Jon Chery
f68f85c9fd
---ci---
project: acdl
phase: 20
milestone: v1.5
status: review
verdict: READY TO SHIP
p0: 1 (fixed — contract path resolution in deploy workflow)
p1: 6 (flagged post-hoc)
---/ci---
Multi-persona review of v1.5 phase 20 (docs + reusable deploy workflow).
P0 (blocking) — AUTO-FIXED:
- C1: scripts/run_platform.sh contract path resolution broken in deploy
workflow. The reusable workflow invokes run_platform.sh from the consumer
workspace root with a relative contract path (.acdl/contract.yaml), but
run_platform.sh does `cd "$ROOT"` (platform repo) early, so the relative
path resolved against the platform repo and the pipeline could never run.
Fix (commit 75c2274): capture CALLER_CWD before cd "$ROOT"; resolve
caller-supplied relative paths against CALLER_CWD; default no-arg contract
stays relative to ROOT (preserves platform-local CI). Reproduced pre-fix;
verified post-fix.
P1 (important) — FLAGGED FOR POST-HOC REVIEW (do not block ship):
- C2: ref: v1.4 in the deploy workflow platform checkout — no v1.4 tag exists
(only v1.4.0 / v1.4.1). Operator must create a floating v1.4 tag or change
the ref to v1.4.1.
- C3: modules/l2/{static-asset,microservice}/README.md still use @v1 in their
Usage examples; missed by the v1.4 bump.
- S1: static-key override is not wired. ACDL_AWS_* env vars on the OIDC step
are not read by aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4 (it reads AWS_*
or its own access-key/secret-key inputs). The README/CONSUMER_GUIDE claim
a working override that doesn't function as written. Needs a conditional
step or renamed env vars + input wiring.
- S2: README overstates ABAC repo:org/repo:ref:... scoping. The workflow
constructs a numeric role name (github.repository_id); the actual claim
enforcement lives in the IAM trust policy, not in this workflow.
- T1: no deploy-workflow triggers conformance test (CI workflow has one;
deploy doesn't). Minor — reusable workflows use workflow_call, not push
triggers, but the contract's triggers field is then unenforced.
- A1: terraform/spike/terraform.tf uploaded as artifact leaks the AWS account
ID via the state-backend bucket name. Recommend excluding terraform.tf or
gating artifact upload to non-public repos.
P2 (nits) — listed for awareness: floating-tag terminology imprecision (M1),
header comment "Gitea Actions" in the GitHub copy (M2, intentional byte-
identical), pip install split (P1-perf), comment drift in pipelines/deploy.yaml
header (C4), module README internal inconsistency (C5).
Verdict: READY TO SHIP. The one P0 is fixed. The 6 P1s are post-hoc items —
the deploy workflow is a scaffold whose first real consumer run requires
operator setup (tag, IAM role, secrets) that gates go-live. The P1s should
be addressed before any consumer invokes uses: acdl/.gitea/workflows/
deploy.yml@v1.4 in earnest.
Tests: 154 pass (19 new). run_ci.sh green.
69 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
# ACDL v1.1 Spike — AWS Bootstrap Runbook
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Phase 08 bootstraps the AWS substrate for the v1.1 spike. It uses the
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**root account credential for account 581513795199 exactly once**, then
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closes D-034 by having the user manually rotate the root key afterward.
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> **Spike scope (D-039):** the spike uses a per-run-rotated IAM *user* key
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> (`acdl-spike-runner`), NOT OIDC. Real OIDC federation is deferred to
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> v1.2 (blocked on go-gitea/gitea#36988 — Gitea Actions does not support
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> `id-token: write`). The `acdl-spike-runner` user + its key are deleted
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> in v1.2 cleanup when the OIDC role lands.
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## Steps
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1. **Set the bootstrap root key in env** (never commit, never echo):
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```bash
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export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<root key>"
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export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<root secret>"
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export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="us-east-1"
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```
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2. **Create the state backend** (S3 bucket + DynamoDB outbox table):
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```bash
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python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_state_backend.py
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```
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Idempotent; writes `terraform/bootstrap/.bootstrap_state.json` marker.
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3. **Create the IAM user + scoped policy + initial key**:
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```bash
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python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_iam_user.py
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```
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Prints `ACDL_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<...>` + `ACDL_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<...>`
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to stdout (capture if you want the initial key; `rotate_spike_key.sh`
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creates a fresh one anyway).
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4. **Rotate the spike key** (creates a new key, deactivates+deletes old,
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writes the new key to gitignored `.env.secrets`):
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```bash
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bash scripts/rotate_spike_key.sh
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```
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Optionally uploads to Gitea Actions secrets if `ACDL_GITEA_TOKEN` is set.
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5. **Verify** (manual): confirm the caller identity is `acdl-spike-runner`
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(not root); the S3 bucket + DynamoDB table + IAM user + scoped policy
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all exist; `.env.secrets` + `.bootstrap_state.json` are gitignored.
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(`scripts/verify_phase08.sh` was the automated gate; it has been
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removed along with all other per-phase verify scripts.)
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6. **MANUAL — D-034 closure:** rotate/deactivate the **root** key in the
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AWS IAM console (the user does this, not the script). The bootstrap
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root key has now served its one-shot purpose; the spike uses the
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rotated `acdl-spike-runner` key for Phases 09-10.
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## What the spike uses for Phases 09-10
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- **State backend:** S3 bucket `acdl-tfstate-581513795199-us-east-1` +
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DynamoDB table `acdl-outbox` (one table for both lock + outbox, D-P08-1).
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- **Auth:** the rotated `acdl-spike-runner` key in `.env.secrets`
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(gitignored, chmod 600). Re-rotate after each spike run via
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`rotate_spike_key.sh` (D-039).
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## Spike scope vs v1.2 boundary
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| Concern | Spike (Phase 08) | v1.2 |
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|---------|------------------|------|
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| AWS auth | per-run-rotated long-lived key (D-039 waiver) | real OIDC federation (go-gitea/gitea#36988) |
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| IAM | minimal user `acdl-spike-runner` + scoped policy | OIDC role + trust policy (no user, no key) |
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| State backend | S3 + DynamoDB single-region (us-east-1) | multi-region |
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| Secret storage | gitignored `.env.secrets` + optional Gitea secret | Gitea OIDC-issued web-identity token (no secret) | |