []string{"cert", "renew"})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("renew: %v\n%s", err, out)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(out, "rotated") {
+			t.Errorf("renew output unexpected: %s", out)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("file_modes", func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := os.Getenv("ORCA_HOME")
+		checks := []struct {
+			path string
+			want os.FileMode
+		}{
+			{"ca.crt", 0o644},
+			{"ca.key", 0o600},
+			{"server.crt", 0o644},
+			{"server.key", 0o600},
+		}
+		for _, c := range checks {
+			info, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, c.path))
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("stat %s: %v", c.path, err)
+			}
+			if got := info.Mode().Perm(); got != c.want {
+				t.Errorf("mode %s = %04o, want %04o (REQ-033)", c.path, got, c.want)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func isHex(s string) bool {
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if !((r >= '0' && r <= '9') || (r >= 'a' && r <= 'f') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'F')) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}

internal/cli/cert_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestCertCommandRegistered(t *testing.T) {
+	found := false
+	for _, cmd := range rootCmd.Commands() {
+		if strings.Fields(cmd.Use)[0] == "cert" {
+			found = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatal("cert command not registered on rootCmd")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertSubcommands(t *testing.T) {
+	expected := []string{"ca-init", "gen", "show", "renew", "fingerprint"}
+	registered := make(map[string]bool)
+	for _, cmd := range rootCmd.Commands() {
+		if strings.Fields(cmd.Use)[0] != "cert" {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() {
+			registered[strings.Fields(sub.Use)[0]] = true
+		}
+	}
+	for _, name := range expected {
+		if !registered[name] {
+			t.Errorf("expected cert subcommand %q not registered", name)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/cli/daemon.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
@@ -13,6 +14,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/daemon"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/engine"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
 )
 
 var (
@@ -22,7 +25,7 @@ var (
 var daemonCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "daemon",
 	Short: "Run the orca daemon (HTTP API + health checks)",
-	Long:  "Start the orca daemon. Listens on the configured address for health and API requests.",
+	Long:  "Start the orca daemon. Listens on the configured address for health, API, and dispatch requests.",
 	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 		db, closer, err := openDB()
 		if err != nil {
@@ -30,12 +33,25 @@ var daemonCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		}
 		defer closer()
 
+		log := newLogger()
+		addr := daemonAddr
+		if cfg := configFromCtx(cmd.Context()); cfg != nil && cfg.ListenAddr != "" && addr == ":8080" {
+			addr = cfg.ListenAddr
+		}
 		srv := daemon.NewServer(daemon.Options{
 			DB:    db,
-			Log:   newLogger(),
-			Addr:  daemonAddr,
+			Log:   log,
+			Addr:  addr,
 			Actor: "daemon",
 		})
+
+		// Wire the orca.v1.Dispatch service (v0.2 P02). The executor
+		// runs jobs locally; the dispatcher decides local vs peer.
+		executor := engine.NewExecutor(store.NewJobRepo(db), store.NewTaskRepo(db), log)
+		peers := engine.NewPeerRegistry()
+		dispatcher := engine.NewDispatcher(log, store.NewCapacityRepo(db), peers, executor)
+		srv.RegisterDispatch(daemon.NewDispatchHandlers(dispatcher, dispatcher.Dedupe()))
+
 		srv.MarkReady()
 
 		errCh := make(chan error, 1)
@@ -47,12 +63,14 @@ var daemonCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		}()
 
 		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "✓ orca daemon listening on %s\n", daemonAddr)
-		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /healthz    - liveness")
-		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /readyz     - readiness (db + ready flag)")
-		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /v1/status  - status JSON")
-		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /v1/jobs    - list jobs")
-		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /v1/nodes   - list nodes")
-		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /v1/tasks   - list tasks")
+		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /healthz                        - liveness")
+		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /readyz                         - readiness (db + ready flag)")
+		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /v1/status                      - status JSON")
+		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /v1/jobs                        - list jobs")
+		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /v1/nodes                       - list nodes")
+		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /v1/tasks                       - list tasks")
+		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit        - cross-node job submit (P02)")
+		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  /orca.v1.Dispatch/Status        - cross-node job status (P02)")
 		fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  press Ctrl+C to stop")
 
 		ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(cmd.Context(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
@@ -73,4 +91,5 @@ var daemonCmd = &cobra.Command{
 func init() {
 	daemonCmd.Flags().StringVar(&daemonAddr, "addr", ":8080", "listen address")
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(daemonCmd)
+	_ = slog.Default // keep import if unused above
 }

internal/cli/doctor.go

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ var doctorNetworkCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "network",
 	Short: "Run the network self-check (P02 impl)",
 	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		c := doctor.NetworkStub()
+		c := doctor.Network()
 		r, msg := c.Run(cmd.Context())
 		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "%-20s %-5s  %s\n", c.Name, r, msg)
 		return nil
@@ -62,14 +62,42 @@ var doctorDBCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "db",
 	Short: "Run the database self-check (P02 impl)",
 	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		c := doctor.DBStub()
+		c := doctor.DB()
 		r, msg := c.Run(cmd.Context())
 		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "%-20s %-5s  %s\n", c.Name, r, msg)
 		return nil
 	},
 }
 
+var doctorOSCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:   "os",
+	Short: "Run the OS detection self-check (v0.6 P03)",
+	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		c := doctor.OS()
+		r, msg := c.Run(cmd.Context())
+		if jsonOutput {
+			return printJSON(doctor.CheckResult{Name: c.Name, Result: r, Message: msg})
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "%-20s %-5s  %s\n", c.Name, r, msg)
+		return nil
+	},
+}
+
+var doctorProxmoxCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:   "proxmox",
+	Short: "Run the proxmox node reachability self-check (v0.6 P03)",
+	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		c := doctor.Proxmox()
+		r, msg := c.Run(cmd.Context())
+		if jsonOutput {
+			return printJSON(doctor.CheckResult{Name: c.Name, Result: r, Message: msg})
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "%-20s %-5s  %s\n", c.Name, r, msg)
+		return nil
+	},
+}
+
 func init() {
-	doctorCmd.AddCommand(doctorCertCmd, doctorNetworkCmd, doctorDBCmd)
+	doctorCmd.AddCommand(doctorCertCmd, doctorNetworkCmd, doctorDBCmd, doctorOSCmd, doctorProxmoxCmd)
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(doctorCmd)
 }

internal/cli/init.go

@@ -1,38 +1,194 @@
 package cli
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
+	"time"
 
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/certpaths"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/security"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+const (
+	initCAN       = "orca-internal-ca"
+	localhostName = "localhost"
+	localhostAddr = "localhost:8443"
 )
 
 var initCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "init",
-	Short: "Initialize local orca state directory",
-	Long:  "Create the local orca state directory at ~/.orca/ and write a default config file.",
+	Short: "Initialize local orca state with full bootstrap",
+	Long: `Initialize the local orca state directory and provision all
+dependencies required for ` + "`orca doctor`" + ` to pass:
+
+  1. Create the namespace directory (honors $ORCA_HOME; defaults to ~/.orca)
+  2. Open and migrate the SQLite database (migrations 0001..0006)
+  3. Bootstrap the internal CA (ca.crt + ca.key) if not already present
+  4. Generate the server cert (server.crt + server.key) if not already present
+  5. Auto-detect the local OS via /etc/os-release
+  6. Register a localhost node (kind=localhost, os=<detected>)
+
+Idempotent: re-running is safe and will refresh last_seen + os on the
+localhost node without regenerating certs or changing the node ID.`,
 	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
-		if err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("get home dir: %w", err)
-		}
-		orcaDir := filepath.Join(home, ".orca")
-		if err := os.MkdirAll(orcaDir, 0o755); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("create orca dir: %w", err)
-		}
-		result := map[string]string{
-			"path":   orcaDir,
-			"status": "initialized",
-		}
-		if jsonOutput {
-			return printJSON(result)
-		}
-		printText("✓ Initialized orca state at %s\n", orcaDir)
-		return nil
+		return runInit(cmd.OutOrStdout())
 	},
 }
 
+func runInit(out interface{ Write([]byte) (int, error) }) error {
+	dir := certpaths.Dir()
+
+	type stepResult struct {
+		Label  string `json:"label"`
+		Status string `json:"status"`
+		Detail string `json:"detail,omitempty"`
+	}
+	type initSummary struct {
+		Namespace       string       `json:"namespace"`
+		Database        string       `json:"database"`
+		CAFingerprint   string       `json:"ca_fingerprint,omitempty"`
+		CertFingerprint string       `json:"cert_fingerprint,omitempty"`
+		OS              string       `json:"os"`
+		NodeID          string       `json:"node_id"`
+		NodeName        string       `json:"node_name"`
+		Steps           []stepResult `json:"steps"`
+	}
+	summary := initSummary{Namespace: dir}
+
+	// Step 1: namespace dir.
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("create orca dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	summary.Steps = append(summary.Steps, stepResult{Label: "namespace", Status: "ok", Detail: dir})
+	if !jsonOutput {
+		fmt.Fprintf(out, "✓ Namespace dir: %s\n", dir)
+	}
+
+	// Step 2: database + migrations.
+	dbPath := certpaths.DBPath()
+	db, err := store.Open(dbPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("open database: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	summary.Database = dbPath
+	summary.Steps = append(summary.Steps, stepResult{Label: "database", Status: "ok", Detail: dbPath})
+	if !jsonOutput {
+		fmt.Fprintf(out, "✓ Database initialized: %s\n", dbPath)
+	}
+
+	// Step 3: CA bootstrap (idempotent — CAInit has a fast-path).
+	ca, err := security.CAInit(dir, initCAN)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("bootstrap CA: %w", err)
+	}
+	caFp := ca.Fingerprint()
+	summary.CAFingerprint = caFp
+	summary.Steps = append(summary.Steps, stepResult{Label: "ca", Status: "ok", Detail: caFp[:16] + "..."})
+	if !jsonOutput {
+		fmt.Fprintf(out, "✓ CA provisioned: fp=%s\n", caFp[:16]+"...")
+	}
+
+	// Step 4: server cert (only if absent — D-036 idempotency).
+	certPath := certpaths.ServerCertPath()
+	certFp := ""
+	if _, err := os.Stat(certPath); err == nil {
+		// Already exists — load fingerprint for the summary.
+		if fp, err := security.Fingerprint(certPath); err == nil {
+			certFp = fp
+		}
+		summary.Steps = append(summary.Steps, stepResult{Label: "server-cert", Status: "skipped", Detail: "already present"})
+	} else if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		keyPEM, csrPEM, err := security.GenerateCSR("localhost", []string{"localhost", "127.0.0.1"})
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("generate server CSR: %w", err)
+		}
+		certPEM, err := ca.SignCSR(csrPEM)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("sign server CSR: %w", err)
+		}
+		if err := security.WriteCert(certPath, certPEM); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("write server cert: %w", err)
+		}
+		if err := security.WriteKey(certpaths.ServerKeyPath(), keyPEM); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("write server key: %w", err)
+		}
+		certFp = security.FingerprintOf(parseFirstCertDER(certPEM))
+		summary.Steps = append(summary.Steps, stepResult{Label: "server-cert", Status: "ok", Detail: certFp[:16] + "..."})
+	} else {
+		return fmt.Errorf("stat server cert: %w", err)
+	}
+	summary.CertFingerprint = certFp
+	if !jsonOutput {
+		if certFp != "" {
+			fmt.Fprintf(out, "✓ Server cert provisioned: fp=%s\n", certFp[:16]+"...")
+		} else {
+			fmt.Fprintf(out, "✓ Server cert: already present\n")
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Step 5: OS detection.
+	osDetected := detectOS()
+	summary.OS = osDetected
+	summary.Steps = append(summary.Steps, stepResult{Label: "os", Status: "ok", Detail: osDetected})
+	if !jsonOutput {
+		fmt.Fprintf(out, "✓ OS detected: %s\n", osDetected)
+	}
+
+	// Step 6: localhost node upsert (idempotent per D-036).
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	repo := store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+	existing, err := repo.GetByName(ctx, localhostName)
+	if err == nil {
+		// Refresh last_seen + os; keep id and joined_at.
+		if err := repo.UpdateLastSeenAndOS(ctx, existing.ID, osDetected); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("refresh localhost node: %w", err)
+		}
+		summary.NodeID = existing.ID
+		summary.NodeName = existing.Name
+		summary.Steps = append(summary.Steps, stepResult{Label: "localhost-node", Status: "refreshed", Detail: existing.ID})
+		if !jsonOutput {
+			fmt.Fprintf(out, "✓ Localhost node refreshed: %s (os=%s)\n", existing.ID, osDetected)
+		}
+	} else if err == store.ErrNotFound {
+		node := &model.Node{
+			ID:       uuid.NewString(),
+			Name:     localhostName,
+			Address:  localhostAddr,
+			State:    model.NodeStateReady,
+			JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
+			LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+			Kind:     string(model.NodeKindLocalhost),
+			OS:       osDetected,
+		}
+		if err := repo.Insert(ctx, node); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("insert localhost node: %w", err)
+		}
+		summary.NodeID = node.ID
+		summary.NodeName = node.Name
+		summary.Steps = append(summary.Steps, stepResult{Label: "localhost-node", Status: "ok", Detail: node.ID})
+		if !jsonOutput {
+			fmt.Fprintf(out, "✓ Localhost node registered: %s (os=%s)\n", node.ID, osDetected)
+		}
+	} else {
+		return fmt.Errorf("lookup localhost node: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if jsonOutput {
+		return printJSON(summary)
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(out, "\n✓ orca init complete — run `orca doctor` to verify.\n")
+	return nil
+}
+
 func init() {
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(initCmd)
 }

internal/cli/init_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/certpaths"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+// initTestEnv sets ORCA_HOME to a temp dir and returns a cleanup func.
+func initTestEnv(t *testing.T) (string, func()) {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	orig := os.Getenv("ORCA_HOME")
+	if err := os.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("set ORCA_HOME: %v", err)
+	}
+	return dir, func() {
+		if err := os.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", orig); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("restore ORCA_HOME: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// discardWriter is an io.Writer that discards all output (for tests
+// that don't need to inspect init stdout).
+type discardWriter struct{}
+
+func (discardWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }
+
+var _ io.Writer = discardWriter{}
+
+func TestInit_FullBootstrap(t *testing.T) {
+	dir, cleanup := initTestEnv(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	if err := runInit(discardWriter{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("init: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Verify namespace dir exists.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(dir); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("namespace dir missing: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Verify CA files exist with correct modes.
+	caCert := certpaths.CACertPath()
+	caKey := certpaths.CAKeyPath()
+	if _, err := os.Stat(caCert); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("ca.crt missing: %v", err)
+	}
+	if info, err := os.Stat(caKey); err == nil {
+		if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
+			t.Errorf("ca.key mode = %04o, want 0600", info.Mode().Perm())
+		}
+	} else {
+		t.Errorf("ca.key missing: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Verify server cert exists.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(certpaths.ServerCertPath()); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("server.crt missing: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Verify DB exists and has migrations applied.
+	db, err := store.Open(certpaths.DBPath())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	version, err := store.MigrationVersion(ctx, db)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("migration version: %v", err)
+	}
+	if version != "0007_certs_serial_unique.sql" {
+		t.Errorf("migration version = %q, want 0007_certs_serial_unique.sql", version)
+	}
+
+	// Verify localhost node registered with kind=localhost.
+	repo := store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+	node, err := repo.GetByName(ctx, "localhost")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get localhost node: %v", err)
+	}
+	if node.Kind != string(model.NodeKindLocalhost) {
+		t.Errorf("node kind = %q, want localhost", node.Kind)
+	}
+	if node.OS == "" {
+		t.Errorf("node os is empty, expected detected value")
+	}
+	if node.Address != "localhost:8443" {
+		t.Errorf("node address = %q, want localhost:8443", node.Address)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInit_IdempotentReRun(t *testing.T) {
+	_, cleanup := initTestEnv(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	// First init.
+	if err := runInit(discardWriter{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("first init: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Capture first-run state.
+	caCertBefore, _ := os.ReadFile(certpaths.CACertPath())
+	serverCertBefore, _ := os.ReadFile(certpaths.ServerCertPath())
+
+	db, err := store.Open(certpaths.DBPath())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	repo := store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	nodeBefore, err := repo.GetByName(ctx, "localhost")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get node before: %v", err)
+	}
+	nodeIDBefore := nodeBefore.ID
+	joinedAtBefore := nodeBefore.JoinedAt
+	if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("close db: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Wait a moment so last_seen can differ.
+	time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	// Second init (should be idempotent).
+	if err := runInit(discardWriter{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second init: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// CA and server cert must NOT have been regenerated.
+	caCertAfter, _ := os.ReadFile(certpaths.CACertPath())
+	serverCertAfter, _ := os.ReadFile(certpaths.ServerCertPath())
+	if string(caCertBefore) != string(caCertAfter) {
+		t.Error("CA was regenerated on re-run (D-036 violation)")
+	}
+	if string(serverCertBefore) != string(serverCertAfter) {
+		t.Error("server cert was regenerated on re-run (D-036 violation)")
+	}
+
+	// Node ID and joined_at must be unchanged; last_seen should be refreshed.
+	db, err = store.Open(certpaths.DBPath())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reopen db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	repo = store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+	nodeAfter, err := repo.GetByName(ctx, "localhost")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get node after: %v", err)
+	}
+	if nodeAfter.ID != nodeIDBefore {
+		t.Errorf("node id changed: was %s, now %s (D-036 violation)", nodeIDBefore, nodeAfter.ID)
+	}
+	if !nodeAfter.JoinedAt.Equal(joinedAtBefore) {
+		t.Errorf("joined_at changed: was %v, now %v (D-036 violation)", joinedAtBefore, nodeAfter.JoinedAt)
+	}
+	if !nodeAfter.LastSeen.After(joinedAtBefore) {
+		t.Errorf("last_seen not refreshed: was %v, now %v", joinedAtBefore, nodeAfter.LastSeen)
+	}
+
+	// No duplicate localhost nodes.
+	nodes, err := repo.List(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list nodes: %v", err)
+	}
+	localhostCount := 0
+	for _, n := range nodes {
+		if n.Name == "localhost" {
+			localhostCount++
+		}
+	}
+	if localhostCount != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("found %d localhost nodes, want 1 (idempotency)", localhostCount)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInit_NamespaceDirCreation(t *testing.T) {
+	dir, cleanup := initTestEnv(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	// The namespace dir is the ORCA_HOME temp dir itself — but let's
+	// point at a non-existent subdir to test MkdirAll.
+	subDir := filepath.Join(dir, "nested", "orca-state")
+	if err := os.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", subDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("set ORCA_HOME: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if err := runInit(discardWriter{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("init with nested dir: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(subDir); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("nested namespace dir not created: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/cli/job.go

@@ -2,8 +2,12 @@ package cli
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/signal"
+	"syscall"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -31,10 +35,17 @@ func jobExecutor() (*engine.Executor, func() error, error) {
 	return engine.NewExecutor(jobs, tasks, newLogger()), closer, nil
 }
 
+var (
+	stopID    string
+	runTarget string
+	runIDKey  string
+	jobWatch  bool
+)
+
 var jobRunCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "run <spec.hcl>",
 	Short: "Run a job from an HCL spec file",
-	Long:  "Submit a job spec, execute its tasks, and persist the result.",
+	Long:  "Submit a job spec, execute its tasks, and persist the result. Use --target to pin to a specific node (overrides bin-packing); --idempotency-key for cross-node dispatch dedupe.",
 	Args:  cobra.ExactArgs(1),
 	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 		spec, err := jobspec.ParseFile(args[0])
@@ -51,6 +62,35 @@ var jobRunCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		}
 		defer closer()
 
+		// If --target or --idempotency-key is set, route through the
+		// dispatcher (which may land the job locally or on a peer
+		// based on capacity).
+		if runTarget != "" || runIDKey != "" {
+			db, dbCloser, err := openDB()
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			defer dbCloser()
+			peers := engine.NewPeerRegistry()
+			dispatcher := engine.NewDispatcher(newLogger(), store.NewCapacityRepo(db), peers, exec)
+			specBytes, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
+				"name":    spec.Job.Name,
+				"command": "/bin/true", // placeholder; full HCL dispatch lands in a later phase
+			})
+			jobID, nodeID, err := dispatcher.Submit(ctx, runTarget, specBytes, runIDKey)
+			if err != nil {
+				if jsonOutput {
+					_ = printJSON(map[string]any{"status": "failed", "error": err.Error()})
+				}
+				return err
+			}
+			if jsonOutput {
+				return printJSON(map[string]any{"id": jobID, "node_id": nodeID, "status": "dispatched"})
+			}
+			fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "✓ Job dispatched: %s to %s\n", jobID, nodeID)
+			return nil
+		}
+
 		job := &model.Job{
 			ID:     uuid.NewString(),
 			Name:   spec.Job.Name,
@@ -76,8 +116,11 @@ var jobRunCmd = &cobra.Command{
 var jobListCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "list",
 	Short: "List all jobs",
-	Long:  "Display all jobs and their status.",
+	Long:  "Display all jobs and their status. Use --watch to stream updates until Ctrl-C.",
 	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		if jobWatch {
+			return watchJobs(cmd)
+		}
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 5*time.Second)
 		defer cancel()
 
@@ -106,9 +149,72 @@ var jobListCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	},
 }
 
-var (
-	stopID string
-)
+func watchJobs(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
+	ctx, cancel := signal.NotifyContext(cmd.Context(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
+	defer cancel()
+	return watchJobsCtx(cmd, ctx)
+}
+
+func watchJobsCtx(cmd *cobra.Command, ctx context.Context) error {
+	db, closer, err := openDB()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer closer()
+
+	out := cmd.OutOrStdout()
+
+	if jsonOutput {
+		seen := make(map[string]string)
+		for snapshot := range store.NewJobRepo(db).Watch(ctx) {
+			current := make(map[string]bool, len(snapshot))
+			for _, j := range snapshot {
+				current[j.ID] = true
+				compact, _ := json.Marshal(j)
+				key := string(compact)
+				if prev, ok := seen[j.ID]; !ok || prev != key {
+					event := "init"
+					if ok {
+						event = "update"
+					}
+					line, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"event": event, "job": j})
+					fmt.Fprintln(out, string(line))
+					seen[j.ID] = key
+				}
+			}
+			for id := range seen {
+				if !current[id] {
+					line, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"event": "delete", "id": id})
+					fmt.Fprintln(out, string(line))
+					delete(seen, id)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	prevTable := ""
+	for snapshot := range store.NewJobRepo(db).Watch(ctx) {
+		table := renderJobTable(snapshot)
+		if table != prevTable {
+			fmt.Fprint(out, "\033[2J\033[H")
+			fmt.Fprint(out, table)
+			prevTable = table
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func renderJobTable(jobs []*model.Job) string {
+	if len(jobs) == 0 {
+		return "No jobs.\n"
+	}
+	out := fmt.Sprintf("%-36s  %-20s  %-12s  %-8s\n", "ID", "NAME", "STATUS", "EXIT")
+	for _, j := range jobs {
+		out += fmt.Sprintf("%-36s  %-20s  %-12s  %-8d\n", j.ID, j.Name, j.Status, j.ExitCode)
+	}
+	return out
+}
 
 var jobStopCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "stop [job-id]",
@@ -201,6 +307,9 @@ var jobLogsCmd = &cobra.Command{
 func init() {
 	jobStopCmd.Flags().StringVar(&stopID, "id", "", "job id")
 	jobLogsCmd.Flags().StringVar(&stopID, "id", "", "job id")
+	jobRunCmd.Flags().StringVar(&runTarget, "target", "", "pin job to a specific node id (overrides bin-packing)")
+	jobRunCmd.Flags().StringVar(&runIDKey, "idempotency-key", "", "X-Orca-Idempotency-Key for cross-node dispatch dedupe")
+	jobListCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jobWatch, "watch", false, "stream jobs until Ctrl-C (table refresh or --json per-event)")
 
 	jobCmd.AddCommand(jobRunCmd)
 	jobCmd.AddCommand(jobListCmd)

internal/cli/namespace_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/certpaths"
+)
+
+func resetRootFlags(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	rootCmd.SetArgs(nil)
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	rootCmd.SetOut(&buf)
+	rootCmd.SetErr(&buf)
+	_ = rootCmd.PersistentFlags().Set("system", "false")
+	_ = rootCmd.PersistentFlags().Set("json", "false")
+}
+
+func TestNamespaceDefaultsToUserHome(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", "")
+	home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("UserHomeDir: %v", err)
+	}
+	want := filepath.Join(home, ".orca")
+	if got := certpaths.Dir(); got != want {
+		t.Errorf("certpaths.Dir() = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNamespaceHonorsORCAHOME(t *testing.T) {
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", tmp)
+	if got := certpaths.Dir(); got != tmp {
+		t.Errorf("certpaths.Dir() = %q, want %q", got, tmp)
+	}
+	if got := certpaths.DBPath(); got != filepath.Join(tmp, "orca.db") {
+		t.Errorf("certpaths.DBPath() = %q, want %q", got, filepath.Join(tmp, "orca.db"))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInitHonorsORCAHOME(t *testing.T) {
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", tmp)
+	resetRootFlags(t)
+
+	rootCmd.SetArgs([]string{"init"})
+	if err := rootCmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("init: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	info, err := os.Stat(tmp)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stat %s: %v", tmp, err)
+	}
+	if !info.IsDir() {
+		t.Errorf("%s is not a directory", tmp)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSystemFlagSetsORCAHOME(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", "")
+	resetRootFlags(t)
+
+	rootCmd.SetArgs([]string{"--system", "init"})
+	if err := rootCmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("--system init: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := os.Getenv("ORCA_HOME"); got != systemNamespaceRoot {
+		t.Errorf("ORCA_HOME = %q, want %q", got, systemNamespaceRoot)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSystemFlagConflictsWithORCAHOME(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", "/custom/path")
+	resetRootFlags(t)
+
+	rootCmd.SetArgs([]string{"--system", "init"})
+	err := rootCmd.Execute()
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for --system + ORCA_HOME conflict, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInitJSONOutput(t *testing.T) {
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", tmp)
+	resetRootFlags(t)
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	rootCmd.SetOut(&buf)
+	rootCmd.SetArgs([]string{"init", "--json"})
+	if err := rootCmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("init --json: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// v0.6: init --json now outputs a full bootstrap summary object.
+	var result map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(buf.Bytes()), &result); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmarshal init output: %v\noutput: %s", err, buf.String())
+	}
+	if result["namespace"] != tmp {
+		t.Errorf("init --json namespace = %q, want %q", result["namespace"], tmp)
+	}
+	if result["os"] == nil || result["os"] == "" {
+		t.Errorf("init --json os is missing/empty")
+	}
+	if result["node_id"] == nil || result["node_id"] == "" {
+		t.Errorf("init --json node_id is missing/empty")
+	}
+	steps, ok := result["steps"].([]any)
+	if !ok || len(steps) < 6 {
+		t.Errorf("init --json steps: expected 6+ entries, got %v", result["steps"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSystemFlagIsPersistent(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, name := range []string{"system", "json"} {
+		f := rootCmd.PersistentFlags().Lookup(name)
+		if f == nil {
+			t.Errorf("persistent flag %q not found", name)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/cli/node.go

@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ package cli
 import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
+	"os/signal"
+	"syscall"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -15,20 +17,13 @@ import (
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/certpaths"
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/engine"
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/proxmox"
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/security"
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
 )
 
-func dbPath() string {
-	if p := os.Getenv("ORCA_DB"); p != "" {
-		return p
-	}
-	home, _ := os.UserHomeDir()
-	return filepath.Join(home, ".orca", "orca.db")
-}
-
 func openDB() (*sql.DB, func() error, error) {
-	db, err := store.Open(dbPath())
+	db, err := store.Open(certpaths.DBPath())
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, nil, err
 	}
@@ -53,7 +48,15 @@ var (
 	joinName     string
 	joinAddr     string
 	joinCAFinger string
+	joinType     string
+	joinHost     string
+	joinSSHUser  string
+	joinPassword string
+	joinSSHPort  int
+	proxmoxUser  string
+	proxmoxRole  string
 	leaveID      string
+	nodeWatch    bool
 )
 
 var nodeCmd = &cobra.Command{
@@ -65,60 +68,143 @@ var nodeCmd = &cobra.Command{
 var nodeJoinCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "join",
 	Short: "Join a node to the orca registry",
-	Long:  "Register a node in the local orca registry. Persisted to SQLite.",
+	Long: `Register a node in the local orca registry. Persisted to SQLite.
+
+Node types (via --type):
+  localhost (default): register a local or Linux node (existing behavior)
+  proxmox:             SSH-bootstrap a remote Proxmox VE 8/9 host
+                       (deploys orca pubkey, creates orca user + PVE role +
+                       sudoers allowlist; requires --host + --password)`,
 	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		if joinName == "" {
-			return fmt.Errorf("--name is required")
+		if joinType == "proxmox" {
+			return joinProxmox(cmd)
 		}
-		if joinAddr == "" {
-			joinAddr = "localhost:8443"
-		}
-
-		// REQ-026: if --ca-fingerprint is set, verify the on-disk CA
-		// matches the pinned value before we touch the registry. This
-		// prevents typos in the operator-supplied fingerprint from
-		// silently degrading to "no pin" and accepting any cert.
-		if joinCAFinger != "" {
-			fp, err := security.Fingerprint(certpaths.CACertPath())
-			if err != nil {
-				return fmt.Errorf("--ca-fingerprint set but local CA is missing: %w (run `orca cert ca-init` first)", err)
-			}
-			if fp != joinCAFinger {
-				return fmt.Errorf(
-					"CA fingerprint mismatch: on-disk=%s, pinned=%s — refusing to join (REQ-026)",
-					fp, joinCAFinger,
-				)
-			}
-		}
-
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 5*time.Second)
-		defer cancel()
-
-		registry, closer, err := nodeRegistry()
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		defer closer()
-
-		node := &model.Node{
-			ID:       uuid.NewString(),
-			Name:     joinName,
-			Address:  joinAddr,
-			State:    model.NodeStateReady,
-			JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
-			LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
-		}
-		if err := registry.Join(ctx, node); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if jsonOutput {
-			return printJSON(node)
-		}
-		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "✓ Node joined: %s (%s) at %s\n", node.ID, node.Name, node.Address)
-		return nil
+		return joinLocal(cmd)
 	},
 }
 
+// joinLocal is the existing localhost/Linux node join flow (fingerprint
+// check + registry.Insert).
+func joinLocal(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
+	if joinName == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("--name is required")
+	}
+	if joinAddr == "" {
+		joinAddr = "localhost:8443"
+	}
+
+	// REQ-026: if --ca-fingerprint is set, verify the on-disk CA
+	// matches the pinned value before we touch the registry. This
+	// prevents typos in the operator-supplied fingerprint from
+	// silently degrading to "no pin" and accepting any cert.
+	if joinCAFinger != "" {
+		fp, err := security.Fingerprint(certpaths.CACertPath())
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("--ca-fingerprint set but local CA is missing: %w (run `orca cert ca-init` first)", err)
+		}
+		if fp != joinCAFinger {
+			return fmt.Errorf(
+				"CA fingerprint mismatch: on-disk=%s, pinned=%s — refusing to join (REQ-026)",
+				fp, joinCAFinger,
+			)
+		}
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	registry, closer, err := nodeRegistry()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer closer()
+
+	node := &model.Node{
+		ID:       uuid.NewString(),
+		Name:     joinName,
+		Address:  joinAddr,
+		State:    model.NodeStateReady,
+		JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
+		LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+	}
+	if err := registry.Join(ctx, node); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if jsonOutput {
+		return printJSON(node)
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "✓ Node joined: %s (%s) at %s\n", node.ID, node.Name, node.Address)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// joinProxmox bootstraps a remote Proxmox VE 8/9 host via SSH and
+// registers it as an orca node (REQ-050, REQ-051). The password is
+// never persisted (D-031).
+func joinProxmox(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
+	if joinHost == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("--host is required for --type proxmox")
+	}
+	password := joinPassword
+	if password == "" {
+		password = os.Getenv("ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD")
+	}
+	if password == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("password is required for --type proxmox (use --password or $ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD)")
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 60*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	result, err := proxmox.BootstrapProxmox(ctx, proxmox.Options{
+		Host:        joinHost,
+		SSHUser:     joinSSHUser,
+		Password:    password,
+		ProxmoxUser: proxmoxUser,
+		ProxmoxRole: proxmoxRole,
+		SSHPort:     joinSSHPort,
+		Logger:      newLogger(),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("proxmox bootstrap: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Zero the password byte slice (D-031 — never persist, minimize memory exposure).
+	pwBytes := []byte(password)
+	for i := range pwBytes {
+		pwBytes[i] = 0
+	}
+
+	// Register the proxmox node in the orca registry.
+	registry, closer, err := nodeRegistry()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer closer()
+
+	regCtx, regCancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 5*time.Second)
+	defer regCancel()
+
+	node := &model.Node{
+		ID:       uuid.NewString(),
+		Name:     result.NodeName,
+		Address:  result.NodeAddress,
+		State:    model.NodeStateReady,
+		JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
+		LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+		Kind:     string(model.NodeKindProxmox),
+		OS:       "pve",
+	}
+	if err := registry.Join(regCtx, node); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("register proxmox node: %w", err)
+	}
+	if jsonOutput {
+		return printJSON(node)
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "✓ Proxmox node joined: %s (%s) at %s\n", node.ID, node.Name, node.Address)
+	fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "  role: %s, user: %s@pam\n", proxmoxRole, proxmoxUser)
+	return nil
+}
+
 var nodeLeaveCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "leave [node-id]",
 	Short: "Remove a node from the orca registry",
@@ -155,8 +241,11 @@ var nodeLeaveCmd = &cobra.Command{
 var nodeListCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "list",
 	Short: "List all nodes in the orca registry",
-	Long:  "Display all registered nodes and their state.",
+	Long:  "Display all registered nodes and their state. Use --watch to stream updates until Ctrl-C.",
 	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		if nodeWatch {
+			return watchNodes(cmd)
+		}
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 5*time.Second)
 		defer cancel()
 
@@ -185,11 +274,86 @@ var nodeListCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	},
 }
 
+func watchNodes(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
+	ctx, cancel := signal.NotifyContext(cmd.Context(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
+	defer cancel()
+	return watchNodesCtx(cmd, ctx)
+}
+
+func watchNodesCtx(cmd *cobra.Command, ctx context.Context) error {
+	db, closer, err := openDB()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer closer()
+
+	out := cmd.OutOrStdout()
+
+	if jsonOutput {
+		seen := make(map[string]string)
+		for snapshot := range store.NewNodeRepo(db).Watch(ctx) {
+			current := make(map[string]bool, len(snapshot))
+			for _, n := range snapshot {
+				current[n.ID] = true
+				compact, _ := json.Marshal(n)
+				key := string(compact)
+				if prev, ok := seen[n.ID]; !ok || prev != key {
+					event := "init"
+					if ok {
+						event = "update"
+					}
+					line, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"event": event, "node": n})
+					fmt.Fprintln(out, string(line))
+					seen[n.ID] = key
+				}
+			}
+			for id := range seen {
+				if !current[id] {
+					line, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"event": "delete", "id": id})
+					fmt.Fprintln(out, string(line))
+					delete(seen, id)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	prevTable := ""
+	for snapshot := range store.NewNodeRepo(db).Watch(ctx) {
+		table := renderNodeTable(snapshot)
+		if table != prevTable {
+			fmt.Fprint(out, "\033[2J\033[H")
+			fmt.Fprint(out, table)
+			prevTable = table
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func renderNodeTable(nodes []*model.Node) string {
+	if len(nodes) == 0 {
+		return "No nodes registered.\n"
+	}
+	out := fmt.Sprintf("%-36s  %-20s  %-22s  %-10s\n", "ID", "NAME", "ADDRESS", "STATE")
+	for _, n := range nodes {
+		out += fmt.Sprintf("%-36s  %-20s  %-22s  %-10s\n", n.ID, n.Name, n.Address, n.State)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 func init() {
-	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&joinName, "name", "", "node name (required)")
+	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&joinName, "name", "", "node name (required for --type localhost)")
 	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&joinAddr, "addr", "", "node address (default localhost:8443)")
 	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&joinCAFinger, "ca-fingerprint", "", "pin CA cert SHA-256 (REQ-026); fails if on-disk CA doesn't match")
+	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&joinType, "type", "localhost", "node type: localhost (default) or proxmox (SSH bootstrap)")
+	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&joinHost, "host", "", "proxmox host address (IP/hostname, no port; required for --type proxmox)")
+	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&joinSSHUser, "ssh-user", "root", "SSH username for proxmox bootstrap (default root)")
+	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&joinPassword, "password", "", "SSH password for proxmox bootstrap (never persisted; prefer $ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD)")
+	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().IntVar(&joinSSHPort, "ssh-port", 22, "SSH port for proxmox bootstrap (default 22)")
+	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&proxmoxUser, "proxmox-user", "orca", "Linux system user to create on the proxmox host (config-overridable)")
+	nodeJoinCmd.Flags().StringVar(&proxmoxRole, "proxmox-role", "OrcaOperator", "PVE custom role to create (config-overridable)")
 	nodeLeaveCmd.Flags().StringVar(&leaveID, "id", "", "node id")
+	nodeListCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&nodeWatch, "watch", false, "stream nodes until Ctrl-C (table refresh or --json per-event)")
 
 	nodeCmd.AddCommand(nodeJoinCmd)
 	nodeCmd.AddCommand(nodeLeaveCmd)

internal/cli/node_capacity.go

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+// node_capacity.go implements `orca node capacity` for v0.2 P02.
+// The capacity declaration is per-node (cpu_millicores, memory_mib,
+// disk_mib) and feeds the bin-packing scheduler.
+//
+// REQ-028: HCL/YAML schema for NodeCapacity — the CLI accepts the
+// three numeric flags and writes a row to the `node_capacity` table.
+// A future enhancement can read `~/.orca/node.hcl` at join time
+// (out of scope for P02).
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+var (
+	capSetCPU  int64
+	capSetMem  int64
+	capSetDisk int64
+	capNodeID  string
+)
+
+var nodeCapacityCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:   "capacity",
+	Short: "Manage node capacity declarations (P02 bin-packing input)",
+	Long:  "Read or write the per-node capacity used by the multi-node scheduler.",
+}
+
+var nodeCapacityShowCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:   "show [node-id]",
+	Short: "Show capacity for a node (defaults to 'self')",
+	Args:  cobra.MaximumNArgs(1),
+	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		id := capNodeID
+		if id == "" && len(args) > 0 {
+			id = args[0]
+		}
+		if id == "" {
+			id = "self"
+		}
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 5*time.Second)
+		defer cancel()
+		db, closer, err := openDB()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		defer closer()
+		repo := store.NewCapacityRepo(db)
+		c, err := repo.Get(ctx, id)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("node %s: %w (use `orca node capacity --set` to declare)", id, err)
+		}
+		if jsonOutput {
+			return printJSON(c)
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "Node:        %s\n", c.NodeID)
+		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "CPU:         %d millicores\n", c.CPUMillicores)
+		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "Memory:      %d MiB\n", c.MemoryMiB)
+		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "Disk:        %d MiB\n", c.DiskMiB)
+		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "Updated:     %s\n", c.UpdatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
+		return nil
+	},
+}
+
+var nodeCapacitySetCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:   "set",
+	Short: "Declare capacity for a node (used by bin-packing)",
+	Long:  "Write cpu_millicores, memory_mib, and disk_mib for the named node. Idempotent: subsequent calls overwrite.",
+	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		if capSetCPU <= 0 || capSetMem <= 0 || capSetDisk <= 0 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("--cpu, --memory, and --disk must all be positive")
+		}
+		id := capNodeID
+		if id == "" {
+			id = "self"
+		}
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 5*time.Second)
+		defer cancel()
+		db, closer, err := openDB()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		defer closer()
+		repo := store.NewCapacityRepo(db)
+		c := &store.NodeCapacity{
+			NodeID:        id,
+			CPUMillicores: capSetCPU,
+			MemoryMiB:     capSetMem,
+			DiskMiB:       capSetDisk,
+		}
+		if err := repo.Upsert(ctx, c); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if jsonOutput {
+			return printJSON(c)
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "✓ Capacity set for %s: cpu=%d mem=%d disk=%d\n",
+			c.NodeID, c.CPUMillicores, c.MemoryMiB, c.DiskMiB)
+		return nil
+	},
+}
+
+var nodeCapacityListCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:   "list",
+	Short: "List all node capacity declarations",
+	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 5*time.Second)
+		defer cancel()
+		db, closer, err := openDB()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		defer closer()
+		repo := store.NewCapacityRepo(db)
+		rows, err := repo.List(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if jsonOutput {
+			return printJSON(rows)
+		}
+		if len(rows) == 0 {
+			fmt.Fprintln(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "No capacity declarations. Use `orca node capacity --set` to add one.")
+			return nil
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "%-20s  %12s  %12s  %12s  %s\n", "NODE", "CPU(mc)", "MEM(MiB)", "DISK(MiB)", "UPDATED")
+		for _, c := range rows {
+			fmt.Fprintf(cmd.OutOrStdout(), "%-20s  %12d  %12d  %12d  %s\n",
+				c.NodeID, c.CPUMillicores, c.MemoryMiB, c.DiskMiB, c.UpdatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
+		}
+		return nil
+	},
+}
+
+func init() {
+	nodeCapacitySetCmd.Flags().Int64Var(&capSetCPU, "cpu", 0, "CPU capacity in millicores (1000 = 1 vCPU)")
+	nodeCapacitySetCmd.Flags().Int64Var(&capSetMem, "memory", 0, "Memory capacity in MiB")
+	nodeCapacitySetCmd.Flags().Int64Var(&capSetDisk, "disk", 0, "Disk capacity in MiB")
+	nodeCapacitySetCmd.Flags().StringVar(&capNodeID, "node", "", "node id (defaults to 'self')")
+	nodeCapacityShowCmd.Flags().StringVar(&capNodeID, "node", "", "node id (defaults to 'self')")
+
+	nodeCapacityCmd.AddCommand(nodeCapacityShowCmd, nodeCapacitySetCmd, nodeCapacityListCmd)
+	nodeCmd.AddCommand(nodeCapacityCmd)
+}

internal/cli/osdetect.go

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+package cli
+
+import "git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/osdetect"
+
+// detectOS reads /etc/os-release and returns the ID= value.
+// Delegates to internal/osdetect to avoid import cycles with
+// internal/doctor (both need OS detection).
+func detectOS() string {
+	return osdetect.Detect()
+}

internal/cli/osdetect_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// The osdetect parsing/detection logic is tested in
+// internal/osdetect/osdetect_test.go. These tests verify the cli
+// wrapper delegates correctly.
+
+func TestDetectOS_DelegatesToPackage(t *testing.T) {
+	// On this host (Ubuntu), detectOS should return "ubuntu" via the
+	// osdetect package. If /etc/os-release is absent (e.g., in a
+	// minimal container), it returns "linux".
+	result := detectOS()
+	if result == "" {
+		t.Error("detectOS returned empty string, expected a non-empty OS ID")
+	}
+}

internal/cli/root.go

@@ -1,18 +1,26 @@
 package cli
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
+	"os"
 
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/config"
 )
 
+type configCtxKey struct{}
+
 var (
 	version   = "0.1.0-dev"
 	gitCommit = "unknown"
 	buildTime = "unknown"
 )
 
+const systemNamespaceRoot = "/root/.orca"
+
 var rootCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Use:   "orca",
 	Short: "Orca — offline/CLI-first orchestration engine",
@@ -21,12 +29,43 @@ inspired by HashiCorp Nomad, prioritizing stability, security, and simplicity
 over feature richness.`,
 	SilenceUsage:  true,
 	SilenceErrors: true,
+	PersistentPreRunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		if systemNamespace {
+			if existing := os.Getenv("ORCA_HOME"); existing != "" && existing != systemNamespaceRoot {
+				return fmt.Errorf("--system conflicts with ORCA_HOME=%q (already set); unset ORCA_HOME or drop --system", existing)
+			}
+			if err := os.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", systemNamespaceRoot); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("set ORCA_HOME for --system: %w", err)
+			}
+		}
+		if configPath != "" {
+			cfg, err := config.Load(configPath)
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("load config %s: %w", configPath, err)
+			}
+			cmd.SetContext(context.WithValue(cmd.Context(), configCtxKey{}, cfg))
+		}
+		return nil
+	},
 }
 
-var jsonOutput bool
+var (
+	jsonOutput      bool
+	systemNamespace bool
+	configPath      string
+)
 
 func init() {
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "output in JSON format")
+	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&systemNamespace, "system", false, "use system-level namespace root (/root/.orca) instead of user-level (~/.orca)")
+	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&configPath, "config", "", "path to config.hcl (overrides ~/.orca/config.hcl)")
+}
+
+func configFromCtx(ctx context.Context) *config.Config {
+	if v, ok := ctx.Value(configCtxKey{}).(*config.Config); ok {
+		return v
+	}
+	return nil
 }
 
 func Execute() error {

internal/cli/root_test.go

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 package cli
 
 import (
+	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/config"
 )
 
 func TestVersionCommandExists(t *testing.T) {
@@ -65,3 +68,47 @@ func TestRootHelpMentionsKeyPillars(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+func TestConfigFlagRegistered(t *testing.T) {
+	f := rootCmd.PersistentFlags().Lookup("config")
+	if f == nil {
+		t.Fatal("--config persistent flag not registered")
+	}
+	if f.DefValue != "" {
+		t.Errorf("--config default = %q, want empty", f.DefValue)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigFlagLoadsFile(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := dir + "/config.hcl"
+	cfgContent := `db_path          = "` + dir + `/test.db"
+listen_addr      = "127.0.0.1:9999"
+ca_path          = "` + dir + `/ca.crt"
+server_cert_path = "` + dir + `/server.crt"
+server_key_path  = "` + dir + `/server.key"
+
+node_capacity {
+  cpu       = 4
+  memory_mb = 8192
+}
+`
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cfgPath, []byte(cfgContent), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write config: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	old := configPath
+	configPath = cfgPath
+	defer func() { configPath = old }()
+
+	cfg, err := config.Load(cfgPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load config: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.ListenAddr != "127.0.0.1:9999" {
+		t.Errorf("listen_addr = %q, want 127.0.0.1:9999", cfg.ListenAddr)
+	}
+	if cfg.NodeCapacity == nil || cfg.NodeCapacity.CPU != 4 {
+		t.Errorf("node_capacity.cpu not parsed, got %+v", cfg.NodeCapacity)
+	}
+}

internal/cli/watch_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestWatchJobs_JSONStreaming(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db")
+	db, err := store.Open(dbPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	repo := store.NewJobRepo(db)
+	bgCtx := context.Background()
+	_ = repo.Insert(bgCtx, &model.Job{ID: "seed-job", Name: "seed", Spec: "t", Status: model.JobStatusPending})
+
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", dbPath)
+
+	jsonOutput = true
+	t.Cleanup(func() { jsonOutput = false })
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	rootCmd.SetOut(&buf)
+	rootCmd.SetErr(&buf)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { rootCmd.SetOut(os.Stdout); rootCmd.SetErr(os.Stderr) })
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(bgCtx)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { done <- watchJobsCtx(rootCmd, ctx) }()
+
+	// First yield is immediate (G-002); wait for it.
+	time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	_ = repo.Insert(bgCtx, &model.Job{ID: "watch-job", Name: "watch", Spec: "t", Status: model.JobStatusPending})
+
+	// Wait for at least one ticker interval (default 1s) to capture the change.
+	time.Sleep(1100 * time.Millisecond)
+	cancel()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("watchJobsCtx did not return within 2s after cancel")
+	}
+
+	output := buf.String()
+	if !strings.Contains(output, `"event":"init"`) {
+		t.Errorf("expected init event, got: %s", output)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(output, "watch-job") {
+		t.Errorf("expected watch-job in output, got: %s", output)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWatchJobs_TableRefresh(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db")
+	db, err := store.Open(dbPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	repo := store.NewJobRepo(db)
+	bgCtx := context.Background()
+	_ = repo.Insert(bgCtx, &model.Job{ID: "seed-job", Name: "seed", Spec: "t", Status: model.JobStatusPending})
+
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", dbPath)
+
+	jsonOutput = false
+	t.Cleanup(func() { jsonOutput = false })
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	rootCmd.SetOut(&buf)
+	rootCmd.SetErr(&buf)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { rootCmd.SetOut(os.Stdout); rootCmd.SetErr(os.Stderr) })
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(bgCtx)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { done <- watchJobsCtx(rootCmd, ctx) }()
+
+	time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	_ = repo.Insert(bgCtx, &model.Job{ID: "table-job", Name: "table", Spec: "t", Status: model.JobStatusPending})
+
+	time.Sleep(1100 * time.Millisecond)
+	cancel()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("watchJobsCtx did not return within 2s after cancel")
+	}
+
+	output := buf.String()
+	if !strings.Contains(output, "\033[2J\033[H") {
+		t.Errorf("expected clear-screen escape in table watch output, got: %s", output)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(output, "table-job") {
+		t.Errorf("expected table-job in output, got: %s", output)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWatchNodes_JSONStreaming(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db")
+	db, err := store.Open(dbPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	repo := store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+	bgCtx := context.Background()
+	_ = repo.Insert(bgCtx, &model.Node{
+		ID: "seed-node", Name: "seed", Address: "addr",
+		State: model.NodeStateReady, JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+	})
+
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", dbPath)
+
+	jsonOutput = true
+	t.Cleanup(func() { jsonOutput = false })
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	rootCmd.SetOut(&buf)
+	rootCmd.SetErr(&buf)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { rootCmd.SetOut(os.Stdout); rootCmd.SetErr(os.Stderr) })
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(bgCtx)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { done <- watchNodesCtx(rootCmd, ctx) }()
+
+	time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	_ = repo.Insert(bgCtx, &model.Node{
+		ID: "watch-node", Name: "watch", Address: "addr2",
+		State: model.NodeStateReady, JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+	})
+
+	time.Sleep(1100 * time.Millisecond)
+	cancel()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("watchNodesCtx did not return within 2s after cancel")
+	}
+
+	output := buf.String()
+	initFound := false
+	watchNodeFound := false
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(output, "\n") {
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		if line == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		var event map[string]any
+		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &event); err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if event["event"] == "init" {
+			initFound = true
+			if node, ok := event["node"].(map[string]any); ok {
+				if node["id"] == "watch-node" {
+					watchNodeFound = true
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !initFound {
+		t.Errorf("expected init event in JSON stream, got: %s", output)
+	}
+	if !watchNodeFound {
+		t.Errorf("expected watch-node in JSON stream, got: %s", output)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWatchNodes_TableRefresh(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db")
+	db, err := store.Open(dbPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	repo := store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+	bgCtx := context.Background()
+	_ = repo.Insert(bgCtx, &model.Node{
+		ID: "seed-node", Name: "seed", Address: "addr",
+		State: model.NodeStateReady, JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+	})
+
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", dbPath)
+
+	jsonOutput = false
+	t.Cleanup(func() { jsonOutput = false })
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	rootCmd.SetOut(&buf)
+	rootCmd.SetErr(&buf)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { rootCmd.SetOut(os.Stdout); rootCmd.SetErr(os.Stderr) })
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(bgCtx)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { done <- watchNodesCtx(rootCmd, ctx) }()
+
+	time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	_ = repo.Insert(bgCtx, &model.Node{
+		ID: "table-node", Name: "table", Address: "addr2",
+		State: model.NodeStateReady, JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+	})
+
+	time.Sleep(1100 * time.Millisecond)
+	cancel()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("watchNodesCtx did not return within 2s after cancel")
+	}
+
+	output := buf.String()
+	if !strings.Contains(output, "\033[2J\033[H") {
+		t.Errorf("expected clear-screen escape in table watch output, got: %s", output)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(output, "table-node") {
+		t.Errorf("expected table-node in output, got: %s", output)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRenderJobTable(t *testing.T) {
+	jobs := []*model.Job{
+		{ID: "j1", Name: "alpha", Status: "running", ExitCode: 0},
+		{ID: "j2", Name: "beta", Status: "done", ExitCode: 0},
+	}
+	out := renderJobTable(jobs)
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "j1") || !strings.Contains(out, "alpha") {
+		t.Errorf("renderJobTable missing job 1: %s", out)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "j2") || !strings.Contains(out, "beta") {
+		t.Errorf("renderJobTable missing job 2: %s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRenderJobTableEmpty(t *testing.T) {
+	out := renderJobTable(nil)
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "No jobs") {
+		t.Errorf("expected empty message, got: %s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRenderNodeTable(t *testing.T) {
+	nodes := []*model.Node{
+		{ID: "n1", Name: "alpha", Address: "localhost:8443", State: "ready"},
+	}
+	out := renderNodeTable(nodes)
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "n1") || !strings.Contains(out, "alpha") {
+		t.Errorf("renderNodeTable missing node: %s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRenderNodeTableEmpty(t *testing.T) {
+	out := renderNodeTable(nil)
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "No nodes") {
+		t.Errorf("expected empty message, got: %s", out)
+	}
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+package config
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2/hclsimple"
+)
+
+type CapacityConfig struct {
+	CPU      int `hcl:"cpu,optional"`
+	MemoryMB int `hcl:"memory_mb,optional"`
+}
+
+type Config struct {
+	DBPath         string          `hcl:"db_path,optional"`
+	ListenAddr     string          `hcl:"listen_addr,optional"`
+	CAPath         string          `hcl:"ca_path,optional"`
+	ServerCertPath string          `hcl:"server_cert_path,optional"`
+	ServerKeyPath  string          `hcl:"server_key_path,optional"`
+	NodeCapacity   *CapacityConfig `hcl:"node_capacity,block"`
+}
+
+type Flags struct {
+	DBPath         *string
+	ListenAddr     *string
+	CAPath         *string
+	ServerCertPath *string
+	ServerKeyPath  *string
+	CPU            *int
+	MemoryMB       *int
+}
+
+type Environ map[string]string
+
+func Load(paths ...string) (*Config, error) {
+	for _, p := range paths {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(p); err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		data, err := os.ReadFile(p)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("read config %s: %w", p, err)
+		}
+		var cfg Config
+		if err := hclsimple.Decode(p, data, nil, &cfg); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode config %s: %w", p, err)
+		}
+		return &cfg, nil
+	}
+	return &Config{}, nil
+}
+
+func (c *Config) MergeOverrides(flags Flags, env Environ) *Config {
+	out := &Config{
+		DBPath:         c.DBPath,
+		ListenAddr:     c.ListenAddr,
+		CAPath:         c.CAPath,
+		ServerCertPath: c.ServerCertPath,
+		ServerKeyPath:  c.ServerKeyPath,
+		NodeCapacity:   c.NodeCapacity,
+	}
+
+	applyStr := func(flag *string, envKey, fileVal string) string {
+		if flag != nil {
+			return *flag
+		}
+		if v, ok := env[envKey]; ok && v != "" {
+			return v
+		}
+		return fileVal
+	}
+
+	out.DBPath = applyStr(flags.DBPath, "ORCA_DB", out.DBPath)
+	out.ListenAddr = applyStr(flags.ListenAddr, "ORCA_LISTEN_ADDR", out.ListenAddr)
+	out.CAPath = applyStr(flags.CAPath, "ORCA_CA_PATH", out.CAPath)
+	out.ServerCertPath = applyStr(flags.ServerCertPath, "ORCA_SERVER_CERT_PATH", out.ServerCertPath)
+	out.ServerKeyPath = applyStr(flags.ServerKeyPath, "ORCA_SERVER_KEY_PATH", out.ServerKeyPath)
+
+	if out.NodeCapacity == nil {
+		out.NodeCapacity = &CapacityConfig{}
+	} else {
+		nc := *out.NodeCapacity
+		out.NodeCapacity = &nc
+	}
+
+	if flags.CPU != nil {
+		out.NodeCapacity.CPU = *flags.CPU
+	} else if v, ok := env["ORCA_NODE_CPU"]; ok && v != "" {
+		if n, err := atoi(v); err == nil {
+			out.NodeCapacity.CPU = n
+		}
+	}
+
+	if flags.MemoryMB != nil {
+		out.NodeCapacity.MemoryMB = *flags.MemoryMB
+	} else if v, ok := env["ORCA_NODE_MEMORY_MB"]; ok && v != "" {
+		if n, err := atoi(v); err == nil {
+			out.NodeCapacity.MemoryMB = n
+		}
+	}
+
+	return out
+}
+
+func atoi(s string) (int, error) {
+	n := 0
+	if s == "" {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("empty")
+	}
+	neg := false
+	i := 0
+	if s[0] == '-' {
+		neg = true
+		i = 1
+	}
+	for ; i < len(s); i++ {
+		if s[i] < '0' || s[i] > '9' {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("bad")
+		}
+		n = n*10 + int(s[i]-'0')
+	}
+	if neg {
+		n = -n
+	}
+	return n, nil
+}

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+package config
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+const exampleHCL = `
+db_path          = "/tmp/orca/test.db"
+listen_addr      = "127.0.0.1:9999"
+ca_path          = "/tmp/orca/ca.crt"
+server_cert_path = "/tmp/orca/server.crt"
+server_key_path  = "/tmp/orca/server.key"
+
+node_capacity {
+  cpu       = 4
+  memory_mb = 8192
+}
+`
+
+func writeFile(t *testing.T, dir, name, content string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	p := filepath.Join(dir, name)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(p, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", p, err)
+	}
+	return p
+}
+
+func TestLoad_Valid(t *testing.T) {
+	p := writeFile(t, t.TempDir(), "config.hcl", exampleHCL)
+	cfg, err := Load(p)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.DBPath != "/tmp/orca/test.db" {
+		t.Errorf("DBPath=%q", cfg.DBPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.ListenAddr != "127.0.0.1:9999" {
+		t.Errorf("ListenAddr=%q", cfg.ListenAddr)
+	}
+	if cfg.CAPath != "/tmp/orca/ca.crt" {
+		t.Errorf("CAPath=%q", cfg.CAPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.ServerCertPath != "/tmp/orca/server.crt" {
+		t.Errorf("ServerCertPath=%q", cfg.ServerCertPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.ServerKeyPath != "/tmp/orca/server.key" {
+		t.Errorf("ServerKeyPath=%q", cfg.ServerKeyPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.NodeCapacity == nil {
+		t.Fatal("NodeCapacity nil")
+	}
+	if cfg.NodeCapacity.CPU != 4 {
+		t.Errorf("CPU=%d", cfg.NodeCapacity.CPU)
+	}
+	if cfg.NodeCapacity.MemoryMB != 8192 {
+		t.Errorf("MemoryMB=%d", cfg.NodeCapacity.MemoryMB)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_Missing(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, err := Load(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nope.hcl"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg == nil {
+		t.Fatal("nil config")
+	}
+	if cfg.DBPath != "" || cfg.ListenAddr != "" || cfg.NodeCapacity != nil {
+		t.Errorf("expected zero config, got %+v", cfg)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_Malformed(t *testing.T) {
+	p := writeFile(t, t.TempDir(), "bad.hcl", "db_path = ")
+	cfg, err := Load(p)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected error, got %+v", cfg)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_FirstExisting(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	existing := writeFile(t, dir, "real.hcl", exampleHCL)
+	missing := filepath.Join(dir, "missing.hcl")
+	cfg, err := Load(missing, existing)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.DBPath != "/tmp/orca/test.db" {
+		t.Errorf("DBPath=%q", cfg.DBPath)
+	}
+}
+
+func strPtr(s string) *string { return &s }
+func intPtr(i int) *int       { return &i }
+
+func TestMergeOverrides_FlagWins(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{
+		DBPath:     "/file.db",
+		ListenAddr: "127.0.0.1:9000",
+		NodeCapacity: &CapacityConfig{
+			CPU:      4,
+			MemoryMB: 8192,
+		},
+	}
+	flags := Flags{
+		DBPath:     strPtr("/flag.db"),
+		ListenAddr: strPtr("0.0.0.0:1234"),
+	}
+	env := Environ{"ORCA_DB": "/env.db"}
+	out := cfg.MergeOverrides(flags, env)
+	if out.DBPath != "/flag.db" {
+		t.Errorf("DBPath=%q want /flag.db", out.DBPath)
+	}
+	if out.ListenAddr != "0.0.0.0:1234" {
+		t.Errorf("ListenAddr=%q want 0.0.0.0:1234", out.ListenAddr)
+	}
+	if cfg.DBPath != "/file.db" {
+		t.Errorf("receiver mutated: %q", cfg.DBPath)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMergeOverrides_EnvWinsOverFile(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{DBPath: "/file.db", ListenAddr: "127.0.0.1:9000"}
+	env := Environ{"ORCA_DB": "/env.db"}
+	out := cfg.MergeOverrides(Flags{}, env)
+	if out.DBPath != "/env.db" {
+		t.Errorf("DBPath=%q want /env.db", out.DBPath)
+	}
+	if out.ListenAddr != "127.0.0.1:9000" {
+		t.Errorf("ListenAddr=%q want 127.0.0.1:9000", out.ListenAddr)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMergeOverrides_FileWinsOverDefault(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{DBPath: "/file.db", ListenAddr: "127.0.0.1:9000"}
+	out := cfg.MergeOverrides(Flags{}, Environ{})
+	if out.DBPath != "/file.db" {
+		t.Errorf("DBPath=%q want /file.db", out.DBPath)
+	}
+	if out.ListenAddr != "127.0.0.1:9000" {
+		t.Errorf("ListenAddr=%q want 127.0.0.1:9000", out.ListenAddr)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMergeOverrides_EmptyFlagDoesNotOverride(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{DBPath: "/file.db"}
+	env := Environ{"ORCA_DB": "/env.db"}
+	out := cfg.MergeOverrides(Flags{}, env)
+	if out.DBPath != "/env.db" {
+		t.Errorf("DBPath=%q want /env.db", out.DBPath)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMergeOverrides_EmptyEnvDoesNotOverride(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{DBPath: "/file.db"}
+	env := Environ{"ORCA_DB": ""}
+	out := cfg.MergeOverrides(Flags{}, env)
+	if out.DBPath != "/file.db" {
+		t.Errorf("DBPath=%q want /file.db", out.DBPath)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMergeOverrides_NodeCapacity(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{
+		NodeCapacity: &CapacityConfig{CPU: 4, MemoryMB: 8192},
+	}
+	out := cfg.MergeOverrides(Flags{}, Environ{})
+	if out.NodeCapacity == nil {
+		t.Fatal("NodeCapacity nil")
+	}
+	if out.NodeCapacity.CPU != 4 {
+		t.Errorf("CPU=%d want 4", out.NodeCapacity.CPU)
+	}
+	if out.NodeCapacity.MemoryMB != 8192 {
+		t.Errorf("MemoryMB=%d want 8192", out.NodeCapacity.MemoryMB)
+	}
+	if cfg.NodeCapacity == out.NodeCapacity {
+		t.Error("NodeCapacity not cloned")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMergeOverrides_NodeCapacityFlagAndEnv(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{NodeCapacity: &CapacityConfig{CPU: 4, MemoryMB: 8192}}
+	flags := Flags{CPU: intPtr(8)}
+	env := Environ{"ORCA_NODE_MEMORY_MB": "16384"}
+	out := cfg.MergeOverrides(flags, env)
+	if out.NodeCapacity.CPU != 8 {
+		t.Errorf("CPU=%d want 8", out.NodeCapacity.CPU)
+	}
+	if out.NodeCapacity.MemoryMB != 16384 {
+		t.Errorf("MemoryMB=%d want 16384", out.NodeCapacity.MemoryMB)
+	}
+}

internal/config/testdata/config.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+db_path          = "/tmp/orca/test.db"
+listen_addr      = "127.0.0.1:9999"
+ca_path          = "/tmp/orca/ca.crt"
+server_cert_path = "/tmp/orca/server.crt"
+server_key_path  = "/tmp/orca/server.key"
+
+node_capacity {
+  cpu       = 4
+  memory_mb = 8192
+}

internal/daemon/dispatch_handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// Package daemon — dispatch_handler.go mounts the orca.v1.Dispatch
+// service on the daemon's HTTP server. The service is registered as
+// two handlers (POST /orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit and /Status) and is
+// gated on the mTLS state — if the server is in plaintext mode
+// (v0.1 compat), the handlers refuse to serve.
+package daemon
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/transport"
+)
+
+// DispatchHandlers groups the Submit and Status handlers so they
+// can be registered as a unit on the daemon mux.
+type DispatchHandlers struct {
+	Submit *transport.SubmitHandler
+	Status *transport.StatusHandler
+}
+
+// NewDispatchHandlers builds the dispatch handler pair from a
+// transport.Dispatcher (the engine layer satisfies this).
+func NewDispatchHandlers(d transport.Dispatcher, dedupe *transport.IdempotencyStore) *DispatchHandlers {
+	if dedupe == nil {
+		dedupe = transport.NewIdempotencyStore()
+	}
+	return &DispatchHandlers{
+		Submit: transport.NewSubmitHandler(d, dedupe),
+		Status: transport.NewStatusHandler(d),
+	}
+}
+
+// Mount registers Submit and Status on the given mux. Called by the
+// daemon's mux builder.
+func (h *DispatchHandlers) Mount(mux *http.ServeMux) {
+	mux.Handle("/orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit", h.Submit)
+	mux.Handle("/orca.v1.Dispatch/Status", h.Status)
+}

internal/daemon/dispatch_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+// Package daemon — dispatch_test.go exercises the orca.v1.Dispatch
+// round-trip end-to-end: a SubmitHandler is mounted on a test server
+// and a DispatchClient dials it. The test asserts the spec flows
+// through, the job ID is returned, and dedupe (X-Orca-Idempotency-Key)
+// works.
+package daemon
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/transport"
+)
+
+// stubDispatcher is a transport.Dispatcher for tests. It records
+// every Submit and Status call and returns deterministic responses.
+type stubDispatcher struct {
+	mu         sync.Mutex
+	submits    [][]byte
+	statuses   []string
+	nextJobID  int
+	failSubmit bool
+}
+
+func (s *stubDispatcher) LocalSubmit(_ context.Context, spec []byte) (string, error) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.failSubmit {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("submit failed (test)")
+	}
+	cp := make([]byte, len(spec))
+	copy(cp, spec)
+	s.submits = append(s.submits, cp)
+	s.nextJobID++
+	return fmt.Sprintf("job-%d", s.nextJobID), nil
+}
+
+func (s *stubDispatcher) LocalStatus(_ context.Context, jobID string) (string, error) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.statuses = append(s.statuses, jobID)
+	return "running", nil
+}
+
+func TestDispatchRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubDispatcher{}
+	dedupe := transport.NewIdempotencyStore()
+	handlers := NewDispatchHandlers(stub, dedupe)
+
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	handlers.Mount(mux)
+	ts := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(ts.Close)
+
+	// Submit a spec wrapped in the SubmitRequest envelope.
+	// The wire format is {"spec": <json.RawMessage>}; the inner
+	// spec is opaque to the dispatch service and is parsed by the
+	// local executor downstream.
+	inner := []byte(`{"name":"hello","command":"/bin/echo","args":["hi"],"env":[]}`)
+	wire, _ := json.Marshal(transport.SubmitRequest{Spec: inner})
+	resp, err := http.Post(ts.URL+"/orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit", "application/json", bytes.NewReader(wire))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Submit: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("Submit status: got %d, want 200", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	var sr transport.SubmitResponse
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &sr); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode Submit response: %v", err)
+	}
+	if sr.JobID == "" {
+		t.Fatal("Submit response missing job_id")
+	}
+	if len(stub.submits) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("LocalSubmit calls: got %d, want 1", len(stub.submits))
+	}
+
+	// Status query.
+	statusReq := transport.StatusRequest{JobID: sr.JobID}
+	body2, _ := json.Marshal(statusReq)
+	resp2, err := http.Post(ts.URL+"/orca.v1.Dispatch/Status", "application/json", bytes.NewReader(body2))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Status: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer resp2.Body.Close()
+	if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("Status code: got %d, want 200", resp2.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var stResp transport.StatusResponse
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp2.Body).Decode(&stResp); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode Status: %v", err)
+	}
+	if stResp.State != "running" {
+		t.Errorf("Status.State: got %q, want running", stResp.State)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDispatchIdempotencyDedupe(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubDispatcher{}
+	dedupe := transport.NewIdempotencyStore()
+	handlers := NewDispatchHandlers(stub, dedupe)
+
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	handlers.Mount(mux)
+	ts := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(ts.Close)
+
+	inner := []byte(`{"name":"hello","command":"/bin/echo","args":["hi"]}`)
+	wire, _ := json.Marshal(transport.SubmitRequest{Spec: inner})
+	post := func() string {
+		req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, ts.URL+"/orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit", bytes.NewReader(wire))
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		req.Header.Set(transport.IdempotencyHeader, "key-42")
+		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Submit: %v", err)
+		}
+		defer resp.Body.Close()
+		b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+		return string(b)
+	}
+
+	// First call: real submit, LocalSubmit invoked.
+	first := post()
+	var sr1 transport.SubmitResponse
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(first), &sr1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode 1: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(stub.submits) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("after first call: submits=%d, want 1", len(stub.submits))
+	}
+
+	// Second call: same key, dedupe replay.
+	second := post()
+	var sr2 transport.SubmitResponse
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(second), &sr2); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode 2: %v", err)
+	}
+	if sr1.JobID != sr2.JobID {
+		t.Errorf("dedupe: first=%s, second=%s (should match)", sr1.JobID, sr2.JobID)
+	}
+	if len(stub.submits) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("after second call: submits=%d, want 1 (dedupe)", len(stub.submits))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDispatchSubmitValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubDispatcher{}
+	handlers := NewDispatchHandlers(stub, transport.NewIdempotencyStore())
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	handlers.Mount(mux)
+	ts := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(ts.Close)
+
+	// Empty spec: 400.
+	resp, _ := http.Post(ts.URL+"/orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit", "application/json", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{}`)))
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Errorf("empty spec: status=%d, want 400", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+
+	// GET instead of POST: 405.
+	resp2, _ := http.Get(ts.URL + "/orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit")
+	if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
+		t.Errorf("GET: status=%d, want 405", resp2.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp2.Body.Close()
+}

internal/daemon/server.go

@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ type Server struct {
 	// either in plaintext mode (default, v0.1 compat) or mTLS mode
 	// (v0.2 P01 forward).
 	mtls *MTLSState
+
+	// dispatch is the orca.v1.Dispatch service mounted on
+	// /orca.v1.Dispatch/* (P02). Optional — nil if no Dispatcher
+	// was registered. P02 wires this via RegisterDispatch.
+	dispatch *DispatchHandlers
 }
 
 // Options configures a new Server.
@@ -92,6 +97,8 @@ func (s *Server) Ready() bool { return s.ready.Load() }
 //   - jobs_handler.go    /v1/jobs/*
 //   - nodes_handler.go   /v1/nodes/*
 //   - tasks_handler.go   /v1/tasks/*
+//   - dispatch_handler.go  /orca.v1.Dispatch/* (P02; mounted only if
+//     RegisterDispatch was called)
 func (s *Server) mux() http.Handler {
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", s.handleHealthz)
@@ -101,9 +108,27 @@ func (s *Server) mux() http.Handler {
 	mux.HandleFunc("/v1/jobs/", s.handleJobsItem)
 	mux.HandleFunc("/v1/nodes", s.handleNodesCollection)
 	mux.HandleFunc("/v1/tasks", s.handleTasksCollection)
+	if s.dispatch != nil {
+		s.dispatch.Mount(mux)
+	}
 	return loggingMiddleware(s.log, mux)
 }
 
+// RegisterDispatch attaches the orca.v1.Dispatch service to the
+// daemon. Call before Start(). The dispatch routes are mounted at
+// /orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit and /orca.v1.Dispatch/Status.
+func (s *Server) RegisterDispatch(h *DispatchHandlers) {
+	if h == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	s.dispatch = h
+	s.log.Info("dispatch handlers registered",
+		slog.String("component", "daemon"),
+		slog.String("submit", "/orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit"),
+		slog.String("status", "/orca.v1.Dispatch/Status"),
+	)
+}
+
 // Start runs the HTTP server. Returns http.ErrServerClosed on clean shutdown.
 func (s *Server) Start() error {
 	s.log.Info("daemon starting",

internal/doctor/doctor.go

@@ -19,12 +19,21 @@ import (
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"encoding/pem"
 	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"sort"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts"
+
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/certpaths"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/osdetect"
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/security"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/transport"
 )
 
 // Result is the outcome of a single check.
@@ -63,8 +72,10 @@ func All() []Check {
 		CertServer(),
 		CertExpiry(),
 		CertFingerprint(),
-		NetworkStub(),
-		DBStub(),
+		OS(),
+		Network(),
+		Proxmox(),
+		DB(),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -177,28 +188,297 @@ func CertFingerprint() Check {
 	}
 }
 
-// NetworkStub is a stub for the network check; full impl in P02.
-func NetworkStub() Check {
+// DB checks SQLite integrity and migration version (REQ-032 completion).
+func DB() Check {
 	return Check{
-		Name:        "network",
-		Description: "TCP reachability + mTLS handshake (full impl in P02)",
-		Run: func(_ context.Context) (Result, string) {
-			return ResultWarn, "network check is a stub in P01; full impl in P02"
+		Name:        "db",
+		Description: "SQLite integrity_check + migration version",
+		Run: func(ctx context.Context) (Result, string) {
+			path := certpaths.DBPath()
+			db, err := store.Open(path)
+			if err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("open db: %v", err)
+			}
+			defer db.Close()
+
+			var integrity string
+			if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "PRAGMA integrity_check").Scan(&integrity); err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("integrity_check: %v", err)
+			}
+			if !strings.EqualFold(integrity, "ok") {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("integrity_check: %s", integrity)
+			}
+
+			version, err := store.MigrationVersion(ctx, db)
+			if err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("migration version: %v", err)
+			}
+			if version == "" {
+				return ResultWarn, "integrity OK but no migrations applied (fresh db)"
+			}
+			return ResultPass, fmt.Sprintf("integrity OK, migrations up to %s", version)
 		},
 	}
 }
 
-// DBStub is a stub for the database check; full impl in P02.
-func DBStub() Check {
+// Network probes peer reachability via mTLS /healthz (REQ-032 completion).
+// Peers are sourced from the persisted nodes table (not the in-memory
+// PeerRegistry, which is empty at CLI time). Zero peers → WARN (single-node
+// is legitimate). Any peer unreachable → FAIL (D-038).
+func Network() Check {
 	return Check{
-		Name:        "db",
-		Description: "SQLite open + migration apply (full impl in P02)",
-		Run: func(_ context.Context) (Result, string) {
-			return ResultWarn, "db check is a stub in P01; full impl in P02"
+		Name:        "network",
+		Description: "peer reachability via mTLS /healthz probe",
+		Run: func(ctx context.Context) (Result, string) {
+			caPath := certpaths.CACertPath()
+			certPath := certpaths.ServerCertPath()
+			keyPath := certpaths.ServerKeyPath()
+
+			// Check that cert files exist before attempting probes.
+			if _, err := os.Stat(caPath); err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("CA cert missing: %v (run `orca cert init`)", err)
+			}
+
+			path := certpaths.DBPath()
+			db, err := store.Open(path)
+			if err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("open db: %v", err)
+			}
+			defer db.Close()
+
+			nodes, err := store.NewNodeRepo(db).List(ctx)
+			if err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("list nodes: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			live := make([]*model.Node, 0, len(nodes))
+			for _, n := range nodes {
+				if n.State != model.NodeStateLeft {
+					live = append(live, n)
+				}
+			}
+
+			if len(live) == 0 {
+				return ResultWarn, "no peers registered (single-node?)"
+			}
+
+			var lines []string
+			anyFail := false
+			for _, n := range live {
+				probeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 3*time.Second)
+				err := probeHealthz(probeCtx, caPath, certPath, keyPath, n.Name, n.Address)
+				cancel()
+				if err != nil {
+					anyFail = true
+					lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  ✗ %s (%s): %v", n.Name, n.Address, err))
+				} else {
+					lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  ✓ %s (%s)", n.Name, n.Address))
+				}
+			}
+
+			result := ResultPass
+			if anyFail {
+				result = ResultFail
+			}
+			return result, strings.Join(lines, "\n")
 		},
 	}
 }
 
+// probeHealthz opens an mTLS connection to the peer and GETs /healthz.
+func probeHealthz(ctx context.Context, caPath, certPath, keyPath, serverName, addr string) error {
+	client, err := transport.NewMTLSClient(caPath, serverName, certPath, keyPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("mTLS client: %w", err)
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, "https://"+addr+"/healthz", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("request: %w", err)
+	}
+	resp, err := client.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("probe: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		return fmt.Errorf("healthz returned %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// OS checks that the auto-detected OS matches the stored localhost
+// node's os field (REQ-052). Drift (e.g., OS upgraded since init)
+// returns WARN; match returns PASS; missing localhost node returns FAIL.
+func OS() Check {
+	return Check{
+		Name:        "os",
+		Description: "localhost OS detection vs stored node row",
+		Run: func(ctx context.Context) (Result, string) {
+			detected := osdetect.Detect()
+
+			db, err := store.Open(certpaths.DBPath())
+			if err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("open db: %v", err)
+			}
+			defer db.Close()
+
+			node, err := store.NewNodeRepo(db).GetByName(ctx, "localhost")
+			if err == store.ErrNotFound {
+				return ResultFail, "no localhost node registered — run `orca init`"
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("lookup localhost node: %v", err)
+			}
+			if node.OS == "" {
+				return ResultWarn, fmt.Sprintf("localhost node has no os field (pre-0006 row?); detected=%s — re-run `orca init` to refresh", detected)
+			}
+			if node.OS != detected {
+				return ResultWarn, fmt.Sprintf("OS drift: init=%s, now=%s — re-run `orca init` to refresh", node.OS, detected)
+			}
+			return ResultPass, fmt.Sprintf("localhost os=%s (matches /etc/os-release)", detected)
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// Proxmox probes each kind=proxmox node via SSH with `pveversion`
+// (REQ-052). Clones the Network() pattern: list nodes, filter by kind,
+// 3s timeout per peer, PASS/WARN/FAIL per node. Zero proxmox nodes
+// returns WARN (single-node cluster is legitimate).
+func Proxmox() Check {
+	return Check{
+		Name:        "proxmox",
+		Description: "proxmox node reachability via SSH pveversion probe",
+		Run: func(ctx context.Context) (Result, string) {
+			db, err := store.Open(certpaths.DBPath())
+			if err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("open db: %v", err)
+			}
+			defer db.Close()
+
+			nodes, err := store.NewNodeRepo(db).List(ctx)
+			if err != nil {
+				return ResultFail, fmt.Sprintf("list nodes: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			proxmoxNodes := make([]*model.Node, 0, len(nodes))
+			for _, n := range nodes {
+				if n.Kind == string(model.NodeKindProxmox) && n.State != model.NodeStateLeft {
+					proxmoxNodes = append(proxmoxNodes, n)
+				}
+			}
+
+			if len(proxmoxNodes) == 0 {
+				return ResultWarn, "no proxmox nodes registered (single-node?)"
+			}
+
+			var lines []string
+			anyFail := false
+			for _, n := range proxmoxNodes {
+				probeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 3*time.Second)
+				err := probeProxmoxPVEVersion(probeCtx, n.Name)
+				cancel()
+				if err != nil {
+					anyFail = true
+					lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  ✗ %s: %v", n.Name, err))
+				} else {
+					lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  ✓ %s", n.Name))
+				}
+			}
+
+			result := ResultPass
+			if anyFail {
+				result = ResultFail
+			}
+			return result, strings.Join(lines, "\n")
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// probeProxmoxPVEVersion SSHes into the proxmox host and runs
+// `pveversion` to verify reachability + PVE installation. Uses the
+// orca SSH key for auth (deployed during `orca node join --type proxmox`)
+// and the known_hosts TOFU store for host-key verification (D-035).
+func probeProxmoxPVEVersion(ctx context.Context, host string) error {
+	// Load the orca SSH key for public-key auth.
+	keyPEM, err := os.ReadFile(certpaths.SSHKeyPath())
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("read SSH key: %w (run `orca node join --type proxmox` first)", err)
+	}
+	signer, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(keyPEM)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("parse SSH key: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	hostKeyCallback, err := knownhosts.New(certpaths.KnownHostsPath())
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("known_hosts: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	config := &ssh.ClientConfig{
+		User:            "orca",
+		Auth:            []ssh.AuthMethod{ssh.PublicKeys(signer)},
+		HostKeyCallback: hostKeyCallback,
+		Timeout:         3 * time.Second,
+	}
+
+	// Extract host from the node address (orca stores host:8443;
+	// SSH needs host:22). We dial the SSH port, not the orca daemon port.
+	sshHost := host
+	if strings.Contains(host, ":") {
+		sshHost = strings.SplitN(host, ":", 2)[0]
+	}
+	sshAddr := sshHost + ":22"
+
+	dialer := &netDialer{}
+	conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", sshAddr, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("ssh dial: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	session, err := conn.NewSession()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("new session: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer session.Close()
+
+	out, err := session.CombinedOutput("pveversion")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("pveversion: %w (output: %s)", err, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// netDialer wraps ssh.Dial with context support. The ssh package's
+// Dial doesn't accept a context directly, so we use a dialer that
+// respects ctx cancellation via a goroutine + channel.
+type netDialer struct{}
+
+func (d *netDialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string, config *ssh.ClientConfig) (*ssh.Client, error) {
+	type result struct {
+		client *ssh.Client
+		err    error
+	}
+	ch := make(chan result, 1)
+	go func() {
+		client, err := ssh.Dial(network, addr, config)
+		ch <- result{client, err}
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		// Best-effort: if the dial succeeds after ctx cancellation,
+		// the goroutine will close the client. We return the ctx error.
+		go func() {
+			if r := <-ch; r.client != nil {
+				_ = r.client.Close()
+			}
+		}()
+		return nil, ctx.Err()
+	case r := <-ch:
+		return r.client, r.err
+	}
+}
+
 // loadCert reads a PEM cert from path and parses the first CERTIFICATE
 // block.
 func loadCert(path string) (*x509.Certificate, error) {

internal/doctor/doctor_test.go

@@ -2,60 +2,75 @@ package doctor
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/osdetect"
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/security"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
 )
 
-// TestRunAllChecksWithNoCA runs the full battery in a clean temp dir
-// and expects all checks to FAIL (no CA, no server cert) except the
-// two stubs which return WARN.
+// TestRunAllChecksWithNoCA runs the full battery in a clean temp dir.
+// With the P02 real checks (no stubs): cert checks FAIL (no CA),
+// db check PASS (store.Open runs migrations), network check WARN
+// (no peers).
 func TestRunAllChecksWithNoCA(t *testing.T) {
-	// Isolated home so we don't touch the real ~/.orca.
-	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", t.TempDir())
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
 
 	rep := Run(context.Background())
 	if len(rep.Checks) == 0 {
 		t.Fatal("expected checks, got 0")
 	}
-	hasFail := false
-	hasWarn := false
+
+	byName := make(map[string]CheckResult, len(rep.Checks))
 	for _, c := range rep.Checks {
-		if c.Result == ResultFail {
-			hasFail = true
-		}
-		if c.Result == ResultWarn {
-			hasWarn = true
-		}
-	}
-	if !hasFail {
-		t.Error("expected at least one FAIL (no CA installed)")
-	}
-	if !hasWarn {
-		t.Error("expected at least one WARN (stubs in P01)")
+		byName[c.Name] = c
 	}
 
-	// Render the report — basic shape check.
-	out := rep.Print()
-	if !strings.Contains(out, "PASS") {
-		t.Errorf("expected PASS in output, got: %s", out)
+	// Cert checks: no CA → FAIL.
+	for _, name := range []string{"cert.ca", "cert.server", "cert.expiry", "cert.fingerprint"} {
+		c, ok := byName[name]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Errorf("missing check %s", name)
+			continue
+		}
+		if c.Result != ResultFail {
+			t.Errorf("%s: got %s, want FAIL — %s", name, c.Result, c.Message)
+		}
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(out, "WARN") {
-		t.Errorf("expected WARN in output, got: %s", out)
+
+	// DB check: store.Open runs migrations → PASS.
+	if c, ok := byName["db"]; ok {
+		if c.Result != ResultPass {
+			t.Errorf("db: got %s, want PASS — %s", c.Result, c.Message)
+		}
+	} else {
+		t.Error("missing check db")
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(out, "FAIL") {
-		t.Errorf("expected FAIL in output, got: %s", out)
+
+	// Network check: no CA → FAIL (can't build mTLS client without CA).
+	if c, ok := byName["network"]; ok {
+		if c.Result != ResultFail {
+			t.Errorf("network: got %s, want FAIL (no CA cert) — %s", c.Result, c.Message)
+		}
+	} else {
+		t.Error("missing check network")
 	}
 }
 
 // TestRunWithCAAndServerCert covers the happy path: CA + server cert
-// installed → all cert checks PASS.
+// installed → all cert checks PASS, db PASS, network WARN (no peers).
 func TestRunWithCAAndServerCert(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
 
-	// Bootstrap CA.
 	if _, err := security.CAInit(dir, "test-ca"); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("CAInit: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -63,7 +78,6 @@ func TestRunWithCAAndServerCert(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("LoadCA: %v", err)
 	}
-	// Generate + sign server cert.
 	keyPEM, csrPEM, err := security.GenerateCSR("test-server", []string{"localhost", "127.0.0.1"})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateCSR: %v", err)
@@ -80,13 +94,305 @@ func TestRunWithCAAndServerCert(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	rep := Run(context.Background())
-	// The cert-related checks should be PASS; the network/db stubs WARN.
+	byName := make(map[string]CheckResult, len(rep.Checks))
 	for _, c := range rep.Checks {
-		switch c.Name {
-		case "cert.ca", "cert.server", "cert.expiry", "cert.fingerprint":
-			if c.Result != ResultPass {
-				t.Errorf("%s: got %s, want PASS — %s", c.Name, c.Result, c.Message)
-			}
+		byName[c.Name] = c
+	}
+
+	for _, name := range []string{"cert.ca", "cert.server", "cert.expiry", "cert.fingerprint", "db"} {
+		c, ok := byName[name]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Errorf("missing check %s", name)
+			continue
+		}
+		if c.Result != ResultPass {
+			t.Errorf("%s: got %s, want PASS — %s", name, c.Result, c.Message)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if c, ok := byName["network"]; ok {
+		if c.Result != ResultWarn {
+			t.Errorf("network: got %s, want WARN (no peers) — %s", c.Result, c.Message)
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// TestDBCheck_IntegrityOK verifies the DB check passes on a fresh
+// database with migrations applied.
+func TestDBCheck_IntegrityOK(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	db, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	c := DB()
+	r, msg := c.Run(context.Background())
+	if r != ResultPass {
+		t.Errorf("DB check: got %s, want PASS — %s", r, msg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "migrations up to") {
+		t.Errorf("DB check message should contain migration version, got: %s", msg)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNetworkCheck_NoPeers verifies the network check returns WARN
+// when no peers are registered.
+func TestNetworkCheck_NoPeers(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	// Create a CA + server cert so the network check can build a client.
+	if _, err := security.CAInit(dir, "test-ca"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CAInit: %v", err)
+	}
+	ca, _ := security.LoadCA(dir)
+	keyPEM, csrPEM, _ := security.GenerateCSR("test-server", []string{"localhost"})
+	certPEM, _ := ca.SignCSR(csrPEM)
+	_ = security.WriteCert(dir+"/server.crt", certPEM)
+	_ = security.WriteKey(dir+"/server.key", keyPEM)
+
+	c := Network()
+	r, msg := c.Run(context.Background())
+	if r != ResultWarn {
+		t.Errorf("Network check: got %s, want WARN — %s", r, msg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "no peers") {
+		t.Errorf("Network check message should mention no peers, got: %s", msg)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNetworkCheck_PeerUnreachable verifies the network check returns
+// FAIL when a registered peer is not reachable.
+func TestNetworkCheck_PeerUnreachable(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	// Create a CA + server cert.
+	if _, err := security.CAInit(dir, "test-ca"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CAInit: %v", err)
+	}
+	ca, _ := security.LoadCA(dir)
+	keyPEM, csrPEM, _ := security.GenerateCSR("test-server", []string{"localhost"})
+	certPEM, _ := ca.SignCSR(csrPEM)
+	_ = security.WriteCert(dir+"/server.crt", certPEM)
+	_ = security.WriteKey(dir+"/server.key", keyPEM)
+
+	// Insert a peer node with an unreachable address.
+	db, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	repo := store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+	_ = repo.Insert(context.Background(), &model.Node{
+		ID: "dead-peer", Name: "dead", Address: "127.0.0.1:1",
+		State: model.NodeStateReady, JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+	})
+
+	c := Network()
+	r, msg := c.Run(context.Background())
+	if r != ResultFail {
+		t.Errorf("Network check: got %s, want FAIL — %s", r, msg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "dead") {
+		t.Errorf("Network check message should mention the dead peer, got: %s", msg)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNetworkCheck_NoCert verifies the network check returns FAIL
+// when no CA cert is installed.
+func TestNetworkCheck_NoCert(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	c := Network()
+	r, msg := c.Run(context.Background())
+	if r != ResultFail {
+		t.Errorf("Network check: got %s, want FAIL — %s", r, msg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "CA cert missing") {
+		t.Errorf("Network check message should mention missing CA, got: %s", msg)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRenderReport verifies the report output format.
+func TestRenderReport(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	rep := Run(context.Background())
+	out := rep.Print()
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "PASS") {
+		t.Errorf("expected PASS in output, got: %s", out)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "WARN") {
+		t.Errorf("expected WARN in output, got: %s", out)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "FAIL") {
+		t.Errorf("expected FAIL in output, got: %s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestOSCheck_MissingLocalhostNode verifies the OS check returns FAIL
+// when no localhost node is registered.
+func TestOSCheck_MissingLocalhostNode(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	// Open the DB to apply migrations but insert no nodes.
+	db, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	db.Close()
+
+	c := OS()
+	r, msg := c.Run(context.Background())
+	if r != ResultFail {
+		t.Errorf("OS check: got %s, want FAIL — %s", r, msg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "no localhost node") {
+		t.Errorf("OS check message should mention missing localhost node, got: %s", msg)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestOSCheck_Match verifies the OS check returns PASS when the stored
+// localhost node's os matches the detected OS.
+func TestOSCheck_Match(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	db, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	repo := store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+
+	// Insert a localhost node with the currently-detected OS.
+	detected := osdetect.Detect()
+	if err := repo.Insert(context.Background(), &model.Node{
+		ID: "os-match-1", Name: "localhost", Address: "localhost:8443",
+		State: model.NodeStateReady, JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+		Kind: "localhost", OS: detected,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	c := OS()
+	r, msg := c.Run(context.Background())
+	if r != ResultPass {
+		t.Errorf("OS check: got %s, want PASS — %s", r, msg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, detected) {
+		t.Errorf("OS check message should contain %s, got: %s", detected, msg)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestOSCheck_Drift verifies the OS check returns WARN when the stored
+// os differs from the detected os.
+func TestOSCheck_Drift(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	db, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	repo := store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+
+	// Insert a localhost node with a deliberately wrong OS.
+	if err := repo.Insert(context.Background(), &model.Node{
+		ID: "os-drift-1", Name: "localhost", Address: "localhost:8443",
+		State: model.NodeStateReady, JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+		Kind: "localhost", OS: "debian",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	c := OS()
+	r, msg := c.Run(context.Background())
+	if r != ResultWarn {
+		t.Errorf("OS check: got %s, want WARN — %s", r, msg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "drift") {
+		t.Errorf("OS check message should mention drift, got: %s", msg)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestProxmoxCheck_NoProxmoxNodes verifies the proxmox check returns
+// WARN when no proxmox nodes are registered.
+func TestProxmoxCheck_NoProxmoxNodes(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	db, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	c := Proxmox()
+	r, msg := c.Run(context.Background())
+	if r != ResultWarn {
+		t.Errorf("Proxmox check: got %s, want WARN — %s", r, msg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "no proxmox nodes") {
+		t.Errorf("Proxmox check message should mention no proxmox nodes, got: %s", msg)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestProxmoxCheck_UnreachableNode verifies the proxmox check returns
+// FAIL when a proxmox node is registered but unreachable (no SSH key
+// or host down). We insert a proxmox node with an unreachable address;
+// the SSH dial will fail (no SSH key file → error).
+func TestProxmoxCheck_UnreachableNode(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_DB", filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+
+	db, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dir, "orca.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	repo := store.NewNodeRepo(db)
+
+	// Insert a proxmox node. The SSH probe will fail because no SSH
+	// key exists in the test namespace dir.
+	if err := repo.Insert(context.Background(), &model.Node{
+		ID: "px-1", Name: "10.0.0.99", Address: "10.0.0.99:8443",
+		State: model.NodeStateReady, JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+		Kind: "proxmox", OS: "pve",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	c := Proxmox()
+	r, msg := c.Run(context.Background())
+	if r != ResultFail {
+		t.Errorf("Proxmox check: got %s, want FAIL — %s", r, msg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "10.0.0.99") {
+		t.Errorf("Proxmox check message should mention the node, got: %s", msg)
+	}
+}
+
+func init() {
+	// Suppress slog noise during tests.
+	_ = os.Setenv("ORCA_LOG_LEVEL", "error")
+}

internal/engine/dispatcher.go

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+// Package engine — dispatcher.go implements the cross-node job
+// dispatch logic (v0.2 P02). The dispatcher is the bridge between
+// the local "should I run this?" decision (scheduler.PickNode) and
+// the remote "please run this" call (transport.DispatchClient).
+//
+// Flow:
+//
+//  1. Receive a job spec (HCL bytes from the CLI).
+//  2. Parse the spec into a JobSpec (cpu/mem/disk).
+//  3. Check local capacity. If it fits, run locally via the local
+//     executor. If not, pick a peer and dispatch.
+//  4. Return the job ID and the node that actually accepted it.
+package engine
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"sync"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/transport"
+)
+
+// Dispatcher is the public surface; constructed via NewDispatcher.
+type Dispatcher struct {
+	log      *slog.Logger
+	capacity *store.CapacityRepo
+	peers    *PeerRegistry
+	executor LocalExecutor
+	dedupe   *transport.IdempotencyStore
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+}
+
+// LocalExecutor is the contract the dispatcher uses to run jobs on
+// the local node. The engine.Executor satisfies this.
+type LocalExecutor interface {
+	Submit(ctx context.Context, specBytes []byte) (jobID string, err error)
+	Status(ctx context.Context, jobID string) (state string, err error)
+}
+
+// NewDispatcher builds a Dispatcher.
+func NewDispatcher(log *slog.Logger, capacity *store.CapacityRepo, peers *PeerRegistry, exec LocalExecutor) *Dispatcher {
+	if log == nil {
+		log = slog.Default()
+	}
+	return &Dispatcher{
+		log:      log,
+		capacity: capacity,
+		peers:    peers,
+		executor: exec,
+		dedupe:   transport.NewIdempotencyStore(),
+	}
+}
+
+// Dedupe exposes the in-memory dedupe store for testing.
+func (d *Dispatcher) Dedupe() *transport.IdempotencyStore { return d.dedupe }
+
+// Submit runs the spec locally if it fits, otherwise dispatches to a
+// peer. Returns the (jobID, chosenNodeID) pair. If `target` is
+// non-empty, it overrides bin-packing.
+func (d *Dispatcher) Submit(ctx context.Context, target string, specBytes []byte, idempotencyKey string) (jobID, nodeID string, err error) {
+	if len(specBytes) == 0 {
+		return "", "", errors.New("Dispatcher.Submit: empty spec")
+	}
+	if idempotencyKey != "" {
+		if jid, ok := d.dedupe.Get(idempotencyKey); ok {
+			return jid, "self", nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	parsed, err := parseInlineSpec(specBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("Dispatcher.Submit: parse spec: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// 1. Explicit target: dispatch there.
+	if target != "" {
+		return d.dispatchTo(ctx, target, specBytes, idempotencyKey)
+	}
+
+	// 2. Check local capacity.
+	if d.capacity != nil {
+		local, err := d.capacity.Get(ctx, "self")
+		if err == nil && parsed.Fits(local) {
+			jid, lerr := d.executor.Submit(ctx, specBytes)
+			if lerr != nil {
+				return "", "", fmt.Errorf("Dispatcher.Submit: local: %w", lerr)
+			}
+			if idempotencyKey != "" {
+				d.dedupe.Put(idempotencyKey, jid)
+			}
+			d.log.Info("dispatch.local",
+				slog.String("event", "dispatch.local"),
+				slog.String("job_id", jid),
+				slog.String("node_id", "self"),
+			)
+			return jid, "self", nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 3. Pick a peer.
+	if d.peers == nil {
+		return "", "", errors.New("Dispatcher.Submit: no local capacity and no peer registry")
+	}
+	peers, err := d.peers.All(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("Dispatcher.Submit: list peers: %w", err)
+	}
+	if len(peers) == 0 {
+		return "", "", errors.New("Dispatcher.Submit: no peers registered")
+	}
+	var caps []*store.NodeCapacity
+	for _, p := range peers {
+		caps = append(caps, p.Capacity)
+	}
+	best, _, err := PickNode(parsed, caps)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("Dispatcher.Submit: %w", err)
+	}
+	var chosen *Peer
+	for _, p := range peers {
+		if p.NodeID == best.NodeID {
+			chosen = p
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if chosen == nil {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("Dispatcher.Submit: chosen node %s has no peer record", best.NodeID)
+	}
+	return d.dispatchToPeer(ctx, chosen, specBytes, idempotencyKey)
+}
+
+// dispatchTo sends a Submit to a specific node id (looked up in the peer registry).
+func (d *Dispatcher) dispatchTo(ctx context.Context, targetNode string, specBytes []byte, idempotencyKey string) (string, string, error) {
+	if d.peers == nil {
+		return "", "", errors.New("dispatchTo: no peer registry")
+	}
+	peers, err := d.peers.All(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("dispatchTo: list peers: %w", err)
+	}
+	for _, p := range peers {
+		if p.NodeID == targetNode {
+			return d.dispatchToPeer(ctx, p, specBytes, idempotencyKey)
+		}
+	}
+	return "", "", fmt.Errorf("dispatchTo: target node %q not found in peer registry", targetNode)
+}
+
+// dispatchToPeer opens an mTLS client and calls Submit on the peer.
+func (d *Dispatcher) dispatchToPeer(ctx context.Context, p *Peer, specBytes []byte, idempotencyKey string) (string, string, error) {
+	if p.CAPath == "" || p.ServerName == "" {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("dispatchToPeer: peer %s missing CA or server name", p.NodeID)
+	}
+	client, err := transport.NewDispatchClient(p.CAPath, p.ServerName, "https://"+p.Address)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("dispatchToPeer: %w", err)
+	}
+	resp, err := client.Submit(ctx, specBytes, idempotencyKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("dispatchToPeer: %w", err)
+	}
+	if idempotencyKey != "" {
+		d.dedupe.Put(idempotencyKey, resp.JobID)
+	}
+	d.log.Info("dispatch.peer",
+		slog.String("event", "dispatch.peer"),
+		slog.String("job_id", resp.JobID),
+		slog.String("node_id", p.NodeID),
+	)
+	return resp.JobID, p.NodeID, nil
+}
+
+// LocalSubmit / LocalStatus satisfy the transport.Dispatcher
+// interface (the server-side counterpart of DispatchClient).
+func (d *Dispatcher) LocalSubmit(ctx context.Context, specBytes []byte) (string, error) {
+	if d.executor == nil {
+		return "", errors.New("Dispatcher.LocalSubmit: no local executor")
+	}
+	return d.executor.Submit(ctx, specBytes)
+}
+
+func (d *Dispatcher) LocalStatus(ctx context.Context, jobID string) (string, error) {
+	if d.executor == nil {
+		return "", errors.New("Dispatcher.LocalStatus: no local executor")
+	}
+	return d.executor.Status(ctx, jobID)
+}
+
+// parseInlineSpec parses a minimal JSON spec with cpu_millicores,
+// memory_mib, disk_mib fields. The CLI uses this as the wire format
+// for cross-node dispatch; full HCL parsing is in internal/jobspec.
+func parseInlineSpec(b []byte) (JobSpec, error) {
+	type wire struct {
+		CPUMillicores int64 `json:"cpu_millicores"`
+		MemoryMiB     int64 `json:"memory_mib"`
+		DiskMiB       int64 `json:"disk_mib"`
+	}
+	var w wire
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &w); err != nil {
+		return JobSpec{}, fmt.Errorf("parseInlineSpec: %w", err)
+	}
+	return JobSpec{
+		CPUMillicores: w.CPUMillicores,
+		MemoryMiB:     w.MemoryMiB,
+		DiskMiB:       w.DiskMiB,
+	}, nil
+}

internal/engine/dispatcher_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+package engine
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+type mockExecutor struct {
+	submitFn  func(ctx context.Context, spec []byte) (string, error)
+	statusFn  func(ctx context.Context, jobID string) (string, error)
+	submitted bool
+}
+
+func (m *mockExecutor) Submit(ctx context.Context, spec []byte) (string, error) {
+	m.submitted = true
+	if m.submitFn != nil {
+		return m.submitFn(ctx, spec)
+	}
+	return "mock-job-id", nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockExecutor) Status(ctx context.Context, jobID string) (string, error) {
+	if m.statusFn != nil {
+		return m.statusFn(ctx, jobID)
+	}
+	return "complete", nil
+}
+
+func newTestDispatcher(t *testing.T, exec LocalExecutor) (*Dispatcher, *store.CapacityRepo, func()) {
+	t.Helper()
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db")
+	db, err := store.Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	capRepo := store.NewCapacityRepo(db)
+	peers := NewPeerRegistry()
+	d := NewDispatcher(nil, capRepo, peers, exec)
+	return d, capRepo, func() { _ = db.Close() }
+}
+
+func TestDispatcher_Submit_EmptySpec(t *testing.T) {
+	d, _, cleanup := newTestDispatcher(t, &mockExecutor{})
+	defer cleanup()
+	_, _, err := d.Submit(context.Background(), "", nil, "")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Submit: expected error for empty spec, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDispatcher_Submit_IdempotencyHit(t *testing.T) {
+	exec := &mockExecutor{}
+	d, _, cleanup := newTestDispatcher(t, exec)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	d.Dedupe().Put("key-1", "cached-job-id")
+	spec := []byte(`{"cpu_millicores":100,"memory_mib":64,"disk_mib":64}`)
+	jobID, nodeID, err := d.Submit(context.Background(), "", spec, "key-1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Submit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if jobID != "cached-job-id" {
+		t.Errorf("jobID: got %q, want cached-job-id", jobID)
+	}
+	if nodeID != "self" {
+		t.Errorf("nodeID: got %q, want self", nodeID)
+	}
+	if exec.submitted {
+		t.Error("executor was called on idempotency hit; should have been short-circuited")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDispatcher_Submit_LocalCapacity(t *testing.T) {
+	exec := &mockExecutor{
+		submitFn: func(ctx context.Context, spec []byte) (string, error) {
+			return "local-job-id", nil
+		},
+	}
+	d, capRepo, cleanup := newTestDispatcher(t, exec)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if err := capRepo.Upsert(ctx, &store.NodeCapacity{
+		NodeID:        "self",
+		CPUMillicores: 4000,
+		MemoryMiB:     4096,
+		DiskMiB:       4096,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Upsert capacity: %v", err)
+	}
+	spec := []byte(`{"cpu_millicores":100,"memory_mib":64,"disk_mib":64}`)
+	jobID, nodeID, err := d.Submit(ctx, "", spec, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Submit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if jobID != "local-job-id" {
+		t.Errorf("jobID: got %q, want local-job-id", jobID)
+	}
+	if nodeID != "self" {
+		t.Errorf("nodeID: got %q, want self", nodeID)
+	}
+	if !exec.submitted {
+		t.Error("executor was not called for local-capacity path")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDispatcher_Submit_ExplicitTarget(t *testing.T) {
+	exec := &mockExecutor{}
+	d, _, cleanup := newTestDispatcher(t, exec)
+	defer cleanup()
+	spec := []byte(`{"cpu_millicores":100,"memory_mib":64,"disk_mib":64}`)
+	_, _, err := d.Submit(context.Background(), "nodeA", spec, "")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Submit with explicit target nodeA (no peer): expected error, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDispatcher_Submit_NoPeers(t *testing.T) {
+	exec := &mockExecutor{}
+	d, capRepo, cleanup := newTestDispatcher(t, exec)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if err := capRepo.Upsert(ctx, &store.NodeCapacity{
+		NodeID:        "self",
+		CPUMillicores: 0,
+		MemoryMiB:     0,
+		DiskMiB:       0,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Upsert: %v", err)
+	}
+	spec := []byte(`{"cpu_millicores":1000,"memory_mib":1024,"disk_mib":1024}`)
+	_, _, err := d.Submit(ctx, "", spec, "")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Submit: expected error when no peers and no local capacity, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDispatcher_LocalSubmit(t *testing.T) {
+	exec := &mockExecutor{
+		submitFn: func(ctx context.Context, spec []byte) (string, error) {
+			return "ls-job", nil
+		},
+	}
+	d, _, cleanup := newTestDispatcher(t, exec)
+	defer cleanup()
+	jobID, err := d.LocalSubmit(context.Background(), []byte(`{"command":"/bin/true"}`))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LocalSubmit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if jobID != "ls-job" {
+		t.Errorf("LocalSubmit: got %q, want ls-job", jobID)
+	}
+	if !exec.submitted {
+		t.Error("LocalSubmit: executor.Submit not called")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDispatcher_LocalStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	exec := &mockExecutor{
+		statusFn: func(ctx context.Context, jobID string) (string, error) {
+			if jobID == "known" {
+				return "running", nil
+			}
+			return "", errors.New("not found")
+		},
+	}
+	d, _, cleanup := newTestDispatcher(t, exec)
+	defer cleanup()
+	st, err := d.LocalStatus(context.Background(), "known")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LocalStatus: %v", err)
+	}
+	if st != "running" {
+		t.Errorf("LocalStatus: got %q, want running", st)
+	}
+	if _, err := d.LocalStatus(context.Background(), "missing"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("LocalStatus: expected error for missing job, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDispatcher_LocalSubmit_NilExecutor(t *testing.T) {
+	d := NewDispatcher(nil, nil, NewPeerRegistry(), nil)
+	if _, err := d.LocalSubmit(context.Background(), []byte(`{}`)); err == nil {
+		t.Error("LocalSubmit with nil executor: expected error, got nil")
+	}
+	if _, err := d.LocalStatus(context.Background(), "x"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("LocalStatus with nil executor: expected error, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseInlineSpec(t *testing.T) {
+	spec, err := parseInlineSpec([]byte(`{"cpu_millicores":500,"memory_mib":256,"disk_mib":128}`))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parseInlineSpec: %v", err)
+	}
+	if spec.CPUMillicores != 500 || spec.MemoryMiB != 256 || spec.DiskMiB != 128 {
+		t.Errorf("parseInlineSpec: got %+v, want cpu=500 mem=256 disk=128", spec)
+	}
+	if _, err := parseInlineSpec([]byte(`{bad json`)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("parseInlineSpec: expected error for malformed JSON, got nil")
+	}
+}

internal/engine/executor.go

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package engine
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"os/exec"
@@ -29,6 +31,65 @@ func NewExecutor(jobs *store.JobRepo, tasks *store.TaskRepo, log *slog.Logger) *
 	return &Executor{jobs: jobs, tasks: tasks, log: log}
 }
 
+// Submit is the dispatch-friendly entry point (v0.2 P02). It parses
+// the spec bytes as a minimal TaskSpec and runs a single task under
+// a fresh job. Returns the job ID. This is intentionally simpler
+// than the v0.1 Run() entry point — the cross-node dispatch wire
+// format is a flat task (one process), not a multi-task job.
+//
+// The spec format is a JSON object with at least:
+//
+//	{ "name": "...", "command": "...", "args": [...], "env": [...] }
+//
+// All fields except command are optional.
+func (e *Executor) Submit(ctx context.Context, specBytes []byte) (string, error) {
+	type wireSpec struct {
+		Name    string   `json:"name"`
+		Command string   `json:"command"`
+		Args    []string `json:"args"`
+		Env     []string `json:"env"`
+	}
+	var ws wireSpec
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(specBytes, &ws); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("Executor.Submit: parse: %w", err)
+	}
+	if ws.Command == "" {
+		return "", errors.New("Executor.Submit: spec.command is required")
+	}
+	if ws.Name == "" {
+		ws.Name = "dispatched"
+	}
+	job := &model.Job{
+		ID:     uuid.NewString(),
+		Spec:   string(specBytes),
+		Status: model.JobStatusPending,
+	}
+	ts := TaskSpec{
+		Name:    ws.Name,
+		Command: ws.Command,
+		Args:    ws.Args,
+		Env:     ws.Env,
+	}
+	if err := e.Run(ctx, job, []TaskSpec{ts}); err != nil {
+		return job.ID, err
+	}
+	return job.ID, nil
+}
+
+// Status returns the current state of a job for the Status dispatch
+// endpoint. The returned string is one of: "pending", "running",
+// "complete", "failed", "stopped". Maps to model.JobStatus* values.
+func (e *Executor) Status(ctx context.Context, jobID string) (string, error) {
+	if e.jobs == nil {
+		return "", errors.New("Executor.Status: nil job repo")
+	}
+	j, err := e.jobs.Get(ctx, jobID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return string(j.Status), nil
+}
+
 type TaskSpec struct {
 	Name    string
 	Command string

internal/engine/executor_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+package engine
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+func newTestExecutor(t *testing.T) (*Executor, func()) {
+	t.Helper()
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db")
+	db, err := store.Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	ex := NewExecutor(store.NewJobRepo(db), store.NewTaskRepo(db), nil)
+	return ex, func() { _ = db.Close() }
+}
+
+func TestExecutor_Submit_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	ex, cleanup := newTestExecutor(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	spec := []byte(`{"command":"/bin/echo","args":["hello"]}`)
+	jobID, err := ex.Submit(ctx, spec)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Submit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if jobID == "" {
+		t.Fatal("Submit: empty jobID")
+	}
+	status, err := ex.Status(ctx, jobID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Status: %v", err)
+	}
+	if status != string(model.JobStatusComplete) {
+		t.Errorf("Status: got %q, want %q", status, model.JobStatusComplete)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExecutor_Submit_MissingCommand(t *testing.T) {
+	ex, cleanup := newTestExecutor(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	_, err := ex.Submit(context.Background(), []byte(`{"name":"x"}`))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Submit: expected error for missing command, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExecutor_Submit_MalformedJSON(t *testing.T) {
+	ex, cleanup := newTestExecutor(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	_, err := ex.Submit(context.Background(), []byte(`{bad json`))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Submit: expected error for malformed JSON, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExecutor_Submit_FailingCommand(t *testing.T) {
+	ex, cleanup := newTestExecutor(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	jobID, err := ex.Submit(ctx, []byte(`{"command":"/bin/false"}`))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Submit failing command: expected error, got nil")
+	}
+	if jobID == "" {
+		t.Fatal("Submit failing command: empty jobID")
+	}
+	status, err := ex.Status(ctx, jobID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Status: %v", err)
+	}
+	if status != string(model.JobStatusFailed) {
+		t.Errorf("Status: got %q, want %q", status, model.JobStatusFailed)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExecutor_Status_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	ex, cleanup := newTestExecutor(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	_, err := ex.Status(context.Background(), "nonexistent-job-id")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Status: expected error for missing job, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExecutor_Run_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	ex, cleanup := newTestExecutor(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	job := &model.Job{
+		ID:     uuid.NewString(),
+		Name:   "run-success",
+		Spec:   "{}",
+		Status: model.JobStatusPending,
+	}
+	specs := []TaskSpec{{Name: "echo", Command: "/bin/echo", Args: []string{"hi"}}}
+	if err := ex.Run(ctx, job, specs); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
+	}
+	got, err := ex.Status(ctx, job.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Status: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != string(model.JobStatusComplete) {
+		t.Errorf("Status: got %q, want %q", got, model.JobStatusComplete)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExecutor_Run_ContextCancel(t *testing.T) {
+	ex, cleanup := newTestExecutor(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	job := &model.Job{
+		ID:     uuid.NewString(),
+		Name:   "run-cancel",
+		Spec:   "{}",
+		Status: model.JobStatusPending,
+	}
+	specs := []TaskSpec{{Name: "sleep", Command: "/bin/sleep", Args: []string{"10"}}}
+
+	go func() {
+		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+		cancel()
+	}()
+
+	err := ex.Run(ctx, job, specs)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Run: expected error after context cancel, got nil")
+	}
+	status, sErr := ex.Status(context.Background(), job.ID)
+	if sErr != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Status after cancel: %v", sErr)
+	}
+	if status == string(model.JobStatusComplete) {
+		t.Errorf("Status: got %q, want not complete (task should have been killed)", status)
+	}
+}

internal/engine/peer.go

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+// Package engine — peer.go implements the peer registry for multi-node
+// scheduling (v0.2 P02). A peer is a remote orca node reachable over
+// mTLS. The registry is in-memory plus optionally SQLite-persisted;
+// for P02 the in-memory map is the source of truth and persistence
+// is best-effort.
+package engine
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+// Peer is a remote orca node reachable over mTLS.
+type Peer struct {
+	NodeID     string
+	Address    string // host:port (the peer's daemon listener)
+	ServerName string // expected SAN on the peer's cert
+	CAPath     string // path to the CA cert this peer validates against
+	LastSeen   time.Time
+	Capacity   *store.NodeCapacity
+}
+
+// PeerRegistry tracks known peers. Methods are safe for concurrent
+// use; the underlying map is guarded by a sync.RWMutex.
+type PeerRegistry struct {
+	mu    sync.RWMutex
+	peers map[string]*Peer
+	// optional persistence (not required for P02; can be added later)
+	persist PeerPersister
+}
+
+// PeerPersister is an optional callback for persisting peer records.
+// P02 doesn't use it; it's here for the P03 audit log integration.
+type PeerPersister interface {
+	SavePeer(ctx context.Context, p *Peer) error
+}
+
+// NewPeerRegistry returns an empty registry.
+func NewPeerRegistry() *PeerRegistry {
+	return &PeerRegistry{peers: make(map[string]*Peer)}
+}
+
+// Add inserts or updates a peer record.
+func (r *PeerRegistry) Add(p *Peer) error {
+	if p == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("PeerRegistry.Add: nil peer")
+	}
+	if p.NodeID == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("PeerRegistry.Add: NodeID is required")
+	}
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	r.peers[p.NodeID] = p
+	r.mu.Unlock()
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Remove deletes a peer by ID. Returns true if a peer was removed.
+func (r *PeerRegistry) Remove(nodeID string) bool {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	_, ok := r.peers[nodeID]
+	if ok {
+		delete(r.peers, nodeID)
+	}
+	return ok
+}
+
+// Get returns the peer with the given ID, or nil.
+func (r *PeerRegistry) Get(nodeID string) *Peer {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	defer r.mu.RUnlock()
+	return r.peers[nodeID]
+}
+
+// All returns a snapshot of all peers, sorted by NodeID for determinism.
+func (r *PeerRegistry) All(_ context.Context) ([]*Peer, error) {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	out := make([]*Peer, 0, len(r.peers))
+	for _, p := range r.peers {
+		out = append(out, p)
+	}
+	r.mu.RUnlock()
+	sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool { return out[i].NodeID < out[j].NodeID })
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Len returns the number of registered peers.
+func (r *PeerRegistry) Len() int {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	defer r.mu.RUnlock()
+	return len(r.peers)
+}
+
+// UpdateLastSeen bumps the LastSeen timestamp on a peer.
+func (r *PeerRegistry) UpdateLastSeen(nodeID string) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	if p, ok := r.peers[nodeID]; ok {
+		p.LastSeen = time.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	r.mu.Unlock()
+}

internal/engine/peer_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+package engine
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestPeerRegistry_AddAndGet(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewPeerRegistry()
+	p := &Peer{
+		NodeID:     "node-1",
+		Address:    "localhost:8443",
+		ServerName: "node-1.orca",
+		CAPath:     "/etc/orca/ca.pem",
+	}
+	if err := r.Add(p); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Add: %v", err)
+	}
+	got := r.Get("node-1")
+	if got == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Get: returned nil after Add")
+	}
+	if got.NodeID != "node-1" || got.Address != "localhost:8443" ||
+		got.ServerName != "node-1.orca" || got.CAPath != "/etc/orca/ca.pem" {
+		t.Errorf("Get: fields mismatch: %+v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPeerRegistry_AddNil(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewPeerRegistry()
+	if err := r.Add(nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Add(nil): expected error, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPeerRegistry_AddMissingID(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewPeerRegistry()
+	if err := r.Add(&Peer{Address: "a"}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Add(empty NodeID): expected error, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPeerRegistry_Remove(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewPeerRegistry()
+	p := &Peer{NodeID: "node-r", Address: "a"}
+	if err := r.Add(p); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Add: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !r.Remove("node-r") {
+		t.Fatal("Remove: returned false for existing peer")
+	}
+	if got := r.Get("node-r"); got != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Get after Remove: want nil, got %+v", got)
+	}
+	if r.Remove("node-r") {
+		t.Error("Remove second time: want false, got true")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPeerRegistry_All(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewPeerRegistry()
+	for _, id := range []string{"node-c", "node-a", "node-b"} {
+		if err := r.Add(&Peer{NodeID: id, Address: "a"}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Add %s: %v", id, err)
+		}
+	}
+	got, err := r.All(context.Background())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("All: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(got) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("All: got %d, want 3", len(got))
+	}
+	want := []string{"node-a", "node-b", "node-c"}
+	for i, w := range want {
+		if got[i].NodeID != w {
+			t.Errorf("All[%d]: got %s, want %s (not sorted by NodeID)", i, got[i].NodeID, w)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPeerRegistry_All_Empty(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewPeerRegistry()
+	got, err := r.All(context.Background())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("All on empty: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("All on empty: got %d, want 0", len(got))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPeerRegistry_Len(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewPeerRegistry()
+	if r.Len() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("Len on empty: got %d, want 0", r.Len())
+	}
+	if err := r.Add(&Peer{NodeID: "n1", Address: "a"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Add n1: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := r.Add(&Peer{NodeID: "n2", Address: "a"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Add n2: %v", err)
+	}
+	if r.Len() != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("Len: got %d, want 2", r.Len())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPeerRegistry_UpdateLastSeen(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewPeerRegistry()
+	old := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour).UTC()
+	p := &Peer{
+		NodeID:   "node-u",
+		Address:  "a",
+		LastSeen: old,
+		Capacity: &store.NodeCapacity{NodeID: "node-u", CPUMillicores: 1000, MemoryMiB: 1024, DiskMiB: 1024},
+	}
+	if err := r.Add(p); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Add: %v", err)
+	}
+	r.UpdateLastSeen("node-u")
+	got := r.Get("node-u")
+	if got == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Get: nil after UpdateLastSeen")
+	}
+	if !got.LastSeen.After(old) {
+		t.Errorf("UpdateLastSeen: LastSeen not bumped; old=%v now=%v", old, got.LastSeen)
+	}
+	if time.Since(got.LastSeen) > 5*time.Second {
+		t.Errorf("UpdateLastSeen: LastSeen not recent: %v", got.LastSeen)
+	}
+	r.UpdateLastSeen("nonexistent")
+}

internal/engine/scheduler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+// Package engine — scheduler.go implements best-fit bin-packing for
+// the multi-node scheduler (v0.2 P02, REQ-028). The scheduler
+// receives a JobSpec, looks at the local NodeCapacity, and either
+// runs locally or falls through to a remote peer via the dispatcher.
+//
+// The bin-pack scoring is intentionally simple: pick the node with
+// the most free capacity (cpu_millicores + memory_mib weighted 1:1
+// after normalization). This is deterministic and easy to test.
+package engine
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+// JobSpec is a minimal projection of the spec needed for scheduling
+// decisions. The full spec parsing is in internal/jobspec; this is
+// just enough to ask "does this fit?" and "where should it go?".
+type JobSpec struct {
+	CPUMillicores int64
+	MemoryMiB     int64
+	DiskMiB       int64
+}
+
+// Fits reports whether the local node has enough free capacity to
+// run the spec. Capacity accounting is conservative: a job is allowed
+// to run only if cpu + memory + disk are all >= the spec.
+func (s JobSpec) Fits(c *store.NodeCapacity) bool {
+	if c == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return c.CPUMillicores >= s.CPUMillicores &&
+		c.MemoryMiB >= s.MemoryMiB &&
+		c.DiskMiB >= s.DiskMiB
+}
+
+// Score returns a sortable score for bin-packing; higher = more free
+// capacity. Weighted roughly toward CPU (which is usually the
+// constraint) but normalized so the test isn't fragile.
+func (s JobSpec) Score(c *store.NodeCapacity) int64 {
+	if c == nil {
+		return -1
+	}
+	// Use 1:1 weighting in normalized units (millicores vs MiB) to
+	// keep the score monotonic. This isn't physically meaningful
+	// (mixing units) but it gives a stable ordering for tests.
+	freeCPU := c.CPUMillicores - s.CPUMillicores
+	freeMem := c.MemoryMiB - s.MemoryMiB
+	if freeCPU < 0 || freeMem < 0 {
+		return -1
+	}
+	return freeCPU + freeMem
+}
+
+// PickNode selects the best-fit node from a slice of capacities.
+// Returns the chosen *store.NodeCapacity and its index, or an error
+// if none can fit. Ties are broken by NodeID (lexicographic) for
+// determinism.
+func PickNode(spec JobSpec, capacities []*store.NodeCapacity) (*store.NodeCapacity, int, error) {
+	if len(capacities) == 0 {
+		return nil, -1, fmt.Errorf("PickNode: no nodes available")
+	}
+	type scored struct {
+		c     *store.NodeCapacity
+		idx   int
+		score int64
+	}
+	var fits []scored
+	for i, c := range capacities {
+		if !spec.Fits(c) {
+			continue
+		}
+		fits = append(fits, scored{c: c, idx: i, score: spec.Score(c)})
+	}
+	if len(fits) == 0 {
+		return nil, -1, fmt.Errorf("PickNode: no node can fit the spec (cpu=%d mem=%d disk=%d)",
+			spec.CPUMillicores, spec.MemoryMiB, spec.DiskMiB)
+	}
+	sort.SliceStable(fits, func(i, j int) bool {
+		if fits[i].score != fits[j].score {
+			return fits[i].score > fits[j].score
+		}
+		return fits[i].c.NodeID < fits[j].c.NodeID
+	})
+	return fits[0].c, fits[0].idx, nil
+}
+
+// LocalNode is a minimal abstraction of the local node for the
+// scheduler. The concrete implementation reads from the
+// store.CapacityRepo.
+type LocalNode interface {
+	Capacity(ctx context.Context) (*store.NodeCapacity, error)
+}
+
+// memLocalNode returns capacity from a fixed *store.NodeCapacity.
+// Useful for tests; production code wraps CapacityRepo.
+type memLocalNode struct{ c *store.NodeCapacity }
+
+// MemLocalNode returns a LocalNode backed by a fixed capacity. Test-only.
+func MemLocalNode(c *store.NodeCapacity) LocalNode {
+	return &memLocalNode{c: c}
+}
+
+func (m *memLocalNode) Capacity(_ context.Context) (*store.NodeCapacity, error) {
+	if m.c == nil {
+		return nil, store.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return m.c, nil
+}
+
+// ensure model import compiles even if unused above (placeholder for
+// future scheduler fields that take *model.Node).
+var _ = model.NodeStateReady

internal/engine/scheduler_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+package engine
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/store"
+)
+
+func TestPickNodeBestFit(t *testing.T) {
+	caps := []*store.NodeCapacity{
+		{NodeID: "node-b", CPUMillicores: 1000, MemoryMiB: 1024, DiskMiB: 1024},
+		{NodeID: "node-a", CPUMillicores: 4000, MemoryMiB: 4096, DiskMiB: 4096},
+		{NodeID: "node-c", CPUMillicores: 500, MemoryMiB: 512, DiskMiB: 512},
+	}
+	spec := JobSpec{CPUMillicores: 1000, MemoryMiB: 1024, DiskMiB: 1024}
+	got, idx, err := PickNode(spec, caps)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("PickNode: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.NodeID != "node-a" {
+		t.Errorf("PickNode: got %s, want node-a (most free capacity)", got.NodeID)
+	}
+	if idx != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("PickNode: got idx %d, want 1", idx)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPickNodeNoFit(t *testing.T) {
+	caps := []*store.NodeCapacity{
+		{NodeID: "node-a", CPUMillicores: 100, MemoryMiB: 100, DiskMiB: 100},
+	}
+	spec := JobSpec{CPUMillicores: 1000, MemoryMiB: 1024, DiskMiB: 1024}
+	_, _, err := PickNode(spec, caps)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected PickNode to fail when no node can fit")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPickNodeTieDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
+	// Two nodes with identical free capacity. Tie broken by NodeID
+	// (lexicographic) for determinism.
+	caps := []*store.NodeCapacity{
+		{NodeID: "node-z", CPUMillicores: 4000, MemoryMiB: 4096, DiskMiB: 4096},
+		{NodeID: "node-a", CPUMillicores: 4000, MemoryMiB: 4096, DiskMiB: 4096},
+	}
+	spec := JobSpec{CPUMillicores: 1000, MemoryMiB: 1024, DiskMiB: 1024}
+	got, _, err := PickNode(spec, caps)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("PickNode: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.NodeID != "node-a" {
+		t.Errorf("PickNode tie-break: got %s, want node-a (lexicographic)", got.NodeID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestJobSpecFits(t *testing.T) {
+	spec := JobSpec{CPUMillicores: 1000, MemoryMiB: 1024, DiskMiB: 1024}
+	c := &store.NodeCapacity{CPUMillicores: 2000, MemoryMiB: 2048, DiskMiB: 2048}
+	if !spec.Fits(c) {
+		t.Error("Fits: should fit")
+	}
+	c.CPUMillicores = 500
+	if spec.Fits(c) {
+		t.Error("Fits: should not fit (CPU too low)")
+	}
+}

internal/model/node.go

@@ -10,6 +10,19 @@ const (
 	NodeStateLeft    NodeState = "left"
 )
 
+// NodeKind classifies a node by how it joined the cluster.
+type NodeKind string
+
+const (
+	// NodeKindLocalhost is the auto-registered local node from `orca init`.
+	NodeKindLocalhost NodeKind = "localhost"
+	// NodeKindLinux is a generic Linux node (ubuntu/debian/alpine) joined
+	// without a specific type. Reserved for future SSH-join flows.
+	NodeKindLinux NodeKind = "linux"
+	// NodeKindProxmox is a Proxmox VE 8/9 host joined via SSH bootstrap.
+	NodeKindProxmox NodeKind = "proxmox"
+)
+
 type Node struct {
 	ID       string            `json:"id"`
 	Name     string            `json:"name"`
@@ -18,4 +31,10 @@ type Node struct {
 	JoinedAt time.Time         `json:"joined_at"`
 	LastSeen time.Time         `json:"last_seen"`
 	Metadata map[string]string `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
+	// Kind classifies the node: localhost | linux | proxmox (REQ-049).
+	// Empty string for rows created before migration 0006.
+	Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"`
+	// OS is the auto-detected OS identifier from /etc/os-release ID=
+	// (ubuntu|debian|alpine|pve|linux). Empty for pre-0006 rows.
+	OS string `json:"os,omitempty"`
 }

internal/osdetect/osdetect.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// Package osdetect provides OS detection from /etc/os-release (D-032).
+// It's a separate package to avoid import cycles between internal/cli
+// and internal/doctor (both need to detect the local OS).
+package osdetect
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// osReleasePaths are checked in order for the os-release file. The
+// freedesktop.org spec says /etc/os-release is the canonical path,
+// with /usr/lib/os-release as a fallback for minimal containers that
+// may not symlink the former.
+var osReleasePaths = []string{"/etc/os-release", "/usr/lib/os-release"}
+
+// Detect reads /etc/os-release (then /usr/lib/os-release as a
+// fallback) and returns the value of the ID= field. Returns "linux"
+// (the generic fallback per D-032) if the file is missing, the ID
+// field is absent, or the value is empty. Unknown ID values (e.g.
+// "fedora", "arch") are returned verbatim — doctor os can warn on
+// unknown values, but orca init must not fail.
+func Detect() string {
+	for _, p := range osReleasePaths {
+		data, err := os.ReadFile(p)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if id := ParseID(data); id != "" {
+			return id
+		}
+	}
+	return "linux"
+}
+
+// ParseID extracts the ID= value from os-release content.
+// The format is shell-compatible KEY=VALUE lines; values may be
+// double-quoted. Returns "" if ID is absent or empty.
+func ParseID(data []byte) string {
+	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(string(data)))
+	for scanner.Scan() {
+		line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
+		if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
+			continue
+		}
+		key, value, ok := strings.Cut(line, "=")
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		key = strings.TrimSpace(key)
+		if key != "ID" {
+			continue
+		}
+		value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
+		// Strip surrounding double quotes (freedesktop spec allows quoted values).
+		if len(value) >= 2 && value[0] == '"' && value[len(value)-1] == '"' {
+			value = value[1 : len(value)-1]
+		}
+		return value
+	}
+	return ""
+}

internal/osdetect/osdetect_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package osdetect
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestParseID_Ubuntu(t *testing.T) {
+	content := `NAME="Ubuntu"
+VERSION="24.04.4 LTS (Noble Numbat)"
+ID=ubuntu
+ID_LIKE=debian`
+	if got := ParseID([]byte(content)); got != "ubuntu" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want ubuntu", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseID_Debian(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ParseID([]byte("ID=debian\n")); got != "debian" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want debian", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseID_Alpine(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ParseID([]byte("ID=alpine\n")); got != "alpine" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want alpine", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseID_PVE(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ParseID([]byte("ID=pve\nID_LIKE=debian\n")); got != "pve" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want pve", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseID_QuotedValue(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ParseID([]byte(`ID="ubuntu"` + "\n")); got != "ubuntu" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want ubuntu", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseID_MissingID(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ParseID([]byte("NAME=Test\n")); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want empty", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseID_UnknownIDVerbatim(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ParseID([]byte("ID=fedora\n")); got != "fedora" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want fedora", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseID_CommentsAndBlanks(t *testing.T) {
+	content := `# comment
+
+NAME="Test"
+# ID below
+ID=arch`
+	if got := ParseID([]byte(content)); got != "arch" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want arch", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDetect_FallbackToLinux(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := osReleasePaths
+	defer func() { osReleasePaths = orig }()
+	osReleasePaths = []string{filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nonexistent")}
+	if got := Detect(); got != "linux" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want linux (fallback)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDetect_ReadsFile(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	orig := osReleasePaths
+	defer func() { osReleasePaths = orig }()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "os-release")
+	osReleasePaths = []string{path}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("ID=ubuntu\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := Detect(); got != "ubuntu" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want ubuntu", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDetect_FallbackToUsrLib(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	orig := osReleasePaths
+	defer func() { osReleasePaths = orig }()
+	osReleasePaths = []string{
+		filepath.Join(dir, "etc"),     // missing
+		filepath.Join(dir, "usr-lib"), // fallback
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(osReleasePaths[1], []byte("ID=alpine\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := Detect(); got != "alpine" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want alpine (from fallback)", got)
+	}
+}

internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go

@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+// Package proxmox implements the SSH-based bootstrap of a remote
+// Proxmox VE 8/9 host as an orca node (REQ-050, REQ-051).
+//
+// The bootstrap sequence (run via `orca node join --type proxmox`):
+//  1. Generate or load the orca SSH keypair (Ed25519, D-037)
+//  2. SSH dial with password auth + TOFU host-key capture (D-035)
+//  3. Deploy the orca pubkey to ~orca/.ssh/authorized_keys
+//  4. Create the `orca` Linux system user (config-overridable name)
+//  5. Create the OrcaOperator PVE role with least-privilege privileges
+//  6. Create the orca@pam PVE user (maps to the Linux system user)
+//  7. Assign the OrcaOperator role to orca@pam on path /
+//  8. Write /etc/sudoers.d/orca with NOEXEC on pct/qm, no NOEXEC on
+//     apt-get/dpkg, and pvesh EXCLUDED (AD-020: pvesh can bypass NOEXEC
+//     via the API execute endpoint)
+//  9. Validate the sudoers file with visudo -cf
+//  10. Return the node metadata for the caller to persist
+//
+// All steps are idempotent (D-036): re-running the bootstrap on an
+// already-configured host is a no-op. The password is never persisted
+// (D-031) — it is used only for the initial SSH auth and pubkey
+// deployment; subsequent orca→Proxmox access uses the deployed SSH key.
+package proxmox
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/certpaths"
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/security"
+)
+
+// DefaultProxmoxUser is the default Linux system user created on the
+// Proxmox host. Overridable via Options.ProxmoxUser.
+const DefaultProxmoxUser = "orca"
+
+// DefaultProxmoxRole is the default PVE custom role created for the
+// orca user. Overridable via Options.ProxmoxRole.
+const DefaultProxmoxRole = "OrcaOperator"
+
+// DefaultSSHPort is the default SSH port for Proxmox hosts.
+const DefaultSSHPort = 22
+
+// OrcaOperatorPrivileges is the least-privilege privilege set for the
+// OrcaOperator PVE role (D-033). Space-separated per pveum --privs
+// syntax. VM.Audit covers CTs as well (both live under /vms/{vmid}).
+const OrcaOperatorPrivileges = "VM.Audit Datastore.AllocateSpace SDN.Use"
+
+// Options configures a Proxmox bootstrap run.
+type Options struct {
+	// Host is the Proxmox host address (IP or hostname, no port).
+	Host string
+	// SSHUser is the initial SSH username (default "root").
+	SSHUser string
+	// Password is the SSH password for the initial connection.
+	// NEVER persisted (D-031). The caller must zero this after use.
+	Password string
+	// ProxmoxUser is the Linux system user to create on the host
+	// (default "orca"). Config-overridable.
+	ProxmoxUser string
+	// ProxmoxRole is the PVE custom role to create (default
+	// "OrcaOperator"). Config-overridable.
+	ProxmoxRole string
+	// SSHPort is the SSH port (default 22).
+	SSHPort int
+	// Logger receives audit-log entries. If nil, slog.Default() is used.
+	Logger *slog.Logger
+}
+
+// Result is the outcome of a successful bootstrap.
+type Result struct {
+	// NodeName is the name to use for the node in the orca registry
+	// (typically the host address).
+	NodeName string
+	// NodeAddress is the orca daemon address on the Proxmox host
+	// (host:8443 — the orca daemon port).
+	NodeAddress string
+	// HostKeyFingerprint is the SHA-256 fingerprint of the captured
+	// SSH host key (for operator verification).
+	HostKeyFingerprint string
+}
+
+// BootstrapProxmox runs the full SSH bootstrap sequence on a remote
+// Proxmox VE 8/9 host. All steps are idempotent. Returns a Result
+// describing the node to register, or an error if any step fails.
+func BootstrapProxmox(ctx context.Context, opts Options) (*Result, error) {
+	if opts.Host == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("proxmox bootstrap: host is required")
+	}
+	if opts.Password == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("proxmox bootstrap: password is required (use --password or $ORCA_PROXMOX_PASSWORD)")
+	}
+	if opts.SSHUser == "" {
+		opts.SSHUser = "root"
+	}
+	if opts.ProxmoxUser == "" {
+		opts.ProxmoxUser = DefaultProxmoxUser
+	}
+	if opts.ProxmoxRole == "" {
+		opts.ProxmoxRole = DefaultProxmoxRole
+	}
+	if opts.SSHPort == 0 {
+		opts.SSHPort = DefaultSSHPort
+	}
+	log := opts.Logger
+	if log == nil {
+		log = slog.Default()
+	}
+
+	// Step 1: Generate or load the orca SSH keypair (D-037).
+	// The key is deployed to the remote host's authorized_keys in step 3.
+	_, pubLine, err := security.GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(certpaths.Dir())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh key: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 2: SSH dial with password auth + TOFU host-key capture (D-035).
+	// knownhosts.New reads ~/.orca/known_hosts; on first connect it
+	// captures the host key, on subsequent connects it verifies.
+	hostKeyCallback, err := knownhosts.New(certpaths.KnownHostsPath())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("known_hosts callback: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	sshAddr := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", opts.Host, opts.SSHPort)
+	sshConfig := &ssh.ClientConfig{
+		User:            opts.SSHUser,
+		Auth:            []ssh.AuthMethod{ssh.Password(opts.Password)},
+		HostKeyCallback: hostKeyCallback,
+		Timeout:         10 * time.Second,
+	}
+
+	dialCtx, dialCancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 15*time.Second)
+	defer dialCancel()
+	conn, err := sshDialer.DialContext(dialCtx, "tcp", sshAddr, sshConfig)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh dial %s: %w", sshAddr, err)
+	}
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	log.Info("proxmox.ssh_connected",
+		slog.String("event", "proxmox.ssh_connected"),
+		slog.String("host", opts.Host),
+		slog.String("ssh_user", opts.SSHUser),
+	)
+
+	// Step 3: Deploy orca pubkey to ~orca/.ssh/authorized_keys (idempotent).
+	if err := deployPubKey(conn, opts.ProxmoxUser, string(pubLine)); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("deploy pubkey: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 4: Create orca Linux system user (idempotent).
+	if err := createLinuxUser(conn, opts.ProxmoxUser); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create user %s: %w", opts.ProxmoxUser, err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 5: Create OrcaOperator PVE role (idempotent).
+	if err := createPVERole(conn, opts.ProxmoxRole); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create PVE role %s: %w", opts.ProxmoxRole, err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 6: Create orca@pam PVE user (idempotent).
+	if err := createPVEUser(conn, opts.ProxmoxUser); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create PVE user %s@pam: %w", opts.ProxmoxUser, err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 7: Assign OrcaOperator role to orca@pam on path / (idempotent).
+	if err := assignPVEACL(conn, opts.ProxmoxUser, opts.ProxmoxRole); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("assign ACL: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 8: Write /etc/sudoers.d/orca (AD-020: NOEXEC on pct/qm,
+	// no NOEXEC on apt-get/dpkg, pvesh EXCLUDED).
+	if err := writeSudoers(conn, opts.ProxmoxUser); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("write sudoers: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 9: Validate sudoers with visudo -cf.
+	if err := validateSudoers(conn); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("validate sudoers: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	log.Info("proxmox.bootstrap_ok",
+		slog.String("event", "proxmox.bootstrap_ok"),
+		slog.String("host", opts.Host),
+		slog.String("proxmox_user", opts.ProxmoxUser),
+		slog.String("proxmox_role", opts.ProxmoxRole),
+	)
+
+	return &Result{
+		NodeName:    opts.Host,
+		NodeAddress: opts.Host + ":8443",
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// sshDialer is the dialer used by BootstrapProxmox. It's a package-level
+// variable so tests can override it with a fake SSH server.
+var sshDialer sshDialerType = defaultSSHDialer{}
+
+type sshDialerType interface {
+	DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string, config *ssh.ClientConfig) (*ssh.Client, error)
+}
+
+type defaultSSHDialer struct{}
+
+func (defaultSSHDialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string, config *ssh.ClientConfig) (*ssh.Client, error) {
+	return ssh.Dial(network, addr, config)
+}
+
+// runRemote runs a command over the SSH connection and returns its
+// combined output. Returns an error if the command exits non-zero.
+func runRemote(conn *ssh.Client, cmd string) ([]byte, error) {
+	session, err := conn.NewSession()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("new session: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer session.Close()
+	out, err := session.CombinedOutput(cmd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return out, fmt.Errorf("run %q: %w (output: %s)", cmd, err, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// deployPubKey appends the orca public key to the remote user's
+// authorized_keys file, creating the .ssh dir if needed. Idempotent:
+// if the key is already present, it is not re-appended.
+func deployPubKey(conn *ssh.Client, user, pubLine string) error {
+	pubLine = strings.TrimSpace(pubLine)
+	if pubLine == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("deployPubKey: empty pub line")
+	}
+	home := "/home/" + user
+	if user == "root" {
+		home = "/root"
+	}
+	sshDir := home + "/.ssh"
+	authFile := sshDir + "/authorized_keys"
+	// Create .ssh dir, touch authorized_keys, set modes, append key if absent.
+	cmd := fmt.Sprintf(
+		"mkdir -p %s && touch %s && chmod 0700 %s && chmod 0600 %s && grep -qF '%s' %s || echo '%s' >> %s",
+		sshDir, authFile, sshDir, authFile, pubLine, authFile, pubLine, authFile,
+	)
+	if _, err := runRemote(conn, cmd); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// createLinuxUser creates the orca system user if it doesn't already
+// exist. Idempotent: `id -u` check before `useradd`.
+func createLinuxUser(conn *ssh.Client, user string) error {
+	cmd := fmt.Sprintf("id -u %s 2>/dev/null || useradd -m -s /bin/bash %s", user, user)
+	if _, err := runRemote(conn, cmd); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// createPVERole creates the OrcaOperator PVE role if it doesn't exist.
+// Idempotent: probes `pveum role list` before `pveum role add`.
+func createPVERole(conn *ssh.Client, role string) error {
+	cmd := fmt.Sprintf(
+		"pveum role list 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^%s' || pveum role add %s --privs '%s'",
+		role, role, OrcaOperatorPrivileges,
+	)
+	if _, err := runRemote(conn, cmd); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// createPVEUser creates the orca@pam PVE user if it doesn't exist.
+// Idempotent: probes `pveum user list` before `pveum user add`.
+// Uses @pam realm (AD-019) since orca creates a Linux system user.
+func createPVEUser(conn *ssh.Client, user string) error {
+	pveUserID := user + "@pam"
+	cmd := fmt.Sprintf(
+		"pveum user list 2>/dev/null | grep -q '%s' || pveum user add %s -comment 'Orca automation user'",
+		pveUserID, pveUserID,
+	)
+	if _, err := runRemote(conn, cmd); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// assignPVEACL assigns the OrcaOperator role to orca@pam on path /
+// (cluster-wide). `pveum acl modify` is idempotent (creates or updates).
+func assignPVEACL(conn *ssh.Client, user, role string) error {
+	pveUserID := user + "@pam"
+	cmd := fmt.Sprintf("pveum acl modify / -user %s -role %s", pveUserID, role)
+	if _, err := runRemote(conn, cmd); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// sudoersContent returns the /etc/sudoers.d/orca file content (AD-020).
+// NOEXEC on pct/qm (blocks shell escapes); no NOEXEC on apt-get/dpkg
+// (they need exec for maintainer scripts); pvesh EXCLUDED (API execute
+// bypasses NOEXEC). File must be mode 0440 per sudo requirements.
+func sudoersContent(user string) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`# /etc/sudoers.d/orca — Managed by orca; do not edit manually.
+# Least-privilege allowlist for the orca PVE operator user.
+# NOPASSWD: non-interactive SSH automation. NOEXEC: blocks shell escapes.
+# pvesh is EXCLUDED (AD-020: pvesh can bypass NOEXEC via API execute).
+%s ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: NOEXEC: /usr/bin/pct
+%s ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: NOEXEC: /usr/bin/qm
+%s ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/apt-get
+%s ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/dpkg
+`, user, user, user, user)
+}
+
+// writeSudoers writes the /etc/sudoers.d/orca file on the remote host
+// with mode 0440. Uses a heredoc via cat to avoid quoting issues.
+func writeSudoers(conn *ssh.Client, user string) error {
+	content := sudoersContent(user)
+	// Write via cat heredoc, then chmod 0440.
+	cmd := fmt.Sprintf("cat > /etc/sudoers.d/%s <<'ORCA_SUDOERS_EOF'\n%s\nORCA_SUDOERS_EOF\nchmod 0440 /etc/sudoers.d/%s",
+		user, content, user)
+	if _, err := runRemote(conn, cmd); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// validateSudoers runs `visudo -cf` on the sudoers file. Aborts the
+// bootstrap if validation fails (prevents a broken sudoers from
+// locking the orca user out of sudo).
+func validateSudoers(conn *ssh.Client) error {
+	cmd := "visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/orca"
+	out, err := runRemote(conn, cmd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("visudo validation failed: %w (output: %s)", err, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(out), "parsed OK") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("visudo validation did not report OK: %s", strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
+	}
+	return nil
+}

internal/proxmox/bootstrap_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+package proxmox
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+)
+
+func TestSudoersContent(t *testing.T) {
+	content := sudoersContent("orca")
+
+	if !strings.Contains(content, "NOPASSWD: NOEXEC: /usr/bin/pct") {
+		t.Error("missing NOEXEC on pct (AD-020)")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(content, "NOPASSWD: NOEXEC: /usr/bin/qm") {
+		t.Error("missing NOEXEC on qm (AD-020)")
+	}
+
+	if !strings.Contains(content, "NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/apt-get") {
+		t.Error("missing NOPASSWD on apt-get")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(content, "NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/dpkg") {
+		t.Error("missing NOPASSWD on dpkg")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(content, "NOEXEC: /usr/bin/apt-get") {
+		t.Error("apt-get must NOT have NOEXEC (breaks maintainer scripts)")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(content, "NOEXEC: /usr/bin/dpkg") {
+		t.Error("dpkg must NOT have NOEXEC (breaks maintainer scripts)")
+	}
+
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(content, "\n") {
+		trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "#") || trimmed == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(trimmed, "pvesh") {
+			t.Errorf("pvesh must be EXCLUDED from sudoers command lines (AD-020): %s", trimmed)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(content, "# /etc/sudoers.d/orca") {
+		t.Error("missing managed-by-orca header")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(content, "orca ALL=(root)") {
+		t.Error("missing orca user in sudoers")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSudoersContent_CustomUser(t *testing.T) {
+	content := sudoersContent("custom-orca")
+	if !strings.Contains(content, "custom-orca ALL=(root)") {
+		t.Error("missing custom-orca user in sudoers")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOrcaOperatorPrivileges(t *testing.T) {
+	privs := strings.Fields(OrcaOperatorPrivileges)
+	expected := map[string]bool{
+		"VM.Audit":                true,
+		"Datastore.AllocateSpace": true,
+		"SDN.Use":                 true,
+	}
+	if len(privs) != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 3 privileges, got %d: %v", len(privs), privs)
+	}
+	for _, p := range privs {
+		if !expected[p] {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected privilege %q", p)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_Validation(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	_, err := BootstrapProxmox(ctx, Options{Password: "pw"})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "host is required") {
+		t.Errorf("expected host-required error, got %v", err)
+	}
+
+	_, err = BootstrapProxmox(ctx, Options{Host: "10.0.0.1"})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "password is required") {
+		t.Errorf("expected password-required error, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDefaultOptions(t *testing.T) {
+	if DefaultProxmoxUser != "orca" {
+		t.Errorf("DefaultProxmoxUser = %q, want orca", DefaultProxmoxUser)
+	}
+	if DefaultProxmoxRole != "OrcaOperator" {
+		t.Errorf("DefaultProxmoxRole = %q, want OrcaOperator", DefaultProxmoxRole)
+	}
+	if DefaultSSHPort != 22 {
+		t.Errorf("DefaultSSHPort = %d, want 22", DefaultSSHPort)
+	}
+}
+
+type mockSSHDialer struct {
+	client   *ssh.Client
+	err      error
+	calls    int
+	lastAddr string
+	lastCfg  *ssh.ClientConfig
+}
+
+func (m *mockSSHDialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string, config *ssh.ClientConfig) (*ssh.Client, error) {
+	m.calls++
+	m.lastAddr = addr
+	m.lastCfg = config
+	if m.err != nil {
+		return nil, m.err
+	}
+	return m.client, nil
+}
+
+func setupORCAHome(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", dir)
+	knownHosts := filepath.Join(dir, "known_hosts")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(knownHosts, []byte{}, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create known_hosts: %v", err)
+	}
+	return dir
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_SSHAuthFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	sshDialer = &mockSSHDialer{err: errors.New("ssh: handshake failed: ssh: unable to authenticate")}
+
+	setupORCAHome(t)
+
+	_, err := BootstrapProxmox(context.Background(), Options{
+		Host:     "10.0.0.1",
+		Password: "pw",
+	})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ssh") {
+		t.Errorf("error should mention ssh, got: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ssh dial") {
+		t.Errorf("error should mention ssh dial, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_SSHDialCalledWithCorrectAddr(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	dialer := &mockSSHDialer{err: errors.New("connection refused")}
+	sshDialer = dialer
+
+	setupORCAHome(t)
+
+	_, _ = BootstrapProxmox(context.Background(), Options{
+		Host:     "10.0.0.42",
+		Password: "pw",
+		SSHPort:  2222,
+	})
+	if dialer.calls != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("dialer calls = %d, want 1", dialer.calls)
+	}
+	if dialer.lastAddr != "10.0.0.42:2222" {
+		t.Errorf("dial addr = %q, want 10.0.0.42:2222", dialer.lastAddr)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_DefaultSSHPort(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	dialer := &mockSSHDialer{err: errors.New("connection refused")}
+	sshDialer = dialer
+
+	setupORCAHome(t)
+
+	_, _ = BootstrapProxmox(context.Background(), Options{
+		Host:     "10.0.0.99",
+		Password: "pw",
+	})
+	if dialer.lastAddr != "10.0.0.99:22" {
+		t.Errorf("dial addr = %q, want 10.0.0.99:22 (default port)", dialer.lastAddr)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_CustomSSHUser(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	dialer := &mockSSHDialer{err: errors.New("connection refused")}
+	sshDialer = dialer
+
+	setupORCAHome(t)
+
+	_, _ = BootstrapProxmox(context.Background(), Options{
+		Host:     "10.0.0.1",
+		Password: "pw",
+		SSHUser:  "custom-admin",
+	})
+	if dialer.calls != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("dialer calls = %d, want 1", dialer.calls)
+	}
+	if dialer.lastCfg == nil || dialer.lastCfg.User != "custom-admin" {
+		t.Errorf("ssh user not propagated, got %+v", dialer.lastCfg)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_SSHKeyGenerated(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	sshDialer = &mockSSHDialer{err: errors.New("connection refused")}
+
+	dir := setupORCAHome(t)
+
+	_, _ = BootstrapProxmox(context.Background(), Options{
+		Host:     "10.0.0.1",
+		Password: "pw",
+	})
+
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "orca_ssh_key")
+	pubPath := filepath.Join(dir, "orca_ssh_key.pub")
+	if _, err := os.Stat(keyPath); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("SSH key not generated at %s: %v", keyPath, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(pubPath); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("SSH pub not generated at %s: %v", pubPath, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_KnownHostsFileCreated(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	sshDialer = &mockSSHDialer{err: errors.New("connection refused")}
+
+	dir := setupORCAHome(t)
+
+	_, _ = BootstrapProxmox(context.Background(), Options{
+		Host:     "10.0.0.1",
+		Password: "pw",
+	})
+
+	knownHosts := filepath.Join(dir, "known_hosts")
+	if _, err := os.Stat(knownHosts); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("known_hosts not created at %s: %v", knownHosts, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_NilLogger(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	sshDialer = &mockSSHDialer{err: errors.New("connection refused")}
+
+	setupORCAHome(t)
+
+	defer func() {
+		if r := recover(); r != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("nil logger panicked: %v", r)
+		}
+	}()
+	_, _ = BootstrapProxmox(context.Background(), Options{
+		Host:     "10.0.0.1",
+		Password: "pw",
+		Logger:   nil,
+	})
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_CustomLogger(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	sshDialer = &mockSSHDialer{err: errors.New("connection refused")}
+
+	setupORCAHome(t)
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&buf, nil))
+
+	defer func() {
+		if r := recover(); r != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("custom logger panicked: %v", r)
+		}
+	}()
+	_, _ = BootstrapProxmox(context.Background(), Options{
+		Host:     "10.0.0.1",
+		Password: "pw",
+		Logger:   log,
+	})
+	_ = buf.String()
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_ContextCancelled(t *testing.T) {
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	sshDialer = &mockSSHDialer{err: errors.New("connection refused")}
+
+	setupORCAHome(t)
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	_, err := BootstrapProxmox(ctx, Options{
+		Host:     "10.0.0.1",
+		Password: "pw",
+	})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error with cancelled context")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeployPubKey_EmptyPubLine(t *testing.T) {
+	err := deployPubKey(nil, "orca", "")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected error for empty pub line")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty pub line") {
+		t.Errorf("error should mention empty pub line, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeployPubKey_WhitespaceOnlyPubLine(t *testing.T) {
+	err := deployPubKey(nil, "orca", "   \n  \t  ")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected error for whitespace-only pub line")
+	}
+}

internal/proxmox/ssh_session_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+package proxmox
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+)
+
+type fakeSSHServer struct {
+	listener net.Listener
+	config   *ssh.ServerConfig
+	done     chan struct{}
+
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	state   map[string]string
+	authDir string
+}
+
+func newFakeSSHServer(t *testing.T) *fakeSSHServer {
+	t.Helper()
+	_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ed25519 gen: %v", err)
+	}
+	hostSigner, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ssh signer: %v", err)
+	}
+	config := &ssh.ServerConfig{
+		PasswordCallback: func(c ssh.ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*ssh.Permissions, error) {
+			if string(password) != "pw" {
+				return nil, errors.New("invalid password")
+			}
+			return nil, nil
+		},
+	}
+	config.AddHostKey(hostSigner)
+
+	ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
+	}
+	srv := &fakeSSHServer{
+		listener: ln,
+		config:   config,
+		done:     make(chan struct{}),
+		state:    make(map[string]string),
+		authDir:  t.TempDir(),
+	}
+	go srv.serve()
+	return srv
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) addr() string { return s.listener.Addr().String() }
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) serve() {
+	for {
+		conn, err := s.listener.Accept()
+		if err != nil {
+			close(s.done)
+			return
+		}
+		go s.handle(conn)
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) handle(netConn net.Conn) {
+	defer netConn.Close()
+	_, chans, reqs, err := ssh.NewServerConn(netConn, s.config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	go ssh.DiscardRequests(reqs)
+	for newChan := range chans {
+		if newChan.ChannelType() != "session" {
+			newChan.Reject(ssh.UnknownChannelType, "only session")
+			continue
+		}
+		go s.handleSession(newChan)
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) handleSession(newChan ssh.NewChannel) {
+	ch, reqs, err := newChan.Accept()
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	defer ch.Close()
+	for req := range reqs {
+		switch req.Type {
+		case "exec":
+			var execReq struct{ Command string }
+			if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req.Payload, &execReq); err != nil {
+				req.Reply(false, nil)
+				continue
+			}
+			req.Reply(true, nil)
+			out, code := s.runCommand(execReq.Command)
+			_, _ = ch.Write(out)
+			_, _ = ch.SendRequest("exit-status", false, ssh.Marshal(struct{ Code uint32 }{uint32(code)}))
+			_ = ch.Close()
+		default:
+			req.Reply(false, nil)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) runCommand(cmd string) ([]byte, int) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(cmd)
+	switch {
+	case trimmed == "echo hello":
+		return []byte("hello\n"), 0
+	case strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "exit "):
+		return nil, 1
+	case strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "id -u "):
+		return []byte("1000\n"), 0
+	case strings.Contains(trimmed, "pveum role list") || strings.Contains(trimmed, "pveum role add"):
+		s.state["pve_role:"+extractField(trimmed, "add ", " ")] = "ok"
+		return nil, 0
+	case strings.Contains(trimmed, "pveum user list") || strings.Contains(trimmed, "pveum user add"):
+		s.state["pve_user:orca@pam"] = "ok"
+		return nil, 0
+	case strings.Contains(trimmed, "pveum acl modify"):
+		s.state["pve_acl"] = "ok"
+		return nil, 0
+	case strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "mkdir -p ") && strings.Contains(trimmed, "authorized_keys"):
+		return s.handleAuthKeyDeploy(trimmed)
+	case strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "cat > /etc/sudoers.d/"):
+		return s.handleSudoersWrite(trimmed), 0
+	case strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/orca"):
+		if s.state["sudoers_valid"] == "true" {
+			return []byte("/etc/sudoers.d/orca: parsed OK\n"), 0
+		}
+		return []byte("/etc/sudoers.d/orca: syntax error\n"), 1
+	case strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "cat /") && strings.HasSuffix(trimmed, "/authorized_keys"):
+		return s.readAuthFile(trimmed[4:]), 0
+	case strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "cat /") && strings.Contains(trimmed, "/orca"):
+		return s.readSudoers(trimmed[4:]), 0
+	default:
+		return []byte("sh: command not found\n"), 127
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) handleAuthKeyDeploy(cmd string) ([]byte, int) {
+	parts := strings.Split(cmd, "'")
+	var pubLine string
+	if len(parts) >= 2 {
+		pubLine = parts[1]
+	}
+	authPath := filepath.Join(s.authDir, "authorized_keys")
+	existing := string(s.readFile(authPath))
+	if !strings.Contains(existing, pubLine) {
+		existing += pubLine + "\n"
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(authPath, []byte(existing), 0o600); err != nil {
+		return []byte("mkdir: permission denied\n"), 1
+	}
+	return nil, 0
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) readAuthFile(path string) []byte {
+	if strings.HasSuffix(path, "/authorized_keys") {
+		return s.readFile(filepath.Join(s.authDir, "authorized_keys"))
+	}
+	return []byte("cat: " + path + ": No such file or directory\n")
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) handleSudoersWrite(cmd string) []byte {
+	idx := strings.Index(cmd, "\n")
+	if idx < 0 {
+		return []byte("sh: bad heredoc\n")
+	}
+	content := cmd[idx+1:]
+	if end := strings.Index(content, "ORCA_SUDOERS_EOF"); end >= 0 {
+		content = content[:end]
+	}
+	s.state["sudoers_content"] = content
+	s.state["sudoers_valid"] = "true"
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) readSudoers(path string) []byte {
+	if v, ok := s.state["sudoers_content"]; ok {
+		return []byte(v)
+	}
+	return []byte("cat: " + path + ": No such file or directory\n")
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) readFile(path string) []byte {
+	b, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
+	return b
+}
+
+func (s *fakeSSHServer) close() {
+	s.listener.Close()
+	<-s.done
+}
+
+func extractField(s, after, until string) string {
+	i := strings.Index(s, after)
+	if i < 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	rest := s[i+len(after):]
+	j := strings.Index(rest, until)
+	if j < 0 {
+		return rest
+	}
+	return rest[:j]
+}
+
+func fakeSSHClient(t *testing.T, srv *fakeSSHServer) *ssh.Client {
+	t.Helper()
+	config := &ssh.ClientConfig{
+		User:            "root",
+		Auth:            []ssh.AuthMethod{ssh.Password("pw")},
+		HostKeyCallback: ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
+		Timeout:         5 * time.Second,
+	}
+	client, err := ssh.Dial("tcp", srv.addr(), config)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ssh.Dial: %v", err)
+	}
+	return client
+}
+
+func TestRunRemote_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+	out, err := runRemote(conn, "echo hello")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("runRemote: %v", err)
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(string(out)) != "hello" {
+		t.Errorf("output = %q, want hello", strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunRemote_Failure(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+	_, err := runRemote(conn, "exit 7")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for non-zero exit")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "run") {
+		t.Errorf("error should mention run, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeployPubKey_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	if err := deployPubKey(conn, "orca", "ssh-ed25519 AAAA test@orca"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("deployPubKey: %v", err)
+	}
+	out := srv.readFile(filepath.Join(srv.authDir, "authorized_keys"))
+	if !strings.Contains(string(out), "ssh-ed25519 AAAA test@orca") {
+		t.Errorf("auth file does not contain the key: %s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeployPubKey_Idempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	if err := deployPubKey(conn, "orca", "ssh-ed25519 AAAA test@orca"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("first deploy: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := deployPubKey(conn, "orca", "ssh-ed25519 AAAA test@orca"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second deploy: %v", err)
+	}
+	out := srv.readFile(filepath.Join(srv.authDir, "authorized_keys"))
+	if cnt := strings.Count(string(out), "ssh-ed25519 AAAA test@orca"); cnt != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("key count = %d, want 1 (idempotent)", cnt)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCreateLinuxUser_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+	if err := createLinuxUser(conn, "orca"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("createLinuxUser: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCreatePVERole_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+	if err := createPVERole(conn, "OrcaOperator"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("createPVERole: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCreatePVEUser_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+	if err := createPVEUser(conn, "orca"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("createPVEUser: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAssignPVEACL_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+	if err := assignPVEACL(conn, "orca", "OrcaOperator"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("assignPVEACL: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWriteSudoers_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	if err := writeSudoers(conn, "orca"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("writeSudoers: %v", err)
+	}
+	if srv.state["sudoers_valid"] != "true" {
+		t.Error("sudoers not marked valid")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(srv.state["sudoers_content"], "orca ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: NOEXEC: /usr/bin/pct") {
+		t.Errorf("sudoers content missing pct: %s", srv.state["sudoers_content"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateSudoers_ParsedOK(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	srv.state["sudoers_valid"] = "true"
+	if err := validateSudoers(conn); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("validateSudoers: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateSudoers_Failure(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	srv.state["sudoers_valid"] = "false"
+	if err := validateSudoers(conn); err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected error for invalid sudoers")
+	}
+}
+
+type staticDialer struct {
+	client *ssh.Client
+}
+
+func (d *staticDialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string, config *ssh.ClientConfig) (*ssh.Client, error) {
+	return d.client, nil
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_FullFlow_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+
+	home := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", home)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, "known_hosts"), []byte{}, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create known_hosts: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+	sshDialer = &staticDialer{client: fakeSSHClient(t, srv)}
+
+	host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(srv.addr())
+
+	var logBuf bytes.Buffer
+	result, err := BootstrapProxmox(t.Context(), Options{
+		Host:     host,
+		Password: "pw",
+		Logger:   slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&logBuf, nil)),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("BootstrapProxmox: %v", err)
+	}
+	if result == nil {
+		t.Fatal("result is nil")
+	}
+	if result.NodeName != host {
+		t.Errorf("NodeName = %q, want %q", result.NodeName, host)
+	}
+	if result.NodeAddress != host+":8443" {
+		t.Errorf("NodeAddress = %q, want %q:8443", result.NodeAddress, host)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), "proxmox.bootstrap_ok") {
+		t.Errorf("expected bootstrap_ok log, got: %s", logBuf.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBootstrapProxmox_FullFlow_DeployPubKeyFails(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newFakeSSHServer(t)
+	defer srv.close()
+
+	home := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("ORCA_HOME", home)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, "known_hosts"), []byte{}, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create known_hosts: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	orig := sshDialer
+	defer func() { sshDialer = orig }()
+
+	// Use a real client that connects to a server which will reject deploy
+	// by returning a non-zero exit for the mkdir command. We achieve this
+	// by using a dialer that returns a client to a server whose authDir
+	// is read-only — but simpler: just use a fresh server that errors on
+	// authorized_keys commands via a custom server. We reuse newFakeSSHServer
+	// but sabotage it by pointing authDir to a read-only location.
+	conn := fakeSSHClient(t, srv)
+	defer conn.Close()
+	sshDialer = &staticDialer{client: conn}
+
+	host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(srv.addr())
+
+	// Make authDir unwritable so deployPubKey's mkdir handler fails.
+	srv.authDir = "/proc/1/forbidden-orca-test"
+
+	_, err := BootstrapProxmox(t.Context(), Options{
+		Host:     host,
+		Password: "pw",
+	})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error from deployPubKey failure")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "deploy pubkey") {
+		t.Errorf("error should mention deploy pubkey, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/security/security_gosec_g101_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+// security_gosec_g101_test.go — verifies that a hardcoded
+// credential in a Go file (G101 pattern) would be caught by gosec.
+// We don't run gosec here (it requires the external binary); we
+// assert that the gosec configuration (in .golangci.yml + the
+// .coreci.yml `validate` stage) requires it. The fixture file
+// `testdata/hardcoded_creds.go` carries a literal G101 pattern
+// that, if reintroduced into production code, would fail CI.
+//
+// The fixture is in `internal/security/testdata/` so the
+// .gitleaks.toml and gosec path-excludes can allowlist it for
+// testing purposes only.
+package security
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestHardcodedCredsFixturePresent is a meta-test: the fixture
+// file MUST exist; if it's missing, the test fails loudly. The
+// fixture carries a literal `apiKey := "..."` pattern (G101) so
+// that any tooling run on the orca repo that finds it (after
+// allowlist removal) will fail.
+func TestHardcodedCredsFixturePresent(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "internal", "security", "testdata", "hardcoded_creds.go")
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read fixture: %v (the fixture is required so the G101 pattern is testable)", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(body), `apiKey := "GOSEC_G101_FIXTURE_VALUE_`) {
+		t.Error("fixture is missing the G101 pattern")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGosecInstalledInCi confirms the .coreci.yml `validate`
+// pipeline installs gosec. We don't run gosec here; we just
+// assert the install + run commands are present.
+func TestGosecInstalledInCi(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, ".coreci.yml"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "go install github.com/securego/gosec") {
+		t.Error(".coreci.yml validate pipeline must install gosec")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "gosec -fmt") {
+		t.Error(".coreci.yml validate pipeline must run gosec")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGovulncheckOfflineMode confirms the offline mode env var
+// is set in .coreci.yml. REQ-027.
+func TestGovulncheckOfflineMode(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, ".coreci.yml"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "GOFLAGS: -mod=mod") {
+		t.Error(".coreci.yml must set GOFLAGS=-mod=mod for offline mode (REQ-027)")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "govulncheck") {
+		t.Error(".coreci.yml must invoke govulncheck")
+	}
+}

internal/security/security_scan_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+// Package security — security_scan_test.go exercises the
+// security-scan configuration files in v0.2 P03. The actual tool
+// binaries (gosec, govulncheck, gitleaks) are external to the
+// Go test runner; here we assert the configuration files exist
+// and have the expected shape, plus run a Go-level detection
+// of a hardcoded credential in a fixture file to confirm the
+// CI gate would catch it.
+//
+// These tests run as part of `go test ./...` and require no
+// external tools.
+package security
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestGitleaksConfigExists verifies the .gitleaks.toml file is
+// present and parseable. The allowlist for cert PEM is required
+// for the P01 security work to not generate false positives.
+func TestGitleaksConfigExists(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(root, ".gitleaks.toml")
+	if _, err := os.Stat(path); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf(".gitleaks.toml missing at %s: %v", path, err)
+	}
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read .gitleaks.toml: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	for _, must := range []string{
+		"orca-cert-pem",
+		"BEGIN CERTIFICATE",
+		"internal/security/testdata",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(s, must) {
+			t.Errorf(".gitleaks.toml missing required token: %q", must)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGitleaksBaselineRoundTrip checks that the baseline file
+// exists and has the expected JSON shape. A real round-trip
+// (gitleaks detect --baseline-path) requires the gitleaks
+// binary, which we don't assume; instead we assert structure.
+func TestGitleaksBaselineRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(root, ".gitleaks-baseline.json")
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read baseline: %v", err)
+	}
+	var entries []map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &entries); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse baseline: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(entries) == 0 {
+		t.Error("baseline empty: should suppress at least the v0.1 .env leak")
+	}
+	for i, e := range entries {
+		if e["Op"] != "skip" {
+			t.Errorf("entry %d: Op=%v, want skip", i, e["Op"])
+		}
+		if _, ok := e["Commit"]; !ok {
+			t.Errorf("entry %d: missing Commit", i)
+		}
+		if _, ok := e["File"]; !ok {
+			t.Errorf("entry %d: missing File", i)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGolangciYmlShape verifies the .golangci.yml has the
+// required linters enabled (REQ-040). We don't run golangci-lint
+// here because it's an external binary; we just check that the
+// linters we expect are listed.
+func TestGolangciYmlShape(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(root, ".golangci.yml")
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read .golangci.yml: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	for _, linter := range []string{"gosec", "govet", "ineffassign", "misspell"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(s, "- "+linter) && !strings.Contains(s, linter+":") {
+			t.Errorf(".golangci.yml: linter %q not enabled", linter)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSecurityScanScriptShape checks that the wrapper script
+// exists, is executable, and invokes all three tools.
+func TestSecurityScanScriptShape(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "scripts", "security_scan.sh")
+	info, err := os.Stat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stat: %v", err)
+	}
+	if info.Mode()&0o100 == 0 {
+		t.Error("security_scan.sh is not executable (mode should include 0100)")
+	}
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	for _, must := range []string{"gosec", "govulncheck", "gitleaks", "GOFLAGS=-mod=mod", ".gitleaks.toml", ".gitleaks-baseline.json"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(s, must) {
+			t.Errorf("security_scan.sh missing required token: %q", must)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCoreciYmlHasSecurityStages verifies the .coreci.yml
+// `validate` pipeline includes the three security stages added
+// in P03.
+func TestCoreciYmlHasSecurityStages(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(root, ".coreci.yml")
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read .coreci.yml: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	for _, must := range []string{
+		"- name: gosec",
+		"- name: govulncheck",
+		"- name: gitleaks",
+		"GOFLAGS",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(s, must) {
+			t.Errorf(".coreci.yml missing required token: %q", must)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMakefileHasSecurityAndTestRace verifies the new make
+// targets are wired in.
+func TestMakefileHasSecurityAndTestRace(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "Makefile")
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read Makefile: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	for _, must := range []string{
+		"test-race:",
+		"security-scan:",
+		"go test -race",
+		"scripts/security_scan.sh",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(s, must) {
+			t.Errorf("Makefile missing required token: %q", must)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPreCommitHookShape verifies the gitleaks pre-commit hook
+// exists, is executable, and gates only when gitleaks is present.
+func TestPreCommitHookShape(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(root, ".githooks", "pre-commit")
+	info, err := os.Stat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stat: %v", err)
+	}
+	if info.Mode()&0o100 == 0 {
+		t.Error("pre-commit hook is not executable")
+	}
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	for _, must := range []string{"gitleaks protect", "core.hooksPath"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(s, must) {
+			// core.hooksPath is a git config setting, not in the file
+			// itself. Loosen the assertion for that one.
+			if must == "core.hooksPath" {
+				continue
+			}
+			t.Errorf("pre-commit missing required token: %q", must)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCertPEMAllowlistMentions proves the .gitleaks.toml allowlist
+// for cert PEM blocks is in effect. We don't run gitleaks; we
+// just confirm the config structure has the right stopwords.
+func TestCertPEMAllowlistMentions(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, ".gitleaks.toml"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := string(body)
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----") {
+		t.Error(".gitleaks.toml should allowlist cert PEM blocks")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "-----END CERTIFICATE-----") {
+		t.Error(".gitleaks.toml should allowlist cert PEM END blocks")
+	}
+}
+
+// findRepoRoot walks up the directory tree to find the orca
+// repo root (the directory containing go.mod). This makes the
+// tests independent of cwd.
+func findRepoRoot() (string, error) {
+	dir, err := os.Getwd()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	for {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod")); err == nil {
+			return dir, nil
+		}
+		parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
+		if parent == dir {
+			return "", os.ErrNotExist
+		}
+		dir = parent
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGoTestRaceInCi verifies the .coreci.yml `test` pipeline
+// runs `go test -race`. This is a documentation-shape check; the
+// actual race-clean runs are in the prior session's history.
+func TestGoTestRaceInCi(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := findRepoRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("findRepoRoot: %v", err)
+	}
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, ".coreci.yml"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(body), "go test -race") {
+		t.Error(".coreci.yml test pipeline should run with -race (REQ-031)")
+	}
+}
+
+// Compile-time guard that exec is used (testdata is referenced
+// in future-proofing for gosec exclusion tests).
+var _ = exec.Command

internal/security/sshkey.go

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+package security
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+)
+
+// SSHKeyMode is the file mode for the SSH private key. Matches the
+// CA key mode (REQ-033 spirit: 0600 for private keys).
+const SSHKeyMode os.FileMode = 0o600
+
+// SSHPubMode is the file mode for the SSH public key (authorized_keys
+// line). Matches the CA cert mode (0644 for public material).
+const SSHPubMode os.FileMode = 0o644
+
+const (
+	sshKeyFile = "orca_ssh_key"
+	sshPubFile = "orca_ssh_key.pub"
+)
+
+// GenerateOrLoadSSHKey returns the orca SSH keypair, generating it
+// lazily on first call (D-037). The key is Ed25519 (smaller, faster,
+// more secure than RSA for SSH auth), persisted as PKCS8 PEM to
+// dir/orca_ssh_key (0600) and dir/orca_ssh_key.pub (0644).
+//
+// Idempotent: if both files exist with valid content, they are loaded
+// and returned without regeneration. This matches the CAInit fast-path
+// pattern (D-036 idempotency).
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - keyPEM: PKCS8 PEM private key (parses with ssh.ParsePrivateKey)
+//   - pubLine: authorized_keys line (ssh-ed25519 AAAA... comment\n)
+func GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(dir string) (keyPEM, pubLine []byte, err error) {
+	if dir == "" {
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("GenerateOrLoadSSHKey: dir is required")
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("GenerateOrLoadSSHKey: mkdir: %w", err)
+	}
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, sshKeyFile)
+	pubPath := filepath.Join(dir, sshPubFile)
+
+	// Fast path: existing key — load and return.
+	if ok, err := bothExist(keyPath, pubPath); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	} else if ok {
+		keyPEM, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("read SSH key: %w", err)
+		}
+		pubLine, err := os.ReadFile(pubPath)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("read SSH pub: %w", err)
+		}
+		return keyPEM, pubLine, nil
+	}
+
+	// Generate Ed25519 keypair.
+	pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("GenerateOrLoadSSHKey: ed25519 gen: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Serialize private key as PKCS8 PEM (consistent with ca.key/server.key).
+	keyDER, err := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("GenerateOrLoadSSHKey: marshal key: %w", err)
+	}
+	keyPEM = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
+
+	// Serialize public key as authorized_keys line.
+	sshPub, err := ssh.NewPublicKey(pub)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("GenerateOrLoadSSHKey: new pubkey: %w", err)
+	}
+	pubLine = ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(sshPub)
+
+	// Persist with correct modes (atomic write + chmod).
+	if err := writeAtomic(keyPath, SSHKeyMode, keyPEM); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("write SSH key: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := writeAtomic(pubPath, SSHPubMode, pubLine); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("write SSH pub: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return keyPEM, pubLine, nil
+}

internal/security/sshkey_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+package security
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+)
+
+func TestGenerateOrLoadSSHKey_Generates(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	keyPEM, pubLine, err := GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Private key file exists with mode 0600.
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, sshKeyFile)
+	info, err := os.Stat(keyPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stat key: %v", err)
+	}
+	if info.Mode().Perm() != SSHKeyMode {
+		t.Errorf("key mode = %04o, want %04o", info.Mode().Perm(), SSHKeyMode)
+	}
+
+	// Public key file exists with mode 0644.
+	pubPath := filepath.Join(dir, sshPubFile)
+	info, err = os.Stat(pubPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stat pub: %v", err)
+	}
+	if info.Mode().Perm() != SSHPubMode {
+		t.Errorf("pub mode = %04o, want %04o", info.Mode().Perm(), SSHPubMode)
+	}
+
+	// Public key line is ssh-ed25519 format.
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(string(pubLine), "ssh-ed25519 ") {
+		t.Errorf("pub line = %q, want ssh-ed25519 prefix", string(pubLine))
+	}
+
+	// Private key PEM parses with ssh.ParsePrivateKey (PKCS8).
+	signer, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(keyPEM)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse private key: %v", err)
+	}
+	if signer.PublicKey().Type() != "ssh-ed25519" {
+		t.Errorf("signer key type = %q, want ssh-ed25519", signer.PublicKey().Type())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGenerateOrLoadSSHKey_IdempotentLoad(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	// First call generates.
+	keyPEM1, pubLine1, err := GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("first generate: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Second call loads existing.
+	keyPEM2, pubLine2, err := GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second load: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if string(keyPEM1) != string(keyPEM2) {
+		t.Error("key was regenerated on second call (D-036 idempotency violation)")
+	}
+	if string(pubLine1) != string(pubLine2) {
+		t.Error("pub was regenerated on second call (D-036 idempotency violation)")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGenerateOrLoadSSHKey_EmptyDir(t *testing.T) {
+	_, _, err := GenerateOrLoadSSHKey("")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected error for empty dir")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGenerateOrLoadSSHKey_CreatesDir(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nested", "ssh-dir")
+	if _, _, err := GenerateOrLoadSSHKey(dir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate with nested dir: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(dir); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("nested dir not created: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/security/testdata/hardcoded_creds.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// Package testdata contains fixtures used by the security tests.
+// This file deliberately carries a G101 pattern (hardcoded
+// credential) so that any gosec run that doesn't allowlist this
+// path will fail. The allowlist lives in .golangci.yml and
+// .gitleaks.toml. Removing this fixture will break the
+// TestHardcodedCredsFixturePresent meta-test.
+package testdata
+
+// HardcodedCredsFixture is a stub function whose body carries a
+// G101 pattern. gosec (with severity=high and confidence=medium,
+// per .golangci.yml) flags `apiKey := "..."` as G101. The value
+// is intentionally not a real secret (just the literal prefix
+// "GOSEC_G101_FIXTURE_VALUE_") so it doesn't trigger gitleaks.
+func HardcodedCredsFixture() string {
+	apiKey := "GOSEC_G101_FIXTURE_VALUE_NOT_A_REAL_SECRET"
+	_ = apiKey
+	return apiKey
+}

internal/store/capacity_repo.go

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// Package store — capacity_repo.go implements persistence for NodeCapacity
+// declarations (v0.2 P02). Capacity is declared per node via
+// `orca node capacity --set` (or from `~/.orca/node.hcl` at join time).
+// The dispatcher reads capacity rows to bin-pack jobs across nodes.
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// NodeCapacity is the per-node resource declaration consumed by the
+// scheduler. Units:
+//   - CPUMillicores: 1000 = 1 vCPU
+//   - MemoryMiB:     mebibytes of RAM
+//   - DiskMiB:       mebibytes of scratch disk
+type NodeCapacity struct {
+	NodeID        string
+	CPUMillicores int64
+	MemoryMiB     int64
+	DiskMiB       int64
+	UpdatedAt     time.Time
+}
+
+// CapacityRepo is the persistence layer for NodeCapacity rows.
+type CapacityRepo struct {
+	db *sql.DB
+}
+
+// NewCapacityRepo returns a CapacityRepo backed by the given DB.
+func NewCapacityRepo(db *sql.DB) *CapacityRepo {
+	return &CapacityRepo{db: db}
+}
+
+// Upsert writes the capacity row for nodeID, replacing any prior row.
+// The UpdatedAt column is set to time.Now().UTC() unless the caller
+// supplied a non-zero value.
+func (r *CapacityRepo) Upsert(ctx context.Context, c *NodeCapacity) error {
+	if c == nil {
+		return errors.New("CapacityRepo.Upsert: nil capacity")
+	}
+	if c.NodeID == "" {
+		return errors.New("CapacityRepo.Upsert: NodeID is required")
+	}
+	if c.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
+		c.UpdatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO node_capacity (node_id, cpu_millicores, memory_mib, disk_mib, updated_at)
+		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+		ON CONFLICT(node_id) DO UPDATE SET
+			cpu_millicores = excluded.cpu_millicores,
+			memory_mib     = excluded.memory_mib,
+			disk_mib       = excluded.disk_mib,
+			updated_at     = excluded.updated_at
+	`, c.NodeID, c.CPUMillicores, c.MemoryMiB, c.DiskMiB, c.UpdatedAt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("CapacityRepo.Upsert: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Get returns the capacity for nodeID or ErrNotFound.
+func (r *CapacityRepo) Get(ctx context.Context, nodeID string) (*NodeCapacity, error) {
+	if nodeID == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("CapacityRepo.Get: nodeID is required")
+	}
+	row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		SELECT node_id, cpu_millicores, memory_mib, disk_mib, updated_at
+		FROM node_capacity WHERE node_id = ?
+	`, nodeID)
+	var c NodeCapacity
+	if err := row.Scan(&c.NodeID, &c.CPUMillicores, &c.MemoryMiB, &c.DiskMiB, &c.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+			return nil, ErrNotFound
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("CapacityRepo.Get: %w", err)
+	}
+	return &c, nil
+}
+
+// List returns all capacity rows ordered by node_id.
+func (r *CapacityRepo) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*NodeCapacity, error) {
+	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
+		SELECT node_id, cpu_millicores, memory_mib, disk_mib, updated_at
+		FROM node_capacity ORDER BY node_id
+	`)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("CapacityRepo.List: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	var out []*NodeCapacity
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var c NodeCapacity
+		if err := rows.Scan(&c.NodeID, &c.CPUMillicores, &c.MemoryMiB, &c.DiskMiB, &c.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("CapacityRepo.List: scan: %w", err)
+		}
+		out = append(out, &c)
+	}
+	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("CapacityRepo.List: rows: %w", err)
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Delete removes the capacity row for nodeID. Returns ErrNotFound if
+// the row doesn't exist.
+func (r *CapacityRepo) Delete(ctx context.Context, nodeID string) error {
+	res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM node_capacity WHERE node_id = ?`, nodeID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("CapacityRepo.Delete: %w", err)
+	}
+	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("CapacityRepo.Delete: rows: %w", err)
+	}
+	if n == 0 {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}

internal/store/capacity_repo_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestCapacityRepoUpsertGetList(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	db, err := Open(filepath.Join(dir, "test.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Open: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	repo := NewCapacityRepo(db)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Empty initially.
+	if _, err := repo.Get(ctx, "self"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected ErrNotFound on empty store")
+	}
+	rows, err := repo.List(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("List: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(rows) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("List: got %d rows, want 0", len(rows))
+	}
+
+	// Insert.
+	c1 := &NodeCapacity{NodeID: "self", CPUMillicores: 4000, MemoryMiB: 4096, DiskMiB: 4096}
+	if err := repo.Upsert(ctx, c1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Upsert: %v", err)
+	}
+	got, err := repo.Get(ctx, "self")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Get: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.CPUMillicores != 4000 || got.MemoryMiB != 4096 || got.DiskMiB != 4096 {
+		t.Errorf("Get: got %+v, want cpu=4000 mem=4096 disk=4096", got)
+	}
+
+	// Update (overwrite).
+	c2 := &NodeCapacity{NodeID: "self", CPUMillicores: 8000, MemoryMiB: 8192, DiskMiB: 8192}
+	if err := repo.Upsert(ctx, c2); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Upsert(update): %v", err)
+	}
+	got, _ = repo.Get(ctx, "self")
+	if got.CPUMillicores != 8000 {
+		t.Errorf("Update: cpu=%d, want 8000", got.CPUMillicores)
+	}
+
+	// Add a second node.
+	c3 := &NodeCapacity{NodeID: "peer-1", CPUMillicores: 2000, MemoryMiB: 2048, DiskMiB: 2048}
+	if err := repo.Upsert(ctx, c3); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Upsert(peer-1): %v", err)
+	}
+	rows, _ = repo.List(ctx)
+	if len(rows) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("List: got %d rows, want 2", len(rows))
+	}
+
+	// Delete.
+	if err := repo.Delete(ctx, "peer-1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Delete: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := repo.Get(ctx, "peer-1"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected ErrNotFound after Delete")
+	}
+	if err := repo.Delete(ctx, "missing"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected ErrNotFound on Delete of missing row")
+	}
+}

internal/store/cert_repo_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func openCertTestDB(t *testing.T) (*CertRepo, func()) {
+	t.Helper()
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db")
+	db, err := Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	return NewCertRepo(db), func() { _ = db.Close() }
+}
+
+func sampleCert(id, nodeID, serial string, createdAt time.Time) *Cert {
+	return &Cert{
+		ID:          id,
+		Kind:        CertKindServer,
+		NodeID:      nodeID,
+		SerialHex:   serial,
+		SubjectCN:   "cn-" + id,
+		IssuerCN:    "issuer-" + id,
+		NotBefore:   createdAt.Add(-time.Hour),
+		NotAfter:    createdAt.Add(24 * time.Hour),
+		Fingerprint: "fp-" + id,
+		SourcePath:  "/path/" + id,
+		CreatedAt:   createdAt,
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_InsertAndGet(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	createdAt := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
+	want := sampleCert("cert-1", "node-1", "AA", createdAt)
+
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, want); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	got, err := repo.Get(ctx, "cert-1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.ID != want.ID {
+		t.Errorf("id = %q, want %q", got.ID, want.ID)
+	}
+	if got.Kind != want.Kind {
+		t.Errorf("kind = %q, want %q", got.Kind, want.Kind)
+	}
+	if got.NodeID != want.NodeID {
+		t.Errorf("node_id = %q, want %q", got.NodeID, want.NodeID)
+	}
+	if got.SerialHex != want.SerialHex {
+		t.Errorf("serial_hex = %q, want %q", got.SerialHex, want.SerialHex)
+	}
+	if got.SubjectCN != want.SubjectCN {
+		t.Errorf("subject_cn = %q, want %q", got.SubjectCN, want.SubjectCN)
+	}
+	if got.IssuerCN != want.IssuerCN {
+		t.Errorf("issuer_cn = %q, want %q", got.IssuerCN, want.IssuerCN)
+	}
+	if !got.NotBefore.Equal(want.NotBefore) {
+		t.Errorf("not_before = %v, want %v", got.NotBefore, want.NotBefore)
+	}
+	if !got.NotAfter.Equal(want.NotAfter) {
+		t.Errorf("not_after = %v, want %v", got.NotAfter, want.NotAfter)
+	}
+	if got.Fingerprint != want.Fingerprint {
+		t.Errorf("fingerprint = %q, want %q", got.Fingerprint, want.Fingerprint)
+	}
+	if got.SourcePath != want.SourcePath {
+		t.Errorf("source_path = %q, want %q", got.SourcePath, want.SourcePath)
+	}
+	if !got.CreatedAt.Equal(want.CreatedAt) {
+		t.Errorf("created_at = %v, want %v", got.CreatedAt, want.CreatedAt)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_InsertNil(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for nil cert, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_InsertMissingID(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	c := sampleCert("", "node-1", "AA", time.Now().UTC())
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, c); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for missing ID, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_InsertMissingKind(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	c := sampleCert("cert-1", "node-1", "AA", time.Now().UTC())
+	c.Kind = ""
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, c); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for missing Kind, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_InsertDuplicateSerial(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	c1 := sampleCert("cert-1", "node-1", "DUP", time.Now().UTC())
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, c1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert c1: %v", err)
+	}
+	c2 := sampleCert("cert-2", "node-1", "DUP", time.Now().UTC())
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, c2); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for duplicate serial_hex, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_GetMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	_, err := repo.Get(ctx, "nope")
+	if err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("expected ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_List(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	base := time.Now().UTC()
+	ids := []string{"old", "mid", "new"}
+	for i, id := range ids {
+		c := sampleCert(id, "node-1", "S"+id, base.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Second))
+		if err := repo.Insert(ctx, c); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("insert %s: %v", id, err)
+		}
+	}
+	got, err := repo.List(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(got) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 3 certs, got %d", len(got))
+	}
+	wantOrder := []string{"new", "mid", "old"}
+	for i, want := range wantOrder {
+		if got[i].ID != want {
+			t.Errorf("list[%d].id = %q, want %q", i, got[i].ID, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_ListByNode(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	base := time.Now().UTC()
+	for i, id := range []string{"a1", "a2"} {
+		c := sampleCert(id, "nodeA", "SA"+id, base.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Second))
+		if err := repo.Insert(ctx, c); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("insert %s: %v", id, err)
+		}
+	}
+	for i, id := range []string{"b1"} {
+		c := sampleCert(id, "nodeB", "SB"+id, base.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Second))
+		if err := repo.Insert(ctx, c); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("insert %s: %v", id, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	aCerts, err := repo.ListByNode(ctx, "nodeA")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list nodeA: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(aCerts) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 2 nodeA certs, got %d", len(aCerts))
+	}
+	for _, c := range aCerts {
+		if c.NodeID != "nodeA" {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected node_id %q in nodeA results", c.NodeID)
+		}
+	}
+
+	bCerts, err := repo.ListByNode(ctx, "nodeB")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list nodeB: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(bCerts) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 1 nodeB cert, got %d", len(bCerts))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_LatestForKind(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	base := time.Now().UTC()
+	older := sampleCert("old", "node-1", "O", base)
+	newer := sampleCert("new", "node-1", "N", base.Add(time.Minute))
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, older); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert old: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, newer); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert new: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	got, err := repo.LatestForKind(ctx, "node-1", CertKindServer)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("latest: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.ID != "new" {
+		t.Errorf("latest.id = %q, want new", got.ID)
+	}
+
+	_, err = repo.LatestForKind(ctx, "node-empty", CertKindServer)
+	if err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("expected ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_PruneOlderThan(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	base := time.Now().UTC()
+	for i, id := range []string{"c1", "c2", "c3", "c4"} {
+		c := sampleCert(id, "node-1", "S"+id, base.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Second))
+		if err := repo.Insert(ctx, c); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("insert %s: %v", id, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	n, err := repo.PruneOlderThan(ctx, "node-1", string(CertKindServer), 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("prune: %v", err)
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 1 row deleted, got %d", n)
+	}
+	remaining, err := repo.ListByNode(ctx, "node-1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(remaining) != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 3 remaining, got %d", len(remaining))
+	}
+	for _, c := range remaining {
+		if c.ID == "c1" {
+			t.Errorf("expected c1 pruned, but found")
+		}
+	}
+
+	n2, err := repo.PruneOlderThan(ctx, "node-1", string(CertKindServer), 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("prune keep=0: %v", err)
+	}
+	if n2 != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("keep=0 treated as keep=1: expected 2 deleted, got %d", n2)
+	}
+	remaining2, err := repo.ListByNode(ctx, "node-1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list after keep=0: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(remaining2) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("keep=0 treated as keep=1: expected 1 remaining, got %d", len(remaining2))
+	}
+	if remaining2[0].ID != "c4" {
+		t.Errorf("expected newest c4 retained, got %q", remaining2[0].ID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCertRepo_Delete(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openCertTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	c := sampleCert("cert-del", "node-1", "DEL", time.Now().UTC())
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, c); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := repo.Delete(ctx, "cert-del"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("delete: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := repo.Delete(ctx, "cert-del"); err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("expected ErrNotFound on second delete, got %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/store/job_task_repo.go

@@ -6,11 +6,19 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"iter"
+	"log/slog"
 	"time"
 
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
 )
 
+// watchInterval is the poll cadence used by JobRepo.Watch and NodeRepo.Watch.
+// It is an unexported package var (default 1s) so tests can override it to a
+// small value for deterministic assertions (D-043). Do not change it from
+// production code paths.
+var watchInterval = 1 * time.Second
+
 type JobRepo struct {
 	db *sql.DB
 }
@@ -59,6 +67,52 @@ func (r *JobRepo) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*model.Job, error) {
 	return jobs, rows.Err()
 }
 
+// Watch yields the full snapshot of jobs on a watchInterval ticker until ctx
+// is cancelled or the consumer stops pulling (yield returns false). It does
+// not spawn a goroutine; the polling loop runs inline in the caller's
+// goroutine via the range-over-func pull protocol (D-032).
+//
+// Each tick re-runs the List query and yields one []*model.Job snapshot
+// containing ALL rows for that tick (G-001). The first yield happens
+// immediately before the first ticker wait, so the consumer sees the initial
+// state with no watchInterval delay (G-002). Transient query/scan errors are
+// logged via slog.Default().Warn and the loop continues to the next tick
+// rather than terminating the stream (D-034 lite). The ticker is stopped and
+// rows are closed on every exit path (ctx.Done, yield==false, scan error).
+func (r *JobRepo) Watch(ctx context.Context) iter.Seq[[]*model.Job] {
+	return func(yield func([]*model.Job) bool) {
+		ticker := time.NewTicker(watchInterval)
+		defer ticker.Stop()
+		for {
+			rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
+				`SELECT id, name, spec, status, exit_code, created_at, started_at, ended_at FROM jobs ORDER BY created_at DESC`)
+			if err != nil {
+				slog.Default().Warn("watch jobs: query failed", "error", err)
+				// fall through to the select to wait for the next tick
+			} else {
+				snapshot := make([]*model.Job, 0)
+				for rows.Next() {
+					j, scanErr := scanJob(rows)
+					if scanErr != nil {
+						slog.Default().Warn("watch jobs: scan failed", "error", scanErr)
+						continue
+					}
+					snapshot = append(snapshot, j)
+				}
+				rows.Close()
+				if !yield(snapshot) {
+					return // consumer stopped pulling
+				}
+			}
+			select {
+			case <-ctx.Done():
+				return
+			case <-ticker.C:
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func (r *JobRepo) UpdateStatus(ctx context.Context, id string, status model.JobStatus, exitCode int) error {
 	now := time.Now().UTC()
 	var startedAt, endedAt *time.Time

internal/store/job_task_repo_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
+)
+
+func openJobTestDB(t *testing.T) (*JobRepo, func()) {
+	t.Helper()
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db")
+	db, err := Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	return NewJobRepo(db), func() { _ = db.Close() }
+}
+
+func insertJob(t *testing.T, repo *JobRepo, ctx context.Context, id, name string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, &model.Job{
+		ID:     id,
+		Name:   name,
+		Spec:   "test",
+		Status: model.JobStatusPending,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert job %s: %v", id, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// withFastWatch sets watchInterval to a small value for deterministic tests and
+// restores the default (1s) on cleanup.
+func withFastWatch(t *testing.T, d time.Duration) {
+	t.Helper()
+	prev := watchInterval
+	watchInterval = d
+	t.Cleanup(func() { watchInterval = prev })
+}
+
+// TestJobRepoWatch_YieldsSnapshots verifies each yield is a complete tick
+// snapshot (G-001): the first snapshot contains only the first job, and a
+// later snapshot contains both jobs after a second insert.
+func TestJobRepoWatch_YieldsSnapshots(t *testing.T) {
+	withFastWatch(t, 10*time.Millisecond)
+	repo, cleanup := openJobTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	insertJob(t, repo, ctx, "job-1", "alpha")
+
+	var snapshots [][]*model.Job
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+		for snap := range repo.Watch(ctx) {
+			snapshots = append(snapshots, snap)
+			if len(snapshots) >= 40 {
+				cancel()
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// Insert a second job after a short delay so a later tick observes it.
+	// Use a background context — the watch ctx may be cancelled by the
+	// goroutine above once it collects enough snapshots.
+	time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	insertJob(t, repo, context.Background(), "job-2", "beta")
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("watch did not complete within 2s")
+	}
+
+	if len(snapshots) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected at least one snapshot, got none")
+	}
+	// First snapshot must contain only the first job (G-001).
+	if len(snapshots[0]) != 1 || snapshots[0][0].ID != "job-1" {
+		t.Errorf("first snapshot = %+v, want only job-1", snapshots[0])
+	}
+	// At least one later snapshot must contain both jobs.
+	foundBoth := false
+	for _, snap := range snapshots[1:] {
+		ids := make(map[string]bool, len(snap))
+		for _, j := range snap {
+			ids[j.ID] = true
+		}
+		if ids["job-1"] && ids["job-2"] {
+			foundBoth = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !foundBoth {
+		t.Errorf("no snapshot contained both jobs; snapshots=%v", snapshots)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestJobRepoWatch_ImmediateFirstYield verifies G-002: the first snapshot
+// arrives before the first ticker wait, i.e. well under the watchInterval.
+func TestJobRepoWatch_ImmediateFirstYield(t *testing.T) {
+	withFastWatch(t, 200*time.Millisecond)
+	repo, cleanup := openJobTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	insertJob(t, repo, ctx, "job-immediate", "first")
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	var firstSnap []*model.Job
+	got := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		for snap := range repo.Watch(ctx) {
+			firstSnap = snap
+			close(got)
+			cancel()
+			return
+		}
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-got:
+	case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
+		t.Fatal("first yield took >100ms; expected immediate (G-002)")
+	}
+
+	elapsed := time.Since(start)
+	if elapsed > 100*time.Millisecond {
+		t.Errorf("first yield took %v; expected immediate (G-002)", elapsed)
+	}
+	if len(firstSnap) != 1 || firstSnap[0].ID != "job-immediate" {
+		t.Errorf("first snapshot = %+v, want job-immediate", firstSnap)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestJobRepoWatch_StopsOnConsumerBreak verifies the yield==false path: the
+// range loop returns promptly when the consumer breaks after the first yield.
+func TestJobRepoWatch_StopsOnConsumerBreak(t *testing.T) {
+	withFastWatch(t, 10*time.Millisecond)
+	repo, cleanup := openJobTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	insertJob(t, repo, ctx, "job-break", "break")
+
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+		for range repo.Watch(ctx) {
+			break // stop pulling immediately after the first snapshot
+		}
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+		// success: range returned
+	case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
+		t.Fatal("watch did not stop on consumer break within 500ms")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestJobRepoWatch_StopsOnCtxCancel verifies the loop exits promptly after
+// ctx is cancelled.
+func TestJobRepoWatch_StopsOnCtxCancel(t *testing.T) {
+	withFastWatch(t, 10*time.Millisecond)
+	repo, cleanup := openJobTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+
+	insertJob(t, repo, ctx, "job-cancel", "cancel")
+
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+		for range repo.Watch(ctx) {
+			// drain until cancelled
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// Let at least one tick land, then cancel.
+	time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	cancel()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+		// success
+	case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
+		t.Fatal("watch did not stop on ctx cancel within 500ms")
+	}
+}

internal/store/migrate.go

@@ -12,6 +12,21 @@ import (
 //go:embed migrations/*.sql
 var migrationsFS embed.FS
 
+// MigrationVersion returns the name of the highest applied migration
+// (e.g. "0005_node_capacity.sql"). Returns ("", nil) if no migrations
+// have been applied (fresh or empty database).
+func MigrationVersion(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) (string, error) {
+	var name string
+	err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT name FROM schema_migrations ORDER BY name DESC LIMIT 1`).Scan(&name)
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("query migration version: %w", err)
+	}
+	return name, nil
+}
+
 func migrate(db *sql.DB) error {
 	entries, err := migrationsFS.ReadDir("migrations")
 	if err != nil {

internal/store/migrate_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestMigrationVersion(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	db, err := Open(filepath.Join(dir, "test.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	version, err := MigrationVersion(ctx, db)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("migration version: %v", err)
+	}
+	if version != "0007_certs_serial_unique.sql" {
+		t.Errorf("MigrationVersion = %q, want 0007_certs_serial_unique.sql", version)
+	}
+
+	// Empty the migrations table → should return ("", nil).
+	if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, "DELETE FROM schema_migrations"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("clear migrations: %v", err)
+	}
+	version, err = MigrationVersion(ctx, db)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("migration version after clear: %v", err)
+	}
+	if version != "" {
+		t.Errorf("MigrationVersion after clear = %q, want empty", version)
+	}
+}

internal/store/migrations/0005_node_capacity.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-- Node capacity declaration for multi-node scheduling (v0.2 P02).
+-- Loaded from `~/.orca/node.hcl` at `orca node join` and updated via
+-- `orca node capacity --set`. Read by the dispatcher for bin-packing.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS node_capacity (
+    node_id         TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    cpu_millicores  INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    memory_mib      INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    disk_mib        INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    updated_at      DATETIME NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_capacity_updated ON node_capacity(updated_at);

internal/store/migrations/0006_node_kind_os.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-- Node kind and OS columns (v0.6 P01, REQ-049).
+-- Nullable for backward compatibility: existing rows get NULL, which
+-- the Go scanNode helper maps to "" (empty string). New rows from
+-- `orca init` get kind='localhost', os=<detected>; proxmox joins get
+-- kind='proxmox', os='pve'.
+ALTER TABLE nodes ADD COLUMN kind TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE nodes ADD COLUMN os TEXT;
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_nodes_kind ON nodes(kind);

internal/store/migrations/0007_certs_serial_unique.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-- Enforce uniqueness of serial_hex (ideation I-107): no two certs
+-- issued by orca may share the same serial. Implemented as a UNIQUE
+-- INDEX so existing 0004_certs.sql need not be re-run on deployed
+-- databases. v0.7 P01 (REQ-053 companion).
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_certs_serial_unique ON certs(serial_hex);

internal/store/node_repo.go

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"iter"
+	"log/slog"
 	"time"
 
 	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/model"
@@ -36,8 +38,8 @@ func (r *NodeRepo) Insert(ctx context.Context, n *model.Node) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("marshal metadata: %w", err)
 	}
 	_, err = r.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`INSERT INTO nodes (id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
-		n.ID, n.Name, n.Address, string(n.State), n.JoinedAt, n.LastSeen, string(metaJSON))
+		`INSERT INTO nodes (id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata, kind, os) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+		n.ID, n.Name, n.Address, string(n.State), n.JoinedAt, n.LastSeen, string(metaJSON), n.Kind, n.OS)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("insert node: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -46,13 +48,19 @@ func (r *NodeRepo) Insert(ctx context.Context, n *model.Node) error {
 
 func (r *NodeRepo) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*model.Node, error) {
 	row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
-		`SELECT id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata FROM nodes WHERE id = ?`, id)
+		`SELECT id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata, kind, os FROM nodes WHERE id = ?`, id)
+	return scanNode(row)
+}
+
+func (r *NodeRepo) GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*model.Node, error) {
+	row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata, kind, os FROM nodes WHERE name = ? ORDER BY joined_at ASC LIMIT 1`, name)
 	return scanNode(row)
 }
 
 func (r *NodeRepo) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*model.Node, error) {
 	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
-		`SELECT id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata FROM nodes ORDER BY joined_at ASC`)
+		`SELECT id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata, kind, os FROM nodes ORDER BY joined_at ASC`)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("list nodes: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -69,6 +77,40 @@ func (r *NodeRepo) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*model.Node, error) {
 	return nodes, rows.Err()
 }
 
+func (r *NodeRepo) Watch(ctx context.Context) iter.Seq[[]*model.Node] {
+	return func(yield func([]*model.Node) bool) {
+		ticker := time.NewTicker(watchInterval)
+		defer ticker.Stop()
+		for {
+			rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
+				`SELECT id, name, address, state, joined_at, last_seen, metadata, kind, os FROM nodes ORDER BY joined_at ASC`)
+			if err != nil {
+				slog.Default().Warn("watch nodes: query failed", "error", err)
+				// fall through to the select to wait for the next tick
+			} else {
+				snapshot := make([]*model.Node, 0)
+				for rows.Next() {
+					n, scanErr := scanNode(rows)
+					if scanErr != nil {
+						slog.Default().Warn("watch nodes: scan failed", "error", scanErr)
+						continue
+					}
+					snapshot = append(snapshot, n)
+				}
+				rows.Close()
+				if !yield(snapshot) {
+					return // consumer stopped pulling
+				}
+			}
+			select {
+			case <-ctx.Done():
+				return
+			case <-ticker.C:
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func (r *NodeRepo) UpdateState(ctx context.Context, id string, state model.NodeState) error {
 	res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx,
 		`UPDATE nodes SET state = ?, last_seen = ? WHERE id = ?`,
@@ -83,6 +125,23 @@ func (r *NodeRepo) UpdateState(ctx context.Context, id string, state model.NodeS
 	return nil
 }
 
+// UpdateLastSeenAndOS refreshes the last_seen timestamp and os field
+// of an existing node without changing its id or joined_at. Used by
+// `orca init` re-runs to refresh the localhost node (D-036 idempotency).
+func (r *NodeRepo) UpdateLastSeenAndOS(ctx context.Context, id, os string) error {
+	res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`UPDATE nodes SET last_seen = ?, os = ? WHERE id = ?`,
+		time.Now().UTC(), os, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("update node last_seen+os: %w", err)
+	}
+	rows, _ := res.RowsAffected()
+	if rows == 0 {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (r *NodeRepo) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM nodes WHERE id = ?`, id)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -104,8 +163,10 @@ func scanNode(s scanner) (*model.Node, error) {
 		n        model.Node
 		state    string
 		metaJSON sql.NullString
+		kind     sql.NullString
+		os       sql.NullString
 	)
-	err := s.Scan(&n.ID, &n.Name, &n.Address, &state, &n.JoinedAt, &n.LastSeen, &metaJSON)
+	err := s.Scan(&n.ID, &n.Name, &n.Address, &state, &n.JoinedAt, &n.LastSeen, &metaJSON, &kind, &os)
 	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
 	}
@@ -118,5 +179,8 @@ func scanNode(s scanner) (*model.Node, error) {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal metadata: %w", err)
 		}
 	}
+	// Map SQL NULL → "" for backward compatibility with pre-0006 rows.
+	n.Kind = kind.String
+	n.OS = os.String
 	return &n, nil
 }

internal/store/node_repo_test.go

@@ -100,3 +100,272 @@ func TestNodeRepo_Delete(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("expected ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestNodeRepo_KindOS_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	n := &model.Node{
+		ID: "kind-os-1", Name: "localhost", Address: "localhost:8443",
+		State: model.NodeStateReady, JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+		Kind: string(model.NodeKindLocalhost), OS: "ubuntu",
+	}
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, n); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert: %v", err)
+	}
+	got, err := repo.Get(ctx, "kind-os-1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.Kind != "localhost" {
+		t.Errorf("kind = %q, want localhost", got.Kind)
+	}
+	if got.OS != "ubuntu" {
+		t.Errorf("os = %q, want ubuntu", got.OS)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNodeRepo_NullKindOS_EmptyString(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	// Insert with empty Kind/OS — simulates a pre-0006 row or a node
+	// that doesn't set kind/os.
+	n := &model.Node{
+		ID: "null-kind-os", Name: "legacy", Address: "addr",
+		JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+	}
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, n); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert: %v", err)
+	}
+	got, err := repo.Get(ctx, "null-kind-os")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.Kind != "" {
+		t.Errorf("kind = %q, want empty string for NULL", got.Kind)
+	}
+	if got.OS != "" {
+		t.Errorf("os = %q, want empty string for NULL", got.OS)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNodeRepo_GetByName(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	_ = repo.Insert(ctx, &model.Node{
+		ID: "by-name-1", Name: "localhost", Address: "addr",
+		JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(), LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+		Kind: "localhost", OS: "ubuntu",
+	})
+
+	got, err := repo.GetByName(ctx, "localhost")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get by name: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.ID != "by-name-1" {
+		t.Errorf("id = %q, want by-name-1", got.ID)
+	}
+
+	_, err = repo.GetByName(ctx, "nonexistent")
+	if err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("expected ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNodeRepo_UpdateLastSeenAndOS(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	original := time.Now().UTC().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
+	n := &model.Node{
+		ID: "update-os-1", Name: "localhost", Address: "addr",
+		JoinedAt: original, LastSeen: original,
+		Kind: "localhost", OS: "ubuntu",
+	}
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, n); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if err := repo.UpdateLastSeenAndOS(ctx, "update-os-1", "debian"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("update last_seen+os: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	got, err := repo.Get(ctx, "update-os-1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.OS != "debian" {
+		t.Errorf("os = %q, want debian", got.OS)
+	}
+	if !got.LastSeen.After(original) {
+		t.Errorf("last_seen not refreshed: %v", got.LastSeen)
+	}
+	if !got.JoinedAt.Equal(original) {
+		t.Errorf("joined_at changed: was %v, now %v (D-036 violation)", original, got.JoinedAt)
+	}
+	if got.ID != "update-os-1" {
+		t.Errorf("id changed: %q (D-036 violation)", got.ID)
+	}
+}
+
+func insertNode(t *testing.T, repo *NodeRepo, ctx context.Context, id, name string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err := repo.Insert(ctx, &model.Node{
+		ID:       id,
+		Name:     name,
+		Address:  "addr",
+		State:    model.NodeStateReady,
+		JoinedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
+		LastSeen: time.Now().UTC(),
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert node %s: %v", id, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNodeRepoWatch_YieldsSnapshots(t *testing.T) {
+	withFastWatch(t, 10*time.Millisecond)
+	repo, cleanup := openTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	insertNode(t, repo, ctx, "node-1", "alpha")
+
+	var snapshots [][]*model.Node
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+		for snap := range repo.Watch(ctx) {
+			snapshots = append(snapshots, snap)
+			if len(snapshots) >= 40 {
+				cancel()
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	insertNode(t, repo, context.Background(), "node-2", "beta")
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("watch did not complete within 2s")
+	}
+
+	if len(snapshots) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected at least one snapshot, got none")
+	}
+	if len(snapshots[0]) != 1 || snapshots[0][0].ID != "node-1" {
+		t.Errorf("first snapshot = %+v, want only node-1", snapshots[0])
+	}
+	foundBoth := false
+	for _, snap := range snapshots[1:] {
+		ids := make(map[string]bool, len(snap))
+		for _, n := range snap {
+			ids[n.ID] = true
+		}
+		if ids["node-1"] && ids["node-2"] {
+			foundBoth = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !foundBoth {
+		t.Errorf("no snapshot contained both nodes; snapshots=%v", snapshots)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNodeRepoWatch_ImmediateFirstYield(t *testing.T) {
+	withFastWatch(t, 200*time.Millisecond)
+	repo, cleanup := openTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	insertNode(t, repo, ctx, "node-immediate", "first")
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	var firstSnap []*model.Node
+	got := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		for snap := range repo.Watch(ctx) {
+			firstSnap = snap
+			close(got)
+			cancel()
+			return
+		}
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-got:
+	case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
+		t.Fatal("first yield took >100ms; expected immediate (G-002)")
+	}
+
+	elapsed := time.Since(start)
+	if elapsed > 100*time.Millisecond {
+		t.Errorf("first yield took %v; expected immediate (G-002)", elapsed)
+	}
+	if len(firstSnap) != 1 || firstSnap[0].ID != "node-immediate" {
+		t.Errorf("first snapshot = %+v, want node-immediate", firstSnap)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNodeRepoWatch_StopsOnConsumerBreak(t *testing.T) {
+	withFastWatch(t, 10*time.Millisecond)
+	repo, cleanup := openTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	insertNode(t, repo, ctx, "node-break", "break")
+
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+		for range repo.Watch(ctx) {
+			break
+		}
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
+		t.Fatal("watch did not stop on consumer break within 500ms")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNodeRepoWatch_StopsOnCtxCancel(t *testing.T) {
+	withFastWatch(t, 10*time.Millisecond)
+	repo, cleanup := openTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+
+	insertNode(t, repo, ctx, "node-cancel", "cancel")
+
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(done)
+		for range repo.Watch(ctx) {
+		}
+	}()
+
+	time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	cancel()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
+		t.Fatal("watch did not stop on ctx cancel within 500ms")
+	}
+}

internal/store/store.go

@@ -7,15 +7,13 @@ import (
 	"path/filepath"
 
 	_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
+
+	"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/certpaths"
 )
 
 func Open(path string) (*sql.DB, error) {
 	if path == "" {
-		home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("get home dir: %w", err)
-		}
-		path = filepath.Join(home, ".orca", "orca.db")
+		path = certpaths.DBPath()
 	}
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create db dir: %w", err)