chore(P13): final review + audit — v0.13 milestone complete
All 15 v0.13 requirements (REQ-149..REQ-163) marked complete. All 14 phases shipped (P0..P13, tags v0.12.0..v0.12.12). 163 requirements consistent with roadmap (verify-reqs passes). ROADMAP.md marks v0.13 COMPLETE. All Go tests pass. Build clean. Milestone deliverables: - R-022: orca job run deploys to remote nodes via scheduler+emitter+SSH-push - R-023: zero-trust enforcement wired (acl.Check on every request path) - 11 injection vectors fixed - Go toolchain bumped to 1.25.12 (24 stdlib vulns closed) - Audit chain race fixed (BEGIN IMMEDIATE) - Concurrency safety (SQLite busy_timeout, flock, cache invalidation) - Transport safety (typed errors, IPv6, SSH timeouts, signal handler) - Migration safety (job stop real systemctl, backup+atomic-rename) - Observability (7 new metrics, security headers) - Doc drift fixed (README, cli.md, CHANGELOG, verify-reqs regex) - --type linux SSH-join for Ubuntu workers - docs/uat.md (3-host topology, 35-claim matrix) - scripts/uat-signoff.sh (35 assertions, idempotent, v1.0 gate) - scripts/uat-smoke.sh (13 CI assertions) v1.0.0 production-ready tag stays deferred for UAT signoff. Operator runs scripts/uat-signoff.sh, pastes output, CI agent cuts v1.0.0. ---ci--- project: orca phase: 13 milestone: v0.13 status: complete requirements: covered: [149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163] ---/ci---
This commit is contained in:
Jon Chery
@@ -1,21 +1,26 @@
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{
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"phase": 1,
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"phase": 13,
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"stage": "complete",
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"milestone": "v0.13",
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"milestone_slug": "production-hardening-2",
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"phase_role": "execution",
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"phase_role": "final",
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"attempts": 0,
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"updated_at": "2026-08-07T19:05:00Z",
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"milestone_complete": false,
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"updated_at": "2026-08-10T14:30:00Z",
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"milestone_complete": true,
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"previous_milestone": "v0.12",
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"phase_count": 14,
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"phases_shipped": ["P0", "P1"],
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"tags_shipped": ["v0.12.0", "v0.12.1"],
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"phases_shipped": ["P0","P1","P2","P3","P4","P5","P6","P7","P8","P9","P10","P11","P12","P13"],
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"tags_shipped": ["v0.12.0","v0.12.1","v0.12.2","v0.12.3","v0.12.4","v0.12.5","v0.12.6","v0.12.7","v0.12.8","v0.12.9","v0.12.10","v0.12.11","v0.12.12"],
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"requirements": {
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"covered": [149],
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"covered": [149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163],
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"partial": []
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},
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"binding_conditions": ["C-39","C-40","C-41","C-42","C-43","C-44","C-45","C-46","C-47","C-48","C-49"],
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"load_bearing_rule": "R-022",
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"next_milestone": "v1.0"
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"next_milestone": "v1.0",
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"ship": {
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"tag": "v0.12.13",
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"merged_to_milestone": true,
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"milestone_release": "v0.13"
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}
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}
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+16
-16
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ zero-trust identity model (R-021). See ROADMAP.md for the 29-phase plan
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## Milestone v0.13: Production Hardening Round 2 + UAT Plan
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**Status**: in progress (2026-08-07). v0.12 (Security Hardening) is
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**Status**: complete (2026-08-10). v0.12 (Security Hardening) is
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COMPLETE; v0.13 is the final hardening round before the v1.0.0
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production-ready tag. v1.0.0 is gated on the UAT signoff script
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(`scripts/uat-signoff.sh`) delivered by this milestone.
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@@ -320,41 +320,41 @@ production-ready tag. v1.0.0 is gated on the UAT signoff script
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| ID | Requirement | Priority | Phase | Status |
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|----|-------------|----------|-------|--------|
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| REQ-149 | Go toolchain bump to 1.25.12+ (closes 24 stdlib vulns: archive/tar GO-2025-4014/GO-2026-4869, crypto/tls GO-2026-5856/GO-2025-4008, crypto/x509 GO-2026-5037/4947/4946/GO-2025-4175/4155/4013, net/http GO-2026-4918/GO-2025-4012, net/url GO-2026-4601/4341/GO-2025-4010, encoding/pem GO-2025-4009, os GO-2026-4602); `govulncheck -show verbose` triage of 6 imported third-party vulns; bump deps with reachable traces | High | **v0.13 P01** | pending |
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| REQ-150 | Input validation & injection hardening: (a) `orca logs --job` validate against `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$`, use `shellQuote` not `%q` (critical: backtick RCE via SSH fanout); (b) pprof `isLoopback(":6060")` treat empty host as non-loopback/bind-all, reject unless explicit public-allow flag wired; remove phantom `--pprof-allow-public` references, make loopback-only a hard invariant; (c) backup restore tar-slip fix: use `filepath.Rel(target, dest)` containment check instead of `HasPrefix(name, "..")`; (d) `orca txn rollback` validate txn ID against `^T-[0-9a-f]{16}$`; (e) `orca nft diff --against` validate txn ID before `filepath.Join`; (f) `drain stopAlloc` validate `allocID` against `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$` before `systemctl stop`; (g) `cluster_compat` `shellQuote(first)` for peer dir name; (h) `runtime/podman.go` use `shellQuote(image)` not `%q`; (i) nft `TrustedProbes` validate each entry with `net.ParseIP`/`net.ParseCIDR`; (j) sudoers: validate `--proxmox-user`/`--proxmox-role` against `^[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,31}$`; write to fixed `/etc/sudoers.d/orca`; `shellQuote` all pveum/useradd; `validateSudoers` check the actual file written; (k) `nft country block add` validate `^[A-Z]{2}$` | Critical | **v0.13 P02** | pending |
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| REQ-149 | Go toolchain bump to 1.25.12+ (closes 24 stdlib vulns: archive/tar GO-2025-4014/GO-2026-4869, crypto/tls GO-2026-5856/GO-2025-4008, crypto/x509 GO-2026-5037/4947/4946/GO-2025-4175/4155/4013, net/http GO-2026-4918/GO-2025-4012, net/url GO-2026-4601/4341/GO-2025-4010, encoding/pem GO-2025-4009, os GO-2026-4602); `govulncheck -show verbose` triage of 6 imported third-party vulns; bump deps with reachable traces | High | **v0.13 P01** | complete |
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| REQ-150 | Input validation & injection hardening: (a) `orca logs --job` validate against `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$`, use `shellQuote` not `%q` (critical: backtick RCE via SSH fanout); (b) pprof `isLoopback(":6060")` treat empty host as non-loopback/bind-all, reject unless explicit public-allow flag wired; remove phantom `--pprof-allow-public` references, make loopback-only a hard invariant; (c) backup restore tar-slip fix: use `filepath.Rel(target, dest)` containment check instead of `HasPrefix(name, "..")`; (d) `orca txn rollback` validate txn ID against `^T-[0-9a-f]{16}$`; (e) `orca nft diff --against` validate txn ID before `filepath.Join`; (f) `drain stopAlloc` validate `allocID` against `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$` before `systemctl stop`; (g) `cluster_compat` `shellQuote(first)` for peer dir name; (h) `runtime/podman.go` use `shellQuote(image)` not `%q`; (i) nft `TrustedProbes` validate each entry with `net.ParseIP`/`net.ParseCIDR`; (j) sudoers: validate `--proxmox-user`/`--proxmox-role` against `^[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,31}$`; write to fixed `/etc/sudoers.d/orca`; `shellQuote` all pveum/useradd; `validateSudoers` check the actual file written; (k) `nft country block add` validate `^[A-Z]{2}$` | Critical | **v0.13 P02** | complete |
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### Wave B — Scheduler wiring & jobspec parser (architectural)
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| ID | Requirement | Priority | Phase | Status |
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|----|-------------|----------|-------|--------|
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| REQ-151 | Scheduler/deployment wiring: wire `internal/scheduler.Schedule()` into `orca job run` — replace local `exec.CommandContext` path with: evaluate constraints/capacity/affinity via scheduler → render systemd units via `internal/emitter` → SSH-push to target via `internal/sshpush`; `--target` overrides scheduler selection; capacity enforced (reject job if no node fits); CEL constraints evaluated; affinity weighted scoring; `systemd-analyze verify` on rendered unit before deploy; `job run` without `--target` uses scheduler bin-packing across registered nodes | Critical | **v0.13 P03** | pending |
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| REQ-152 | jobspec parser fixes: add `case "schedule":` and `case "timeout":` to top-level switch in `internal/jobspec/markdown.go` (currently silently dropped); fix DaemonSet — parser must not default Count to 1 for DaemonSet (validator rejects Count!=0); DaemonSet schedule block actually parsed and stored; `timeout:` on Jobs parsed and enforced (kill after duration); `restart:` policy translated to systemd `Restart=`/`StartLimitBurst` in emitter; add `job lint` warnings for advisory-only fields (cron, health, update, affinity) with honest "not enforced in this version" message | Critical | **v0.13 P03** | pending |
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| REQ-151 | Scheduler/deployment wiring: wire `internal/scheduler.Schedule()` into `orca job run` — replace local `exec.CommandContext` path with: evaluate constraints/capacity/affinity via scheduler → render systemd units via `internal/emitter` → SSH-push to target via `internal/sshpush`; `--target` overrides scheduler selection; capacity enforced (reject job if no node fits); CEL constraints evaluated; affinity weighted scoring; `systemd-analyze verify` on rendered unit before deploy; `job run` without `--target` uses scheduler bin-packing across registered nodes | Critical | **v0.13 P03** | complete |
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| REQ-152 | jobspec parser fixes: add `case "schedule":` and `case "timeout":` to top-level switch in `internal/jobspec/markdown.go` (currently silently dropped); fix DaemonSet — parser must not default Count to 1 for DaemonSet (validator rejects Count!=0); DaemonSet schedule block actually parsed and stored; `timeout:` on Jobs parsed and enforced (kill after duration); `restart:` policy translated to systemd `Restart=`/`StartLimitBurst` in emitter; add `job lint` warnings for advisory-only fields (cron, health, update, affinity) with honest "not enforced in this version" message | Critical | **v0.13 P03** | complete |
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### Wave C — Zero-trust enforcement wiring
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| ID | Requirement | Priority | Phase | Status |
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|----|-------------|----------|-------|--------|
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| REQ-153 | ACL enforcement + WebAuthn registration auth: (a) wire `acl.Check` into all 5 daemon handlers (`dispatch`/`jobs`/`nodes`/`tasks`/`health`) — extract OIDC sub/SPIFFE SVID from mTLS peer cert, check against ACL for namespace+verb, deny-by-default; (b) wire `acl.Check` into sshpush applier + txn apply path (validate `ORCA_OIDC_TOKEN` bearer against JWKS); (c) thread OIDC sub/SVID into audit `actor` field (replaces "cli"/"daemon"); (d) fix `acl.json` mode 0644→0600; (e) fix WebAuthn unauthenticated registration — `/orca/webauthn/register` requires existing authenticated session or admin bootstrap token; do not allow overwriting existing credentials without re-auth; (f) add flock on `acl.json` for concurrent grant/revoke | Critical | **v0.13 P04** | pending |
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| REQ-154 | Seal/audit CLI + chain race + key zeroing: (a) implement `orca cluster seal`/`unseal` (OIDC token exchange→unwrap master key→zeroed on shutdown; Shamir 3-of-5 shards printed at seal time; sealed blob at `ClusterDir()/master.key.sealed` 0600); (b) implement `orca doctor audit` (invokes `AuditRepo.VerifyChain`); (c) implement `orca doctor modes` (invokes `EnforceFileModes` across ORCA_HOME); (d) fix audit hash-chain race — `Append` uses `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` transaction; (e) fix `secrets rotate-master` to actually re-seal to OIDC; (f) zero master key / namespace keys / SVID private keys after use (defense-in-depth against pprof heap extraction) | High | **v0.13 P05** | pending |
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| REQ-155 | auth init-idp real + auth register: (a) implement `orca auth init-idp` — render Dex systemd unit + config template + Traefik dynamic route from `internal/webauthn/` connector at `https://<cluster>/orca/webauthn/{register,login}`; RP ID = cluster Traefik domain (C-38); HTTPS secure context via step-ca cert; atomic deploy with rollback; (b) implement `orca auth register` (browser flow to WebAuthn registration endpoint); (c) `loadOIDCConfig` config-file loading (`oidc.issuer` in config, not flags-only); (d) `orca doctor oidc` health check | High | **v0.13 P06** | pending |
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| REQ-153 | ACL enforcement + WebAuthn registration auth: (a) wire `acl.Check` into all 5 daemon handlers (`dispatch`/`jobs`/`nodes`/`tasks`/`health`) — extract OIDC sub/SPIFFE SVID from mTLS peer cert, check against ACL for namespace+verb, deny-by-default; (b) wire `acl.Check` into sshpush applier + txn apply path (validate `ORCA_OIDC_TOKEN` bearer against JWKS); (c) thread OIDC sub/SVID into audit `actor` field (replaces "cli"/"daemon"); (d) fix `acl.json` mode 0644→0600; (e) fix WebAuthn unauthenticated registration — `/orca/webauthn/register` requires existing authenticated session or admin bootstrap token; do not allow overwriting existing credentials without re-auth; (f) add flock on `acl.json` for concurrent grant/revoke | Critical | **v0.13 P04** | complete |
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| REQ-154 | Seal/audit CLI + chain race + key zeroing: (a) implement `orca cluster seal`/`unseal` (OIDC token exchange→unwrap master key→zeroed on shutdown; Shamir 3-of-5 shards printed at seal time; sealed blob at `ClusterDir()/master.key.sealed` 0600); (b) implement `orca doctor audit` (invokes `AuditRepo.VerifyChain`); (c) implement `orca doctor modes` (invokes `EnforceFileModes` across ORCA_HOME); (d) fix audit hash-chain race — `Append` uses `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` transaction; (e) fix `secrets rotate-master` to actually re-seal to OIDC; (f) zero master key / namespace keys / SVID private keys after use (defense-in-depth against pprof heap extraction) | High | **v0.13 P05** | complete |
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| REQ-155 | auth init-idp real + auth register: (a) implement `orca auth init-idp` — render Dex systemd unit + config template + Traefik dynamic route from `internal/webauthn/` connector at `https://<cluster>/orca/webauthn/{register,login}`; RP ID = cluster Traefik domain (C-38); HTTPS secure context via step-ca cert; atomic deploy with rollback; (b) implement `orca auth register` (browser flow to WebAuthn registration endpoint); (c) `loadOIDCConfig` config-file loading (`oidc.issuer` in config, not flags-only); (d) `orca doctor oidc` health check | High | **v0.13 P06** | complete |
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### Wave D — Concurrency, transport, migration safety
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| ID | Requirement | Priority | Phase | Status |
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|----|-------------|----------|-------|--------|
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| REQ-156 | Concurrency safety: (a) SQLite `busy_timeout(5000)` + `SetMaxOpenConns(1)` on all DSNs (store, cache, recovery, webauthn); (b) secrets file flock (concurrent `secrets set` on same ns no longer loses data); (c) upgrade lock file (refuse concurrent `orca upgrade`); (d) backup lock file; (e) cache invalidation by write commands (`node join`/`leave`, `ns create`/`delete`, `job run`/`stop` invalidate relevant cache class — read-after-write consistency); (f) `Executor.Run` mutex scope fix (hold only for DB inserts, not whole job duration); (g) `ns create` atomic dir+ns.md write; (h) `writeCurrentLead` atomic write; (i) consolidate 3 divergent `writeAtomic` impls onto `security.WriteAtomic`; (j) WebAuthn session stores guarded with `sync.Mutex` | High | **v0.13 P07** | pending |
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| REQ-157 | Transport & SSH safety: (a) replace substring matching in `transport.IsTransient` AND `sshpush.isTransient` with typed sentinels (`errors.Is`); (b) `rotateSSHKeys` 2-phase atomic swap (stage new key on all peers → atomic swap → verify → cleanup old); (c) `known_hosts` flock field actually read by `dial()` (TOFU callback uses new field, not v0.8 `certpaths.KnownHostsPath()`); (d) IPv6 `net.JoinHostPort` in proxmox SSH dial + drain `splitHostPort`; (e) explicit timeouts for all SSH commands (peer-setup, drift remediate/ack, txn rollback, job restart — use `context.WithTimeout`); (f) `verifyCutover` use `security.ClientTLSConfig` with orca CA pool; (g) OIDC callback server `ReadHeaderTimeout: 5s`; (h) root SIGINT/SIGTERM handler for non-watch commands (clean SSH session + temp file cleanup) | High | **v0.13 P08** | pending |
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| REQ-158 | Migration & operational safety: (a) migration transaction + torn-write fix — `migrateDBSchema` wraps ALTER TABLE in transaction; crash after `os.Rename` but before schema fixup is recoverable; (b) `job stop` real `systemctl stop` via SSH (matches `job restart` pattern; honest semantics); (c) DB retention/compaction for `jobs`/`tasks`/`audit_log` tables (retention policy + `orca doctor db` compaction check); (d) `orca logs --lines` cap + `--since` upper bound (prevent OOM from unbounded journalctl output); (e) cache DB mode 0600 (matches `store.Open`); (f) `upgrade.go` cutover backup-file + atomic-rename (replace direct `sed -i`) | High | **v0.13 P09** | pending |
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| REQ-156 | Concurrency safety: (a) SQLite `busy_timeout(5000)` + `SetMaxOpenConns(1)` on all DSNs (store, cache, recovery, webauthn); (b) secrets file flock (concurrent `secrets set` on same ns no longer loses data); (c) upgrade lock file (refuse concurrent `orca upgrade`); (d) backup lock file; (e) cache invalidation by write commands (`node join`/`leave`, `ns create`/`delete`, `job run`/`stop` invalidate relevant cache class — read-after-write consistency); (f) `Executor.Run` mutex scope fix (hold only for DB inserts, not whole job duration); (g) `ns create` atomic dir+ns.md write; (h) `writeCurrentLead` atomic write; (i) consolidate 3 divergent `writeAtomic` impls onto `security.WriteAtomic`; (j) WebAuthn session stores guarded with `sync.Mutex` | High | **v0.13 P07** | complete |
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| REQ-157 | Transport & SSH safety: (a) replace substring matching in `transport.IsTransient` AND `sshpush.isTransient` with typed sentinels (`errors.Is`); (b) `rotateSSHKeys` 2-phase atomic swap (stage new key on all peers → atomic swap → verify → cleanup old); (c) `known_hosts` flock field actually read by `dial()` (TOFU callback uses new field, not v0.8 `certpaths.KnownHostsPath()`); (d) IPv6 `net.JoinHostPort` in proxmox SSH dial + drain `splitHostPort`; (e) explicit timeouts for all SSH commands (peer-setup, drift remediate/ack, txn rollback, job restart — use `context.WithTimeout`); (f) `verifyCutover` use `security.ClientTLSConfig` with orca CA pool; (g) OIDC callback server `ReadHeaderTimeout: 5s`; (h) root SIGINT/SIGTERM handler for non-watch commands (clean SSH session + temp file cleanup) | High | **v0.13 P08** | complete |
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| REQ-158 | Migration & operational safety: (a) migration transaction + torn-write fix — `migrateDBSchema` wraps ALTER TABLE in transaction; crash after `os.Rename` but before schema fixup is recoverable; (b) `job stop` real `systemctl stop` via SSH (matches `job restart` pattern; honest semantics); (c) DB retention/compaction for `jobs`/`tasks`/`audit_log` tables (retention policy + `orca doctor db` compaction check); (d) `orca logs --lines` cap + `--since` upper bound (prevent OOM from unbounded journalctl output); (e) cache DB mode 0600 (matches `store.Open`); (f) `upgrade.go` cutover backup-file + atomic-rename (replace direct `sed -i`) | High | **v0.13 P09** | complete |
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### Wave E — Observability, docs, UAT
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| ID | Requirement | Priority | Phase | Status |
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|----|-------------|----------|-------|--------|
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| REQ-159 | Observability expansion: metrics add `orca_jobs_by_state` histogram, `orca_drift_events_total` counter, `orca_ssh_errors_total` counter, `orca_txn_apply_total`/`orca_txn_rollback_total` counters, `orca_acl_denials_total` counter, `orca_audit_chain_head` gauge; new `docs/metrics.md` with Prometheus scrape config; security headers middleware on daemon (`X-Content-Type-Options`, `X-Frame-Options`) | Medium | **v0.13 P10** | pending |
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| REQ-160 | Doc drift round 2: (a) README — update status banner (v0.12+v0.13 complete), latest tag, subcommand table (add `auth`/`nft`/`peer-setup`/`secrets rotate-master`), correct "mTLS by default" claim (SSH-push is canonical, mTLS deprecated), add missing docs to table; (b) `docs/cli.md` — complete rewrite covering all ~40 subcommands; (c) CHANGELOG regen; (d) help text fixes (`job run` HCL→markdown, `job stop` daemon→SSH-push); (e) `docs/webauthn.md` add `auth register`; (f) `docs/namespace.md` add `inherit`/`set-constraint`; (g) `docs/install.md`+`docker.md` update version refs; (h) `docs/security-runbook.md` match P05 reality; (i) fix `verify-reqs` bold-format regex (currently bypasses v0.12); (j) fix ROADMAP/REQUIREMENTS v0.12 status hygiene; (k) `docs/security-scanning.md` gosec.json; (l) `internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go` comments (password→key auth); (m) deprecate `orca status` stub; (n) `make verify-docs` target (cli.md ↔ `orca --help` consistency) | High | **v0.13 P11** | pending |
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| REQ-161 | `--type linux` SSH-join: implement `NodeKindLinux` path (reserved at `model/node.go:29`); new `internal/linux/bootstrap.go` mirroring Proxmox pattern — orca pubkey deploy → `orca` system user → drift-events dir → no PVE role; key-auth only (R-021); `orca node join --type linux --host <ip> --ssh-user root --ssh-key <path>`; `peer-setup.go` kept as documented fallback | High | **v0.13 P12** | pending |
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| REQ-162 | UAT plan: `docs/uat.md` — 3-host topology (lead Ubuntu 22.04 + pve01 Proxmox VE 8/9 + worker01 Ubuntu 22.04); step-by-step with exact commands (bootstrap→onboard Proxmox→onboard Ubuntu worker→capacity→namespace→deploy full stack→migrate between hosts→exercise every claim); claim matrix mapping ~35 feature claims to UAT steps; signoff procedure (run `scripts/uat-signoff.sh`, paste output) | Critical | **v0.13 P12** | pending |
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| REQ-163 | UAT signoff script: `scripts/uat-signoff.sh` — idempotent, `set -euo pipefail`, ~35 named assertions covering all feature claims; read + non-mutating only (doctor, list, --dry-run); exit 0 iff all pass; `scripts/uat-smoke.sh` — pure-CLI subset for CI `validate` (version, acl file mode, doctor modes, no-password grep, metrics shape); tests for both scripts | Critical | **v0.13 P12** | pending |
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| REQ-159 | Observability expansion: metrics add `orca_jobs_by_state` histogram, `orca_drift_events_total` counter, `orca_ssh_errors_total` counter, `orca_txn_apply_total`/`orca_txn_rollback_total` counters, `orca_acl_denials_total` counter, `orca_audit_chain_head` gauge; new `docs/metrics.md` with Prometheus scrape config; security headers middleware on daemon (`X-Content-Type-Options`, `X-Frame-Options`) | Medium | **v0.13 P10** | complete |
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| REQ-160 | Doc drift round 2: (a) README — update status banner (v0.12+v0.13 complete), latest tag, subcommand table (add `auth`/`nft`/`peer-setup`/`secrets rotate-master`), correct "mTLS by default" claim (SSH-push is canonical, mTLS deprecated), add missing docs to table; (b) `docs/cli.md` — complete rewrite covering all ~40 subcommands; (c) CHANGELOG regen; (d) help text fixes (`job run` HCL→markdown, `job stop` daemon→SSH-push); (e) `docs/webauthn.md` add `auth register`; (f) `docs/namespace.md` add `inherit`/`set-constraint`; (g) `docs/install.md`+`docker.md` update version refs; (h) `docs/security-runbook.md` match P05 reality; (i) fix `verify-reqs` bold-format regex (currently bypasses v0.12); (j) fix ROADMAP/REQUIREMENTS v0.12 status hygiene; (k) `docs/security-scanning.md` gosec.json; (l) `internal/proxmox/bootstrap.go` comments (password→key auth); (m) deprecate `orca status` stub; (n) `make verify-docs` target (cli.md ↔ `orca --help` consistency) | High | **v0.13 P11** | complete |
|
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| REQ-161 | `--type linux` SSH-join: implement `NodeKindLinux` path (reserved at `model/node.go:29`); new `internal/linux/bootstrap.go` mirroring Proxmox pattern — orca pubkey deploy → `orca` system user → drift-events dir → no PVE role; key-auth only (R-021); `orca node join --type linux --host <ip> --ssh-user root --ssh-key <path>`; `peer-setup.go` kept as documented fallback | High | **v0.13 P12** | complete |
|
||||
| REQ-162 | UAT plan: `docs/uat.md` — 3-host topology (lead Ubuntu 22.04 + pve01 Proxmox VE 8/9 + worker01 Ubuntu 22.04); step-by-step with exact commands (bootstrap→onboard Proxmox→onboard Ubuntu worker→capacity→namespace→deploy full stack→migrate between hosts→exercise every claim); claim matrix mapping ~35 feature claims to UAT steps; signoff procedure (run `scripts/uat-signoff.sh`, paste output) | Critical | **v0.13 P12** | complete |
|
||||
| REQ-163 | UAT signoff script: `scripts/uat-signoff.sh` — idempotent, `set -euo pipefail`, ~35 named assertions covering all feature claims; read + non-mutating only (doctor, list, --dry-run); exit 0 iff all pass; `scripts/uat-smoke.sh` — pure-CLI subset for CI `validate` (version, acl file mode, doctor modes, no-password grep, metrics shape); tests for both scripts | Critical | **v0.13 P12** | complete |
|
||||
|
||||
### Scope notes (v0.13)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+15
-15
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ The v1.0.0 production-ready tag stays deferred for post-v0.12 UAT
|
||||
- External CA / Let's Encrypt / cert transparency
|
||||
- Online-only features (HSTS, OCSP stapling, telemetry)
|
||||
|
||||
## Milestone v0.13: Production Hardening Round 2 + UAT Plan — IN PROGRESS
|
||||
## Milestone v0.13: Production Hardening Round 2 + UAT Plan — **COMPLETE**
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope**: final production hardening round before the v1.0.0
|
||||
production-ready tag. Three deep codebase sweeps (security, reliability,
|
||||
@@ -579,20 +579,20 @@ signoff script that gates the v1.0.0 cut.
|
||||
|
||||
### Phases (14 total: P0 + P01..P12 + P13 final)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P0: Pre-execution (SPECIFY→CLARIFY→RESEARCH→IDEATE→PLAN→GRILL) — tag `v0.12.0`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P01: Toolchain & dependency vulns (REQ-149) — tag `v0.12.1`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P02: Input validation & injection hardening (REQ-150) — tag `v0.12.2`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P03: Scheduler/deployment wiring + jobspec parser (REQ-151, REQ-152) — tag `v0.12.3`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P04: ACL enforcement + WebAuthn registration auth (REQ-153) — tag `v0.12.4`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P05: Seal/audit CLI + chain race + key zeroing (REQ-154) — tag `v0.12.5`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P06: auth init-idp real + auth register (REQ-155) — tag `v0.12.6`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P07: Concurrency safety (REQ-156) — tag `v0.12.7`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P08: Transport & SSH safety (REQ-157) — tag `v0.12.8`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P09: Migration & operational safety (REQ-158) — tag `v0.12.9`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P10: Observability & metrics (REQ-159) — tag `v0.12.10`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P11: Doc drift round 2 (REQ-160) — tag `v0.12.11`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P12: `--type linux` + UAT plan + signoff script (REQ-161, REQ-162, REQ-163) — tag `v0.12.12`
|
||||
- [ ] Phase P13: Final review + ship + audit (milestone release) — tag `v0.12.13` = **v0.13 milestone release**
|
||||
- [x] Phase P0: Pre-execution (SPECIFY→CLARIFY→RESEARCH→IDEATE→PLAN→GRILL) — tag `v0.12.0`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P01: Toolchain & dependency vulns (REQ-149) — tag `v0.12.1`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P02: Input validation & injection hardening (REQ-150) — tag `v0.12.2`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P03: Scheduler/deployment wiring + jobspec parser (REQ-151, REQ-152) — tag `v0.12.3`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P04: ACL enforcement + WebAuthn registration auth (REQ-153) — tag `v0.12.4`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P05: Seal/audit CLI + chain race + key zeroing (REQ-154) — tag `v0.12.5`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P06: auth init-idp real + auth register (REQ-155) — tag `v0.12.6`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P07: Concurrency safety (REQ-156) — tag `v0.12.7`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P08: Transport & SSH safety (REQ-157) — tag `v0.12.8`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P09: Migration & operational safety (REQ-158) — tag `v0.12.9`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P10: Observability & metrics (REQ-159) — tag `v0.12.10`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P11: Doc drift round 2 (REQ-160) — tag `v0.12.11`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P12: `--type linux` + UAT plan + signoff script (REQ-161, REQ-162, REQ-163) — tag `v0.12.12`
|
||||
- [x] Phase P13: Final review + ship + audit (milestone release) — tag `v0.12.13` = **v0.13 milestone release**
|
||||
|
||||
**Milestone tag**: `v0.12.13` (final phase patch = milestone release per
|
||||
feature-milestone rule; no separate `v0.13.0` tag). Per-phase tags:
|
||||
|
||||
Executable
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