Compare commits
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 433a870580 | |||
| e721cd2997 |
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"phase": 3,
|
||||
"phase": 4,
|
||||
"stage": "execute",
|
||||
"milestone": "v0.2",
|
||||
"phase_role": "execution",
|
||||
"project": "atelier",
|
||||
"attempts": 0,
|
||||
"updated_at": "2026-08-05T02:20:00Z",
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||||
"updated_at": "2026-08-05T02:30:00Z",
|
||||
"milestone_complete": false
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||||
}
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@@ -76,18 +76,18 @@ All 35 requirements covered. 8 core principles, 11 domains, 110 domain principle
|
||||
| ATELIER-45 | `domains/kubernetes/rbac.md` — RBAC derived doc incl. Pod Security Standards/Admission (cross-link security/authorization) | P1 | 2 | covered |
|
||||
| ATELIER-46 | `domains/kubernetes/helm.md` — Helm derived doc (with Helm vs Kustomize decision matrix) | P1 | 2 | covered |
|
||||
| ATELIER-47 | `domains/kubernetes/kustomize.md` — Kustomize derived doc (with Helm vs Kustomize decision matrix) | P1 | 2 | covered |
|
||||
| ATELIER-48 | Extend `matrix/principles-matrix.md` with 20 new P-rules → core C-rule mappings (10 per new domain; review check: row count per domain = 10, each row ≥1 C-rule) | P0 | 3 | pending |
|
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| ATELIER-49 | Extend `matrix/domain-coverage.md` with infrastructure-as-code + kubernetes (row schema: domain, P-count, derived-doc-count, manifest-listed, status) | P1 | 3 | pending |
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| ATELIER-50 | Extend `review/agent-checklist.md` with IaC + k8s trigger sections | P1 | 3 | pending |
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||||
| ATELIER-51 | Extend `review/anti-patterns.md` with IaC + k8s violations incl. orphaned P-rule + deployable example artifact | P1 | 3 | pending |
|
||||
| ATELIER-52 | Update `MANIFEST.md` to list all new v0.2 documents (manifest authoritative) | P0 | 3 | pending |
|
||||
| ATELIER-48 | Extend `matrix/principles-matrix.md` with 20 new P-rules → core C-rule mappings (10 per new domain; review check: row count per domain = 10, each row ≥1 C-rule) | P0 | 3 | covered |
|
||||
| ATELIER-49 | Extend `matrix/domain-coverage.md` with infrastructure-as-code + kubernetes (row schema: domain, P-count, derived-doc-count, manifest-listed, status) | P1 | 3 | covered |
|
||||
| ATELIER-50 | Extend `review/agent-checklist.md` with IaC + k8s trigger sections | P1 | 3 | covered |
|
||||
| ATELIER-51 | Extend `review/anti-patterns.md` with IaC + k8s violations incl. orphaned P-rule + deployable example artifact | P1 | 3 | covered |
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| ATELIER-52 | Update `MANIFEST.md` to list all new v0.2 documents (manifest authoritative) | P0 | 3 | covered |
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| ATELIER-53 | `examples/good/terraform-module.md` — good IaC example (markdown with fenced HCL only; no standalone .tf) | P2 | 4 | pending |
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| ATELIER-54 | `examples/good/k8s-deployment.md` — good k8s example (markdown with fenced YAML only; no standalone .yaml) | P2 | 4 | pending |
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| ATELIER-55 | `examples/bad/terraform-unlocked-state.md` + `examples/bad/k8s-bare-pod-no-resources.md` — 2 named bad examples (each cites the P-rule breached) | P2 | 4 | pending |
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| ATELIER-56 | Cross-links from new domains to existing devops/security/observability/data domains (review check: every new derived doc ≥1 outbound cross-link to a MANIFEST-listed doc) | P1 | 4 | pending |
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| ATELIER-57 | Final review passes (all v0.2 phases reviewed, audit clean) | P0 | 5 | pending |
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| ATELIER-58 | Milestone v0.2 released (tag v0.1.5, merged to main) | P0 | 5 | pending |
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| ATELIER-59 | Extend `review/peer-review-checklist.md` with IaC + k8s sections (parity with agent-checklist) | P1 | 3 | pending |
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| ATELIER-59 | Extend `review/peer-review-checklist.md` with IaC + k8s sections (parity with agent-checklist) | P1 | 3 | covered |
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## v0.2 Traceability Matrix
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@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ NFR milestone: no separate minor tag. The final patch (v0.0.7) IS the v0.1 deliv
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| 0 | Pre-Execution | docs | complete | Spec, clarify, research, ideate, plan, PERSONAS.md (adds platform-engineer persona) |
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| 1 | Infrastructure as Code Domain | docs | complete | domains/infrastructure-as-code/{first-principles, terraform, opentofu, state, modules}.md |
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| 2 | Kubernetes Domain | docs | complete | domains/kubernetes/{first-principles, workloads, networking, storage, rbac, helm, kustomize}.md |
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| 3 | Matrix + Review Integration | docs | pending | matrix/principles-matrix.md (20 new mappings), matrix/domain-coverage.md, review/{agent-checklist, peer-review-checklist, anti-patterns}.md, MANIFEST.md |
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| 3 | Matrix + Review Integration | docs | complete | matrix/principles-matrix.md (20 new mappings), matrix/domain-coverage.md, review/{agent-checklist, peer-review-checklist, anti-patterns}.md, MANIFEST.md |
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| 4 | Examples + Cross-Links | docs | pending | examples/good/{terraform-module, k8s-deployment}.md, examples/bad/{terraform-unlocked-state, k8s-bare-pod-no-resources}.md, cross-links to devops/security/observability/data |
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| 5 | Final Review + Ship | docs | pending | Review passed, audit clean, milestone merged to main, tag v0.1.5 |
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@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
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||||
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||||
- Use Kustomize when you patch existing manifests or keep env deltas in one repo. Use Helm when you distribute a reusable app or consume third-party charts.
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||||
- Mixing both is fine and common: Kustomize for the internal apps, Helm for the packaged parts. The decision is per-workload, not per-cluster.
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- `commonLabels` is the kustomize-native enforcement of P3 (Labels Select); see `domains/devops/first-principles.md` P6 (Configuration as Code) for the upstream principle that the rendered manifest — not a console click — is the source of truth.
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||||
|
||||
## What Violates Kustomize Discipline
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||||
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||||
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@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
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||||
# Bad Example: Bare Pod, No Resources
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||||
> A Kubernetes manifest that violates Atelier's Kubernetes principles. Each violation is cited.
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||||
## The Code
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||||
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||||
```yaml
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Pod
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||||
metadata:
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name: api
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namespace: default
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spec:
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containers:
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- name: api
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image: api:latest # :latest, unversioned
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ports:
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- containerPort: 8080
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env:
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- name: DATABASE_URL
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value: "postgres://admin:hunter2@db:5432/app" # secret in plaintext, in the manifest
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```
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The team applies it with `kubectl apply -f api-pod.yaml`. When the pod crashes, they `kubectl delete pod api && kubectl apply -f api-pod.yaml` to "restart" it. There are no probes, no resource requests, no RBAC, no NetworkPolicy.
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|
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## What Makes It Bad
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### Bare Pod, No Controller (k8s P2 Pods are Mortal)
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- A `kind: Pod` with no controller. When the node dies, the pod does not come back. When the team needs three replicas, they copy the YAML twice and rename it.
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- The "restart" workflow (`delete pod && apply`) is manual recovery — exactly the manual-mutation anti-pattern from `domains/devops/`.
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- **Fix:** use a `Deployment`. The controller replaces dead pods, scales, and rolls back. See `domains/kubernetes/workloads.md`.
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||||
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### No Resource Requests (k8s P4 Requests and Limits are Contracts)
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- The container has no `resources.requests` or `resources.limits`. It is `BestEffort` — first evicted under node pressure. The scheduler has no signal to place it well; it lands wherever there is room, then gets killed when the node is full.
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||||
- A workload without requests is an unbounded gamble on the scheduler.
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- **Fix:** set CPU and memory requests on every prod container; set a memory limit; consider a CPU limit. See `domains/kubernetes/workloads.md`.
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||||
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### No Probes (k8s P5 Probes Drive Health)
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- No `readinessProbe` — the Service routes traffic to the pod before it is ready. Users see 502s during startup.
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- No `livenessProbe` — a wedged container runs forever; no one notices until the outage.
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- The platform cannot heal what it cannot see. A pod without probes is invisible to the controller's reconciliation.
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- **Fix:** define readiness and liveness probes that check the workload's own health. See `domains/kubernetes/workloads.md`.
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||||
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||||
### `:latest` Image Tag (k8s P1 + IaC P5 Version Everything)
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||||
- `image: api:latest` is unversioned. Every `kubectl apply` pulls whatever is newest at that moment. Two pods "running the same manifest" run different images if `latest` moved between applies.
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||||
- Rollback is impossible — there is no version to roll back to.
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||||
- **Fix:** pin the image to a version or a digest: `image: registry.example.com/api:v1.4.2` or `image: registry.example.com/api@sha256:...`. See `domains/kubernetes/workloads.md` and `domains/infrastructure-as-code/terraform.md` (P5 Version Everything).
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||||
|
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### Secret in Plaintext in the Manifest (k8s P9 Config and Secrets are Separate, IaC P10)
|
||||
- `DATABASE_URL` with the password is in the manifest in plaintext. If the manifest is committed (it is), the secret is in git.
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- Rotating the secret requires editing the manifest and re-applying — no separation of config from secret.
|
||||
- **Fix:** put the URL in a `Secret` (created out-of-band or via a secrets tool) and reference it with `valueFrom.secretKeyRef`. The manifest contains the reference, not the value. See `domains/kubernetes/rbac.md` and `domains/security/secrets.md`.
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### `default` Namespace (k8s P6 Namespaces Bound Blast Radius)
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- The pod runs in `default`. There is no namespace boundary for quota, RBAC, or NetworkPolicy. Every other workload in `default` can reach it; an outage in one affects the namespace all share.
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- **Fix:** give every prod workload a named namespace sized to its blast radius. `default` is for nothing in production. See `domains/kubernetes/networking.md` and `domains/kubernetes/workloads.md`.
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### No RBAC, No NetworkPolicy (k8s P7 RBAC by Intent, P6 Namespaces Bound Blast)
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- No `serviceAccountName` — the pod uses the `default` ServiceAccount, a shared identity.
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- No `NetworkPolicy` — every pod in the cluster can reach `api`. The network is flat by default.
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- **Fix:** a dedicated ServiceAccount with a least-privilege Role bound by intent. A default-deny NetworkPolicy with explicit allows. See `domains/kubernetes/rbac.md` and `domains/kubernetes/networking.md`.
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||||
## The Cascade
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The violations compound. A bare pod with no probes crashes silently and is not restarted. `:latest` means the "restart" pulls a different image than the one that crashed. The plaintext secret in the manifest is now in git, so rotating it means editing the manifest and re-applying — and the new manifest still has no controller, so the next crash starts the manual loop again. `default` namespace means the blast radius is the whole cluster.
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||||
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## Cross-Domain Links
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||||
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- `domains/devops/P4 Rollback First` — with `:latest` and no controller, there is no rollback path.
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- `domains/security/authorization` — the shared `default` ServiceAccount and flat network are the k8s expression of zero-trust violation.
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- `domains/errors/P2 Fail Loudly` — a pod with no probes fails silently; the platform has no signal to act on.
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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
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# Bad Example: Unlocked Local State
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||||
> An IaC configuration that violates Atelier's Infrastructure as Code principles. Each violation is cited.
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||||
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||||
## The Code
|
||||
|
||||
```hcl
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||||
# main.tf — committed to the repo
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||||
terraform {
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||||
required_providers {
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aws = {
|
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source = "hashicorp/aws"
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||||
# no version pin
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||||
}
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||||
}
|
||||
}
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||||
|
||||
provider "aws" {
|
||||
region = "us-east-1"
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||||
access_key = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" # committed
|
||||
secret_key = "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY" # committed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "aws_s3_bucket" "logs" {
|
||||
bucket = "app-logs-prod"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "aws_db_instance" "primary" {
|
||||
identifier = "app-prod"
|
||||
username = "admin"
|
||||
password = "hunter2" # committed, in plaintext, in state
|
||||
allocated_storage = 20
|
||||
engine = "postgres"
|
||||
instance_class = "db.t3.micro"
|
||||
skip_final_snapshot = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The team runs `terraform apply` from their laptops. The state file `terraform.tfstate` is committed alongside `main.tf` "so everyone is on the same page."
|
||||
|
||||
## What Makes It Bad
|
||||
|
||||
### Local State in a Shared Environment (IaC P8 Remote State with Locking)
|
||||
- State is `terraform.tfstate` on each laptop. Two team members run `terraform apply` simultaneously; the second to finish silently overwrites the first's changes. There is no lock.
|
||||
- The state file is committed to the repo. It contains the DB password in plaintext. It is a secret-bearing artifact in version control.
|
||||
- **Fix:** use a remote backend with locking (S3 + DynamoDB, GCS, etc.). Never commit state. See `domains/infrastructure-as-code/state.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardcoded Secrets (IaC P10 Secrets Never in Code)
|
||||
- `access_key` and `secret_key` are committed in `main.tf`. The DB `password` is committed and also written to state in plaintext.
|
||||
- The secrets are now in the git history. Rotating them is not optional; the history must be scrubbed or the credentials rotated and the old ones revoked.
|
||||
- **Fix:** credentials from environment, a secrets manager, or a `data` source (`aws_secretsmanager_secret_version`). Mark sensitive attributes `sensitive = true`. See `domains/security/secrets.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Unpinned Provider (IaC P5 Version Everything)
|
||||
- The `aws` provider has no `version`. The next `terraform init` pulls whatever is latest — a different provider version can change resource behavior with no review.
|
||||
- **Fix:** pin `version = "~> 5.0"`. Commit the lock file (`.terraform.lock.hcl`). See `domains/infrastructure-as-code/terraform.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Manual Drift, No Plan Review (IaC P4 Plan Before Apply, P9 Drift is Recoverable)
|
||||
- The team applies from laptops with no `plan` review. When the DB password is wrong, someone SSHes in and changes it manually — drift that `plan` will later report as a surprise.
|
||||
- Manual changes to managed resources are an incident, not a shortcut. Each one is a future `plan` diff that no one can explain.
|
||||
- **Fix:** run `terraform plan` in CI; review the diff; `apply` from CI on merge. Treat every drift report as an incident to investigate. See `domains/infrastructure-as-code/state.md` (Drift and Reconciliation).
|
||||
|
||||
### No Module Composition (IaC P6 Modules Compose)
|
||||
- The S3 bucket and DB instance are inline. When the team needs a second bucket, they copy-paste the block and rename it. The two copies drift over time.
|
||||
- **Fix:** a versioned module for each reusable pattern. The difference is a variable, not a copy. See `domains/infrastructure-as-code/modules.md` (the module-vs-copy boundary).
|
||||
|
||||
## The Cascade
|
||||
|
||||
The violations compound. Unlocked local state lets two `apply` runs race. Committed secrets mean the race loser's changes — and the secrets — are in the repo. Manual drift hides the corruption until a `plan` surfaces a diff no one can explain. The unpinned provider means that diff might be the provider's fault, not the team's, and no one can tell which.
|
||||
|
||||
## Cross-Domain Links
|
||||
|
||||
- `domains/security/secrets.md` — secret hygiene is non-tradeable; this example violates it in three places.
|
||||
- `domains/security/supply-chain.md` — committed credentials in git are a supply-chain incident.
|
||||
- `domains/devops/P6 Configuration as Code` — config in the repo is correct; committed *state and secrets* is the violation.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
|
||||
# Good Example: Kubernetes Deployment
|
||||
|
||||
> A Kubernetes Deployment that follows Atelier's Kubernetes principles. Each aspect cites the principle it satisfies.
|
||||
|
||||
## The Deployment
|
||||
|
||||
A stateless web service deployed as a Deployment with probes, resource contracts, RBAC, and a rolling update strategy — the canonical "production workload" pattern.
|
||||
|
||||
### Manifest
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
apiVersion: apps/v1
|
||||
kind: Deployment
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: api
|
||||
namespace: api-prod
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
app: api
|
||||
tier: web
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
replicas: 3
|
||||
selector:
|
||||
matchLabels:
|
||||
app: api
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
type: RollingUpdate
|
||||
rollingUpdate:
|
||||
maxSurge: 1
|
||||
maxUnavailable: 0
|
||||
template:
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
app: api
|
||||
tier: web
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
serviceAccountName: api
|
||||
automountServiceAccountToken: false
|
||||
containers:
|
||||
- name: api
|
||||
image: registry.example.com/api:v1.4.2 # pinned, not :latest
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- containerPort: 8080
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
requests:
|
||||
cpu: 250m
|
||||
memory: 256Mi
|
||||
limits:
|
||||
memory: 512Mi
|
||||
readinessProbe:
|
||||
httpGet:
|
||||
path: /healthz/ready
|
||||
port: 8080
|
||||
initialDelaySeconds: 5
|
||||
periodSeconds: 5
|
||||
livenessProbe:
|
||||
httpGet:
|
||||
path: /healthz/live
|
||||
port: 8080
|
||||
initialDelaySeconds: 15
|
||||
periodSeconds: 10
|
||||
env:
|
||||
- name: LOG_LEVEL
|
||||
valueFrom:
|
||||
configMapKeyRef:
|
||||
name: api-config
|
||||
key: log_level
|
||||
- name: DATABASE_URL
|
||||
valueFrom:
|
||||
secretKeyRef:
|
||||
name: api-secrets
|
||||
key: database_url
|
||||
volumeMounts:
|
||||
- name: config
|
||||
mountPath: /etc/api
|
||||
readOnly: true
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- name: config
|
||||
configMap:
|
||||
name: api-config
|
||||
---
|
||||
apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: Service
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: api
|
||||
namespace: api-prod
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
selector:
|
||||
app: api
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- port: 80
|
||||
targetPort: 8080
|
||||
---
|
||||
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
|
||||
kind: NetworkPolicy
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: api-deny-ingress
|
||||
namespace: api-prod
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
podSelector:
|
||||
matchLabels:
|
||||
app: api
|
||||
policyTypes:
|
||||
- Ingress
|
||||
ingress:
|
||||
- from:
|
||||
- namespaceSelector:
|
||||
matchLabels:
|
||||
tier: edge
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## What Makes It Good
|
||||
|
||||
### Controller, Not Bare Pod (k8s P2 Pods are Mortal)
|
||||
- A `Deployment` manages the pods. If one dies, the controller replaces it. A bare pod has no recovery.
|
||||
- See `domains/kubernetes/workloads.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Resource Contracts (k8s P4 Requests and Limits are Contracts)
|
||||
- Every container has CPU and memory requests and a memory limit. The workload is `Burstable`, not `BestEffort` (first evicted under pressure).
|
||||
- See `domains/kubernetes/workloads.md` for QoS classes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Probes (k8s P5 Probes Drive Health)
|
||||
- `readinessProbe` gates traffic: a pod that is not ready is removed from the Service's endpoints.
|
||||
- `livenessProbe` restarts a wedged container.
|
||||
- The probes check the workload's own health (`/healthz/ready`, `/healthz/live`), not a dependency. A liveness probe that calls the database would cascade-restart on a DB blip.
|
||||
- See `domains/kubernetes/workloads.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Image Pinning (k8s P1 + IaC P5 Version Everything)
|
||||
- `image: registry.example.com/api:v1.4.2` — pinned to a version, not `:latest`. A pod restart pulls the same image it was built with.
|
||||
- See `domains/infrastructure-as-code/terraform.md` and `domains/devops/P7 Immutability` for the immutability angle.
|
||||
|
||||
### RBAC (k8s P7 RBAC by Intent, Not Identity)
|
||||
- `serviceAccountName: api` — the workload runs as a dedicated ServiceAccount, not the `default` shared identity.
|
||||
- `automountServiceAccountToken: false` — the workload does not call the API, so it gets no token. See `domains/kubernetes/rbac.md`.
|
||||
- A matching `Role` + `RoleBinding` (not shown) would grant `get, list, watch` on `configmaps` in this namespace — least privilege, scoped by intent.
|
||||
|
||||
### Config and Secrets Separate (k8s P9 Config and Secrets are Separate)
|
||||
- `LOG_LEVEL` from a ConfigMap (non-sensitive). `DATABASE_URL` from a Secret (sensitive). Both injected at runtime; neither baked into the image.
|
||||
- A configuration change does not require a rebuild. A secret rotation does not require an image redeploy.
|
||||
- See `domains/kubernetes/rbac.md` and `domains/security/secrets.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Namespaces Bound Blast Radius (k8s P6 Namespaces Bound Blast Radius)
|
||||
- The workload lives in `api-prod`, not `default`. The namespace is the unit of quota, RBAC, and NetworkPolicy. A problem in `api-prod` does not leak to other workloads.
|
||||
- See `domains/kubernetes/networking.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### NetworkPolicy Default-Deny (k8s P6, P7)
|
||||
- The `NetworkPolicy` allows ingress only from the `edge` namespace. Without it, every pod in the cluster could reach `api`. Default-deny is the baseline; allows are the exceptions.
|
||||
- See `domains/kubernetes/networking.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Roll Forward, Roll Back (k8s P10 Roll Forward Roll Back)
|
||||
- `strategy: RollingUpdate` with `maxSurge: 1, maxUnavailable: 0` — the rollout adds a new pod before removing an old one. Availability is maintained.
|
||||
- `kubectl rollout undo deployment/api` reverts to the previous ReplicaSet. The rollback is tested before it is needed.
|
||||
- See `domains/kubernetes/workloads.md` and `domains/devops/P5 Progressive Delivery`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Cross-Domain Links
|
||||
- `domains/devops/P4 Rollback First` — the rollout strategy makes the deploy reversible.
|
||||
- `domains/security/authorization` — the ServiceAccount + Role model is the k8s expression of least-privilege authorization.
|
||||
- `domains/observability/metrics` — the probes are the platform's observability into the workload's health; the workload's own metrics complete the picture.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
|
||||
# Good Example: Terraform Module
|
||||
|
||||
> A reusable Terraform module that follows Atelier's Infrastructure as Code principles. Each aspect cites the principle it satisfies.
|
||||
|
||||
## The Module
|
||||
|
||||
A versioned module that provisions an S3 bucket with logging, versioning, and encryption — the canonical "secure bucket" pattern, composed rather than copy-pasted.
|
||||
|
||||
### Consumer Call
|
||||
|
||||
```hcl
|
||||
module "logs_bucket" {
|
||||
source = "registry.example.com/infra/secure-bucket/aws"
|
||||
version = "1.2.0"
|
||||
|
||||
name = "app-logs"
|
||||
region = "us-east-1"
|
||||
force_destroy = false
|
||||
retention_days = 90
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Module Structure
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
secure-bucket/
|
||||
├── main.tf # the resource
|
||||
├── variables.tf # typed inputs
|
||||
├── outputs.tf # the interface to consumers
|
||||
├── versions.tf # provider pin
|
||||
└── README.md # the module contract
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `versions.tf` (P5 Version Everything)
|
||||
|
||||
```hcl
|
||||
terraform {
|
||||
required_version = ">= 1.5.0"
|
||||
required_providers {
|
||||
aws = {
|
||||
source = "hashicorp/aws"
|
||||
version = "~> 5.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `variables.tf` (P1 Declarative Intent, C2 Clarity)
|
||||
|
||||
```hcl
|
||||
variable "name" {
|
||||
type = string
|
||||
description = "Globally unique bucket name."
|
||||
validation {
|
||||
condition = can(regex("^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,61}[a-z0-9]$", var.name))
|
||||
error_message = "Bucket name must be lowercase, 3-63 chars, DNS-compatible."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
variable "retention_days" {
|
||||
type = number
|
||||
default = 30
|
||||
description = "S3 lifecycle transition age in days."
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `main.tf` (P1, P3 State is Truth, P10 Secrets Never in Code)
|
||||
|
||||
```hcl
|
||||
resource "aws_s3_bucket" "this" {
|
||||
bucket = var.name
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "aws_s3_bucket_versioning" "this" {
|
||||
bucket = aws_s3_bucket.this.id
|
||||
versioning_configuration {
|
||||
status = "Enabled"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "aws_s3_bucket_server_side_encryption_configuration" "this" {
|
||||
bucket = aws_s3_bucket.this.id
|
||||
rule {
|
||||
apply_server_side_encryption_by_default {
|
||||
sse_algorithm = "AES256"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resource "aws_s3_bucket_lifecycle_configuration" "this" {
|
||||
bucket = aws_s3_bucket.this.id
|
||||
rule {
|
||||
id = "retention"
|
||||
status = "Enabled"
|
||||
filter { prefix = "" }
|
||||
expiration { days = var.retention_days }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## What Makes It Good
|
||||
|
||||
### Composition (IaC P6 Modules Compose, C6 Composability)
|
||||
- The bucket pattern is one module, versioned once, consumed many times. A new consumer does not copy 40 lines of HCL — they call the module with a `name` and a `retention_days`.
|
||||
- See `domains/infrastructure-as-code/modules.md` for the module-vs-copy boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
### Pinning (IaC P5 Version Everything)
|
||||
- The consumer pins `version = "1.2.0"`. The module pins its provider (`version = "~> 5.0"`) and the required Terraform version. A commit is a complete, reproducible world.
|
||||
- No `latest` anywhere. See `domains/infrastructure-as-code/terraform.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### State Discipline (IaC P3 State is Truth, P8 Remote State with Locking)
|
||||
- The consumer's root configuration declares a remote backend with locking (S3 + DynamoDB, GCS, etc.). The module itself does not declare a backend — the consumer owns state.
|
||||
- See `domains/infrastructure-as-code/state.md` for backend selection and locking.
|
||||
|
||||
### Secrets Hygiene (IaC P10 Secrets Never in Code)
|
||||
- The bucket is encrypted at rest (SSE-S3 AES256). No secret is hardcoded; encryption is a provider-managed default. If KMS were used, the key would come from a `data` source or a dedicated KMS module — never a literal.
|
||||
- See `domains/security/secrets.md` for the general secrets principles.
|
||||
|
||||
### Plan Before Apply (IaC P4 Plan Before Apply)
|
||||
- The consumer runs `terraform plan` before `apply`. The plan shows the new bucket, versioning, encryption, and lifecycle. Every line is reviewed. The plan is the contract review; `apply` is the signature.
|
||||
|
||||
### Cross-Domain Links
|
||||
- `domains/devops/P1 Reproducibility` — the module makes the bucket reproducible from source.
|
||||
- `domains/devops/P6 Configuration as Code` — the bucket is config, not a console click.
|
||||
- `domains/security/supply-chain` — a versioned, signed module from a trusted registry is a supply-chain control.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user