fix(P12): backup symlink validation (REQ-127, F7)

---ci---
project: orca
phase: 12
milestone: v0.12
status: execute
---/ci---

Restore validates Linkname: rejects absolute, .. traversal, and
links escaping target dir. Prevents symlink-to-/etc/shadow attacks.
2 regression tests with crafted tarballs. Build + vet green.
This commit is contained in:
Jon Chery
2026-08-07 11:21:19 +00:00
parent d7dc2d2aad
commit 9b5c8b21f8
2 changed files with 117 additions and 0 deletions
+20
View File
@@ -310,6 +310,26 @@ func Restore(opts RestoreOptions) error {
}
continue
case tar.TypeSymlink:
// REQ-127 / F7: validate Linkname to prevent symlink attacks.
// Reject absolute links, .. traversal, and links outside
// the target dir (which could point to /etc/shadow etc.).
link := hdr.Linkname
if link == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("restore: empty symlink linkname for %q", name)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(link, "/") {
return fmt.Errorf("restore: symlink %q has absolute linkname %q (REQ-127: path traversal)", name, link)
}
if strings.Contains(link, "..") {
// Resolve the link relative to the dest dir; if it
// escapes the target, reject.
linkDest := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(dest), link)
linkClean := filepath.Clean(linkDest)
targetClean := filepath.Clean(target)
if !strings.HasPrefix(linkClean, targetClean+string(filepath.Separator)) && linkClean != targetClean {
return fmt.Errorf("restore: symlink %q linkname %q escapes target (REQ-127)", name, link)
}
}
if err := os.Remove(dest); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("restore: clear symlink %s: %w", name, err)
}
+97
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
package backup
import (
"archive/tar"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"os"
@@ -314,3 +318,96 @@ func TestBackupSignatureFileContent(t *testing.T) {
func hexDecode(s string) ([]byte, error) {
return hex.DecodeString(s)
}
// --- REQ-127 / F7 backup symlink validation tests ---
// TestRestoreRejectsAbsoluteSymlink verifies a tarball with an absolute
// symlink linkname is rejected.
func TestRestoreRejectsAbsoluteSymlink(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
// Create a crafted tarball with an absolute symlink.
tarPath := filepath.Join(dir, "evil.tar.gz")
sigPath := tarPath + ".sig"
if err := createCraftedTarball(tarPath, "link", "/etc/shadow"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create tarball: %v", err)
}
// Create a valid signature (the signature verifies, but the symlink
// validation should still reject the restore).
key := make([]byte, 32)
for i := range key {
key[i] = byte(i)
}
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
data, _ := os.ReadFile(tarPath)
mac.Write(data)
if err := os.WriteFile(sigPath, []byte(hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write sig: %v", err)
}
target := filepath.Join(dir, "restore")
os.MkdirAll(target, 0o755)
err := Restore(RestoreOptions{
InputPath: tarPath,
TargetDir: target,
MasterKey: key,
Force: true,
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Restore should reject absolute symlink (REQ-127)")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "absolute") {
t.Errorf("error should mention absolute: %v", err)
}
}
// TestRestoreRejectsTraversalSymlink verifies a tarball with a .. symlink
// that escapes the target is rejected.
func TestRestoreRejectsTraversalSymlink(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
tarPath := filepath.Join(dir, "evil2.tar.gz")
sigPath := tarPath + ".sig"
if err := createCraftedTarball(tarPath, "link", "../../etc/shadow"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create tarball: %v", err)
}
key := make([]byte, 32)
for i := range key {
key[i] = byte(i + 1)
}
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
data, _ := os.ReadFile(tarPath)
mac.Write(data)
if err := os.WriteFile(sigPath, []byte(hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write sig: %v", err)
}
target := filepath.Join(dir, "restore2")
os.MkdirAll(target, 0o755)
err := Restore(RestoreOptions{
InputPath: tarPath,
TargetDir: target,
MasterKey: key,
Force: true,
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Restore should reject traversal symlink (REQ-127)")
}
}
// createCraftedTarball creates a tar.gz containing a single symlink
// entry with the given linkname. Used to test symlink validation.
func createCraftedTarball(path, name, linkname string) error {
f, err := os.Create(path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer f.Close()
gz := gzip.NewWriter(f)
defer gz.Close()
tw := tar.NewWriter(gz)
defer tw.Close()
hdr := &tar.Header{
Name: name,
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: linkname,
Mode: 0o644,
}
return tw.WriteHeader(hdr)
}