Jon Chery
f68f85c9fd
---ci---
project: acdl
phase: 20
milestone: v1.5
status: review
verdict: READY TO SHIP
p0: 1 (fixed — contract path resolution in deploy workflow)
p1: 6 (flagged post-hoc)
---/ci---
Multi-persona review of v1.5 phase 20 (docs + reusable deploy workflow).
P0 (blocking) — AUTO-FIXED:
- C1: scripts/run_platform.sh contract path resolution broken in deploy
workflow. The reusable workflow invokes run_platform.sh from the consumer
workspace root with a relative contract path (.acdl/contract.yaml), but
run_platform.sh does `cd "$ROOT"` (platform repo) early, so the relative
path resolved against the platform repo and the pipeline could never run.
Fix (commit 75c2274): capture CALLER_CWD before cd "$ROOT"; resolve
caller-supplied relative paths against CALLER_CWD; default no-arg contract
stays relative to ROOT (preserves platform-local CI). Reproduced pre-fix;
verified post-fix.
P1 (important) — FLAGGED FOR POST-HOC REVIEW (do not block ship):
- C2: ref: v1.4 in the deploy workflow platform checkout — no v1.4 tag exists
(only v1.4.0 / v1.4.1). Operator must create a floating v1.4 tag or change
the ref to v1.4.1.
- C3: modules/l2/{static-asset,microservice}/README.md still use @v1 in their
Usage examples; missed by the v1.4 bump.
- S1: static-key override is not wired. ACDL_AWS_* env vars on the OIDC step
are not read by aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4 (it reads AWS_*
or its own access-key/secret-key inputs). The README/CONSUMER_GUIDE claim
a working override that doesn't function as written. Needs a conditional
step or renamed env vars + input wiring.
- S2: README overstates ABAC repo:org/repo:ref:... scoping. The workflow
constructs a numeric role name (github.repository_id); the actual claim
enforcement lives in the IAM trust policy, not in this workflow.
- T1: no deploy-workflow triggers conformance test (CI workflow has one;
deploy doesn't). Minor — reusable workflows use workflow_call, not push
triggers, but the contract's triggers field is then unenforced.
- A1: terraform/spike/terraform.tf uploaded as artifact leaks the AWS account
ID via the state-backend bucket name. Recommend excluding terraform.tf or
gating artifact upload to non-public repos.
P2 (nits) — listed for awareness: floating-tag terminology imprecision (M1),
header comment "Gitea Actions" in the GitHub copy (M2, intentional byte-
identical), pip install split (P1-perf), comment drift in pipelines/deploy.yaml
header (C4), module README internal inconsistency (C5).
Verdict: READY TO SHIP. The one P0 is fixed. The 6 P1s are post-hoc items —
the deploy workflow is a scaffold whose first real consumer run requires
operator setup (tag, IAM role, secrets) that gates go-live. The P1s should
be addressed before any consumer invokes uses: acdl/.gitea/workflows/
deploy.yml@v1.4 in earnest.
Tests: 154 pass (19 new). run_ci.sh green.
64 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
64 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# iam-role — IAM role
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> **Module kind:** L1 primitive | **Version:** 1.0.0
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A single IAM role with an assume-role policy and optional managed
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policy attachments. Used as the ECS task execution role.
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## Resources
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| Resource | Type | Purpose |
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|----------|------|---------|
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| role | `aws_iam_role` | The IAM role with assume-role policy |
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## Inputs
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| Name | Type | Required | Default | Description |
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|------|------|----------|---------|-------------|
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| `role_name` | string | yes | — | The IAM role name |
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| `assume_role_policy` | string | yes | — | Assume-role policy document (JSON string) |
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| `managed_policies` | string | no | — | Comma-separated list of managed policy ARNs to attach |
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| `region` | string | yes | — | AWS region the role is created in |
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## Outputs
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| Name | Type | Description |
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|------|------|-------------|
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| `role_arn` | arn | The IAM role ARN |
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| `role_id` | string | The IAM role id |
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## Usage
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```json
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{
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"id": "roles",
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"type": "aws:iam:role",
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"module": "iam-role@1.0.0",
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"inputs": {
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"role_name": "acdl-microservice-exec",
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"assume_role_policy": "{\"Version\":\"2012-10-17\",\"Statement\":[{\"Effect\":\"Allow\",\"Principal\":{\"Service\":\"ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com\"},\"Action\":\"sts:AssumeRole\"}]}",
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"managed_policies": "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AmazonECSTaskExecutionRolePolicy",
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"region": "us-east-1"
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}
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}
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```
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The `assume_role_policy` is a JSON string — the adapter jsonencodes it
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into the Terraform `assume_role_policy` argument. The
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`managed_policies` input is a comma-separated list of ARNs, emitted as
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`managed_policy_arns = [...]`.
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## Compliance extension points
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- **Permissions boundary** — add `permissions_boundary` to enforce least-privilege guardrails (SOC2 CC6.1, SOX ITGC, DORA ICT access control).
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- **Inline policy** — add `aws_iam_role_policy` for fine-grained least-privilege instead of broad managed policies (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.308(a)(4)).
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- **MFA conditions** — add `condition` blocks requiring MFA for assume-role (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.312(d)).
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- **Source IP / region conditions** — add `aws:SourceIp` / `aws:RequestedRegion` conditions for data residency enforcement (GDPR Art.44-49, DORA ICT third-party risk).
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- **Access Analyzer** — add `aws_accessanalyzer_analyzer` to verify least-privilege (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
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- **Role separation** — add a separate task role vs. execution role (SOC2 CC6.3 segregation of duties).
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## Versioning
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`1.0.0` — interface MAJOR, behavior MINOR, lifecycle PATCH. MAJOR bumps
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require a new registry entry (immutable publication); old entries enter
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a 12-month deprecation window. |