Jon Chery
0e6ecae26d
Rename all acdl-* AWS resources → nova-* across terraform (DynamoDB, Secrets Manager, Lambda, SNS, SG, KMS alias, ECS, ECR, IAM user/policy, state bucket, ALB, VPC/subnet names). Lambda default table names → nova-* (D-111). State bucket backend → nova-tfstate (-migrate-state documented). New docs/NOVA_AWS_MIGRATION.md runbook (staged migration + rollback). New scripts/migrate_dynamodb_data.py (scan+copy, dry-run default). acdl-deploy- → nova-deploy- role ARN in deploy workflows. Test fixtures updated; terraform validate + pytest + run_ci.sh PASS. ---ci--- project: acdl phase: 4 milestone: v1.15 status: execute ---/ci---
100 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
100 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
# Nova v1.1 Spike — AWS Bootstrap Runbook
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Phase 08 bootstraps the AWS engine for the v1.1 spike. It uses the
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**root account credential for account 581513795199 exactly once**, then
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closes D-034 by having the user manually rotate the root key afterward.
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> **Spike scope (D-039):** the spike uses a per-run-rotated IAM *user* key
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> (`nova-spike-runner`), NOT OIDC. Real OIDC federation is deferred to
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> v1.2 (blocked on go-gitea/gitea#36988 — Gitea Actions does not support
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> `id-token: write`). The `nova-spike-runner` user + its key are deleted
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> in v1.2 cleanup when the OIDC role lands.
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## Steps
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1. **Set the bootstrap root key in env** (never commit, never echo):
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```bash
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export NOVA_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<root key>"
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export NOVA_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<root secret>"
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export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="us-east-1"
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```
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2. **Create the state backend** (S3 bucket + DynamoDB outbox table):
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```bash
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python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_state_backend.py
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```
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Idempotent; writes `terraform/bootstrap/.bootstrap_state.json` marker.
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3. **Create the IAM user + scoped policy + initial key**:
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```bash
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python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_iam_user.py
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```
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Prints `NOVA_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<...>` + `NOVA_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<...>`
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to stdout (capture if you want the initial key; `rotate_spike_key.sh`
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creates a fresh one anyway).
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4. **Rotate the spike key** (creates a new key, deactivates+deletes old,
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writes the new key to gitignored `.env.secrets`):
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```bash
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bash scripts/rotate_spike_key.sh
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```
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Optionally uploads to Gitea Actions secrets if `NOVA_GITEA_TOKEN` is set.
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5. **Verify** (manual): confirm the caller identity is `nova-spike-runner`
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(not root); the S3 bucket + DynamoDB table + IAM user + scoped policy
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all exist; `.env.secrets` + `.bootstrap_state.json` are gitignored.
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(`scripts/verify_phase08.sh` was the automated gate; it has been
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removed along with all other per-phase verify scripts.)
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6. **MANUAL — D-034 closure:** rotate/deactivate the **root** key in the
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AWS IAM console (the user does this, not the script). The bootstrap
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root key has now served its one-shot purpose; the spike uses the
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rotated `nova-spike-runner` key for Phases 09-10.
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## v1.11 Phase 56 — IAM re-bootstrap + OIDC role (REQ-116)
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The v1.11 milestone re-bootstraps IAM to close G-005 (CAP-017..022
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deploy-unverified). Phase 56 extends the spike-runner policy with
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CloudFront/WAF/Lambda/DynamoDB-contracts/SecretsManager/SNS/CE/KMS/OIDC
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permissions and re-creates the `nova-act-runner-role` (CAP-022).
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**Apply the IAM baseline (idempotent):**
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```bash
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export NOVA_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<root key>"
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export NOVA_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<root secret>"
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export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="us-east-1"
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python3 terraform/bootstrap/apply_iam_baseline.py
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```
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This script:
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1. Creates (or versions) the customer-managed policy
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`nova-spike-runner-policy` from
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`terraform/bootstrap/spike_runner_policy.json` (ARN
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`arn:aws:iam::581513795199:policy/nova-spike-runner-policy`).
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2. Attaches it to the `nova-spike-runner` user and deletes any leftover
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inline policy (the v1.1 inline policy hit the 2048-byte limit; the
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managed-policy path supports 6144 bytes per version + up to 5
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versions).
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3. Re-creates the `nova-act-runner-role` OIDC role if absent, attaches
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the same managed policy, and sets a trust policy that permits root
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assume until go-gitea/gitea#36988 merges real OIDC federation.
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The applied policy is documented in `.ciagent/IAM_POLICY.md` and
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regression-tested by `tests/test_iam_policy_baseline.py` (15 tests).
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## What the spike uses for Phases 09-10
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- **State backend:** S3 bucket `nova-tfstate-581513795199-us-east-1` +
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DynamoDB table `nova-outbox` (one table for both lock + outbox, D-P08-1).
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- **Auth:** the rotated `nova-spike-runner` key in `.env.secrets`
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(gitignored, chmod 600). Re-rotate after each spike run via
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`rotate_spike_key.sh` (D-039).
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## Spike scope vs v1.2 boundary
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| Concern | Spike (Phase 08) | v1.2 |
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|---------|------------------|------|
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| AWS auth | per-run-rotated long-lived key (D-039 waiver) | real OIDC federation (go-gitea/gitea#36988) |
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| IAM | minimal user `nova-spike-runner` + scoped policy | OIDC role + trust policy (no user, no key) |
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| State backend | S3 + DynamoDB single-region (us-east-1) | multi-region |
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| Secret storage | gitignored `.env.secrets` + optional Gitea secret | Gitea OIDC-issued web-identity token (no secret) | |