Files
acdl/modules/l1/ecr/README.md
T
Jon Chery f68f85c9fd
acdl-ci / Lint (push) Successful in 7s
acdl-ci / Test (push) Successful in 15s
acdl-ci / Platform check-only (offline) (push) Successful in 9s
review(v1.5): READY TO SHIP — multi-persona code review
---ci---
project: acdl
phase: 20
milestone: v1.5
status: review
verdict: READY TO SHIP
p0: 1 (fixed — contract path resolution in deploy workflow)
p1: 6 (flagged post-hoc)
---/ci---

Multi-persona review of v1.5 phase 20 (docs + reusable deploy workflow).

P0 (blocking) — AUTO-FIXED:
- C1: scripts/run_platform.sh contract path resolution broken in deploy
  workflow. The reusable workflow invokes run_platform.sh from the consumer
  workspace root with a relative contract path (.acdl/contract.yaml), but
  run_platform.sh does `cd "$ROOT"` (platform repo) early, so the relative
  path resolved against the platform repo and the pipeline could never run.
  Fix (commit 75c2274): capture CALLER_CWD before cd "$ROOT"; resolve
  caller-supplied relative paths against CALLER_CWD; default no-arg contract
  stays relative to ROOT (preserves platform-local CI). Reproduced pre-fix;
  verified post-fix.

P1 (important) — FLAGGED FOR POST-HOC REVIEW (do not block ship):
- C2: ref: v1.4 in the deploy workflow platform checkout — no v1.4 tag exists
  (only v1.4.0 / v1.4.1). Operator must create a floating v1.4 tag or change
  the ref to v1.4.1.
- C3: modules/l2/{static-asset,microservice}/README.md still use @v1 in their
  Usage examples; missed by the v1.4 bump.
- S1: static-key override is not wired. ACDL_AWS_* env vars on the OIDC step
  are not read by aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4 (it reads AWS_*
  or its own access-key/secret-key inputs). The README/CONSUMER_GUIDE claim
  a working override that doesn't function as written. Needs a conditional
  step or renamed env vars + input wiring.
- S2: README overstates ABAC repo:org/repo:ref:... scoping. The workflow
  constructs a numeric role name (github.repository_id); the actual claim
  enforcement lives in the IAM trust policy, not in this workflow.
- T1: no deploy-workflow triggers conformance test (CI workflow has one;
  deploy doesn't). Minor — reusable workflows use workflow_call, not push
  triggers, but the contract's triggers field is then unenforced.
- A1: terraform/spike/terraform.tf uploaded as artifact leaks the AWS account
  ID via the state-backend bucket name. Recommend excluding terraform.tf or
  gating artifact upload to non-public repos.

P2 (nits) — listed for awareness: floating-tag terminology imprecision (M1),
  header comment "Gitea Actions" in the GitHub copy (M2, intentional byte-
  identical), pip install split (P1-perf), comment drift in pipelines/deploy.yaml
  header (C4), module README internal inconsistency (C5).

Verdict: READY TO SHIP. The one P0 is fixed. The 6 P1s are post-hoc items —
the deploy workflow is a scaffold whose first real consumer run requires
operator setup (tag, IAM role, secrets) that gates go-live. The P1s should
be addressed before any consumer invokes uses: acdl/.gitea/workflows/
deploy.yml@v1.4 in earnest.

Tests: 154 pass (19 new). run_ci.sh green.
2026-07-22 17:24:28 +00:00

58 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown

# ecr — ECR repository
> **Module kind:** L1 primitive | **Version:** 1.0.0
A single ECR repository that hosts the container image for the ECS
task. The simplest container-registry module — one resource, two
inputs, two outputs.
## Resources
| Resource | Type | Purpose |
|----------|------|---------|
| repository | `aws_ecr_repository` | The ECR repository |
## Inputs
| Name | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------|------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `name` | string | yes | — | The ECR repository name |
| `region` | string | yes | — | AWS region the repository is created in |
## Outputs
| Name | Type | Description |
|------|------|-------------|
| `repository_url` | string | The ECR repository URL |
| `repository_arn` | arn | The ECR repository ARN |
## Usage
```json
{
"id": "ecr",
"type": "aws:ecr:repository",
"module": "ecr@1.0.0",
"inputs": {
"name": "acdl-microservice",
"region": "us-east-1"
}
}
```
The `repository_url` output is used to build the `image` input for
`ecs-service` (e.g. `<repository_url>:latest`).
## Compliance extension points
- **Image scanning** — add `image_scanning_configuration { scan_on_push = true }` for vulnerability scanning (SOC2 CC7.6, DORA ICT risk testing, HIPAA security monitoring).
- **Encryption** — add `encryption_configuration { encryption_type = "KMS", kms_key = ... }` with a customer-managed key (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv), GDPR Art.32).
- **Image tag immutability** — add `image_tag_mutability = "IMMUTABLE"` to prevent tag overwriting (SOX §802, SOC2 CC6.1 integrity, DORA audit integrity).
- **Lifecycle policy** — add `aws_ecr_lifecycle_policy` to enforce image retention / cleanup (GDPR Art.5(2) data minimization, SOC2 CC5.2).
- **Access policy** — add a repository policy restricting pull/push to known roles (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.308(a)(4)).
## Versioning
`1.0.0` — interface MAJOR, behavior MINOR, lifecycle PATCH. MAJOR bumps
require a new registry entry (immutable publication); old entries enter
a 12-month deprecation window.