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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ locked commitments and the v1.1 spike scope.
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## Overview
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|
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The platform is **four layers + six cross-cutting concerns**. The sixth
|
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concern — the substrate abstraction (§12) — is first-class, not an
|
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concern — the engine abstraction (§12) — is first-class, not an
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implementation detail. The vision's "Two Consumer Surfaces, One Platform"
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tenet binds everything: L3A and L3B converge on the same contract schema,
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the same policy envelope, and the same evidence stream.
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@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ the same policy envelope, and the same evidence stream.
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## Layers
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### Layer 1 — Foundational Primitives
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Single-purpose, **substrate-agnostic** primitive modules. L1 modules do
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Single-purpose, **engine-agnostic** primitive modules. L1 modules do
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not compose with other L1s; L1 takes its environment as input. The L1
|
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interface is defined against the **Target Stack IR**, not against Terraform
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directly (the IR is shaped to round-trip to Terraform in v1, per §12.1).
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@@ -181,15 +181,15 @@ platform does not run the skill. Stateless agents, all state in the
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platform. Skills are reviewed for sensitive data before release (Infra &
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Ops owns the review; it is the mandatory release gate).
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### Substrate execution (§12) — the binding constraint
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**Target Stack IR** (locked): a substrate-neutral description of resources
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### Angine execution (§12) — the binding constraint
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**Target Stack IR** (locked): a engine-neutral description of resources
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(typed inputs/outputs/NFRs), relationships (single parent per child),
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composition (tree, max depth 5), and policy hooks. The L1 registry, L2
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thin-composition tree, contract YML, and PolicyCheckResult schema are all
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defined against the IR — none against any specific substrate.
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defined against the IR — none against any specific engine.
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**Substrate adapters** are the only substrate-specific code. An adapter
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compiles the IR into a substrate execution plan. **v1 ships exactly one
|
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**Angine adapters** are the only engine-specific code. An adapter
|
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compiles the IR into a engine execution plan. **v1 ships exactly one
|
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adapter: the Terraform adapter.** v2+ may add OpenTofu, Pulumi, K8s CRDs
|
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without architectural change.
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@@ -335,20 +335,20 @@ extends the *implementation*, not the design.
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ECS Fargate service serving HTTP 200 → evidence event to the DynamoDB
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outbox → acdl-evidence timeline.
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### Substrate extension (ECS Fargate)
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### Angine extension (ECS Fargate)
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The Terraform adapter (§12) remains the only substrate-specific code. v1.2
|
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The Terraform adapter (§12) remains the only engine-specific code. v1.2
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expands the adapter `TYPE_MAP` to cover the six new ECS-shaped IR resource
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types. The L1 interface shape (IR-typed inputs/outputs/NFRs, registered in
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`modules-ir/registry.json`) is unchanged — only the set of registered L1s
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grows. The IR commitments (REQ-28) continue to hold: `modules-ir/`,
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`schemas/`, `contracts/`, `core/confidence_signal.py`,
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`core/contract_resolver.py`, `core/outbox_writer.py`
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remain substrate-agnostic.
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remain engine-agnostic.
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### `terraform apply` (dev only)
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v1.2 lifts the substrate execution from `plan` to `apply` for the `dev`
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v1.2 lifts the engine execution from `plan` to `apply` for the `dev`
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environment only. Dev is autonomous per §10 (confidence ≥ 0.50, no HITL).
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`apply` for qa/prod/dr remains HITL-gated and out of scope for v1.2. The
|
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apply result (resources created, plan diff) is captured in the evidence
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@@ -443,4 +443,71 @@ terraform state directory, and publishes the uptime URL via PR comment.
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The platform Lambda (`contract_ingestor.py`) reads `GITHUB_API_BASE` env
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for forge-agnostic API URLs. GitHub uses `/search/issues`; Gitea uses
|
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`/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues`. Detection via `/api/v1` in the base URL.
|
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`/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues`. Detection via `/api/v1` in the base URL.
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## v1.9 Addendum (2026-07-23)
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### New Components
|
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- **`core/contract_resolver.py` interpolation** (D-081): the resolver
|
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now expands `${env.<field>}` + `${contract.<field>}` tokens
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post-schema-validation, pre-IR-resolution. The env context is the
|
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loaded environment onboarding JSON (`core/environments/<name>.json`,
|
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schema `schemas/environment.schema.json`). The resolver's
|
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`child_input_map` routes L2 wires to the sub-resource that declares the
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input (P1-1 — `desired_count` → `aws:ecs:service`, `family` →
|
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`aws:ecs:task_definition`).
|
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- **`core/environment_check.py` `load()`** (REQ-104): loads + returns the
|
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parsed environment JSON; emits a stderr warning for placeholder
|
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`account_id` when env != dev.
|
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- **`core/hitl_gates.py`** (REQ-108, D-084): the HITL pre-execution
|
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attestation gate. Records the approver identity to the DynamoDB outbox
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(`approver_qa`/`approver_prod`/`approver_dr`), runs the separation-of-
|
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duties check on prod, invokes the attestation matrix, returns
|
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`(ok, reason)`. Dev skips (autonomous). `run_platform.sh` calls
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`attest` before apply for qa/prod/dr.
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- **`core/attestation_matrix.py`** (REQ-109, D-084): the 8-concern
|
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attestation matrix from `hitl_matrix_design.md` §10.4. Offline-testable
|
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concerns (contract NFRs, schema validity, policy pass) run for real;
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operator-supplied concerns accept signed evidence artifacts validated
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for freshness + schema. Signature verification skips when
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`ACDL_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID` is unset (D-089).
|
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- **`core/separation_of_duties.py` `route_halt_artifact`** (REQ-107):
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real SNS publish (`acdl-sod-halt` topic, ARN from
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`ACDL_SOD_HALT_TOPIC_ARN`) + outbox fallback
|
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(`SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION` event). The SNS topic is defined in
|
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`terraform/platform/main.tf`.
|
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- **`adapters/wiz/wiz_adapter.py` `WizClient`** (REQ-110): real GraphQL
|
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API client (`<WIZ_API_URL>/graphql`, Bearer auth, pagination via
|
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`pageInfo.hasNextPage`). `fetch_and_adapt` translates issues →
|
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`PolicyCheckResult`. Graceful degrade when unconfigured.
|
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- **`adapters/kyverno/kyverno_adapter.py`** (REQ-111): fleshed-out
|
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`PolicyReport` → `PolicyCheckResult` mapping (pass/fail/skip/warn +
|
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severity + skip-with-reason + resource construction). Inactive-for-TF
|
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guard preserved.
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### Per-Environment Promotion (D-082)
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|
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The deploy workflow (`.github/workflows/deploy.yml` +
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`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml`, byte-identical) declares an `environment`
|
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`workflow_call` input. When non-empty, `run_platform.sh --environment
|
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<name>` overrides the contract's `environment` field before schema
|
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validation (D-088). One CI job per environment; promotion = running the
|
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matching job, no `environment:` field editing. Per-env contract files
|
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(`contracts/<module>.<env>.yaml`) use interpolation for env-specific
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values.
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### Adapter Parameterization (P1-1, D-085)
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The adapter (`adapters/terraform/adapter.py`) reads ECS/ALB/VPC defaults
|
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from L1 `interface.json` inputs (`desired_count`, `launch_type`,
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`family`, `target_type`, `load_balancer_type`, `name`). The adapter is a
|
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thin translator; the `child_input_map` routes wires to the declaring
|
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sub-resource.
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|
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### Deferred (D-083)
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|
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S3 Object Lock + JWS detached signatures + async worker + DLQ + daily
|
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checkpoints (audit ledger build-out) — deferred to a future milestone.
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The hash-chain + DynamoDB-outbox path remains the v1.9 production audit
|
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record.
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@@ -4,45 +4,60 @@
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## Step 1: Reconstruction Test
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- 12 v1.9 commits with `---ci---` blocks (specify → clarify → research →
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plan → execute ×4 phases → merge ×4 → verify/review/audit/complete).
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- State matches config.json (milestone v1.9, status complete).
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- PROJECT.md v1.9 objective + decisions D-080..D-086 + auto-resolved
|
||||
parameters present. REQUIREMENTS.md REQ-100..111 + traceability table
|
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present. ROADMAP.md v1.9 section + phases 39–43 present.
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- 16 v1.9 commits with `---ci---` blocks (specify → clarify → research →
|
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plan → execute ×4 phases → verify/complete → review-fix).
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- Reconstructed state: milestone v1.9, phase 43, status complete.
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- Pipeline stages traversed: specify → clarify → research → plan → execute → verify → complete.
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- Decisions D-080..D-089 all present in git log + `.ciagent/` files.
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- config.json (v1.9 complete), PROJECT.md (v1.9 complete), REQUIREMENTS.md
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(v1.9 complete, 12 reqs), ROADMAP.md (v1.9 complete, phases 39–43),
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REVIEW.md (READY TO SHIP), PERSONAS.md (v1.9), VERIFY.md, AUDIT.md.
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**PASS.**
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## Step 2: File Discipline
|
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- All 10 `.ciagent/` files valid (config.json, PROJECT.md, REQUIREMENTS.md,
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ROADMAP.md, PLAN.md, RESEARCH.md, PERSONAS.md, REVIEW.md, VERIFY.md,
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AUDIT.md).
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- PERSONAS.md updated for v1.9 (milestone field, lambda-engineer
|
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reactivated, phase-specific overrides for 39–43).
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- REVIEW.md reconstructed with v1.9 content (D-086); note records v1.3–v1.8
|
||||
reviews were not persisted (no git-history rewrite).
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**PASS.**
|
||||
- `.ciagent/config.json`: valid JSON; mode, projects[] present. **PASS.**
|
||||
- `.ciagent/PROJECT.md`: Vision/Core Value (≡ "What This Is"), Key
|
||||
Decisions (v1.9 D-080..D-086), Requirements, Constraints, per-milestone
|
||||
Objective sections (≡ "Milestones") present. Section names follow the
|
||||
v1.0 established conventions (not the generic audit template). **PASS.**
|
||||
- `.ciagent/ROADMAP.md`: phases 39–43 present; all marked complete.
|
||||
**PASS.**
|
||||
- `.ciagent/REQUIREMENTS.md`: v1.9 traceability table complete (12/12
|
||||
REQ-100..111 marked `complete (v1.9.0)`). **PASS.**
|
||||
- `.ciagent/ARCHITECTURE.md`: **fixed during audit** — v1.9 addendum
|
||||
added covering all new components (contract_resolver interpolation,
|
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environment_check.load, hitl_gates, attestation_matrix,
|
||||
separation_of_duties.route_halt_artifact, WizClient, kyverno_adapter,
|
||||
per-environment promotion, adapter parameterization, deferred D-083).
|
||||
All 9 v1.9 code components now referenced. **PASS (after fix).**
|
||||
|
||||
## Step 3: Branch Hygiene
|
||||
|
||||
- 5 v1.9 phase branches (phase/39..43) merged to main. They can be pruned
|
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after the milestone tag. No milestone branch was used (single-project
|
||||
mode, main is the integration branch per the v1.8 precedent).
|
||||
- Only main + origin/main + the 5 phase branches remain.
|
||||
- Local: `main` only. Remote: `origin/main` only.
|
||||
- No phase or milestone branches remain (all 5 v1.9 phase branches merged
|
||||
+ pruned during the run/ship workflow).
|
||||
- No orphan branches.
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**PASS.**
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||||
|
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## Step 4: Commit Discipline
|
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|
||||
- 12/12 v1.9 commits have `---ci---` blocks with project, phase, milestone,
|
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- 16/16 v1.9 commits have `---ci---` blocks with project/phase/milestone/
|
||||
status fields.
|
||||
- No stale decisions; D-080..D-086 recorded in PROJECT.md; D-087..D-089
|
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recorded in RESEARCH.md.
|
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- No secrets in commits (SNS topic ARN is a Terraform output, not a
|
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literal; Wiz/KMS/SNS env-var-based).
|
||||
- No stale implementation decisions (D-081..D-085, D-087..D-089 all have
|
||||
code refs; D-080 + D-086 are process/meta decisions correctly living in
|
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`.ciagent/` files).
|
||||
- No unresolved v1.9 escalations (the 3 `audit(...)` commits in history
|
||||
are from prior milestones v1.0/v1.6/v1.7).
|
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**PASS.**
|
||||
|
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## Issues fixed during audit
|
||||
|
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None — the milestone is clean as shipped.
|
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1. **ARCHITECTURE.md missing v1.9 addendum** — the architecture doc had
|
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no coverage of the v1.9 new components (hitl_gates, attestation_matrix,
|
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interpolation, per-env promotion, adapter parameterization, Wiz/Kyverno
|
||||
flesh-outs). Fixed: added a v1.9 addendum section covering all 9 new
|
||||
code components + the per-env promotion model + the deferred D-083
|
||||
items. Verified all 9 components now referenced.
|
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|
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## Audit result: PASS
|
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@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ verification_toolchain:
|
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- **Active:** true
|
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- **Phase-specific:** false
|
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- **Frameworks:** terraform, aws-iam, aws-s3, aws-dynamodb, aws-lambda, aws-cloudfront, aws-waf, aws-ssm, aws-secretsmanager, oidc, json-schema
|
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- **Constraints:** ir-is-substrate-agnostic, adapter-is-only-substrate-specific-code, state-in-s3+dynamodb-single-region, oidc-only-no-long-lived-keys (waiver D-034 for bootstrap), terraform-plan-only-in-spike, cross-account-iam-scoped-via-abac
|
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- **Constraints:** ir-is-engine-agnostic, adapter-is-only-engine-specific-code, state-in-s3+dynamodb-single-region, oidc-only-no-long-lived-keys (waiver D-034 for bootstrap), terraform-plan-only-in-spike, cross-account-iam-scoped-via-abac
|
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- **Territory:** `adapters/terraform/**`, `modules/**` (l1 + l2 + registry.json + examples), `terraform/**` (state backend, provider config, platform infra), `modules/registry.json`
|
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- **Reason:** Owns the Target Stack IR, the L1/L2 IR-typed modules (incl. new cloudfront + waf + rds primitives), the Terraform adapter (TYPE_MAP expansion for cloudfront/waf/rds), the AWS OIDC bootstrap, the state backend, and the platform Terraform (Lambda + DynamoDB + KMS + Secrets Manager + Function URL). The IR is substrate-agnostic; the adapter is the only substrate-specific code (the binding constraint per §12).
|
||||
- **Reason:** Owns the Target Stack IR, the L1/L2 IR-typed modules (incl. new cloudfront + waf + rds primitives), the Terraform adapter (TYPE_MAP expansion for cloudfront/waf/rds), the AWS OIDC bootstrap, the state backend, and the platform Terraform (Lambda + DynamoDB + KMS + Secrets Manager + Function URL). The IR is engine-agnostic; the adapter is the only engine-specific code (the binding constraint per §12).
|
||||
|
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### security-engineer (custom)
|
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- **Domain:** security
|
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@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ verification_toolchain:
|
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### infra-stub-engineer (custom, v1.0 only)
|
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- **Domain:** backend
|
||||
- **Active:** false
|
||||
- **Reason:** Owned L1 stub modules (`modules/l1/**`) in the v1.0 demo. The demo is archived to `demo/` in Phase 06; real L1 modules (`modules-ir/l1/**`, now `modules/l1/**`) are owned by platform-engineer (substrate-agnostic IR + Terraform adapter). The stub engineer is no longer needed.
|
||||
- **Reason:** Owned L1 stub modules (`modules/l1/**`) in the v1.0 demo. The demo is archived to `demo/` in Phase 06; real L1 modules (`modules-ir/l1/**`, now `modules/l1/**`) are owned by platform-engineer (engine-agnostic IR + Terraform adapter). The stub engineer is no longer needed.
|
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- **Phase-specific:** false (was v1.0)
|
||||
- **Territory (would have been):** `demo/modules/l1/**`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ lambda owns the SNS topic Terraform; frontend is unchanged from v1.0
|
||||
|
||||
## Conflict resolutions (lead-developer arbitration)
|
||||
|
||||
- `backend-engineer` vs `platform-engineer` over `schemas/ir.schema.json` + `schemas/stack.schema.json`: platform-engineer owns the IR (substrate-agnostic but infra-shaped); backend-engineer owns the contract schema and the contract→IR resolution. Co-authoring is expected; conflict goes to lead-developer.
|
||||
- `backend-engineer` vs `platform-engineer` over `schemas/ir.schema.json` + `schemas/stack.schema.json`: platform-engineer owns the IR (engine-agnostic but infra-shaped); backend-engineer owns the contract schema and the contract→IR resolution. Co-authoring is expected; conflict goes to lead-developer.
|
||||
- `backend-engineer` vs `security-engineer` over `core/confidence_signal.py`: security-engineer owns the severity→penalty mapping + critical-override semantics; backend-engineer owns the 6-input weighted sum + per-env thresholds. Co-owned; conflicts go to lead-developer.
|
||||
- `platform-engineer` vs `security-engineer` over `adapters/terraform/policy/**`: security-engineer owns the Checkov→PolicyCheckResult adapter + custom rules + the Wiz/Kyverno adapters (policy is a security concern); platform-engineer owns the Terraform adapter (substrate translation). No overlap.
|
||||
- `platform-engineer` vs `security-engineer` over `adapters/terraform/policy/**`: security-engineer owns the Checkov→PolicyCheckResult adapter + custom rules + the Wiz/Kyverno adapters (policy is a security concern); platform-engineer owns the Terraform adapter (engine translation). No overlap.
|
||||
- `lambda-engineer` vs `platform-engineer` over `terraform/platform/main.tf`: lambda-engineer owns the Lambda + DynamoDB + Secrets Manager definitions; platform-engineer reviews the Terraform structure + state backend. Co-authoring expected; conflicts go to lead-developer.
|
||||
- `backend-engineer` vs `lambda-engineer` over `core/lambda/contract_ingestor.py` vs `scripts/run_platform.sh` + `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` error-report step: lambda-engineer owns the Lambda handler; backend-engineer owns the workflow step that invokes it. The interface (the JSON payload) is co-authored; conflicts go to lead-developer.
|
||||
- `lead-developer` vs any: lead-developer owns `.ciagent/**` + `docs/**` meta + verification scripts; persona engineers do not edit CIAgent metadata or the vision/architecture source docs.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Finalize the architecture to v1.0 (resolve all 11 open design decisions in
|
||||
`docs/architecture.md` §13) and prove the locked commitments with one
|
||||
end-to-end v1 implementation spike:
|
||||
|
||||
- **One L1 module** (`l1-s3`) — substrate-agnostic, IR-typed interface.
|
||||
- **One L1 module** (`l1-s3`) — engine-agnostic, IR-typed interface.
|
||||
- **One L2 thin-composition** (`l2-static-assets`) — references the L1.
|
||||
- **Terraform adapter** — compiles the IR to a real `terraform plan`
|
||||
against AWS via OIDC (no long-lived credentials, per §12.5).
|
||||
@@ -364,6 +364,145 @@ historical gap (no git-history rewrite).
|
||||
Milestone COMPLETE gate: review → ship `v1.9.0` (feature milestone, next
|
||||
minor per run.md — v1.8 shipped `v1.8.0`) → audit.
|
||||
|
||||
## Patch v1.9.1 (complete, tag `v1.9.1`)
|
||||
|
||||
Docs-only NFR patch on the v1.9 line. Two leadership-facing presentation
|
||||
decks (How the Platform Works + The Developer Experience) for senior
|
||||
leadership (CTO, Head of Cloud, Head of Infrastructure, Head of DevOps).
|
||||
Each deck has a full markdown source of truth (with speaker notes + mermaid
|
||||
diagrams) and a lean Marp deck (no speaker notes, embedded PNG diagrams). A
|
||||
README documents the 3-step slide creation process (full markdown → Marp
|
||||
synthesis → PPTX export) with conventions, build commands, and maturity
|
||||
framing rules. No code changes; 494 tests pass; `run_ci.sh` +
|
||||
`run_platform.sh --check-only` green.
|
||||
|
||||
## Patch v1.9.2 (complete, tag `v1.9.2`)
|
||||
|
||||
Docs-only NFR patch on the v1.9 line. Applies the S&P Global Energy brand
|
||||
visual identity to both Marp presentation decks. Brand colors extracted
|
||||
from the live spglobal.com compiled Tailwind CSS and SVG logo: red-core
|
||||
`#D6002A`, grey-90 `#1B1B1B`, grey-80 `#2E2E2E`, grey-5 `#F0F0F0`, Akkurat
|
||||
Pro corporate typeface. Title headers changed to full platform name.
|
||||
Footer changed from 'Confidential · For Senior Leadership' to 'Internal'.
|
||||
Title slide subtitle removed. Last DX slide renamed from 'The Outcome for
|
||||
Leadership' to 'The Desired Outcomes'. Marp `theme: default` kept as base.
|
||||
No code changes; 494 tests pass; `run_ci.sh` + `run_platform.sh --check-only`
|
||||
green.
|
||||
|
||||
## Patch v1.9.3 (complete, tag `v1.9.3`)
|
||||
|
||||
Docs-only NFR patch on the v1.9 line. Renders both Marp presentation decks
|
||||
to self-contained HTML (committed to `docs/presentations/`, base64-embedded
|
||||
images, full S&P Global Energy brand theme) and PPTX (uploaded to the Gitea
|
||||
release as downloadable attachments). The HTML files are viewable in any
|
||||
browser and on the git forge — they render the red accent bar, dark
|
||||
title-slide background, red H1 headings, and Akkurat Pro font stack. README
|
||||
updated to document HTML as committed artifacts (re-render when Marp source
|
||||
changes) and PPTX as release attachments (binary, not committed to git).
|
||||
No code changes; 494 tests pass; `run_ci.sh` + `run_platform.sh --check-only`
|
||||
green.
|
||||
|
||||
## Patch v1.9.4 (complete, tag `v1.9.4`)
|
||||
|
||||
Docs-only NFR patch on the v1.9 line. Two categories of changes:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Presentation slide updates** — title slide redesigned (deck title as H1
|
||||
slightly bigger, 'Agentic Cloud Delivery Platform' as H3 subtitle on dark
|
||||
background). DX deck: removed Local Reproducibility slide (not beneficial
|
||||
for DX narrative), redesigned Safe Promotion Path with side-by-side
|
||||
HTML table layout for Approaches A and B, 'an agent' → 'an AI agent' on
|
||||
slides 2 and 3, What a Developer Does diagram floated to the right side.
|
||||
Running header simplified to just the deck name.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Complete removal of a compliance framework** — all references to a
|
||||
specific healthcare compliance framework removed from 25 files
|
||||
across the codebase: presentation source files (Marp + full markdown),
|
||||
all module READMEs (S3, RDS, ECR, ECS, VPC, IAM, KMS, CloudFront, ALB,
|
||||
uptime), top-level README, consumer guide, docs index, module standards.
|
||||
Compliance milestone lists now read: GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA. All section
|
||||
references from that framework removed from compliance annotations.
|
||||
Rendered HTML decks re-generated from updated Marp source.
|
||||
|
||||
No code changes; 494 tests pass; `run_ci.sh` + `run_platform.sh --check-only`
|
||||
green. PPTX files uploaded to Gitea release.
|
||||
|
||||
## Patch v1.9.5 (complete, tag `v1.9.5`)
|
||||
|
||||
Docs-only NFR patch on the v1.9 line. 9 requirements implemented:
|
||||
|
||||
1. DX closing slide strengthened with 'Infrastructure as a utility, not a
|
||||
craft' bullet — conveys the full vision (infrastructure consumed, not
|
||||
maintained; platform compounds value over time).
|
||||
2. PW Problem slide: 'moving a merged change' → 'promoting a change'.
|
||||
3. PW Problem slide: added 'Red tape' and 'Scalability without increasing
|
||||
headcount' bullets (4 frictions, not 2).
|
||||
4. PW Roadmap slide: redesigned with side-by-side HTML table layout
|
||||
(Testing | Planned), 16px font, no overflow.
|
||||
5. PW deck: new slide 'What This Platform Is — and Isn't' after North Star
|
||||
(sovereign boundary, infrastructure as utility, 4 anti-goals). PW deck
|
||||
now 16 slides.
|
||||
6. Maturity nomenclature: 'Available today'/'shipped' → 'Testing' across
|
||||
both decks + source markdown. New .testing badge (blue/teal). The
|
||||
platform has 0 consumer adoption — 'shipped' was inaccurate.
|
||||
7. Global: 'substrate' → 'engine' across entire project (88 matches, 30+
|
||||
files including .ciagent/, docs/, modules/, adapters/, schemas/, code).
|
||||
8. Presentation files only: 'forge' → 'VCS' (6 occurrences in 4 files).
|
||||
'forge' retained in all technical docs and code.
|
||||
9. New .agentic badge (purple/violet) appended to agentic features in both
|
||||
decks: confidence signal, autonomous dev, pattern recognition, dynamic
|
||||
module creation, citizen developer surface, auto-promotion.
|
||||
|
||||
Also: Change Request ID format changed from 'CR-2026-001' to 'CHG0678912'
|
||||
across presentation files, consumer guide, and test fixtures.
|
||||
|
||||
No code changes (test fixture strings only); 494 tests pass; `run_ci.sh` +
|
||||
`run_platform.sh --check-only` green. PPTX files uploaded to Gitea release.
|
||||
|
||||
## Patch v1.9.6 (complete, tag `v1.9.6`)
|
||||
|
||||
Docs-only NFR patch on the v1.9 line. Both Marp presentation decks
|
||||
consolidated to 10 high-impact slides each — every slide high-impact, fluff
|
||||
eliminated.
|
||||
|
||||
**How The Platform Works (16 → 10):**
|
||||
- Merged Problem + North Star + What It Is/Isn't → 1 slide (4 frictions →
|
||||
North Star → 3 success criteria → 2 anti-goals)
|
||||
- Merged Policy & Security + Secure by Default → 'Security by Construction'
|
||||
- Merged Immutable Audit + Human-in-the-Loop → 'Accountability & Audit'
|
||||
- Folded Observability, Platform-Managed Environments, Portability into
|
||||
existing slides as bullets
|
||||
- Added 'The Vision Realized' closing slide
|
||||
|
||||
**The Developer Experience (15 → 10):**
|
||||
- Merged What Dev Does + Contract + No Platform Code → 'The Contract — The
|
||||
Entire Consumer Surface'
|
||||
- Merged Instant Feedback + Deploy Outputs → 'The Developer Feedback Loop'
|
||||
- Merged Safe Promotion Path + Rising Bar → 1 slide
|
||||
- Cut Citizen Developer Experience standalone (mentioned on slides 2 + 10)
|
||||
- Kept Versioned Releases, Friendly Onboarding, Safe Decommission
|
||||
|
||||
**Also:** Removed '5-line YAML' claim from both decks (credibility — complex
|
||||
stacks require more lines). Source markdown files unchanged (remain complete
|
||||
reference with speaker notes for all original slides).
|
||||
|
||||
No code changes; 494 tests pass; `run_ci.sh` + `run_platform.sh --check-only`
|
||||
green. PPTX files uploaded to Gitea release.
|
||||
|
||||
## Patch v1.9.7 (complete, tag `v1.9.7`)
|
||||
|
||||
Docs-only NFR patch on the v1.9 line. Created two talking points markdown
|
||||
files — one per deck — distilling the source of truth (speaker notes +
|
||||
content) into presenter-ready cues indexed by the Marp deck's 10-slide
|
||||
structure. Each file has one section per Marp slide with 3-6 talking point
|
||||
bullets (punchy, actionable cues) + a key takeaway per slide. The talking
|
||||
points are the middle layer between the source of truth (full detail) and
|
||||
the Marp deck (what the audience sees). README updated from 3-step to 4-step
|
||||
process (added Step 4: talking points), with updated diagram, directory
|
||||
layout, checklist, and decks table.
|
||||
|
||||
No code changes; 494 tests pass; `run_ci.sh` + `run_platform.sh --check-only`
|
||||
green.
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
### v1.0 (Prior milestone — the demo)
|
||||
@@ -377,7 +516,7 @@ appendix below. The demo is **archived** to `demo/` in Phase 06.
|
||||
New requirements REQ-16..REQ-28 — see `REQUIREMENTS.md` §v1.1. Summary:
|
||||
|
||||
- **REQ-16:** Architecture finalized to v1.0 (11 open decisions resolved).
|
||||
- **REQ-17:** Target Stack IR defined as JSON Schema; substrate-agnostic.
|
||||
- **REQ-17:** Target Stack IR defined as JSON Schema; engine-agnostic.
|
||||
- **REQ-18:** PolicyCheckResult normalized schema defined; Checkov adapter.
|
||||
- **REQ-19:** Six-input confidence signal specified with per-env thresholds
|
||||
(dev 0.50 / qa 0.75 / prod 0.90 / dr 0.95) and severity→penalty mapping.
|
||||
@@ -397,7 +536,7 @@ New requirements REQ-16..REQ-28 — see `REQUIREMENTS.md` §v1.1. Summary:
|
||||
- **REQ-27:** One end-to-end contract submission → contract→IR resolution →
|
||||
`terraform plan` → Checkov → confidence signal → evidence event to outbox.
|
||||
- **REQ-28:** Spike verification proves the IR-shaped commitments hold (no
|
||||
polyglot mess; the adapter is the only substrate-specific code).
|
||||
polyglot mess; the adapter is the only engine-specific code).
|
||||
|
||||
### v1.2 (Prior milestone — platform hardening + first real consumer deployment, complete)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -462,8 +601,8 @@ D-080+ to avoid collision with v1.8 research decisions D-073..D-077):
|
||||
- **Cloud:** AWS via OIDC federation. **Long-lived credentials are forbidden**
|
||||
(§12.5). The v1.1 spike uses a temporary long-lived key **once** to bootstrap
|
||||
OIDC (waiver D-034), then rotates it.
|
||||
- **Substrate:** Terraform adapter in v1 (the only adapter). L1/L2 are
|
||||
substrate-agnostic in shape; the adapter is the only substrate-specific code.
|
||||
- **Angine:** Terraform adapter in v1 (the only adapter). L1/L2 are
|
||||
engine-agnostic in shape; the adapter is the only engine-specific code.
|
||||
- **State:** S3 (state files) + DynamoDB (locking), single-region in v1.
|
||||
- **Environments:** dev (autonomous) → qa (QA HITL) → prod (SRE HITL) → dr
|
||||
(SRE HITL). **Staging does not exist** (Path A locked).
|
||||
@@ -488,7 +627,7 @@ D-080+ to avoid collision with v1.8 research decisions D-073..D-077):
|
||||
vision/architecture sources, pulled from `origin/main` at the start of v1.1.
|
||||
- The v1.0 demo (tag `v1.1.0`) is the reference of intent — it proved the
|
||||
shape (L1/L2/contract/confidence/evidence/HITL) on stubs. v1.1 replaces the
|
||||
stubs with the real platform substrate.
|
||||
stubs with the real platform engine.
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Decisions (v1.1)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -567,8 +706,8 @@ or user-directed scope). New v1.7 decisions:
|
||||
| BA.C | On-call / operational ownership | **Decided.** Platform on-call = Infra & Ops rotation. Escalation: L3A/L3B halt → platform on-call pager (Sev2); consumer-visible outage → consumer on-call (Sev1) with platform on-call support. Consumer on-call relationship is contractual, defined at onboarding (BA.E). |
|
||||
| BA.D | Cost / capacity governance | **Decided.** Cloud cost owner = Infra & Ops FinOps. Per-contract consumption reported monthly. Runaway spend: hard halt at 120% of contract-declared budget envelope via the confidence signal (cost is one of the 6 inputs); override = FinOps + SRE joint sign-off. |
|
||||
| BA.E | Consumer onboarding | **Decided.** Two paths: developer (L3A) — `getting-started` walks through contract schema + central pipeline template; citizen developer (L3B) — onboarding grants a scoped agent + skill catalog, no workflow authoring. Both end in a sandbox dev submission that must pass the confidence gate before the consumer is promoted. |
|
||||
| BA.F | Cross-platform evolution | **Decided.** The contract schema, IR, PolicyCheckResult, confidence signal, and audit stream are portable (substrate- and forge-agnostic). Forge-specific code: workflow YAML, OIDC trust, CODEOWNERS, Environments. A second forge (e.g., GitLab) requires a forge adapter + a workflow-template translator; no change to L1/L2/IR/confidence/audit. |
|
||||
| Q1.3 | OpenTofu timing | **Decided (deferred).** Not in v1 or v1.1. The substrate abstraction (§12) makes OpenTofu a future adapter, not an architecture change. Revisit when an OpenTofu adapter is requested; no version committed. |
|
||||
| BA.F | Cross-platform evolution | **Decided.** The contract schema, IR, PolicyCheckResult, confidence signal, and audit stream are portable (engine- and forge-agnostic). Forge-specific code: workflow YAML, OIDC trust, CODEOWNERS, Environments. A second forge (e.g., GitLab) requires a forge adapter + a workflow-template translator; no change to L1/L2/IR/confidence/audit. |
|
||||
| Q1.3 | OpenTofu timing | **Decided (deferred).** Not in v1 or v1.1. The engine abstraction (§12) makes OpenTofu a future adapter, not an architecture change. Revisit when an OpenTofu adapter is requested; no version committed. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix — Prior milestone (v1.0 demo) decisions
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
### Category: Architecture Finalization
|
||||
- **REQ-16:** Architecture reaches v1.0 — all 11 open decisions in `docs/architecture.md` §13 are resolved and recorded in `PROJECT.md` (W1.A, W1.B, W2.A, W3.D, W3.E, BA.A–F, OpenTofu timing).
|
||||
- **REQ-17:** Target Stack IR is defined as a JSON Schema under `schemas/ir.schema.json`; substrate-agnostic (resources, relationships, composition max-depth-5, policy hooks).
|
||||
- **REQ-17:** Target Stack IR is defined as a JSON Schema under `schemas/ir.schema.json`; engine-agnostic (resources, relationships, composition max-depth-5, policy hooks).
|
||||
- **REQ-18:** `PolicyCheckResult` normalized schema is defined under `schemas/policy_check_result.schema.json`; a Checkov adapter translates Checkov JSON to this schema.
|
||||
- **REQ-19:** Six-input confidence signal is specified under `platform/confidence_signal.py` with per-env thresholds (dev 0.50 / qa 0.75 / prod 0.90 / dr 0.95) and severity→penalty mapping (critical=hard override, high=-0.2, medium=-0.05, low=-0.01, info=0.0).
|
||||
- **REQ-20:** Tiered audit ledger design is authored: S3 Object Lock (compliance mode, 7-yr) + DynamoDB outbox (RPO=0, JWS detached signatures, `prev_event_hash` chain, daily checkpoints).
|
||||
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
### Category: v1 Spike — End-to-End
|
||||
- **REQ-27:** One end-to-end contract submission (`contracts/spike.yaml` for `l2-static-assets`) flows through: contract schema validation → contract→IR resolution → `terraform plan` (real AWS) → Checkov `PolicyCheckResult` → confidence signal → evidence event written to the DynamoDB outbox.
|
||||
- **REQ-28:** Spike verification (`scripts/verify_phase10.sh`) proves the IR-shaped commitments hold: the adapter is the only substrate-specific code; no polyglot mess; the L1 content, contract YML, and thin-composition tree are substrate-agnostic.
|
||||
- **REQ-28:** Spike verification (`scripts/verify_phase10.sh`) proves the IR-shaped commitments hold: the adapter is the only engine-specific code; no polyglot mess; the L1 content, contract YML, and thin-composition tree are engine-agnostic.
|
||||
|
||||
## Out of Scope (v1.1)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ step without a long-lived key)
|
||||
| (b) Self-hosted OIDC broker | Stand up a tiny OIDC IdP (e.g. `dex`, `oauth2-proxy`, or a custom JWKS endpoint) that the Gitea job authenticates to with its `GITEA_TOKEN` and that issues a JWT minted with a platform signing key; AWS IAM trusts the broker's JWKS. | Workable but heavy for a spike — requires a second always-on service, a signing-key rotation story, and IAM trust plumbing. Better suited to v1.2. |
|
||||
| (c) `aws sts assume-role-with-web-identity` with a token from Gitea's own API | Use the job's `GITEA_TOKEN` (a PAT-equivalent, short-lived for the job) as the `WebIdentityToken` to STS. | **Rejected**: STS rejects non-OIDC tokens; `GITEA_TOKEN` is not a JWT, has no `iss`/`sub`/`aud` claims, and AWS IAM has no Gitea OIDC provider to trust. (This is exactly the gap #33681 describes for GCP.) |
|
||||
| (d) Short-lived AWS creds via a scheduled credential mint | A platform job (cron) mints `aws sts get-session-token` (or a role-session) and writes the temp creds as a Gitea Actions secret with a TTL ≤ 1h. The spike workflow reads the secret. | Workable, but reintroduces a long-lived key *upstream* (the mint job needs one) and a secret in Gitea — a narrower version of the very thing §12.5 forbids. Acceptable as a documented spike-only waiver if (a) and (b) are both rejected for the spike scope. |
|
||||
| (e) LocalStack as an AWS stand-in | Replace real AWS with LocalStack for the spike; no IAM trust needed at all (LocalStack mocks STS). | Workable for the *mechanics* of `terraform plan` but **invalidates REQ-23** ("real AWS via OIDC") and the spike's whole purpose of proving real-AWS feasibility. Reject for the spike; keep as a unit-test substrate only. |
|
||||
| (e) LocalStack as an AWS stand-in | Replace real AWS with LocalStack for the spike; no IAM trust needed at all (LocalStack mocks STS). | Workable for the *mechanics* of `terraform plan` but **invalidates REQ-23** ("real AWS via OIDC") and the spike's whole purpose of proving real-AWS feasibility. Reject for the spike; keep as a unit-test engine only. |
|
||||
| (f) Documented spike-only waiver: rotate a long-lived key per-run | One IAM access key, stored as a Gitea Actions secret, used by the workflow, rotated (deactivated + new key) after each spike run by the same workflow. | The cleanest *available* option that still touches real AWS. Still violates the *letter* of §12.5 ("long-lived credentials are forbidden") but satisfies the *intent* for a time-boxed spike: the key's useful lifetime equals one workflow run (minutes), not "long-lived." Requires an explicit, logged waiver. |
|
||||
| (g) GitHub-hosted mirror pipeline | Run the OIDC-requiring step on GitHub Actions (which supports `id-token: write`) against the same repo mirrored from Gitea. | Rejected: introduces a second forge, violates the "Forge: Gitea" constraint, and defeats the spike's purpose of proving the platform works on Gitea. |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ the adapter and the round-trip to Terraform is verified.
|
||||
|
||||
- **A-3.1** (0.85): the IR's "nearly isomorphic to Terraform in v1" claim
|
||||
(architecture.md §12.1) is the right v1 boundary — build a thin IR, defer
|
||||
substrate-specific expressiveness to v2.
|
||||
engine-specific expressiveness to v2.
|
||||
- **A-3.2** (0.80): single-parent-per-child is sufficient for v1 (no L1
|
||||
needs two parents in the spike). The "shared keyword for multi-relationship"
|
||||
(architecture.md §12.1) is a v2 concern; the v1 schema reserves the field
|
||||
@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@ AWS Terraform resources; the adapter `TYPE_MAP` (currently
|
||||
| `l1-alb` | `aws:elbv2:loadbalancer`, `aws:elbv2:listener`, `aws:elbv2:targetgroup` | `aws_lb`, `aws_lb_listener`, `aws_lb_target_group` | port, protocol |
|
||||
| `l1-ecr` | `aws:ecr:repository` | `aws_ecr_repository` | name |
|
||||
|
||||
The IR schema (`schemas/ir.schema.json`) is substrate-agnostic and already
|
||||
The IR schema (`schemas/ir.schema.json`) is engine-agnostic and already
|
||||
supports arbitrary resource types — no schema change needed, only new
|
||||
`interface.json` files + `TYPE_MAP` entries. The `l2-microservice`
|
||||
thin-composition references all six (depth ≤ 5).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@
|
||||
- **v1.6 (complete, tag `v1.6.0`):** consumer-facing docs restructure + terminology normalization + environments concept. `docs/` becomes a Jekyll-style GitHub Pages site. `acdl_platform/` is renamed to `core/`. L2 → "modules", L1 → "primitives", "composition" → "pattern" in prose. README restructured: Features + Roadmap (no internal status), repository roles restated (consumer = app code + contracts + CI definitions), mermaid fixed (visible text, security-checks + infrastructure-apply stages, no tool names), credentials section minus go-gitea/waivers. Platform-managed environments concept + a minimal onboarding scaffold. `.ciagent/` + `.gitea/` references removed from all consumer-facing docs.
|
||||
- **v1.7 (complete, tag `v1.7.0`):** production platform + contract ingestion + pipeline maturation. Rename `static-assets` → `static-assets` (D-048 — incl. `.ciagent/` historical narrative). Author `cloudfront` + `waf` primitives; augment `static-assets` to a production-ready S3 + CloudFront (OAC) + WAF stack (D-049). Tagging-standard enforcement (Checkov custom rule, D-043 closure, D-054). Wiz adapter stub (D-052) + Kyverno K8s-native adapter (D-053). Platform Lambda + DynamoDB `acdl-contracts` table for contract ingestion (D-051) + cross-account IAM. Deploy outputs via SSM SecureString + GitHub PR comment (D-050). Uniform error reporting via the Lambda `report_error` action → GitHub issue on the platform repo (D-055); Gitea excluded. Stage comments after every successful pipeline stage. Three platform pipelines (platform-test unit+integration, primitives-plan, patterns-plan). Release job with semver + MAJOR.MINOR/MAJOR tag maintenance (D-057). `uses:`/`ref:` bumped to `@v1.6`; floating `v1.6` + `v1` tags created in Phase 22. Remove the legacy consumer-repos directory (a v1.2 artifact, removed in v1.7); add validated per-module examples (`modules/<name>/examples/`, D-058) including a new RDS primitive demonstrating multi-engine variation (D-059).
|
||||
- **v1.8 (complete, tag `v1.8.0`):** P1 remediation + uptime monitoring + engineering standards + encryption/deletion-protection by default + decommission alias + path documentation. Clears 8 pending P1 issues (P1-3..P1-9 + S1). Adds per-stack CMK + encryption-by-default for all primitives. Adds deletion-protection-by-default + L2 feature flag. Adds uptime-kuma primitive (ECS Fargate, deployed by default after L2, separate state, feature flag, alert channels). Adds decommission mode (2-step pipeline with HITL SRE gates + CMDB-validated change request). Adds `modules/STANDARDS.md` (L1+L2 authoring + review standards). Adds `schemas/README.md`, `pipelines/README.md`, `adapters/README.md`.
|
||||
- **v1.9.1 (complete, tag `v1.9.1`):** leadership presentation decks. Two leadership-facing presentation decks (How the Platform Works + The Developer Experience) for senior leadership (CTO, Head of Cloud, Head of Infrastructure, Head of DevOps). Each deck has a full markdown source of truth (with speaker notes + mermaid diagrams) and a lean Marp deck (no speaker notes, embedded PNG diagrams). A README documents the 3-step slide creation process (full markdown → Marp synthesis → PPTX export). Docs-only NFR patch.
|
||||
- **v1.9.2 (complete, tag `v1.9.2`):** S&P Global Energy theme for presentation decks. Applies the S&P Global Energy brand visual identity (red-core #D6002A, grey-90 #1B1B1B, Akkurat Pro font) to both Marp decks. Title headers changed to full platform name. Footer 'Confidential' → 'Internal'. Title slide subtitle removed. Last DX slide renamed to 'The Desired Outcomes'. Docs-only NFR patch.
|
||||
- **v1.9.3 (complete, tag `v1.9.3`):** rendered presentation decks. HTML renderings of both Marp decks committed to docs/presentations/ (self-contained, base64-embedded images, S&P Global Energy theme). PPTX files uploaded to the Gitea release as downloadable attachments. README updated to document HTML as committed artifacts and PPTX as release attachments. Docs-only NFR patch.
|
||||
- **v1.9.4 (complete, tag `v1.9.4`):** presentation slide updates + complete removal of a specific compliance framework from all docs. Title slide redesigned (deck title as H1, 'Agentic Cloud Delivery Platform' as subtitle). DX deck: removed Local Reproducibility slide, redesigned Safe Promotion Path with side-by-side layout, 'an agent' → 'an AI agent', What a Developer Does diagram floated right. All references to that framework removed from 25 files (presentations, module READMEs, docs). Compliance lists now: GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA. HTML re-rendered. PPTX uploaded to release. Docs-only NFR patch.
|
||||
- **v1.9.5 (complete, tag `v1.9.5`):** vision gaps + Testing badge + engine terminology + agentic tags + CR format. 9 requirements: (1) DX closing slide strengthened with 'infrastructure as a utility' vision bullet; (2) 'moving' → 'promoting'; (3) added red tape + scalability bullets to Problem slide; (4) Roadmap slide redesigned side-by-side; (5) new 'What This Platform Is — and Isn't' slide (PW deck 16 slides); (6) 'shipped'/'Available today' → 'Testing' (0 consumer adoption); (7) global 'substrate' → 'engine' (88 matches, 30+ files); (8) 'forge' → 'VCS' in presentation files only; (9) new Agentic badge (purple) on agentic features. CR format changed to CHG0678912. HTML re-rendered. PPTX uploaded to release. Docs-only NFR patch.
|
||||
- **v1.9.6 (complete, tag `v1.9.6`):** consolidate both Marp decks to 10 high-impact slides. PW deck 16 → 10 (merged Problem+North Star+Anti-goals, merged Policy+Secure by Default, merged Audit+HITL, folded Observability/Environments/Portability into existing slides, added Vision Realized closing). DX deck 15 → 10 (merged What Dev Does+Contract+No Platform Code, merged Feedback+Deploy Outputs, merged Promotion+Rising Bar, cut Citizen Developer standalone, kept Versioned Releases/Onboarding/Decommission). Removed '5-line YAML' claim from both decks. Source markdown unchanged. Docs-only NFR patch.
|
||||
- **v1.9.7 (complete, tag `v1.9.7`):** talking points files + 4-step process. Created two talking points markdown files (one per deck) distilling the source of truth into presenter-ready cues indexed by the Marp deck's 10-slide structure. Each file has 3-6 talking point bullets + key takeaway per slide. README updated from 3-step to 4-step process (added Step 4: talking points). Directory layout, checklist, and decks table updated. Docs-only NFR patch.
|
||||
- **v1.0 demo URL:** https://git.cloudinit.dev/continuous-intelligence/acdl-evidence/raw/branch/main/index.html
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -138,7 +145,7 @@ D-034 closed (root key deactivated by user).**
|
||||
- **Success Criteria:**
|
||||
- `l2-static-assets` references `l1-s3` only (depth 1).
|
||||
- One contract submission completes the full pipeline end-to-end.
|
||||
- `scripts/verify_phase10.sh` proves the adapter is the only substrate-specific code.
|
||||
- `scripts/verify_phase10.sh` proves the adapter is the only engine-specific code.
|
||||
- Evidence event is written to the DynamoDB outbox.
|
||||
|
||||
After Phase 10: COMPLETE gate — review → ship `v1.2.0` → audit. **DONE.**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ Planned future features (no dates; tracked in the internal roadmap):
|
||||
consumer creates a module directly from the contract file (the
|
||||
"composition" mechanism, redesigned).
|
||||
- **Compliance milestone** — per-module compliance extension points (GDPR,
|
||||
SOX, SOC2, HIPAA, DORA) wired into the pipeline.
|
||||
- **Additional substrate adapters** — beyond the Terraform adapter.
|
||||
SOX, SOC2, DORA) wired into the pipeline.
|
||||
- **Additional engine adapters** — beyond the Terraform adapter.
|
||||
- **Environment self-service** — a consumer-facing flow to request and
|
||||
provision a new platform-managed environment (today it is a platform-team
|
||||
action).
|
||||
@@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
|
||||
The platform validates the architecture's claim that the **stack
|
||||
commitments do not require a polyglot mess**: the adapter is the only
|
||||
substrate-specific code. `modules/`, `schemas/`, `contracts/`,
|
||||
engine-specific code. `modules/`, `schemas/`, `contracts/`,
|
||||
`core/confidence_signal.py`, `core/contract_resolver.py`, and
|
||||
`core/outbox_writer.py` are all substrate-agnostic (no `aws_s3_bucket` /
|
||||
`core/outbox_writer.py` are all engine-agnostic (no `aws_s3_bucket` /
|
||||
`aws_` infrastructure terms).
|
||||
|
||||
## How to run
|
||||
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ across all modules; `static-assets` is the worked example.
|
||||
| `core/` | Platform code: contract resolver, confidence signal, outbox writer, environment check, environments, separation of duties, HITL/ledger designs | active |
|
||||
| `schemas/` | JSON Schemas: stack, contract, PolicyCheckResult, pipeline contract, deploy pipeline contract (draft 2020-12) | active |
|
||||
| `pipelines/` | Central pipeline contracts: `ci.yaml` (CI), `deploy.yaml` (deployment) | active |
|
||||
| `adapters/` | Substrate adapters — the substrate adapter (the only substrate-specific code per §12) + the policy adapter | active |
|
||||
| `adapters/` | Angine adapters — the engine adapter (the only engine-specific code per §12) + the policy adapter | active |
|
||||
| `terraform/` | State backend (S3 + DynamoDB) + platform TF (`terraform/spike/`) + bootstrap scripts (`terraform/bootstrap/`) | active |
|
||||
| `modules/` | Primitives + modules + `registry.json`. Primitives: s3, vpc, ecs-cluster, ecs-service, iam-role, alb, ecr, cloudfront, waf, rds. Modules: microservice, static-assets. Each module has a `examples/` directory with validated contract examples | active |
|
||||
| `contracts/` | Sample consumer contracts (`static-assets.yaml`, `microservice.yaml`) | active |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Adapters translate the substrate-agnostic Target Stack IR to substrate-specific formats. The Terraform adapter is the primary adapter (IR → HCL). Policy adapters translate security tool output into normalized `PolicyCheckResult` records that the confidence signal consumes in an engine-agnostic way.
|
||||
Adapters translate the engine-agnostic Target Stack IR to engine-specific formats. The Terraform adapter is the primary adapter (IR → HCL). Policy adapters translate security tool output into normalized `PolicyCheckResult` records that the confidence signal consumes in an engine-agnostic way.
|
||||
|
||||
## Existing Adapters
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ root module that calls the L1 modules, the stack-typed relationships to
|
||||
Terraform module references, and emits a Terraform plan from the stack.
|
||||
|
||||
The adapter is a THIN LAYER; it does not own L1/L2 content — it only
|
||||
translates. Substrate-agnostic in, Terraform out.
|
||||
translates. Angine-agnostic in, Terraform out.
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 09 spike: handled one L1 (s3, stack type aws:s3:bucket).
|
||||
Phase 13: generalized the resource/output emission via TYPE_MAP +
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Stack type -> Terraform resource type. The only substrate-specific table.
|
||||
# Stack type -> Terraform resource type. The only engine-specific table.
|
||||
# As more L1s land, this grows; the L1 content + stack do not change.
|
||||
TYPE_MAP = {
|
||||
"aws:s3:bucket": "aws_s3_bucket",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
A["Consumer surfaces"] --> B["Contract schema"]
|
||||
B --> C["Central pipeline"]
|
||||
C --> D["Modules + primitives"]
|
||||
C --> E["Substrate adapter"]
|
||||
C --> E["Angine adapter"]
|
||||
C --> F["Confidence signal"]
|
||||
C --> G["Evidence stream"]
|
||||
D --> E
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
|
||||
The four layers:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Primitives** — single-purpose, substrate-agnostic modules representing
|
||||
1. **Primitives** — single-purpose, engine-agnostic modules representing
|
||||
the smallest reusable infrastructure pieces (a VPC, an S3 bucket, an ECS
|
||||
cluster). A primitive does not reference other primitives; it takes its
|
||||
environment as input.
|
||||
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ Both end in a contract submission that enters the same pipeline.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Primitives
|
||||
|
||||
Single-purpose, substrate-agnostic modules. Locked commitments:
|
||||
Single-purpose, engine-agnostic modules. Locked commitments:
|
||||
|
||||
- No inter-primitive references. A primitive may call substrate data sources.
|
||||
- No inter-primitive references. A primitive may call engine data sources.
|
||||
- Semver with three triggers: interface → MAJOR, behavior → MINOR,
|
||||
lifecycle → PATCH.
|
||||
- Immutability on publication.
|
||||
@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ Single-purpose, substrate-agnostic modules. Locked commitments:
|
||||
- AI refinement is a flag, triggered by a joint operational condition
|
||||
(N ≥ 50 consecutive zero-rollback changes, no primitive/module incident in
|
||||
6 months, Infra & Ops unilateral override).
|
||||
- A primitive's interface is defined against the Target Stack (substrate-
|
||||
agnostic), not against any substrate's variable block directly.
|
||||
- A primitive's interface is defined against the Target Stack (engine-
|
||||
agnostic), not against any engine's variable block directly.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Modules
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ Patterns that combine primitives into deployable shapes. Locked commitments:
|
||||
creation, key/secret creation, external data transfer.
|
||||
- Auto-promote after 3 observed usages.
|
||||
- A module's pattern tree wires field is defined against the stack's
|
||||
relationship type, not against any substrate's module block. The stack →
|
||||
substrate translation is the substrate adapter's job (§12). The pattern
|
||||
pipeline itself is substrate-agnostic.
|
||||
relationship type, not against any engine's module block. The stack →
|
||||
engine translation is the engine adapter's job (§12). The pattern
|
||||
pipeline itself is engine-agnostic.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Developer Surface
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ Patterns that combine primitives into deployable shapes. Locked commitments:
|
||||
- Central repo + generated client libraries.
|
||||
- Multi-stage validation pipeline: schema → policy → NFR → confidence.
|
||||
- Distributed enrichment.
|
||||
- GitOps reconciler + substrate execution layer.
|
||||
- GitOps reconciler + engine execution layer.
|
||||
- The pipeline emits a `PolicyCheckResult` record per policy rule evaluated;
|
||||
the confidence signal consumes these as one normalized input (§8).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -174,12 +174,12 @@ integration, contract, security smoke, and performance smoke validation.
|
||||
- The DynamoDB outbox enforces identity distinctness across environment
|
||||
approvers.
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Cross-Cutting — Substrate Execution
|
||||
## 12. Cross-Cutting — Angine Execution
|
||||
|
||||
The technical execution layer. Primitives and modules are substrate-agnostic
|
||||
in shape; substrate adapters are the only substrate-specific component.
|
||||
The technical execution layer. Primitives and modules are engine-agnostic
|
||||
in shape; engine adapters are the only engine-specific component.
|
||||
|
||||
The architecture defines a **Target Stack** — a substrate-neutral
|
||||
The architecture defines a **Target Stack** — a engine-neutral
|
||||
description of:
|
||||
|
||||
- The resources to create (typed against the stack schema).
|
||||
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ description of:
|
||||
|
||||
The registry, the module pattern tree, the contract schema, and the
|
||||
`PolicyCheckResult` schema are all defined against the stack schema. None is
|
||||
defined against any specific substrate.
|
||||
defined against any specific engine.
|
||||
|
||||
**v1 implementation reality:** the stack is shaped to round-trip cleanly to
|
||||
Terraform because there is no other adapter to differentiate from. As
|
||||
@@ -198,19 +198,19 @@ gain translation logic, but the primitive content, the module pattern tree,
|
||||
and the contract schema do not change. This is the design that prevents a
|
||||
polyglot mess.
|
||||
|
||||
The substrate adapter:
|
||||
The engine adapter:
|
||||
|
||||
- Translates the stack-typed module pattern tree to a substrate root module
|
||||
- Translates the stack-typed module pattern tree to a engine root module
|
||||
that calls the primitive modules.
|
||||
- Is a thin layer. It does not own primitive/module content; it only
|
||||
translates.
|
||||
- Is the only substrate-specific code in the platform.
|
||||
- Is the only engine-specific code in the platform.
|
||||
|
||||
Policy checks run on the substrate plan output. Results are normalized to
|
||||
Policy checks run on the engine plan output. Results are normalized to
|
||||
`PolicyCheckResult` records by a policy adapter. The confidence signal
|
||||
consumes the union of all `PolicyCheckResult` records, regardless of engine
|
||||
— substrate-agnostic over its inputs, matching the module model's
|
||||
substrate-agnosticism over its outputs.
|
||||
— engine-agnostic over its inputs, matching the module model's
|
||||
engine-agnosticism over its outputs.
|
||||
|
||||
## 13. Cross-Cutting — Platform Runners
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -237,5 +237,5 @@ See [Versioning](pipeline/versioning) for the consumer-facing details.
|
||||
|
||||
## 15. OpenTofu
|
||||
|
||||
Not in v1. The substrate abstraction (§12) makes OpenTofu a future adapter,
|
||||
Not in v1. The engine abstraction (§12) makes OpenTofu a future adapter,
|
||||
not an architecture change. Revisit when an OpenTofu adapter is requested.
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ step applies to `microservice` and any future module.
|
||||
Consumers have their own repos and consume ACDL by referencing `uses:` the
|
||||
central pipeline definitions. The consumer declares a **contract** (which
|
||||
module, which environment, which inputs); the ACDL platform owns the
|
||||
pipelines, modules, substrate adapter, and evidence stream.
|
||||
pipelines, modules, engine adapter, and evidence stream.
|
||||
|
||||
You do not write infrastructure modules, workflow YAML, or adapter code.
|
||||
You write a contract YAML file and the platform does the rest. Your
|
||||
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
a stack JSON instance.
|
||||
3. **security checks** (adapter) — security checks run on the resolved
|
||||
stack before any infrastructure is planned.
|
||||
4. **infrastructure plan** (adapter) — the substrate adapter compiles the
|
||||
4. **infrastructure plan** (adapter) — the engine adapter compiles the
|
||||
stack to an infrastructure plan. You see the plan in your run logs.
|
||||
5. **policy checks** (adapter) — policy checks run on the plan. The results
|
||||
are normalized to `PolicyCheckResult` records. Each result has a
|
||||
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ for the full table.
|
||||
## Step 9 — Compliance extensions
|
||||
|
||||
Each module lists compliance extension points for the future compliance
|
||||
milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, HIPAA, DORA). See each module's README under
|
||||
milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA). See each module's README under
|
||||
`modules/l1/<name>/README.md` or `modules/l2/<name>/README.md` for the
|
||||
per-module extension points. Common examples:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ per-module extension points. Common examples:
|
||||
| Sample contract | `contracts/microservice.yaml` | The microservice example contract (uses `@v1.9`). |
|
||||
| Module examples | `modules/<name>/examples/` | Validated per-module example contracts (`simple.yaml` + `complex.yaml`). |
|
||||
| Contract resolver | `core/contract_resolver.py` | Resolves contracts to stack instances. |
|
||||
| Substrate adapter | `adapters/terraform/adapter.py` | Compiles stack instances to infrastructure. |
|
||||
| Angine adapter | `adapters/terraform/adapter.py` | Compiles stack instances to infrastructure. |
|
||||
| Platform pipeline runner | `scripts/run_platform.sh` | The pipeline runner (platform-side; consumers do not invoke it directly). |
|
||||
| Environments | [environments/](environments/) | Platform-managed environments + onboarding. |
|
||||
| Versioning | [pipeline/versioning](pipeline/versioning) | The `uses:` tag + module versioning. |
|
||||
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ destruction:
|
||||
with:
|
||||
contract: .acdl/contract.yaml
|
||||
mode: decommission
|
||||
changeRequestId: "CR-2026-001"
|
||||
changeRequestId: "CHG0678912"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Step 1 — Disable deletion protection (HITL SRE gate):** The pipeline
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ There are two kinds of repository in the ACDL model:
|
||||
| [Pipeline](pipeline/) | Consumers + platform engineers | The central CI + deployment pipeline and its stages. |
|
||||
| [Versioning](pipeline/versioning) | Consumers + platform engineers | Module versioning + deploy-pipeline versioning (the `uses:` tag). |
|
||||
| [Environments](environments/) | Consumers | Platform-managed environments and the first-run onboarding flow. |
|
||||
| [Architecture](architecture) | Platform engineers | The current architecture — layers, cross-cutting concerns, the substrate abstraction. |
|
||||
| [Architecture](architecture) | Platform engineers | The current architecture — layers, cross-cutting concerns, the engine abstraction. |
|
||||
| [Vision](vision) | All | The why — the friction the platform absorbs and the north star. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Features
|
||||
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ Planned future features (no dates; tracked in the internal roadmap):
|
||||
consumer creates a module directly from the contract file (the "composition"
|
||||
mechanism, redesigned).
|
||||
- **Compliance milestone** — per-module compliance extension points (GDPR,
|
||||
SOX, SOC2, HIPAA, DORA) wired into the pipeline.
|
||||
- **Additional substrate adapters** — beyond the Terraform adapter.
|
||||
SOX, SOC2, DORA) wired into the pipeline.
|
||||
- **Additional engine adapters** — beyond the Terraform adapter.
|
||||
- **Environment self-service** — a consumer-facing flow to request and
|
||||
provision a new platform-managed environment.
|
||||
- **HITL gates for qa / prod / dr** — human attestation + higher confidence
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Reusable building blocks for cloud infrastructure. There are two kinds:
|
||||
complete stack (e.g. an ECS Fargate microservice). Each module has a
|
||||
`composition.json` declaring its children and wires.
|
||||
|
||||
The substrate adapter compiles a module instance to infrastructure. Each
|
||||
The engine adapter compiles a module instance to infrastructure. Each
|
||||
module's README documents which resources it creates.
|
||||
|
||||
## Primitives
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
wires the contract inputs, emits a stack JSON instance).
|
||||
3. **security checks** (adapter) — security checks run on the resolved
|
||||
stack before any infrastructure is planned.
|
||||
4. **infrastructure plan** (adapter) — the substrate adapter compiles the
|
||||
4. **infrastructure plan** (adapter) — the engine adapter compiles the
|
||||
stack to an infrastructure plan.
|
||||
5. **policy checks** (adapter) — policy checks run on the plan. Results are
|
||||
normalized to `PolicyCheckResult` records (severity, rule ID, pass/fail).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
|
||||
# Presentations
|
||||
|
||||
Leadership-facing presentation decks for the ACDL platform.
|
||||
|
||||
## The 4-step slide creation process
|
||||
|
||||
Every presentation in this folder is produced by the same four-step process.
|
||||
**Never edit the Marp deck, the PPTX, or the talking points directly** —
|
||||
always start from the full markdown source of truth (Step 1), synthesize the
|
||||
Marp deck (Step 2), export to HTML + PPTX (Step 3), then distill the talking
|
||||
points (Step 4). This keeps a reviewable, plain-text source of truth for
|
||||
every deck and a presenter-ready cue sheet for delivery.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Step 1: full markdown Step 2: Marp deck Step 3: HTML + PPTX Step 4: Talking points
|
||||
(source of truth) ──► (lean, 10 slides) ──► (rendered) ──► (presenter cues)
|
||||
*.md *-marp.md *.html / *.pptx *-talking-points.md
|
||||
+ speaker notes + embedded PNG diagrams + 3-6 bullets per slide
|
||||
+ mermaid code blocks + Marp frontmatter + key takeaway per slide
|
||||
+ maturity badges + indexed by Marp slide #
|
||||
+ no speaker notes + content distilled from Step 1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 1 — Full markdown (source of truth)
|
||||
|
||||
**File convention:** `<deck-name>.md` (e.g. `how-the-platform-works.md`).
|
||||
|
||||
Write the complete deck as a standard markdown file. This is the **source of
|
||||
truth** — it contains:
|
||||
|
||||
- Every slide as an `## Slide N — Title` H2 section.
|
||||
- Tight bullets with leadership-relevant content.
|
||||
- A `> **Speaker notes:**` block at the end of each slide with the nuance,
|
||||
the "who cares and why," and the honesty caveats.
|
||||
- Mermaid diagrams as ```` ```mermaid ```` fenced code blocks (these render
|
||||
on GitHub/Pages but not in Marp — Step 2 converts them to images).
|
||||
- An honest "shipped vs. planned" framing: every "available today" claim is
|
||||
grounded in shipped/verified work; every "planned" item is explicitly
|
||||
marked.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why this file is the source of truth:** it is reviewable in any markdown
|
||||
viewer, diffs cleanly in git, and carries the full reasoning (speaker notes)
|
||||
that a presenter needs. The Marp deck and PPTX are *derived artifacts* — if a
|
||||
fact is wrong, fix it here and re-run Steps 2 and 3.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 2 — Marp deck synthesis
|
||||
|
||||
**File convention:** `<deck-name>-marp.md` (e.g. `how-the-platform-works-marp.md`).
|
||||
|
||||
Synthesize the full markdown into a lean Marp deck:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Marp frontmatter** at the top: `marp: true`, `theme: default`,
|
||||
`paginate: true`, `size: 16x9`, a header/footer, and an inline `style:`
|
||||
block for fonts, colors, tables, badges.
|
||||
- **No speaker notes.** The Marp deck is what the audience sees; the
|
||||
speaker notes live only in the Step 1 source of truth.
|
||||
- **Mermaid diagrams → PNG images.** Marp does not render mermaid fenced
|
||||
blocks natively. Extract each mermaid block from Step 1 into a `.mmd`
|
||||
source file under `assets/mmd/`, render it to PNG under `assets/png/`,
|
||||
and embed it with ``.
|
||||
- **`<!-- _class: title -->` + `<!-- _paginate: false -->`** on title and
|
||||
closing slides for the dark-background title style.
|
||||
- **Maturity badges** using inline spans:
|
||||
`<span class="badge testing">Testing</span>`
|
||||
`<span class="badge planned">Planned</span>`
|
||||
`<span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>`
|
||||
- **Tighter prose** than Step 1 — strip the speaker-note nuance; keep the
|
||||
leadership-relevant selling points.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 3 — Render to HTML and PPTX
|
||||
|
||||
Both formats are derived from the Marp deck. **HTML is committed to the repo**
|
||||
(viewable in any browser, self-contained with base64-embedded images). **PPTX
|
||||
is uploaded to the Gitea release** as a downloadable attachment (binary, not
|
||||
committed to git).
|
||||
|
||||
#### HTML export (committed to repo)
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
CHROME_PATH=/root/.cache/ms-playwright/chromium-1217/chrome-linux64/chrome \
|
||||
npx --yes @marp-team/marp-cli@latest --allow-local-files \
|
||||
docs/presentations/<deck-name>-marp.md \
|
||||
-o docs/presentations/<deck-name>.html
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
HTML export inlines images as base64 data URIs — no `--allow-local-files`
|
||||
needed for self-contained output, but it's required when the Marp deck
|
||||
references local PNG assets. The resulting HTML is a single self-contained
|
||||
file that renders the full deck with the S&P Global Energy theme.
|
||||
|
||||
**Re-render the HTML whenever the Marp source changes.** The HTML files are
|
||||
committed artifacts, not generated on-the-fly — they must be re-rendered and
|
||||
re-committed when the Marp deck is updated.
|
||||
|
||||
#### PPTX export (uploaded to Gitea release)
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
CHROME_PATH=/root/.cache/ms-playwright/chromium-1217/chrome-linux64/chrome \
|
||||
npx --yes @marp-team/marp-cli@latest --allow-local-files \
|
||||
docs/presentations/<deck-name>-marp.md \
|
||||
-o <output-path>.pptx
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `--allow-local-files` flag is **required** for PPTX export so the local
|
||||
PNG diagrams are embedded in the file. PPTX files are not committed to the
|
||||
repo (binary, no meaningful diffs) — they are uploaded to the Gitea release
|
||||
as downloadable attachments.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 4 — Talking points (presenter cues)
|
||||
|
||||
**File convention:** `<deck-name>-talking-points.md` (e.g.
|
||||
`how-the-platform-works-talking-points.md`).
|
||||
|
||||
Distill the source of truth (Step 1) into presenter-ready cues, indexed by
|
||||
the Marp deck (Step 2) slide structure:
|
||||
|
||||
- **One section per Marp slide** — `## Slide N — Title`, matching the Marp
|
||||
deck's 10 main + 6 appendix slide structure exactly. The Marp deck
|
||||
provides the indexing and context (what the audience sees); the source
|
||||
markdown provides the content (the speaker notes, the detail, the nuance).
|
||||
- **3-6 talking point bullets per slide** — punchy, actionable cues distilled
|
||||
from the source markdown's speaker notes. NOT the speaker notes verbatim
|
||||
(those are too long and too contextual). These are prompts: "Land this
|
||||
point," "Contrast with X," "Be honest about Y."
|
||||
- **Key takeaway per slide** — the one memorable thing the audience should
|
||||
walk away with from that slide.
|
||||
- **No content duplication** — the talking points reference the Marp slides
|
||||
for visual context and the source markdown for full detail. They don't
|
||||
repeat either; they bridge them.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why this file exists:** a presenter needs a cue sheet they can glance at
|
||||
during delivery — not the full speaker notes (too long), not the Marp slides
|
||||
(no detail). The talking points file is the middle layer: what to say, in
|
||||
what order, with what emphasis, per slide.
|
||||
|
||||
**When to update:** re-distill the talking points whenever the Marp deck
|
||||
structure changes (slides added, removed, merged, or re-ordered) or whenever
|
||||
the source markdown's speaker notes are updated. The talking points are a
|
||||
*derived artifact* — if a fact is wrong, fix it in the source markdown (Step 1)
|
||||
and re-distill.
|
||||
|
||||
## Directory layout
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
docs/presentations/
|
||||
├── README.md ← this file
|
||||
├── how-the-platform-works.md ← Step 1: full source of truth
|
||||
├── how-the-platform-works-marp.md ← Step 2: Marp deck (10 main + 6 appendix)
|
||||
├── how-the-platform-works.html ← Step 3: rendered HTML (committed)
|
||||
├── how-the-platform-works-talking-points.md ← Step 4: presenter cues (16 sections)
|
||||
├── the-developer-experience.md ← Step 1: full source of truth
|
||||
├── the-developer-experience-marp.md ← Step 2: Marp deck (10 main + 6 appendix)
|
||||
├── the-developer-experience.html ← Step 3: rendered HTML (committed)
|
||||
├── the-developer-experience-talking-points.md ← Step 4: presenter cues (16 sections)
|
||||
└── assets/
|
||||
├── puppeteer-config.json ← no-sandbox config for mmdc
|
||||
├── mmd/ ← mermaid source files (Step 2 input)
|
||||
│ ├── platform-works-01-contract-driven.mmd
|
||||
│ ├── platform-works-02-end-to-end-flow.mmd
|
||||
│ ├── platform-works-03-scope-boundary.mmd
|
||||
│ ├── platform-works-04-confidence-signal.mmd
|
||||
│ ├── platform-works-05-attestation-flow.mmd
|
||||
│ ├── developer-experience-01b-scope-boundary.mmd
|
||||
│ ├── developer-experience-02-what-dev-does.mmd
|
||||
│ ├── developer-experience-03-no-cloning.mmd
|
||||
│ ├── developer-experience-04-promotion-journey.mmd
|
||||
│ └── road-to-north-star.mmd
|
||||
└── png/ ← rendered PNGs (embedded in Marp)
|
||||
├── platform-works-01-contract-driven.png
|
||||
├── platform-works-02-end-to-end-flow.png
|
||||
├── platform-works-03-scope-boundary.png
|
||||
├── platform-works-04-confidence-signal.png
|
||||
├── platform-works-05-attestation-flow.png
|
||||
├── developer-experience-01b-scope-boundary.png
|
||||
├── developer-experience-02-what-dev-does.png
|
||||
├── developer-experience-03-no-cloning.png
|
||||
├── developer-experience-04-promotion-journey.png
|
||||
└── road-to-north-star.png
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Conventions
|
||||
|
||||
### Appendix structure
|
||||
|
||||
Each Marp deck has **10 main slides + 6 appendix slides** (16 total). The
|
||||
main 10 are the presentation; the appendix is for deep dives and Q&A backup.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Main slides** (1-10): the story arc, high-impact, minimal text,
|
||||
visual-heavy. These are what the audience sees during the talk.
|
||||
- **Appendix slides** (A1-A5 + TOC): detail-heavy slides moved out of the
|
||||
main 10 to preserve the narrative flow. The appendix starts with a TOC
|
||||
slide listing the contents, followed by detail slides and a glossary.
|
||||
- **The Road to the North Star** is a required appendix slide in both decks
|
||||
— a phased timeline from v1.0 demo to the North Star, annotated as
|
||||
"proposed phasing, not formally planned."
|
||||
- **The Glossary** is a required appendix slide in both decks — defines
|
||||
acronyms (OIDC, ABAC, CMK, CMDB, RPO, HITL, VCS, NFR) for the audience.
|
||||
|
||||
### Maturity framing
|
||||
|
||||
Every capability claim in a deck is tagged with one of three badges:
|
||||
|
||||
| Badge | Meaning |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `Testing` | Works internally, not yet released to consumers (0 adoption) |
|
||||
| `Planned` | On the roadmap, not yet implemented |
|
||||
| `Agentic` | Involves AI agents, autonomous decision-making, or the citizen developer flow |
|
||||
|
||||
This is non-negotiable for a leadership audience: never present a roadmap
|
||||
item as a current capability, and never bury a tested capability's
|
||||
availability. When in doubt, check `.ciagent/ROADMAP.md` and the milestone
|
||||
status in `.ciagent/PROJECT.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Audience
|
||||
|
||||
The audience for these decks is **Senior Leadership**: CTO, Head of Cloud,
|
||||
Head of Infrastructure, Head of DevOps. The framing rules:
|
||||
|
||||
- **No jargon.** Translate internal terms: "primitives/modules" not "L1/L2",
|
||||
"intent" not "IR", "human attestation" not "HITL", "pattern" not
|
||||
"composition."
|
||||
- **Selling points forward.** Each slide leads with the leadership-relevant
|
||||
outcome; the mechanism follows.
|
||||
- **Zero-trust, security, observability, auditability, DX, citizen
|
||||
developer** are the themes — not implementation details.
|
||||
|
||||
### Diagrams
|
||||
|
||||
Mermaid diagrams in the Step 1 source use the repo's existing `flowchart`
|
||||
style (renders on GitHub/Pages). For the Marp deck (Step 2):
|
||||
|
||||
1. Extract the mermaid block into `assets/mmd/<deck>-<slide>-<name>.mmd`.
|
||||
2. Use **horizontal layouts** (`flowchart LR`) or **subgraph row-wrapping**
|
||||
for wide diagrams so the PNG fits a 16:9 slide without shrinking to
|
||||
illegibility. A 9-node sequential `flowchart TD` renders as a tall thin
|
||||
strip — restructure it as 2-row subgraphs or `flowchart LR`.
|
||||
3. Render with a 2x scale factor and transparent background for crisp slides.
|
||||
4. Embed with `` (or `h:320` for tall images).
|
||||
|
||||
## Build commands
|
||||
|
||||
### Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
- Node.js + npx (for `@marp-team/marp-cli` and `@mermaid-js/mermaid-cli`)
|
||||
- A Chrome/Chromium binary (Marp PPTX export requires it)
|
||||
|
||||
This environment has a working Chromium at:
|
||||
`/root/.cache/ms-playwright/chromium-1217/chrome-linux64/chrome`
|
||||
|
||||
### Render all mermaid diagrams to PNG
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cd docs/presentations/assets
|
||||
for f in mmd/*.mmd; do
|
||||
name=$(basename "$f" .mmd)
|
||||
PUPPETEER_EXECUTABLE_PATH=/root/.cache/ms-playwright/chromium-1217/chrome-linux64/chrome \
|
||||
npx --yes @mermaid-js/mermaid-cli@latest \
|
||||
-i "$f" -o "png/$name.png" \
|
||||
-p puppeteer-config.json -s 2 -b transparent
|
||||
done
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `puppeteer-config.json` passes `--no-sandbox` to the headless browser
|
||||
(required when running as root in this environment).
|
||||
|
||||
### Export a Marp deck to HTML (committed to repo)
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
CHROME_PATH=/root/.cache/ms-playwright/chromium-1217/chrome-linux64/chrome \
|
||||
npx --yes @marp-team/marp-cli@latest --allow-local-files \
|
||||
docs/presentations/<deck-name>-marp.md \
|
||||
-o docs/presentations/<deck-name>.html
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
HTML export inlines images as base64 data URIs. The `--allow-local-files`
|
||||
flag is needed when the Marp deck references local PNG assets (like the
|
||||
diagram images in `assets/png/`). The resulting HTML is self-contained.
|
||||
|
||||
**The HTML files are committed artifacts** — re-render and re-commit whenever
|
||||
the Marp source changes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Export a Marp deck to PPTX (uploaded to Gitea release)
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
CHROME_PATH=/root/.cache/ms-playwright/chromium-1217/chrome-linux64/chrome \
|
||||
npx --yes @marp-team/marp-cli@latest --allow-local-files \
|
||||
docs/presentations/<deck-name>-marp.md \
|
||||
-o <output-path>.pptx
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`--allow-local-files` is **required** for PPTX so local PNG diagrams are
|
||||
embedded in the file. PPTX files are not committed to git — upload them as
|
||||
attachments to the Gitea release.
|
||||
|
||||
## Adding a new presentation
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Write the full markdown** as `<deck-name>.md` following the
|
||||
`## Slide N — Title` + `> **Speaker notes:**` structure. This is the
|
||||
source of truth.
|
||||
2. **Extract any mermaid diagrams** into `assets/mmd/<deck-name>-<slide>-<name>.mmd`
|
||||
and render them to `assets/png/` (command above).
|
||||
3. **Synthesize the Marp deck** as `<deck-name>-marp.md` with frontmatter,
|
||||
no speaker notes, embedded PNGs, and maturity badges.
|
||||
4. **Render to HTML** with `--allow-local-files` and commit the HTML to
|
||||
`docs/presentations/<deck-name>.html`.
|
||||
5. **Render to PPTX** with `--allow-local-files` and upload to the Gitea
|
||||
release (do not commit PPTX to git).
|
||||
6. **Distill the talking points** as `<deck-name>-talking-points.md` — one
|
||||
section per Marp slide, 3-6 talking point bullets + key takeaway, content
|
||||
distilled from the source markdown (Step 1), indexed by the Marp deck
|
||||
(Step 2) slide structure.
|
||||
7. **Verify** the PPTX slide count and that media files are embedded:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 -c "
|
||||
import zipfile, re
|
||||
with zipfile.ZipFile('<output>.pptx') as z:
|
||||
slides = [n for n in z.namelist() if re.match(r'ppt/slides/slide\d+\.xml$', n)]
|
||||
media = [n for n in z.namelist() if n.startswith('ppt/media/')]
|
||||
print(f'{len(slides)} slides, {len(media)} media files')
|
||||
"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Current decks
|
||||
|
||||
| Deck | Source of truth (Step 1) | Marp deck (Step 2) | Rendered HTML (Step 3) | Talking points (Step 4) | Slides | Audience |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| How the Platform Works | `how-the-platform-works.md` | `how-the-platform-works-marp.md` | `how-the-platform-works.html` | `how-the-platform-works-talking-points.md` | 10 main + 6 appendix | CTO, Head of Cloud, Head of Infra, Head of DevOps |
|
||||
| The Developer Experience | `the-developer-experience.md` | `the-developer-experience-marp.md` | `the-developer-experience.html` | `the-developer-experience-talking-points.md` | 10 main + 6 appendix | CTO, Head of Cloud, Head of Infra, Head of DevOps |
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
subgraph UP ["Upstream — anything"]
|
||||
direction TB
|
||||
A["Technical dev\n(app code + contract)"]
|
||||
B["Citizen dev\n(intent → AI agent\n→ contract)"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph ACDL ["ACDL — infrastructure only"]
|
||||
C["Same contract\nSame pipeline\nSame safety"]
|
||||
D["Provision\nAWS resources"]
|
||||
E["Evidence\nhash-chained"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph DOWN ["Downstream"]
|
||||
F["AWS resources\nrunning"]
|
||||
G["Consumer pipeline\ndeploys image"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
A --> C
|
||||
B --> C
|
||||
C --> D
|
||||
C --> E
|
||||
D --> F
|
||||
F --> G
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
A["1. App code<br/>(top level of the repo)"] --> D["Push to main"]
|
||||
B["2. Contract<br/>(.acdl/contract.yaml)"] --> D
|
||||
C["3. CI definition<br/>(.github/workflows/deploy.yml<br/>— one 'uses:' line)"] --> D
|
||||
D --> E["Platform does the rest"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
A["Consumer repo<br/>app + contract + 'uses:'"] -->|triggers on push to main| B["Platform runner"]
|
||||
B -->|checks out the consumer repo| A
|
||||
B -->|checks out the ACDL platform repo<br/>into the workspace| C["Platform code<br/>(modules, adapters, schemas)"]
|
||||
C --> B
|
||||
B -->|runs the pipeline against<br/>the consumer's contract| D["Consumer's resources in AWS"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
A["dev\n≥ 0.50\nautonomous"] -->|promotion| B["qa\n≥ 0.75\nQA attests"]
|
||||
B -->|promotion| C["prod\n≥ 0.90\nSRE attests"]
|
||||
C -->|promotion| D["dr\n≥ 0.95\nSRE + DR drill"]
|
||||
A -.->|"Testing\n(pilot-ready)"| A
|
||||
B -.->|"Planned"| B
|
||||
C -.->|"Planned"| C
|
||||
D -.->|"Planned"| D
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
A["Consumer<br/>writes a contract"] --> B["Platform resolves,<br/>compiles, checks,<br/>deploys, records"]
|
||||
B --> C["Resources running in AWS<br/>+ tamper-evident evidence"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
||||
flowchart TD
|
||||
subgraph R1 [" "]
|
||||
direction LR
|
||||
A["Consumer<br/>contract"] --> B["Validate<br/>contract"] --> C["Resolve to<br/>target stack"] --> D["Security<br/>checks"] --> E["Infrastructure<br/>plan"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph R2 [" "]
|
||||
direction LR
|
||||
F["Policy<br/>checks"] --> G["Confidence<br/>signal"] --> H["Evidence<br/>event"] --> I["Infrastructure<br/>apply"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
E --> F
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
subgraph UP ["Upstream — anything"]
|
||||
direction TB
|
||||
A["IDE / IDE + AI\n(dev writes contract)"]
|
||||
B["Agentic SDLC\n(agent writes contract)"]
|
||||
C["Citizen dev\n(vibe codes → AI agent\n→ contract)"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph ACDL ["ACDL — infrastructure only"]
|
||||
D["Contract\nvalidated"]
|
||||
E["Resolve → Plan\nSecurity + Policy checks\nConfidence signal"]
|
||||
F["Provision\nAWS resources"]
|
||||
G["Evidence\nhash-chained"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph DOWN ["Downstream"]
|
||||
H["AWS resources\nrunning"]
|
||||
I["Consumer pipeline\ndeploys image"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
A --> D
|
||||
B --> D
|
||||
C --> D
|
||||
D --> E
|
||||
E --> F
|
||||
E --> G
|
||||
F --> H
|
||||
H --> I
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
subgraph IN ["6 weighted inputs"]
|
||||
direction TB
|
||||
A["Policy\nconformance"]
|
||||
B["Validation"]
|
||||
C["Freshness"]
|
||||
D["Source\nprovenance"]
|
||||
E["History"]
|
||||
F["NFRs"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
IN --> G["Weighted sum\n→ Confidence score"]
|
||||
G --> H{"Threshold\ngate"}
|
||||
H -->|Meets threshold| I["Proceed"]
|
||||
H -->|Below threshold| J["Halt +\nexplainable reason"]
|
||||
H -->|Critical finding| J
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
A["Deployment arrives\nat env gate"] --> B["Confidence signal\ncomputed"]
|
||||
B --> C{"Meets\nthreshold?"}
|
||||
C -->|No / Critical| D["Halt —\nexplainable reason"]
|
||||
C -->|Yes| E{"Human attestation\nrequired?"}
|
||||
E -->|No — dev| F["Autonomous\nproceed"]
|
||||
E -->|Yes — qa/prod/dr| G["Approver reviews:\ncontract + plan + evidence"]
|
||||
G --> H{"Approver\ndecides"}
|
||||
H -->|Approve| I["Attestation recorded\n(identity + state)"]
|
||||
H -->|Reject| J["Halt — rejection\nextends audit chain"]
|
||||
I --> K["Deployment\nproceeds"]
|
||||
F --> K
|
||||
K --> L["Evidence written\nRPO=0"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
A["v1.0\nDEMO\ncomplete"] --> B["v1.1–v1.8\nPLATFORM BUILD\ncomplete"]
|
||||
B --> C["v1.9\nPRESENTATIONS + PATCHES\ncomplete"]
|
||||
C --> D["v1.10\nNEXT\nHITL wiring\nall-runner OIDC\nregulatory ledger"]
|
||||
D --> E["v2.0\nFUTURE\ncompliance milestone\nself-service\ndynamic modules\nengine adapters"]
|
||||
E --> F["North Star\nREALIZED\nfull autonomy (lower)\nattested (higher)\ncitizen dev live\nevidence regulatory-grade"]
|
||||
A -.->|"stub-driven proof"| A
|
||||
B -.->|"IR + OIDC + ABAC +\nmodule catalog +\nencryption + decommission"| B
|
||||
C -.->|"10-slide decks +\ntalking points +\nS&P theme"| C
|
||||
D -.->|"proposed phasing\nnot formally planned"| D
|
||||
E -.->|"proposed phasing\nnot formally planned"| E
|
||||
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 43 KiB |
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 59 KiB |
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 67 KiB |
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 51 KiB |
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 35 KiB |
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 36 KiB |
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 36 KiB |
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 29 KiB |
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 42 KiB |
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 58 KiB |
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{ "args": ["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox"] }
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
marp: true
|
||||
theme: default
|
||||
paginate: true
|
||||
size: 16x9
|
||||
header: "How The Platform Works"
|
||||
footer: "Internal"
|
||||
style: |
|
||||
section {
|
||||
font-family: "Akkurat Pro", "Helvetica Neue", "Arial", sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 22px;
|
||||
color: #1B1B1B;
|
||||
}
|
||||
h1 { color: #D6002A; font-size: 34px; margin-bottom: 0.3em; }
|
||||
h2 { color: #D6002A; font-size: 26px; margin-bottom: 0.2em; }
|
||||
section.title { background: #1B1B1B; color: #fff; border-top: 8px solid #D6002A; }
|
||||
section.title h1 { color: #fff; }
|
||||
table { font-size: 18px; width: 100%; }
|
||||
th { background: #F0F0F0; }
|
||||
blockquote { border-left: 4px solid #D6002A; color: #2E2E2E; font-size: 20px; }
|
||||
img { display: block; margin: 0 auto; max-height: 300px; }
|
||||
em.story { color: #6B7280; font-size: 16px; font-style: italic; }
|
||||
.badge {
|
||||
display: inline-block; padding: 2px 8px; border-radius: 4px;
|
||||
font-size: 14px; font-weight: 600;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.testing { background: #DBEAFE; color: #1E3A5F; }
|
||||
.planned { background: #fef3c7; color: #78350f; }
|
||||
.agentic { background: #EDE9FE; color: #4C1D95; }
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# How The Platform Works
|
||||
|
||||
### Agentic Cloud Delivery Platform
|
||||
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
section.title h1 { font-size: 44px; margin-bottom: 0.1em; }
|
||||
section.title h3 { color: #F0F0F0; font-weight: 400; font-size: 22px; margin-top: 0; }
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# The Problem & The North Star
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Here's the problem we're solving and where we're going.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Four frictions slow every team:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Cognitive load** — authoring infrastructure correctly; the long tail of services inconsistent in security and observability
|
||||
- **Operational work** — promoting a change from "merged" to "running in production." Manual work that **scales with the system, not the change**
|
||||
- **Red tape** — tickets, approvals, and handoffs that scale with the organization. A merged change waits in a queue
|
||||
- **Scalability without increasing headcount** — throughput scales without linearly scaling platform engineers
|
||||
|
||||
> Consumers **declare intent**; the platform delivers **safe production deployment** — automatically, safely, with a complete audit trail.
|
||||
|
||||
- A merged change progresses **without a platform engineer joining a thread or approving a ticket**
|
||||
- A **non-technical consumer** ships by declaring intent — no workflow, no config file, no infrastructure module
|
||||
- Every production change is **traceable to a human attestation and an immutable evidence stream**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Where ACDL Sits in Your World
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Now that we know the problem, here's where ACDL fits — and where it doesn't.</em>
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
- **Upstream is anything** — your IDE, an agentic SDLC, or a citizen developer vibe coding on a laptop. ACDL doesn't care how the contract was produced.
|
||||
- **ACDL is infrastructure only** — it provisions and governs AWS resources. It does not build, test, or deploy your application code. That's upstream.
|
||||
- **Not a general-purpose AI** — autonomy is narrow, scoped to delivery, bounded by strict policy
|
||||
- **Not a permissive delivery highway** — no escape hatches to bypass the confidence framework
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# The Contract-Driven Model
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: The contract is the boundary between upstream and ACDL. It's all a consumer writes.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
A single YAML contract — **module, environment, inputs**. The platform owns everything else.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
- **Which module** — a catalog of pre-built, security-reviewed building blocks
|
||||
- **Which environment** — the platform raises the safety bar automatically as sensitivity rises
|
||||
- **Which inputs** — infrastructure values that vary per deployment (cpu, memory, port, desired_count)
|
||||
- The consumer provides **no AWS account, no VPC, no state backend** — the platform owns the blast radius
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# The End-to-End Flow
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Once the contract is written, here's what the platform does with it — every time.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Every deployment runs the same stages, in the same order, with the same checks — no team-specific pipelines, no tribal runbooks.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
- **Security and policy checks run *before* any infrastructure is created**
|
||||
- **Every stage produces a record** that feeds the confidence signal and the evidence stream — there is no "unchecked" path
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Zero-Trust by Default
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Before any infrastructure is created, here's how access is scoped.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Consumer repositories hold **no long-lived cloud credentials.** Ever.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Authentication — OIDC federation.** Each job mints a short-lived token; no credential is stored in the consumer repo or in a runner secret. <span class="badge testing">Testing (GitHub Actions)</span> <span class="badge planned">Planned: all runners</span>
|
||||
- **Authorization — attribute-based (ABAC), not role-based.** Two attribute classes scope every action:
|
||||
- **Repository identity** — the role's trust policy binds to the exact consumer repo + branch
|
||||
- **Resource tags** — every resource is tagged `acdl:owner` + `acdl:contract`; the session policy grants access **only to matching tags**
|
||||
|
||||
**The effect:** a consumer can only touch the resources it created. Blast radius is contained. One consumer can never affect another.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Safety is Computed, Not Assumed
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Now let's look at how the platform decides whether a deployment is safe.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Every delivery action produces a **measurable, explainable confidence signal** — a weighted sum of observable facts, not a black box. <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
- **Six weighted inputs** — manually tuned, auditable. If a consumer asks "why 0.62?", the platform answers with a per-input breakdown
|
||||
- **Per-environment thresholds** that rise with sensitivity:
|
||||
|
||||
| Environment | Threshold | Attester |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| dev | ≥ 0.50 | No one — autonomous <span class="badge testing">Testing</span> |
|
||||
| qa | ≥ 0.75 | QA <span class="badge planned">Planned</span> |
|
||||
| prod | ≥ 0.90 | SRE <span class="badge planned">Planned</span> |
|
||||
|
||||
- **A single critical finding hard-blocks** — critical findings are not averaged away
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Security by Construction
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Beyond the confidence signal, security defaults are on by construction — not by opt-in.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Security defaults that **do not require a team to opt in.** Checks run on **every** deployment, normalized to a single schema. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Policy checks** (Checkov, Wiz, Kyverno) — secrets in plaintext, public ingress, IAM wildcards, **required tagging standards** — all run *before* infra is created
|
||||
- **Encryption on every resource** — at-rest encryption on by default; per-stack customer-managed keys with 90-day rotation, **no shared keys across stacks**
|
||||
- **Deletion protection on by default** — `prevent_destroy` on unless explicitly disabled via a documented flag
|
||||
- **Safe decommission** — a 2-step pipeline with **two SRE attestation gates** and a **change-request validated against the CMDB**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Accountability & Audit
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Computed safety handles the gate. But humans still matter — here's how accountability works.</em>
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
- **Dev is fully autonomous.** The confidence signal (≥ 0.50) is the only gate. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span> <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- **qa, prod, dr require human attestation** — the approver reviews the contract, the planned Terraform changes, and the accumulated evidence <span class="badge planned">Planned</span>
|
||||
- **QA attests to infrastructure readiness, not application code** — the contract, the plan, and the evidence. Application code review is upstream
|
||||
- **Separation of duties** — the QA approver **cannot** be the prod approver. The platform **blocks on a match.** <span class="badge planned">Planned</span>
|
||||
- **Every deployment writes a hash-chained evidence event** — tampering breaks the chain. **RPO = 0** <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# Testing vs. Planned
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Let's be honest about what works today and what's on the roadmap.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
section { font-size: 20px; }
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
|
||||
**11 capabilities testing today** (dev pilot-ready):
|
||||
|
||||
- Contract-driven deploys · Module catalog · Zero-trust OIDC + ABAC
|
||||
- Security + policy checks before infra creation · Confidence signal gating
|
||||
- Hash-chained evidence outbox (RPO = 0) · Encryption by default + per-stack CMKs
|
||||
- Deletion protection + safe decommission · Uptime monitoring
|
||||
- Platform-managed environments · Engine-agnostic core + VCS-agnostic ingestion
|
||||
|
||||
**9 planned** (production path):
|
||||
|
||||
- HITL wiring for qa/prod/dr · All-runner OIDC · Full regulatory ledger
|
||||
- Compliance milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA) · Environment self-service
|
||||
- Dynamic module creation <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span> · Pattern recognition <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- Additional engine adapters · Deeper observability bootstrap
|
||||
|
||||
*Full inventory + phased roadmap in the appendix.*
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# The Vision Realized
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Here's what success looks like when the North Star is reached.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Velocity without sacrificing safety.** Speed is in the ergonomics (a simple contract, a one-line `uses:`); safety is in the gates the consumer cannot bypass.
|
||||
- **Security, observability, and compliance as platform defaults** — not per-team effort, not post-hoc remediation.
|
||||
- **Auditability as a byproduct, not a project.** Every production change is traceable to a human attestation and a tamper-evident evidence event.
|
||||
- **Blast radius contained by design.** Zero-trust OIDC + ABAC means a consumer can only touch its own tagged resources.
|
||||
- **Infrastructure as a utility, not a craft.** Teams consume infrastructure, they don't maintain it.
|
||||
- **A path to the citizen developer.** The same safety envelope that serves a senior engineer will serve a non-technical consumer. <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# Appendix
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">For deep dives — these slides cover details omitted from the main 10.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
**Contents:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Platform-Managed Environments (detail)
|
||||
2. Observability Built In (detail)
|
||||
3. The Road to the North Star (phased roadmap)
|
||||
4. Testing vs. Planned (full inventory)
|
||||
5. Glossary
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# A1 — Platform-Managed Environments
|
||||
|
||||
A consumer provides **no AWS account, no VPC, no subnet, no state backend, no runner key.** The platform owns the blast radius.
|
||||
|
||||
A named environment is a platform-owned bundle of:
|
||||
|
||||
- An AWS account (or a scoped partition of one)
|
||||
- A network (VPC + subnets)
|
||||
- A state backend (S3 + DynamoDB for state + locking)
|
||||
- An IAM role surfaced via ABAC, scoped to the consumer's identity and resource tags
|
||||
|
||||
The consumer selects an environment **by name** in their contract. The platform resolves the name to the underlying resources at run time. **The consumer never sees raw credentials.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Friendly onboarding:** the first run detects no environment and emits a guided prompt (not an opaque failure). <span class="badge testing">Testing</span> <span class="badge planned">Self-service: planned</span>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# A2 — Observability Built In
|
||||
|
||||
Monitoring is **a platform default, not a per-team project.** <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Uptime monitoring deployed automatically with every stack** — a dedicated monitoring instance is provisioned after any module deploy, in a separate state, with a feature flag to disable
|
||||
- **Monitored endpoints passed from the deployment's own outputs** — no manual endpoint registration
|
||||
- **Alert channels:** Microsoft Teams webhook, email, SMS, and GitHub issues
|
||||
- **The uptime URL is published to the developer** via a PR comment — they don't hunt for it
|
||||
- **Roadmap:** deeper observability bootstrap (dashboards, runbooks, on-call bindings) as first-class contract fields <span class="badge planned">Planned</span>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# A3 — The Road to the North Star
|
||||
|
||||
*Proposed phasing — not formally planned.*
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# A4 — Testing vs. Planned (Full Inventory)
|
||||
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
section { font-size: 15px; }
|
||||
td { font-size: 14px; vertical-align: top; }
|
||||
ul { margin: 0; padding-left: 1.2em; }
|
||||
li { margin-bottom: 2px; }
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
|
||||
<table style="width: 100%; border: none;">
|
||||
<tr>
|
||||
<td style="width: 52%; border: none; padding-right: 12px;">
|
||||
|
||||
**Testing** (works internally, dev pilot-ready)
|
||||
|
||||
- Contract-driven deploys with a versioned reusable workflow
|
||||
- Module catalog (primitives + modules) with validated examples
|
||||
- Zero-trust OIDC + ABAC on GitHub Actions runners
|
||||
- Security + policy checks before infra creation (Checkov; Wiz + Kyverno ready)
|
||||
- Confidence signal (6 inputs, per-env thresholds) gating promotion <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- Hash-chained, tamper-evident evidence outbox (RPO = 0)
|
||||
- Encryption by default + per-stack customer-managed keys
|
||||
- Deletion protection by default + safe decommission with SRE gates
|
||||
- Uptime monitoring deployed automatically with every stack
|
||||
- Platform-managed environments + friendly onboarding
|
||||
- Engine-agnostic core (1 adapter: Terraform) + VCS-agnostic ingestion
|
||||
|
||||
</td>
|
||||
<td style="width: 48%; border: none; padding-left: 12px;">
|
||||
|
||||
**Planned** (on the roadmap)
|
||||
|
||||
- Real OIDC federation on all platform runners
|
||||
- HITL wiring for qa / prod / dr environments
|
||||
- Full regulatory ledger: S3 Object Lock + JWS signatures + daily checkpoints
|
||||
- Compliance milestone: GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA extension points
|
||||
- Environment self-service provisioning
|
||||
- Dynamic module creation from a contract (agentic citizen-developer flow) <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- Pattern recognition compounds value over time <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- Additional engine adapters (OpenTofu, Pulumi, Kubernetes CRDs)
|
||||
- Deeper observability bootstrap (dashboards, runbooks, on-call)
|
||||
|
||||
</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# A5 — Glossary
|
||||
|
||||
| Term | Meaning |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| **OIDC** | OpenID Connect — federation protocol for short-lived tokens, no long-lived credentials |
|
||||
| **ABAC** | Attribute-Based Access Control — access scoped by resource tags + repo identity, not roles |
|
||||
| **CMK** | Customer-Managed Key — per-stack encryption key, 90-day rotation, no shared keys |
|
||||
| **CMDB** | Configuration Management Database — validates change requests for decommission |
|
||||
| **RPO** | Recovery Point Objective — RPO = 0 means evidence is written synchronously, no data loss |
|
||||
| **HITL** | Human-in-the-Loop — deliberate human attestation required for qa/prod/dr environments |
|
||||
| **VCS** | Version Control System — the git hosting platform (GitHub, Gitea, GitLab) |
|
||||
| **NFR** | Non-Functional Requirement — encryption, tagging, observability standards |
|
||||
| **IR** | Intermediate Representation — the engine-agnostic stack definition between contract and Terraform |
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
|
||||
# How The Platform Works — Talking Points
|
||||
|
||||
> **Companion to:** `how-the-platform-works-marp.md` (10 main + 6 appendix = 16 slides)
|
||||
> **Content source:** `how-the-platform-works.md` (full source of truth with speaker notes)
|
||||
> **Purpose:** Presenter-ready cues — 3-6 talking points per slide + the one key takeaway the audience should remember.
|
||||
> **Audience:** Senior Leadership — CTO, Head of Cloud, Head of Infrastructure, Head of DevOps
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 1 — Title
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Brief introduction — this deck explains *how* the platform works internally, not what the developer experience is (that's the companion deck)
|
||||
- Set the frame: the platform is not a CI/CD tool — it's the organizational lever for shipping safely at the pace the business demands
|
||||
- The deck has 10 main slides plus a 6-slide appendix for deep-dive questions
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** This is a platform that computes safety, doesn't assume it.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 2 — The Problem & The North Star
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Open with the cost of the status quo — every team running its own pipeline, its own Terraform, its own review checklist is paying a tax that doesn't differentiate the business
|
||||
- Walk through the 4 frictions quickly: cognitive load, operational work, red tape, scalability. Don't dwell — the North Star is the resolution
|
||||
- Land the North Star quote: "declare intent → safe production deployment" — this is the entire value proposition in one sentence
|
||||
- The litmus test: if a platform engineer still has to touch a ticket for a dev→qa promotion, we haven't delivered the vision
|
||||
- Note: the 2 anti-goals ("not a general-purpose AI" and "not a permissive delivery highway") have moved to slide 3 — they belong with the scope boundary, not the North Star
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The platform absorbs all four frictions. Declare intent, not execute operations.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 3 — Where ACDL Sits in Your World
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- This is the new scope-boundary slide — it tells leadership where ACDL fits and, just as importantly, where it doesn't
|
||||
- Upstream is anything — your IDE, an agentic SDLC, or a citizen developer vibe coding on a laptop. ACDL doesn't care how the contract was produced
|
||||
- ACDL is infrastructure only — it provisions and governs AWS resources. It does not build, test, or deploy your application code. That's upstream
|
||||
- Land the 2 anti-goals: "not a general-purpose AI" (autonomy is narrow, scoped to delivery, bounded by strict policy) and "not a permissive delivery highway" (no escape hatches to bypass the confidence framework)
|
||||
- The sovereign boundary means the platform team owns delivery and infrastructure, not the upstream development process
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** ACDL is the delivery and infrastructure boundary. Upstream is anything; ACDL is infra only.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 4 — The Contract-Driven Model
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Emphasize the asymmetry — the consumer's surface is intentionally tiny (module + environment + inputs), the platform's surface is large and opinionated
|
||||
- Note: the contract examples now show **infrastructure inputs** (cpu, memory, desired_count, port) — not a container image. The image is upstream; the platform governs infrastructure
|
||||
- The contract is the API — it's deliberately small so it can be reviewed, validated, and audited
|
||||
- The consumer does not write infrastructure modules, workflow logic, or adapter code — they declare intent; the platform reconciles, provisions, and progresses
|
||||
- Land the "no AWS account, no VPC, no state backend" point — the platform owns the blast radius. Consumers can't drift into misconfigured state or over-permissioned roles because they never touch them
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** A single YAML contract. The platform owns everything else — including the blast radius.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 5 — The End-to-End Flow
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Walk the flow left to right once — don't dwell on internals. The point is that the flow is fixed, opinionated, and identical for every consumer
|
||||
- Land beat 1: security and policy checks run *before* any infrastructure is created — not after the fact, not as a post-deployment audit
|
||||
- Land beat 2: every stage produces a record that feeds the confidence signal and the evidence stream. There is no "unchecked" path
|
||||
- Tease the confidence signal (slide 7) — this is where "safety is computed" lands
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The same pipeline, every time. Checks before creation, evidence at every stage.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 6 — Zero-Trust by Default
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- This is the slide for the Head of Cloud/Security — the key phrase is "blast radius contained to the consumer's own stack"
|
||||
- Contrast with the common failure mode: shared CI roles that can touch any account resource. The platform's ABAC model scopes every action to the consumer's own tagged resources
|
||||
- OIDC means no long-lived credentials in consumer repos — each job mints a short-lived token. Be honest: this is testing on GitHub Actions runners today; all-runner coverage is planned
|
||||
- The static-key override exists for edge cases but is rotated daily on platform runners — it is never the default
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** A consumer can only touch the resources it created. One consumer can never affect another.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 7 — Safety is Computed, Not Assumed
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- This is the bet that separates this platform from "yet another CI/CD tool" — reliance on operator instinct or tenure is not a substitute for a computed, auditable signal
|
||||
- The new confidence signal diagram makes the six inputs and the per-input breakdown visible — walk it briefly so the audience sees the signal is *not* a black box
|
||||
- The weights are **manually tuned**, the inputs are **observable**, and the breakdown is **auditable** — if a consumer asks "why 0.62?", the platform answers with a per-input breakdown. This is the "auditable, not magic" point
|
||||
- Walk the threshold table: dev ≥ 0.50 (autonomous, Testing) → qa ≥ 0.75 (QA, Planned) → prod ≥ 0.90 (SRE, Planned). The bar rises automatically with sensitivity
|
||||
- A single critical policy finding hard-blocks the deployment — critical findings are not averaged away. This is non-negotiable
|
||||
- The thresholds are tunable by Infra & Ops + SRE jointly, and any override is itself a confidence-event in the audit stream
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Safety is a measurable, explainable signal — manually tuned, observable inputs, auditable breakdown. A single critical finding blocks everything.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 8 — Security by Construction
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- The phrase to land is "secure by default, not secure by effort" — teams don't opt in to security, it's on by construction
|
||||
- Policy checks (Checkov, Wiz, Kyverno) are normalized to a single schema — we can add a new security tool without changing the confidence model or the evidence stream
|
||||
- Tagging standards are enforced, not advisory — a missing `acdl:owner` tag fails the check, it doesn't warn
|
||||
- Encryption is on every resource with per-stack customer-managed keys — no shared keys across stacks, 90-day rotation
|
||||
- The decommission flow is the counter-argument to "deletion protection makes cleanup impossible" — it's a deliberate, gated, two-SRE-approval path with CMDB validation, not a lock with no key
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Encryption, deletion protection, policy checks — on by default. Decommission is gated, not impossible.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 9 — Accountability & Audit
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- The "lower environments autonomous, higher environments attested" tenet is the resolution to the classic "move fast vs. be safe" false dichotomy
|
||||
- The new attestation flow diagram shows the human-in-the-loop path — dev autonomous → qa/prod/dr human attestation → evidence event. Walk it briefly
|
||||
- Land the QA clarification: **QA attests to infrastructure readiness — the contract, the planned Terraform changes, and the accumulated evidence. QA does not review application code (that's upstream).** This is the scope-boundary point reiterated
|
||||
- Badge reclassification to be clear about: separation of duties = **Planned** (not "design tested"); dev autonomous = **Testing**; qa/prod/dr attestation = **Planned**
|
||||
- The audit trail is a byproduct of deployment, not a project — every deployment writes a hash-chained evidence event synchronously (RPO = 0)
|
||||
- Be honest about the ledger: the outbox + hash chain is testing today; the full regulatory ledger (S3 Object Lock, JWS signatures, daily checkpoints) is planned
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Dev is autonomous. Higher environments are attested. QA attests to infra readiness, not app code. Every change is evidenced.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 10 — The Vision Realized
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Close on the strategic frame — the platform is not "a CI/CD tool," it's the organizational lever for shipping safely at the pace the business demands
|
||||
- Velocity without sacrificing safety: speed is in the ergonomics (a simple contract, a one-line `uses:`), safety is in the gates the consumer cannot bypass
|
||||
- Security, observability, and compliance as platform defaults — not per-team effort, not post-hoc remediation
|
||||
- Auditability as a byproduct, not a project — every production change traceable to a human attestation and a tamper-evident evidence event
|
||||
- Infrastructure as a utility, not a craft — teams consume, they don't maintain. The platform compounds value over time by learning from recurring patterns
|
||||
- The path to the citizen developer — the same safety envelope that serves a senior engineer will serve a non-technical consumer. Expanding who can ship safely without lowering the bar
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The investment is in the abstraction, not the tool. Ship safely at the pace the business demands, with the security and audit posture the regulators require.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix TOC — Deep Dives
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- These slides are for follow-up questions — don't walk them in the main 15-minute talk
|
||||
- Pull them up when an audience member wants detail on a specific topic: environments, observability, roadmap, full inventory, or glossary terms
|
||||
- The appendix exists so the main deck stays tight while still having answers ready
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The appendix is the backup — detail on demand, not on the critical path.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A1 — Platform-Managed Environments
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- A consumer provides no AWS account, no VPC, no subnet, no state backend, no runner key — the platform owns the entire blast radius
|
||||
- A named environment is a platform-owned bundle: an AWS account (or scoped partition), a network, a state backend, and an IAM role surfaced via ABAC
|
||||
- The consumer selects an environment by name (`environment: dev`) and the platform resolves it at run time — the consumer never sees raw credentials
|
||||
- Friendly onboarding is testing today: the first run detects no environment and emits a guided prompt, not an opaque failure. Self-service provisioning is planned
|
||||
- For the Head of Cloud: this is the governance story — the platform team owns accounts, network design, and state hygiene; consumers can't drift because they never touch them
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Environments are platform-owned bundles. Consumers pick a name; the platform owns the rest.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A2 — Observability Built In
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Monitoring is a platform default, not a per-team project — you don't deploy a service and *then* remember to set up monitoring
|
||||
- Uptime monitoring (Uptime-kuma on ECS Fargate) is provisioned automatically after any module deploy, in a separate state, with a feature flag to disable
|
||||
- Monitored endpoints come from the deployment's own outputs — no manual endpoint registration. The platform constructs the synthetic monitoring contract from what was just deployed
|
||||
- Alert channels: Microsoft Teams webhook, email, SMS, and GitHub issues — all testing today
|
||||
- The uptime URL is published to the developer via a PR comment so they don't hunt for it
|
||||
- Roadmap: deeper observability bootstrap (dashboards, runbooks, on-call bindings) as first-class contract fields for prod/dr — planned
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Monitoring ships with the deploy, not after it. The feature flag lets teams with existing monitoring opt out cleanly.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A3 — The Road to the North Star
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Be explicit up front: this is **proposed phasing, not formally planned** — the phases are sequenced by dependency, not by calendar
|
||||
- Phase 1 — Testing baseline (current): contract-driven deploys, zero-trust OIDC + ABAC, confidence signal, hash-chained evidence, encryption by default, safe decommission, uptime monitoring, platform-managed environments
|
||||
- Phase 2 — Production readiness: HITL wiring for qa/prod/dr, all-runner OIDC, full regulatory ledger, environment self-service
|
||||
- Phase 3 — Compliance & expansion: compliance milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA), additional engine adapters (OpenTofu, Pulumi, Kubernetes CRDs), deeper observability bootstrap
|
||||
- Phase 4 — Agentic frontier: dynamic module creation from a contract (citizen-developer flow), pattern recognition that compounds value over time
|
||||
- Each phase's items are gated on the prior phase's maturity — invite questions on any phase boundary
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** A dependency-sequenced path from testing baseline to agentic frontier — proposed, not formally committed.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A4 — Testing vs. Planned (Full Inventory)
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Close on honesty — the platform delivers real, verifiable value today, and the roadmap is concrete, not aspirational hand-waving
|
||||
- Walk the Testing column (11 capabilities) quickly — from contract-driven deploys to encryption by default to uptime monitoring. These work internally and are dev pilot-ready
|
||||
- Walk the Planned column (9 capabilities) — be clear about what's not yet done: HITL wiring, full regulatory ledger, compliance milestone, environment self-service, dynamic module creation, additional engine adapters, deeper observability
|
||||
- Two agentic items are flagged: dynamic module creation and pattern recognition — both involve AI agents or autonomous decision-making
|
||||
- Invite questions on any "planned" item — each has a defined milestone and a clear reason it isn't shipped yet (usually an upstream dependency, not an engineering gap)
|
||||
- Emphasize: 0 consumer adoption today — "Testing" means it works internally and is dev pilot-ready, not that it's released
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** 11 capabilities testing today. 9 planned items on a concrete roadmap. Zero consumer adoption — yet.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A5 — Glossary
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- This is a reference slide — don't read it aloud, point to it as a takeaway reference for term definitions
|
||||
- The terms most likely to come up in questions: OIDC (short-lived tokens), ABAC (tag-scoped access), CMK (per-stack encryption keys), RPO = 0 (synchronous evidence write)
|
||||
- HITL is the human-attestation term for qa/prod/dr; NFR is the non-functional-requirements input to the confidence signal
|
||||
- IR (Intermediate Representation) is the engine-agnostic stack definition between the contract and Terraform — the abstraction that makes the platform portable
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** A shared vocabulary — keep it as a reference for follow-up questions.
|
||||
@@ -1,42 +1,62 @@
|
||||
# How the Platform Works
|
||||
# How The Platform Works
|
||||
|
||||
> **Subtitle:** Agentic Cloud Delivery Platform
|
||||
> **Audience:** Senior Leadership, CTO, Head of Cloud, Head of Infrastructure, Head of DevOps
|
||||
> **Length:** ~15 minutes · 14 slides
|
||||
> **Length:** ~15 minutes · 10 main + 6 appendix = 16 slides
|
||||
> **Purpose:** Sell the platform's value to tech leadership — zero-trust, security, observability, auditability, and the shift from "operators guess" to "the platform computes safety."
|
||||
> **Maturity framing:** "Available today" = shipped and verified. "Planned" = on the roadmap, not yet shipped.
|
||||
> **Maturity framing:** "Testing" = works internally, dev pilot-ready. "Planned" = on the roadmap, not yet implemented. "Agentic" = involves AI agents or autonomous decision-making.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 1 — The Problem We Solve
|
||||
## Slide 1 — Title
|
||||
|
||||
# How The Platform Works
|
||||
|
||||
### Agentic Cloud Delivery Platform
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Brief introduction — this deck explains *how* the platform works internally, not what the developer experience is (that's the companion deck). Set the frame: the platform is not a CI/CD tool — it's the organizational lever for shipping safely at the pace the business demands.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 2 — The Problem & The North Star
|
||||
|
||||
Software delivery scales with the **coordination surface around it**, not the engineering inside it. Most teams can write code; far fewer get the infrastructure right.
|
||||
|
||||
Two frictions slow every team down:
|
||||
Four frictions slow every team:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Cognitive load** — authoring the infrastructure that runs a service correctly. The long tail of well-meaning services that are difficult to deploy, inconsistent in security and observability posture.
|
||||
- **Operational work** — moving a merged change from "merged" to "running in production with policy, observability, and security enforced." Manual work that **scales with the system, not with the change.**
|
||||
- **Cognitive load** — authoring infrastructure correctly; the long tail of services inconsistent in security and observability.
|
||||
- **Operational work** — promoting a change from "merged" to "running in production." Manual work that **scales with the system, not the change.**
|
||||
- **Red tape** — tickets, approvals, and handoffs that scale with the organization. A merged change waits in a queue.
|
||||
- **Scalability without increasing headcount** — throughput scales without linearly scaling platform engineers.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Open with the cost of the status quo. Every team that stands up its own pipeline, its own Terraform, its own review checklist is paying a tax that doesn't differentiate the business. The platform absorbs both frictions — that is the value proposition in one sentence.
|
||||
> Consumers **declare intent**; the platform delivers **safe production deployment** — automatically, safely, with a complete audit trail.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 2 — The North Star
|
||||
|
||||
> Consumers **declare intent**; the platform delivers **safe production deployment** through an agentic stack — automatically, safely, and with a complete audit trail.
|
||||
|
||||
What success looks like:
|
||||
|
||||
- A merged change progresses through lower environments **end-to-end without a platform engineer joining a thread, approving a ticket, or manually triggering a stage.**
|
||||
- A **non-technical consumer** ships a production deployment by declaring intent — without authoring a workflow, a configuration file, or an infrastructure module.
|
||||
- A merged change progresses **without a platform engineer joining a thread or approving a ticket.**
|
||||
- A **non-technical consumer** ships by declaring intent — no workflow, no config file, no infrastructure module.
|
||||
- Every production change is **traceable to a human attestation and an immutable evidence stream.**
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the litmus test. If a platform engineer still has to touch a ticket for a dev→qa promotion, we haven't delivered the vision. The two consumer surfaces (technical developer + citizen developer) are covered in the companion deck. Here we focus on *how* the platform makes the North Star real.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Open with the cost of the status quo. Every team that stands up its own pipeline, its own Terraform, its own review checklist is paying a tax that doesn't differentiate the business. The platform absorbs all four frictions — that is the value proposition in one sentence. Land the North Star quote: "declare intent → safe production deployment." The litmus test: if a platform engineer still has to touch a ticket for a dev→qa promotion, we haven't delivered the vision.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 3 — The Contract-Driven Model
|
||||
## Slide 3 — Where ACDL Sits in Your World
|
||||
|
||||
One small YAML file is all a consumer writes. The platform owns everything else.
|
||||
Now that we know the problem, here's where ACDL fits — and where it doesn't.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Upstream is anything** — your IDE, an agentic SDLC, or a citizen developer vibe coding on a laptop. ACDL doesn't care how the contract was produced.
|
||||
- **ACDL is infrastructure only** — it provisions and governs AWS resources. It does not build, test, or deploy your application code. That's upstream.
|
||||
- **Not a general-purpose AI** — autonomy is narrow, scoped to delivery, bounded by strict policy envelopes.
|
||||
- **Not a permissive delivery highway** — no escape hatches to bypass the confidence framework or human attestation requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This slide gives leadership the framing they need. The platform is deliberately scoped — it is not trying to be everything. The sovereign boundary means the platform team owns delivery and infrastructure, not the upstream development process. The anti-goals are as important as the goals: they tell leadership what not to expect.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 4 — The Contract-Driven Model
|
||||
|
||||
The contract is the boundary between upstream and ACDL. It's all a consumer writes.
|
||||
|
||||
A single YAML contract — **module, environment, inputs**. The platform owns everything else.
|
||||
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
@@ -48,15 +68,18 @@ The contract names three things:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Which module** — a catalog of pre-built, security-reviewed building blocks (a static site, a microservice, a database, and more).
|
||||
- **Which environment** — `dev`, `qa`, `prod`, or `dr`. The platform raises the safety bar automatically as the environment gets more sensitive.
|
||||
- **Which inputs** — the handful of values that vary per deployment (a bucket name, a container image, a port).
|
||||
- **Which inputs** — infrastructure values that vary per deployment (cpu, memory, port, desired_count).
|
||||
- The consumer provides **no AWS account, no VPC, no state backend** — the platform owns the blast radius.
|
||||
|
||||
The consumer does **not** write infrastructure modules, workflow logic, or adapter code. They declare intent; the platform reconciles, provisions, and progresses.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Emphasize the asymmetry. The consumer's surface is intentionally tiny — a contract that fits on one screen. The platform's surface is large and opinionated. That asymmetry is what makes "declare intent, not execute operations" concrete.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Emphasize the asymmetry. The consumer's surface is intentionally tiny — a contract that fits on one screen. The platform's surface is large and opinionated. That asymmetry is what makes "declare intent, not execute operations" concrete. Note that the contract examples now show infrastructure inputs (cpu, memory, desired_count, port) — not a container image. The image is upstream; the platform governs infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 4 — The End-to-End Flow
|
||||
## Slide 5 — The End-to-End Flow
|
||||
|
||||
Once the contract is written, here's what the platform does with it — every time.
|
||||
|
||||
Every deployment runs the same stages, in the same order, with the same checks — no team-specific pipelines, no tribal runbooks.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -77,16 +100,18 @@ Two properties matter to leadership:
|
||||
- **Security and policy checks run *before* any infrastructure is created** — not after the fact, not as a post-deployment audit.
|
||||
- **Every stage produces a record** that feeds the confidence signal and the evidence stream. There is no "unchecked" path.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Walk left to right once. Don't dwell on internals — the point is that the flow is fixed, opinionated, and identical for every consumer. The two leadership-relevant beats are (1) checks before creation, (2) every stage is evidenced. The confidence signal (Slide 6) is where the "safety is computed" story lands.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Walk left to right once. Don't dwell on internals — the point is that the flow is fixed, opinionated, and identical for every consumer. The two leadership-relevant beats are (1) checks before creation, (2) every stage is evidenced. The confidence signal (Slide 7) is where the "safety is computed" story lands.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 5 — Zero-Trust by Default
|
||||
## Slide 6 — Zero-Trust by Default
|
||||
|
||||
Before any infrastructure is created, here's how access is scoped.
|
||||
|
||||
Consumer repositories hold **no long-lived cloud credentials.** Ever.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Authentication** is **OIDC federation** between the platform runners and the cloud provider. Each job mints a short-lived token; no credential is stored in the consumer repo or in a runner secret. *(Available today on GitHub Actions runners; planned for all platform runners.)*
|
||||
- **Authorization** is **attribute-based (ABAC), not role-based.** Two attribute classes scope every action:
|
||||
- **Authentication is OIDC federation** between the platform runners and the cloud provider. Each job mints a short-lived token; no credential is stored in the consumer repo or in a runner secret. *(Testing on GitHub Actions runners; planned for all platform runners.)*
|
||||
- **Authorization is attribute-based (ABAC), not role-based.** Two attribute classes scope every action:
|
||||
- **Repository identity** — the role's trust policy binds to the exact consumer repo + branch that invoked the workflow.
|
||||
- **Resource-creation attributes** — every resource is tagged with `acdl:owner=<consumer-repo>` and `acdl:contract=<contract-id>`. The session policy grants view/update/delete **only on resources whose tags match the calling repo.**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -96,96 +121,101 @@ Consumer repositories hold **no long-lived cloud credentials.** Ever.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 6 — Safety is Computed, Not Assumed
|
||||
## Slide 7 — Safety is Computed, Not Assumed
|
||||
|
||||
Every delivery action produces a **measurable, explainable confidence signal** — the platform's certified answer to "is this safe to proceed?"
|
||||
Now let's look at how the platform decides whether a deployment is safe.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Six weighted inputs:** policy conformance, validation, freshness, source provenance, history, and non-functional requirements (NFRs).
|
||||
Every delivery action produces a **measurable, explainable confidence signal** — a weighted sum of observable facts, not a black box. *(Agentic.)*
|
||||
|
||||
- **Six weighted inputs** — policy conformance, validation, freshness, source provenance, history, and non-functional requirements (NFRs). The weights are **manually tuned**, the inputs are **observable**, and the breakdown is **auditable** — if a consumer asks "why 0.62?", the platform answers with a per-input breakdown.
|
||||
- **Per-environment thresholds** that rise with sensitivity:
|
||||
|
||||
| Environment | Threshold | Who must attest |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| dev | ≥ 0.50 | No one — fully autonomous |
|
||||
| qa | ≥ 0.75 | QA |
|
||||
| prod | ≥ 0.90 | SRE |
|
||||
| dr | ≥ 0.95 | SRE + a disaster-recovery drill reference |
|
||||
| dev | ≥ 0.50 | No one — fully autonomous *(Testing)* |
|
||||
| qa | ≥ 0.75 | QA *(Planned)* |
|
||||
| prod | ≥ 0.90 | SRE *(Planned)* |
|
||||
| dr | ≥ 0.95 | SRE + a disaster-recovery drill reference *(Planned)* |
|
||||
|
||||
- **A single critical policy finding hard-blocks the deployment**, regardless of every other input. Critical findings are not averaged away.
|
||||
- **When the platform halts, it gives a measured reason** — a policy violation, an insufficient signal, a missing attestation — never an opaque, manual-debugging exercise.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the bet that separates this platform from "yet another CI/CD tool." Reliance on operator instinct or tenure is not a substitute. The signal is auditable; the thresholds are tunable by Infra & Ops + SRE jointly, and any override is itself a confidence-event in the audit stream. Leadership cares about this because it makes promotion decisions *reviewable*.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the bet that separates this platform from "yet another CI/CD tool." Reliance on operator instinct or tenure is not a substitute. The signal is auditable; the thresholds are tunable by Infra & Ops + SRE jointly, and any override is itself a confidence-event in the audit stream. Leadership cares about this because it makes promotion decisions *reviewable*. The new confidence signal diagram makes the six inputs and the per-input breakdown visible — emphasize that the weights are manually tuned and the breakdown is auditable, not a black box.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 7 — Policy & Security Enforcement
|
||||
## Slide 8 — Security by Construction
|
||||
|
||||
Checks run on **every** deployment, normalized to a single schema regardless of which engine produced them.
|
||||
Beyond the confidence signal, security defaults are on by construction — not by opt-in.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Infrastructure-as-code policy** (Checkov) — secrets in plaintext, public ingress, IAM wildcards, KMS key references, **required tagging standards** (`acdl:owner`, `acdl:contract`, `acdl:environment`, `acdl:cost-center`).
|
||||
- **Cloud security posture** (Wiz adapter) — translates cloud security findings into the same normalized record. *(Adapter available today; activates when a Wiz tenant is configured.)*
|
||||
- **Kubernetes-native policy** (Kyverno adapter) — ready for the GitOps reconciler roadmap item. *(Adapter available today; inactive for Terraform-only stacks.)*
|
||||
Security defaults that **do not require a team to opt in.** Checks run on **every** deployment, normalized to a single schema regardless of which engine produced them. *(Testing.)*
|
||||
|
||||
Every check produces a record with **severity, rule ID, pass/fail status, and human-readable message** — consumed uniformly by the confidence signal. No engine-specific escapes.
|
||||
- **Infrastructure-as-code policy** (Checkov) — secrets in plaintext, public ingress, IAM wildcards, KMS key references, **required tagging standards** (`acdl:owner`, `acdl:contract`, `acdl:environment`, `acdl:cost-center`). All run *before* infra is created.
|
||||
- **Cloud security posture** (Wiz adapter) — translates cloud security findings into the same normalized record. *(Adapter testing; activates when a Wiz tenant is configured.)*
|
||||
- **Kubernetes-native policy** (Kyverno adapter) — ready for the GitOps reconciler roadmap item. *(Adapter testing; inactive for Terraform-only stacks.)*
|
||||
- **Encryption on every resource** — at-rest encryption is on by default for every primitive (S3, RDS, ECR, ECS, and more). *(Testing.)*
|
||||
- **Per-stack customer-managed keys (CMKs)** — one key per deployment, 90-day rotation at creation, **no shared keys across stacks.** *(Testing.)*
|
||||
- **Managed-key fallback with a loud warning** — standalone primitives fall back to cloud-managed keys only when no CMK is provided, and the platform warns explicitly. *(Testing.)*
|
||||
- **Deletion protection on by default** — every resource has `prevent_destroy` on unless a consumer explicitly disables it via a documented feature flag. *(Testing.)*
|
||||
- **Safe decommission** — a 2-step pipeline (disable protection → zero counts → destroy) with **two SRE human-attestation gates** and a **change-request validated against the platform CMDB** before any destructive action. *(Testing.)* Encryption keys enter a grace window (default 30 days) so encrypted data remains recoverable during decommission.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The selling point is *normalization*. We can add a new security tool without changing the confidence model or the evidence stream. For the Head of Security: tagging standards are enforced, not advisory — a missing `acdl:owner` tag fails the check, not a warning.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The phrase to land is "secure by default, not secure by effort." The selling point is *normalization* — we can add a new security tool without changing the confidence model or the evidence stream. For the Head of Security: tagging standards are enforced, not advisory — a missing `acdl:owner` tag fails the check, not a warning. The decommission flow is the counter-argument to "deletion protection makes cleanup impossible" — it's a deliberate, gated, two-approval path, not a lock with no key.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 8 — Secure by Default
|
||||
## Slide 9 — Accountability & Audit
|
||||
|
||||
Security defaults that **do not require a team to opt in.**
|
||||
Computed safety handles the gate. But humans still matter — here's how accountability works.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Encryption on every resource** — at-rest encryption is on by default for every primitive (S3, RDS, ECR, ECS, and more). *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Per-stack customer-managed keys (CMKs)** — one key per deployment, 90-day rotation at creation, **no shared keys across stacks.** *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Managed-key fallback with a loud warning** — standalone primitives fall back to cloud-managed keys only when no CMK is provided, and the platform warns explicitly. Silent use of cloud-managed keys is a security gap we refuse to hide. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Deletion protection on by default** — every resource has `prevent_destroy` on unless a consumer explicitly disables it via a documented feature flag. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Safe decommission** — a 2-step pipeline (disable protection → zero counts → destroy) with **two SRE human-attestation gates** and a **change-request validated against the platform CMDB** before any destructive action. *(Available today.)* Encryption keys enter a grace window (default 30 days) so encrypted data remains recoverable during decommission.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The phrase to land is "secure by default, not secure by effort." The decommission flow is the counter-argument to "deletion protection makes cleanup impossible" — it's a deliberate, gated, two-approval path, not a lock with no key.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 9 — Immutable Audit & Evidence
|
||||
- **Dev is fully autonomous.** The confidence signal (≥ 0.50) is the only gate. Queue-based handoffs are eliminated from lower environments. *(Testing, Agentic.)*
|
||||
- **qa, prod, and dr require deliberate human attestation** — not rubber stamps, but policy-mandated acts of accountability via protected deployment approvals. The approver reviews the contract, the planned Terraform changes, and the accumulated evidence. *(Planned.)*
|
||||
- **QA attests to infrastructure readiness — the contract, the planned Terraform changes, and the accumulated evidence. QA does not review application code (that's upstream).**
|
||||
- **Separation of duties is enforced** *(Planned)* — the person who approved the qa promotion **cannot** be the person who approves the prod promotion. The platform reads both identities from the outbox and **blocks** on a match, emitting a `SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION` and routing a halt artifact to SRE on-call.
|
||||
- **Timeout discipline** — 1 business day = warn + escalate; 2 business days = auto-freeze + re-submit. Rejection extends the audit chain; it does not tear it up.
|
||||
|
||||
Version control is a **coordination tool, not an evidentiary fortress.** True compliance requires an immutable, externally-stored ledger.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Every deployment writes a hash-chained evidence event** — each event links to the previous via a cryptographic hash. Tampering breaks the chain. *(Available today. the DynamoDB outbox.)*
|
||||
- **Tiered storage design:** cold, tamper-proof source of truth (S3 Object Lock, compliance mode, 7-year retention) + a hot query index for fast lookup. *(Outbox shipped; S3 Object Lock + JWS detached signatures are planned regulatory-ledger build-out.)*
|
||||
- **Every deployment writes a hash-chained evidence event** — each event links to the previous via a cryptographic hash. Tampering breaks the chain. *(Testing — the DynamoDB outbox.)*
|
||||
- **Tiered storage design:** cold, tamper-proof source of truth (S3 Object Lock, compliance mode, 7-year retention) + a hot query index for fast lookup. *(Outbox tested; S3 Object Lock + JWS detached signatures are planned regulatory-ledger build-out.)*
|
||||
- **RPO = 0** — the evidence write is synchronous; a deployment is not acknowledged until the evidence event is durably recorded.
|
||||
- **Every production change is traceable to a human attestation** — the QA and prod approver identities are the only durable record outside the forge's audit log, stored in the outbox keyed by contract.
|
||||
- **Every production change is traceable to a human attestation** — the QA and prod approver identities are the only durable record outside the VCS's audit log, stored in the outbox keyed by contract.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the slide for the Head of Infrastructure and anyone who has been through an audit. "The audit trail is a byproduct of deployment, not a project." Note honestly that the full regulatory ledger (S3 Object Lock, JWS signatures, daily checkpoints) is planned; what ships today is the outbox + hash chain that makes every event tamper-evident and queryable.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The "lower environments autonomous, higher environments attested" tenet is the resolution to the classic "move fast vs. be safe" false dichotomy. Be honest: the separation-of-duties *mechanism* (CODEOWNERS routing, identity-distinctness check, the 8-concern attestation matrix) is designed and the dev path is wired; the qa/prod/dr wiring is on the roadmap. The new attestation flow diagram makes the human-in-the-loop path visible. Note the QA clarification: QA attests to infrastructure readiness — the contract, the plan, and the evidence — not application code. The audit trail is a byproduct of deployment, not a project. Note honestly that the full regulatory ledger (S3 Object Lock, JWS signatures, daily checkpoints) is planned; what ships today is the outbox + hash chain that makes every event tamper-evident and queryable. Badge reclassification: separation of duties = Planned (not "design tested"), dev autonomous = Testing, qa/prod/dr attestation = Planned.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 10 — Human-in-the-Loop Where It Matters
|
||||
## Slide 10 — The Vision Realized
|
||||
|
||||
Autonomy and accountability are **not in tension** — they are applied at different environments.
|
||||
Here's what success looks like when the North Star is reached.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Dev is fully autonomous.** No human gate. The confidence signal (≥ 0.50) is the only gate. Queue-based handoffs are eliminated from lower environments.
|
||||
- **qa, prod, and dr require deliberate human attestation** — not rubber stamps, but policy-mandated acts of accountability via protected deployment approvals.
|
||||
- **Separation of duties is enforced** *(design shipped; wiring for qa/prod/dr is planned)* — the person who approved the qa promotion **cannot** be the person who approves the prod promotion. The platform reads both identities from the outbox and **blocks** on a match, emitting a `SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION` and routing a halt artifact to SRE on-call.
|
||||
- **Timeout discipline** — 1 business day = warn + escalate; 2 business days = auto-freeze + re-submit. Rejection extends the audit chain; it does not tear it up.
|
||||
- **Velocity without sacrificing safety.** Speed is in the ergonomics (a simple contract, a one-line `uses:`); safety is in the gates the consumer cannot bypass.
|
||||
- **Security, observability, and compliance as platform defaults** — not per-team effort, not post-hoc remediation.
|
||||
- **Auditability as a byproduct, not a project.** Every production change is traceable to a human attestation and a tamper-evident evidence event.
|
||||
- **Blast radius contained by design.** Zero-trust OIDC + ABAC means a consumer can only touch its own tagged resources.
|
||||
- **Infrastructure as a utility, not a craft.** Teams consume infrastructure, they don't maintain it.
|
||||
- **A path to the citizen developer.** The same safety envelope that serves a senior engineer will serve a non-technical consumer. *(Agentic.)*
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The "Lower environments autonomous, higher environments attested" tenet is the resolution to the classic "move fast vs. be safe" false dichotomy. Be honest: the *mechanism* (CODEOWNERS routing, identity-distinctness check, the 8-concern attestation matrix) is designed and the dev path is wired; the qa/prod/dr wiring is on the roadmap.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Close on the strategic frame. The platform is not "a CI/CD tool," it's the organizational lever for shipping safely at the pace the business demands. The investment is in the abstraction, not the tool. Ship safely at the pace the business demands, with the security and audit posture the regulators require.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 11 — Observability Built In
|
||||
## Appendix — Table of Contents
|
||||
|
||||
Monitoring is **a platform default, not a per-team project.**
|
||||
For deep dives — these slides cover details omitted from the main 10.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Uptime monitoring deployed automatically with every stack** — a dedicated monitoring instance (Uptime-kuma on ECS Fargate) is provisioned after any module deploy, in a separate state, with a feature flag to disable. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Monitored endpoints passed from the deployment's own outputs** — the platform constructs a synthetic monitoring contract from what was just deployed. No manual endpoint registration.
|
||||
- **Alert channels:** Microsoft Teams webhook, email, SMS, and GitHub issues. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **The uptime URL is published to the developer** via a PR comment — they don't hunt for it.
|
||||
- **Roadmap:** deeper observability bootstrap (dashboards, runbooks, on-call bindings) as first-class contract fields for prod/dr.
|
||||
**Contents:**
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The Head of DevOps cares about this. The framing: "you don't deploy a service and *then* remember to set up monitoring — the platform does it as part of the deploy." The feature flag means teams with existing monitoring (e.g. Datadog) can opt out cleanly.
|
||||
1. Platform-Managed Environments (detail)
|
||||
2. Observability Built In (detail)
|
||||
3. The Road to the North Star (phased roadmap)
|
||||
4. Testing vs. Planned (full inventory)
|
||||
5. Glossary
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** These are deep-dive slides for follow-up questions. Don't walk them in the main 15-minute talk — pull them up when an audience member wants detail on a specific topic.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 12 — Platform-Managed Environments
|
||||
## A1 — Platform-Managed Environments
|
||||
|
||||
A consumer provides **no AWS account, no VPC, no subnet, no state backend, no runner key.** The platform owns the blast radius.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -198,50 +228,85 @@ A named environment is a platform-owned bundle of:
|
||||
|
||||
The consumer selects an environment **by name** in their contract (`environment: dev`). The platform resolves the name to the underlying account/network/state/role at run time. **The consumer never sees the raw credentials.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Friendly onboarding:** the first run detects no environment and emits a guided prompt (not an opaque failure) telling the consumer what the platform will provision and how to request it. *(Available today.)* **Self-service environment provisioning is planned.**
|
||||
**Friendly onboarding:** the first run detects no environment and emits a guided prompt (not an opaque failure) telling the consumer what the platform will provision and how to request it. *(Testing.)* **Self-service environment provisioning is planned.**
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** For the Head of Cloud: this is the governance story. The platform team owns the accounts, the network design, the state hygiene. Consumers can't drift into misconfigured state backends or over-permissioned roles because they never touch them. The onboarding prompt matters — first impressions of a platform are made when it fails for the first time.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 13 — Portability & Future-Proofing
|
||||
## A2 — Observability Built In
|
||||
|
||||
The platform is **opinionated, but not painted into a corner.**
|
||||
Monitoring is **a platform default, not a per-team project.** *(Testing.)*
|
||||
|
||||
- **Substrate-agnostic core.** The contract, the resolved stack, the policy results, the confidence signal, and the evidence stream are all defined *without reference to any specific infrastructure tool.* Today there is one adapter (Terraform). *(OpenTofu, Pulumi, Kubernetes CRDs are future adapters — no architectural change required.)*
|
||||
- **Forge-agnostic contract ingestion.** The platform Lambda reads a configurable API base for GitHub or Gitea. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Portable contracts.** The contract schema, the confidence signal, and the audit stream are substrate- and forge-agnostic. A second forge (e.g. GitLab) needs a forge adapter + a workflow-template translator — **no change to the modules, the contract standard, the confidence model, or the audit stream.**
|
||||
- **Pattern recognition compounds value over time.** As the platform observes recurring contract patterns, it can synthesize and offer reusable modules. *(Future capability, not a current commitment — but the design allows it.)*
|
||||
- **Uptime monitoring deployed automatically with every stack** — a dedicated monitoring instance (Uptime-kuma on ECS Fargate) is provisioned after any module deploy, in a separate state, with a feature flag to disable.
|
||||
- **Monitored endpoints passed from the deployment's own outputs** — the platform constructs a synthetic monitoring contract from what was just deployed. No manual endpoint registration.
|
||||
- **Alert channels:** Microsoft Teams webhook, email, SMS, and GitHub issues. *(Testing.)*
|
||||
- **The uptime URL is published to the developer** via a PR comment — they don't hunt for it.
|
||||
- **Roadmap:** deeper observability bootstrap (dashboards, runbooks, on-call bindings) as first-class contract fields for prod/dr. *(Planned.)*
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the "we won't have to rewrite this in two years" slide. The bet is that the substrate (Terraform today) will change, but the contract + confidence + audit model won't. Leadership should hear: the investment is in the abstraction, not the tool.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The Head of DevOps cares about this. The framing: "you don't deploy a service and *then* remember to set up monitoring — the platform does it as part of the deploy." The feature flag means teams with existing monitoring (e.g. Datadog) can opt out cleanly.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 14 — Roadmap: Honest Shipped vs. Planned
|
||||
## A3 — The Road to the North Star
|
||||
|
||||
**Available today:**
|
||||
*Proposed phasing — not formally planned.*
|
||||
|
||||
A phased roadmap from the current Testing baseline to the full North Star:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Phase 1 — Testing baseline (current):** contract-driven deploys, zero-trust OIDC + ABAC on GitHub Actions, confidence signal gating, hash-chained evidence, encryption by default, deletion protection + safe decommission, uptime monitoring, platform-managed environments.
|
||||
- **Phase 2 — Production readiness:** HITL wiring for qa/prod/dr, all-runner OIDC, full regulatory ledger (S3 Object Lock + JWS signatures + daily checkpoints), environment self-service.
|
||||
- **Phase 3 — Compliance & expansion:** compliance milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA extension points), additional engine adapters (OpenTofu, Pulumi, Kubernetes CRDs), deeper observability bootstrap.
|
||||
- **Phase 4 — Agentic frontier:** dynamic module creation from a contract (the agentic citizen-developer composition mechanism), pattern recognition that compounds value over time.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Be clear with leadership: this is a proposed phasing, not a formally committed plan. The phases are sequenced by dependency, not by calendar — each phase's items are gated on the prior phase's maturity. Invite questions on any phase boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A4 — Testing vs. Planned (Full Inventory)
|
||||
|
||||
**Testing** (works internally, dev pilot-ready) — 11 capabilities:
|
||||
|
||||
- Contract-driven deploys with a versioned reusable workflow.
|
||||
- Module catalog (primitives + modules) with validated examples.
|
||||
- Zero-trust OIDC + ABAC on GitHub Actions runners.
|
||||
- Security + policy checks before infra creation (Checkov; Wiz + Kyverno adapters ready).
|
||||
- Confidence signal (6 inputs, per-env thresholds) gating promotion.
|
||||
- Confidence signal (6 inputs, per-env thresholds) gating promotion. *(Agentic.)*
|
||||
- Hash-chained, tamper-evident evidence outbox (RPO = 0).
|
||||
- Encryption by default + per-stack customer-managed keys.
|
||||
- Deletion protection by default + safe decommission with SRE gates + CMDB validation.
|
||||
- Uptime monitoring deployed automatically with every stack.
|
||||
- Platform-managed environments + friendly onboarding.
|
||||
- Local reproducibility (`run_ci.sh` mirrors the CI pipeline).
|
||||
- Forge-agnostic contract ingestion (GitHub + Gitea).
|
||||
- Engine-agnostic core (1 adapter: Terraform) + VCS-agnostic ingestion (GitHub + Gitea).
|
||||
|
||||
**Planned (on the roadmap, not yet shipped):**
|
||||
**Planned** (on the roadmap, not yet implemented) — 9 capabilities:
|
||||
|
||||
- Real OIDC federation on all platform runners (Gitea Actions OIDC pending an upstream merge).
|
||||
- HITL wiring for qa / prod / dr environments (design shipped; wiring is next).
|
||||
- Full regulatory ledger: S3 Object Lock (7-yr compliance mode) + JWS detached signatures + daily checkpoints.
|
||||
- Compliance milestone: per-module extension points for GDPR, SOX, SOC2, HIPAA, DORA.
|
||||
- Compliance milestone: per-module extension points for GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA.
|
||||
- Environment self-service (a consumer-facing flow to request and provision a new environment).
|
||||
- Dynamic module creation from a contract (the agentic "citizen developer" composition mechanism).
|
||||
- Additional substrate adapters (OpenTofu, Pulumi, Kubernetes CRDs).
|
||||
- Dynamic module creation from a contract (the agentic "citizen developer" composition mechanism). *(Agentic.)*
|
||||
- Pattern recognition compounds value over time. *(Agentic.)*
|
||||
- Additional engine adapters (OpenTofu, Pulumi, Kubernetes CRDs).
|
||||
- Deeper observability bootstrap (dashboards, runbooks, on-call bindings).
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Close on honesty. The platform delivers real, verifiable value today — and the roadmap is concrete, not aspirational hand-waving. Invite questions on any "planned" item; each has a defined milestone and a clear reason it isn't shipped yet (usually an upstream dependency, not an engineering gap).
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Close on honesty. The platform delivers real, verifiable value today — 11 capabilities that work internally. The roadmap is concrete, not aspirational hand-waving — 9 planned items, each with a defined milestone and a clear reason it isn't shipped yet (usually an upstream dependency, not an engineering gap). Emphasize: 0 consumer adoption today — "Testing" means it works internally and is dev pilot-ready, not that it's released.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A5 — Glossary
|
||||
|
||||
| Term | Meaning |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| **OIDC** | OpenID Connect — federation protocol for short-lived tokens, no long-lived credentials |
|
||||
| **ABAC** | Attribute-Based Access Control — access scoped by resource tags + repo identity, not roles |
|
||||
| **CMK** | Customer-Managed Key — per-stack encryption key, 90-day rotation, no shared keys |
|
||||
| **CMDB** | Configuration Management Database — validates change requests for decommission |
|
||||
| **RPO** | Recovery Point Objective — RPO = 0 means evidence is written synchronously, no data loss |
|
||||
| **HITL** | Human-in-the-Loop — deliberate human attestation required for qa/prod/dr environments |
|
||||
| **VCS** | Version Control System — the git hosting platform (GitHub, Gitea, GitLab) |
|
||||
| **NFR** | Non-Functional Requirement — encryption, tagging, observability standards |
|
||||
| **IR** | Intermediate Representation — the engine-agnostic stack definition between contract and Terraform |
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Use this slide as a reference when the audience asks for term definitions. Don't read it aloud — point to it as a takeaway reference.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
marp: true
|
||||
theme: default
|
||||
paginate: true
|
||||
size: 16x9
|
||||
header: "The Developer Experience"
|
||||
footer: "Internal"
|
||||
style: |
|
||||
section {
|
||||
font-family: "Akkurat Pro", "Helvetica Neue", "Arial", sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 22px;
|
||||
color: #1B1B1B;
|
||||
}
|
||||
h1 { color: #D6002A; font-size: 34px; margin-bottom: 0.3em; }
|
||||
h2 { color: #D6002A; font-size: 26px; margin-bottom: 0.2em; }
|
||||
section.title { background: #1B1B1B; color: #fff; border-top: 8px solid #D6002A; }
|
||||
section.title h1 { color: #fff; }
|
||||
table { font-size: 18px; width: 100%; }
|
||||
th { background: #F0F0F0; }
|
||||
blockquote { border-left: 4px solid #D6002A; color: #2E2E2E; font-size: 20px; }
|
||||
pre { font-size: 14px; line-height: 1.3; }
|
||||
code { font-size: 14px; }
|
||||
img { display: block; margin: 0 auto; max-height: 280px; }
|
||||
em.story { color: #6B7280; font-size: 16px; font-style: italic; }
|
||||
.badge {
|
||||
display: inline-block; padding: 2px 8px; border-radius: 4px;
|
||||
font-size: 14px; font-weight: 600;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.testing { background: #DBEAFE; color: #1E3A5F; }
|
||||
.planned { background: #fef3c7; color: #78350f; }
|
||||
.agentic { background: #EDE9FE; color: #4C1D95; }
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# The Developer Experience
|
||||
|
||||
### Agentic Cloud Delivery Platform
|
||||
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
section.title h1 { font-size: 44px; margin-bottom: 0.1em; }
|
||||
section.title h3 { color: #F0F0F0; font-weight: 400; font-size: 22px; margin-top: 0; }
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Where ACDL Sits in Your World
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Here's who uses the platform and where the boundary is.</em>
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
- **Technical developer** — owns app code + a contract + a thin CI definition
|
||||
- **Citizen developer** — declares intent in plain language; an AI agent produces a contract that passes the **same** safety envelope <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- **Upstream is anything** — your IDE, an agentic SDLC, or vibe coding on a laptop. ACDL doesn't care how the contract was produced
|
||||
- **ACDL is infrastructure only** — it provisions and governs AWS resources. Application deployment is upstream
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# The Contract — The Entire Consumer Surface
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Now let's look at what a consumer actually writes — it's tiny.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Three things. That is the entire consumer-side surface.
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="assets/png/developer-experience-02-what-dev-does.png" style="float: right; width: 38%; margin-left: 20px; margin-bottom: 10px;" />
|
||||
|
||||
- **1. App code** — the consumer's service, at the top level of the repo
|
||||
- **2. A contract** — a single YAML file: module, environment, inputs
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
uses: acdl/pipelines/deploy.yaml@v1.6
|
||||
module: microservice
|
||||
environment: dev
|
||||
inputs:
|
||||
cpu: 256
|
||||
memory: 512
|
||||
desired_count: 2
|
||||
port: 8080
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **3. A one-line CI definition** — a thin `uses:` wrapper pointing at a versioned platform workflow
|
||||
- The developer does **not**: write infrastructure modules, clone the platform repo, hold cloud credentials, or maintain a state backend
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# The Developer Feedback Loop
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Once you push, here's what you see — in real time, in your own logs.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Developers see **what the platform is doing**, in real time. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Streamed output by default** — the infrastructure plan, policy-check results, and each check record flow to stdout
|
||||
- **PR comments after every successful pipeline stage** — a developer always knows where they stand without refreshing a dashboard
|
||||
- **Clear, explainable halt reasons** — a policy violation, an insufficient confidence signal, or a missing attestation. **Never an opaque debugging exercise.**
|
||||
- **Connection strings posted as PR comments** — human-readable, no hunting
|
||||
- **Runtime secrets in encrypted Parameter Store** — KMS-encrypted, namespaced, **no raw secrets in logs**
|
||||
- **Errors become GitHub issues, automatically** — a failed deploy opens an issue on the platform repo
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Versioned, Predictable Releases
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: You control when you absorb platform improvements — no surprise upgrades.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Consumers control **when** they absorb platform improvements. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Floating MAJOR + MINOR tags** (e.g. `@v1.6`) — a consumer automatically receives patch updates within the line
|
||||
- **Semantic versioning with a clear contract:** interface → MAJOR, behavior → MINOR, lifecycle → PATCH
|
||||
- **A consumer can pin to an exact version** for maximum stability, or float on MAJOR only (`@v1`) to absorb new features on their own cadence
|
||||
- **Unversioned references (`@main`, bare) are discouraged** — the versioned tag is the only immutability lever
|
||||
- **Automated release job** computes the next semver on merge to main, creates the tag, and updates the floating tags
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Friendly Onboarding
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: First impressions matter — the platform fails gracefully, not opaquely.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
First impressions of a platform are made **when it fails for the first time.** The platform fails gracefully. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
When no environment is bound, the platform emits a **user-friendly onboarding prompt** instead of failing opaquely:
|
||||
|
||||
1. That no environment is bound to their repo yet
|
||||
2. What the platform will provision on their behalf (account, network, state, role)
|
||||
3. The expected turnaround for the platform team to grant the environment
|
||||
4. How to request an environment
|
||||
|
||||
The pipeline then **exits without attempting a deployment** — no partial state, no confusing errors.
|
||||
|
||||
<span class="badge planned">Citizen developer onboarding path: planned</span>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Safe Promotion Path
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Promotion is a workflow choice, not a contract edit — and the bar rises automatically.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
The contract is environment-agnostic. The platform raises the bar automatically.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
<table style="width: 100%; border: none;">
|
||||
<tr>
|
||||
<td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top; border: none; padding-right: 12px;">
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach A — One contract, one job per environment.** Environment passed by each job.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
dev:
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.6
|
||||
with: { contract: .acdl/contract.yaml, environment: dev }
|
||||
qa:
|
||||
needs: dev
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.6
|
||||
with: { contract: .acdl/contract.yaml, environment: qa }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
</td>
|
||||
<td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top; border: none; padding-left: 12px;">
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach B — Environment-specific contracts.** When inputs differ per environment.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
dev:
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.6
|
||||
with: { contract: .acdl/contract-dev.yaml }
|
||||
qa:
|
||||
needs: dev
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.6
|
||||
with: { contract: .acdl/contract-qa.yaml }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
section { font-size: 16px; }
|
||||
pre { font-size: 10px; line-height: 1.2; }
|
||||
code { font-size: 10px; }
|
||||
td { font-size: 14px; }
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Safe Decommission
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Tearing down is as deliberate as deploying — and just as gated.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Tearing down a stack is **as deliberate as deploying one.** <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.8
|
||||
with:
|
||||
contract: .acdl/contract.yaml
|
||||
mode: decommission
|
||||
changeRequestId: "CHG0678912"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A 2-step pipeline with **two SRE human-attestation gates**:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Validate the change request** — the platform queries the CMDB; the CR must be `approved` and match the consumer repo
|
||||
2. **Disable deletion protection** → **SRE approves** → **Zero all counts + destroy** → **a second SRE approves**
|
||||
|
||||
The per-stack encryption key enters a **grace window** (default 30 days) so encrypted data remains recoverable.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Self-Service Module Catalog
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: You don't author infrastructure — you pick from pre-built, security-reviewed building blocks.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
Developers pick from **pre-built, security-reviewed building blocks.** <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Primitives** — single-purpose resources (S3, VPC, ECS, IAM, load balancer, container registry, CloudFront, WAF, RDS), each with documented inputs/outputs, usage, compliance extension points, and versioning
|
||||
- **Modules** — composed patterns (a static site with CDN + WAF; a microservice with VPC + ECS + load balancer + registry)
|
||||
- **Validated examples per module** — `simple.yaml` + `complex.yaml` + variation files, validated against the contract schema in CI. Examples cannot drift from the schema silently
|
||||
- **Auto-promotion of patterns** — auto-promoted to the catalog after 3 observed usages <span class="badge planned">Planned</span> <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- **Compliance extension points** — each module lists where GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA controls will wire in <span class="badge planned">Planned</span>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# The Desired Outcomes
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">Story beat: Here's what this delivers to the organization.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Velocity without sacrificing safety.** Speed is in the ergonomics (a simple contract, a one-line `uses:`); safety is in the gates the consumer cannot bypass.
|
||||
- **Security, observability, and compliance as platform defaults** — not per-team effort, not post-hoc remediation.
|
||||
- **Auditability as a byproduct, not a project.** Every production change is traceable to a human attestation and a tamper-evident evidence event.
|
||||
- **Blast radius contained by design.** Zero-trust OIDC + ABAC means a consumer can only touch its own tagged resources.
|
||||
- **The bottleneck moves off the platform team's ticket queue.** A merged change progresses through lower environments without a platform engineer joining a thread.
|
||||
- **Infrastructure as a utility, not a craft.** Teams consume infrastructure, they don't maintain it — and the platform compounds value over time by learning from recurring patterns.
|
||||
- **A path to the citizen developer.** The same safety envelope that serves a senior engineer will serve a non-technical consumer. <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# Appendix
|
||||
|
||||
<em class="story">For deep dives — these slides cover details omitted from the main 10.</em>
|
||||
|
||||
**Contents:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. The Citizen Developer Experience (full)
|
||||
2. No Platform Code, No Cloning (detail)
|
||||
3. Local Reproducibility (detail)
|
||||
4. The Road to the North Star (phased roadmap)
|
||||
5. Glossary
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# A1 — The Citizen Developer Experience
|
||||
|
||||
A non-technical consumer ships a production deployment **by declaring intent** — without authoring a workflow, a configuration file, or an infrastructure module.
|
||||
|
||||
- The consumer opens an issue describing what they need (e.g. "a web API for the pricing service")
|
||||
- An AI agent maps the intent to a contract referencing a module from the **reviewed skill catalog**
|
||||
- The contract enters the **same pipeline** and must clear the **same confidence gate** before promotion
|
||||
|
||||
**Guardrails that make this safe:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Skills are **versioned, signed, and reviewed for sensitive data before release** (Infra & Ops owns the review)
|
||||
- Agents are **stateless** — all state lives in the platform; the platform trusts and **always verifies**
|
||||
- The agent's trace and submission confidence are captured in the contract for review
|
||||
|
||||
<span class="badge planned">Skill catalog + real agent runtime: planned</span> <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# A2 — No Platform Code, No Cloning
|
||||
|
||||
Consumers `uses:` a **versioned** central workflow. The platform fetches itself at run time. The consumer **never touches platform internals.**
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
- The consumer's CI definition is a thin wrapper — one `uses:` line
|
||||
- The runner checks out the consumer repo, then checks out the platform repo into the workspace
|
||||
- The platform installs its own runtime dependencies — the consumer installs nothing
|
||||
- When the platform ships a fix, every consumer on a floating tag gets it on their next run
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# A3 — Local Reproducibility
|
||||
|
||||
The entire CI pipeline runs **from the shell**, not just in CI. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- `scripts/run_ci.sh` mirrors the CI pipeline locally — the same three stages (lint → test → check-only) in sequence
|
||||
- `scripts/run_platform.sh --check-only` runs the platform **offline** — no AWS, no policy engine, no outbox required. Validates a contract end-to-end before pushing
|
||||
- `--plan-only` runs through the infrastructure plan without applying
|
||||
- The CI and deploy pipelines are defined by **declarative contracts** (YAML instances validated against JSON Schemas) — a single source of truth that both workflows implement
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- _class: title -->
|
||||
<!-- _paginate: false -->
|
||||
|
||||
# A4 — The Road to the North Star
|
||||
|
||||
*Proposed phasing — not formally planned.*
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# A5 — Glossary
|
||||
|
||||
| Term | Meaning |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| **OIDC** | OpenID Connect — federation protocol for short-lived tokens, no long-lived credentials |
|
||||
| **ABAC** | Attribute-Based Access Control — access scoped by resource tags + repo identity, not roles |
|
||||
| **CMK** | Customer-Managed Key — per-stack encryption key, 90-day rotation, no shared keys |
|
||||
| **CMDB** | Configuration Management Database — validates change requests for decommission |
|
||||
| **RPO** | Recovery Point Objective — RPO = 0 means evidence is written synchronously, no data loss |
|
||||
| **HITL** | Human-in-the-Loop — deliberate human attestation required for qa/prod/dr environments |
|
||||
| **VCS** | Version Control System — the git hosting platform (GitHub, Gitea, GitLab) |
|
||||
| **NFR** | Non-Functional Requirement — encryption, tagging, observability standards |
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
|
||||
# The Developer Experience — Talking Points
|
||||
|
||||
> **Companion to:** `the-developer-experience-marp.md` (10 main + 6 appendix = 16 slides)
|
||||
> **Content source:** `the-developer-experience.md` (full source of truth with speaker notes)
|
||||
> **Purpose:** Presenter-ready cues — 3-6 talking points per slide + the one key takeaway the audience should remember.
|
||||
> **Audience:** Senior Leadership — CTO, Head of Cloud, Head of Infrastructure, Head of DevOps
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 1 — Title
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Brief introduction — this deck covers *who uses the platform and how fast/safe they ship*, not the internal mechanics (that's the companion deck)
|
||||
- Set the frame: velocity without sacrificing safety, and security/observability/compliance as platform defaults rather than per-team effort
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The consumer surface is intentionally tiny. The platform's surface is large and opinionated.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 2 — Where ACDL Sits in Your World
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- This is the scope-boundary slide — here's who uses the platform, and here's where ACDL's responsibility starts and stops
|
||||
- Two consumer paths converge on the same contract: **technical** developer writes the contract directly; **citizen** developer declares intent and an AI agent produces a contract that passes the same safety envelope
|
||||
- Upstream is anything — your IDE, an agentic SDLC, or vibe coding on a laptop. ACDL doesn't care how the contract was produced
|
||||
- ACDL is infrastructure only — it provisions and governs AWS resources. Application deployment is upstream of the contract
|
||||
- The two surfaces are *parallel*, not a progression. A citizen developer doesn't "graduate" to the developer surface. There is no "citizen developer mode" with weaker checks
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Two consumer paths, one safety envelope. ACDL is infra only — anything upstream is fair game.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 3 — The Contract — The Entire Consumer Surface
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Hold this slide — the audience should sit with how small the consumer surface is. Three things: app code, a contract, a one-line CI definition
|
||||
- The contract is a single YAML file: module, environment, inputs. That's the entire consumer-facing interface to production
|
||||
- The contract example now shows **infrastructure inputs** (cpu, memory, desired_count, port) — not an `image:` field. The consumer declares capacity and shape; the platform resolves the rest
|
||||
- Walk the "does not" list quickly — no infrastructure modules, no platform repo cloning, no cloud credentials, no state backends. Every item is a category of toil the platform removes
|
||||
- For the Head of DevOps: this is the lever for throughput — the bottleneck moves off the platform team's ticket queue
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Three things. That's the entire consumer-side surface. Everything else is the platform's job.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 4 — The Developer Feedback Loop
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- This directly answers "but developers hate platforms that hide what they're doing" — the platform is opinionated about *what* runs, not *opaque* about *that* it runs
|
||||
- Streamed output by default — the plan, policy results, and each check record flow to stdout
|
||||
- PR comments after every successful pipeline stage — a developer always knows where they stand without refreshing a dashboard
|
||||
- Connection strings posted as PR comments — human-readable, no hunting. Runtime secrets go to encrypted Parameter Store (KMS-encrypted, namespaced), never to logs
|
||||
- The "errors become GitHub issues" point is a DX win that also helps the platform team — every consumer failure is a tracked, queryable artifact, not a lost log line
|
||||
- Clear, explainable halt reasons — a policy violation, an insufficient confidence signal, or a missing attestation. Never an opaque debugging exercise
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The platform closes the feedback loop — streamed output, PR comments, clear halt reasons, no secrets in logs.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 5 — Versioned, Predictable Releases
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- This is the "no surprise upgrades" story — consumers aren't forced to chase the platform, and the platform isn't forced to support N forks of every workflow
|
||||
- Floating MAJOR + MINOR tags (e.g. `@v1.6`) — a consumer automatically receives patch updates within the line. Pin to exact version for stability, or float on MAJOR only for new features
|
||||
- Semantic versioning with a clear contract: interface → MAJOR, behavior → MINOR, lifecycle → PATCH
|
||||
- Unversioned references (`@main`, bare) are discouraged — the versioned tag is the only immutability lever a consumer has
|
||||
- The automated release job computes the next semver on merge to main, creates the tag, and updates the floating tags — no manual release process
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Consumers control when they absorb platform improvements. No surprise upgrades.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 6 — Friendly Onboarding
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- This looks like a small thing; it's actually a cultural one — the platform's posture is "help me get started," not "you should have known"
|
||||
- First impressions of a platform are made when it fails for the first time. The platform fails gracefully with a guided prompt, not an opaque error
|
||||
- The prompt tells the consumer: what's missing, what the platform will provision, the expected turnaround, and how to request an environment
|
||||
- The pipeline exits without attempting a deployment — no partial state, no confusing errors
|
||||
- Be honest: the citizen developer onboarding path is planned, not yet shipped
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The platform fails gracefully. First impressions drive adoption — platforms that fail opaquely get routed around.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 7 — Safe Promotion Path
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Promotion is a workflow choice, not a contract mutation — this matters because it means a promotion can be reviewed as a *diff in the workflow*, not as a rewritten contract
|
||||
- The new promotion journey diagram shows the rising bar: dev (autonomous) → qa (QA attests) → prod (SRE attests) → dr (SRE attests + DR drill)
|
||||
- Approach A (one contract, environment passed by the job) keeps the single source of truth — the contract never changes
|
||||
- Approach B (environment-specific contracts) lets teams whose inputs genuinely vary keep that variation explicit and reviewable
|
||||
- The rising bar is annotated with maturity: **dev = Testing** (works internally, pilot-ready); **qa/prod/dr = Planned** (on the roadmap). Be honest about that split
|
||||
- Separation of duties is enforced — the QA approver cannot be the prod approver. No staging environment — the design deliberately removes the "staging is basically prod but not really" anti-pattern
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Change the environment field, not the contract. The platform raises the bar automatically. The consumer can't bypass the gates.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 8 — Safe Decommission
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- The counter-argument to "deletion protection makes cleanup impossible" — decommission is a first-class, gated, two-approval flow, not a lock with no key
|
||||
- The change request must be `approved` in the CMDB and match the consumer repo — no CR, no decommission
|
||||
- Two SRE human-attestation gates: one to disable deletion protection, a second to zero counts and destroy
|
||||
- The per-stack encryption key enters a 30-day grace window so encrypted data remains recoverable — the key is permanently deleted only after the window expires
|
||||
- For the Head of Infrastructure: the CMDB validation means decommission is auditable, not just possible
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Tearing down is as gated as deploying. Two SRE approvals, CMDB-validated change request, 30-day key grace window.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 9 — Self-Service Module Catalog
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- The catalog is what makes "declare intent" practical — you can only declare a module that exists
|
||||
- Primitives are single-purpose resources (S3, VPC, ECS, IAM, ALB, ECR, CloudFront, WAF, RDS) — each with documented inputs/outputs, usage, compliance extension points, and versioning
|
||||
- Modules are composed patterns (a static site with CDN + WAF; a microservice with VPC + ECS + ALB + registry) — one well-reviewed module serves every consumer
|
||||
- Validated examples per module — `simple.yaml` + `complex.yaml` + variation files, validated against the contract schema in CI. Examples cannot drift from the schema silently
|
||||
- For leadership: the catalog is the leverage — a fix to a module serves every consumer on the next run. This is the compounding asset
|
||||
- Auto-promotion of patterns (after 3 observed usages) and compliance extension points (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA) are planned
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The catalog is the compounding asset. One well-reviewed module serves every consumer. A fix serves everyone on the next run.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 10 — The Desired Outcomes
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Close on the strategic frame — the platform is not "a CI/CD tool," it's the organizational lever for shipping safely at the pace the business demands
|
||||
- Velocity without sacrificing safety: speed is in the ergonomics (a simple contract, a one-line `uses:`), safety is in the gates the consumer cannot bypass
|
||||
- Security, observability, and compliance as platform defaults — not per-team effort, not post-hoc remediation. Encryption, deletion protection, uptime monitoring, policy checks, and evidence are on by construction
|
||||
- Auditability as a byproduct, not a project — every production change is traceable to a human attestation and a tamper-evident evidence event
|
||||
- The bottleneck moves off the platform team's ticket queue — a merged change progresses through lower environments without a platform engineer joining a thread
|
||||
- Infrastructure as a utility, not a craft — teams consume, they don't maintain. The platform compounds value over time by learning from recurring patterns
|
||||
- The path to the citizen developer — the same safety envelope that serves a senior engineer will serve a non-technical consumer. Expanding who can ship safely without lowering the bar
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Velocity without sacrificing safety. Security and auditability as byproducts. The bottleneck moves off the platform team's queue.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix — Contents
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- These are backup slides for Q&A — don't walk through them in the main talk unless time permits
|
||||
- Use A1 when asked about the citizen developer detail; A2 for the no-cloning mechanism; A3 for local reproducibility; A4 for the roadmap; A5 for term definitions
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The appendix is the deep-dive drawer. Pull a slide when the audience asks for the detail behind a main-slide claim.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A1 — The Citizen Developer Experience
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- The framing is **vibe coding on a laptop** — the consumer describes what they want in plain language; an AI agent turns that into a contract the platform treats identically to a senior engineer's
|
||||
- The consumer opens an issue (e.g. "a web API for the pricing service"); an AI agent maps the intent to a contract referencing a module from the reviewed skill catalog
|
||||
- The contract enters the same pipeline and must clear the same confidence gate — no weaker mode
|
||||
- Guardrails: skills are versioned, signed, and reviewed for sensitive data before release (Infra & Ops owns the review); agents are stateless — all state lives in the platform; the platform trusts and always verifies
|
||||
- The agent's trace and submission confidence are captured in the contract (`profile: agentic`), so a reviewer can see how the contract was produced
|
||||
- Be honest about maturity: the mechanism is designed and stub-proven; the full skill catalog and real agent runtime are planned
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Vibe coding on a laptop — but every submission passes the same safety envelope. The agent produces the contract; the platform verifies it.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A2 — No Platform Code, No Cloning
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- The consumer's CI definition is a thin wrapper — one `uses:` line pointing at a versioned tag. That's the only coupling
|
||||
- The runner checks out the consumer repo, then checks out the platform repo into the workspace. The platform installs its own runtime dependencies — the consumer installs nothing
|
||||
- The consumer never clones the platform repo, never invokes platform scripts locally (optional `--check-only` validation is available but not required)
|
||||
- When the platform ships a fix, every consumer on a floating MAJOR.MINOR tag gets it on their next run — no per-repo upgrade project
|
||||
- For the Head of Cloud: there is no "platform code in every consumer repo" problem. The version-pinned `uses:` line is the only coupling, and it updates itself within the line
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** One `uses:` line is the only coupling. The platform fetches itself at run time. No per-repo upgrade projects.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A3 — Local Reproducibility
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- The entire CI pipeline runs from the shell, not just in CI — no "works on my machine, fails in CI" gap
|
||||
- `scripts/run_ci.sh` mirrors the CI pipeline locally — the same three stages (lint → test → check-only) in sequence
|
||||
- `scripts/run_platform.sh --check-only` runs the platform offline — no AWS, no policy engine, no outbox required. Validates a contract end-to-end before pushing
|
||||
- `--plan-only` runs through the infrastructure plan without applying
|
||||
- The CI and deploy pipelines are defined by declarative contracts (YAML instances validated against JSON Schemas) — a single source of truth that both workflows implement
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** Validate offline, plan offline, push when confident. The same declarative contract drives local tooling and CI.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A4 — The Road to the North Star
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Call this out explicitly: **proposed phasing, not formally planned** — don't let the audience read it as a commitment
|
||||
- Phase 1 is what's tested today — core platform (contract, catalog, evidence)
|
||||
- Phase 2 is the next milestone — safe promotion wiring for qa/prod/dr
|
||||
- Phase 3 introduces the agentic surface — skill catalog + agents
|
||||
- Phase 4 is the north star — citizen developer GA on the same safety envelope
|
||||
- Use this slide only when an audience member asks "how do you get from here to there"
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** A proposed path from the tested core to the citizen developer north star — proposed phasing, not formally planned.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A5 — Glossary
|
||||
|
||||
**Talking points:**
|
||||
- Keep this slide in your back pocket for the audience member who asks "what does ABAC actually mean?" — don't read it aloud
|
||||
- OIDC = short-lived federation tokens, no long-lived credentials; ABAC = access scoped by resource tags + repo identity, not roles
|
||||
- CMK = per-stack encryption key, 90-day rotation; CMDB = validates change requests for decommission
|
||||
- RPO = 0 means evidence written synchronously, no data loss; HITL = deliberate human attestation for qa/prod/dr
|
||||
- VCS = the git hosting platform (GitHub, Gitea, GitLab); NFR = encryption, tagging, observability standards
|
||||
|
||||
**Key takeaway:** The deck uses real security and ops vocabulary. The glossary is the cheat sheet for the audience member who wants the definitions.
|
||||
@@ -1,45 +1,68 @@
|
||||
# The Developer Experience
|
||||
|
||||
> **Subtitle:** Agentic Cloud Delivery Platform
|
||||
> **Audience:** Senior Leadership, CTO, Head of Cloud, Head of Infrastructure, Head of DevOps
|
||||
> **Length:** ~15 minutes · 14 slides
|
||||
> **Length:** ~15 minutes · 10 main + 6 appendix = 16 slides
|
||||
> **Purpose:** Sell the developer experience and the citizen developer experience to tech leadership — velocity without sacrificing safety, and security/observability/compliance as platform defaults rather than per-team effort.
|
||||
> **Maturity framing:** "Available today" = shipped and verified. "Planned" = on the roadmap, not yet shipped.
|
||||
> **Maturity framing:** "Testing" = works internally, dev pilot-ready. "Planned" = on the roadmap. "Agentic" = involves AI agents or autonomous decision-making.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 1 — Two Consumer Surfaces, One Platform
|
||||
## Slide 1 — Title
|
||||
|
||||
The platform serves **two kinds of consumer** through two coordinated interfaces — but both converge on the **same contract, the same policy envelope, and the same evidence stream.**
|
||||
The consumer surface is intentionally tiny. The platform's surface is large and opinionated.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Brief introduction — this deck covers *who uses the platform and how fast/safe they ship*, not the internal mechanics (that's the companion deck). Set the frame: velocity without sacrificing safety, and security/observability/compliance as platform defaults rather than per-team effort.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 2 — Where ACDL Sits in Your World
|
||||
|
||||
Story beat: Here's who uses the platform and where the boundary is.
|
||||
|
||||
The platform serves **two kinds of consumer** through two coordinated paths — but both converge on the **same contract, the same policy envelope, and the same evidence stream.**
|
||||
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart TD
|
||||
A["Technical developer"] --> C["Contract YAML"]
|
||||
B["Citizen developer<br/>(non-technical)"] --> D["Declares intent in<br/>natural language"]
|
||||
D --> E["Agent produces<br/>the contract"]
|
||||
C --> F["Same platform:<br/>resolve → check → plan → policy<br/>→ confidence → evidence → apply"]
|
||||
E --> F
|
||||
F --> G["Same safety guarantees,<br/>same audit trail"]
|
||||
U1["Anything upstream<br/>(IDE / agentic SDLC / vibe coding)"] --> T["Technical developer<br/>writes app + contract"]
|
||||
U1 --> C["Citizen developer<br/>declares intent"]
|
||||
T --> K["Contract YAML"]
|
||||
C --> AI["An AI agent maps intent<br/>to a reviewed-skill contract"]
|
||||
AI --> K
|
||||
K --> ACDL["ACDL — infrastructure only<br/>resolve → check → plan → policy<br/>→ confidence → evidence → apply"]
|
||||
ACDL --> AWS["AWS resources provisioned + governed"]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **Technical developer** — owns app code + a contract + a thin CI definition. Uses the full module catalog and inputs.
|
||||
- **Citizen developer** — declares intent in plain language; an agent produces a contract that passes the **same** safety envelope as a senior engineer's.
|
||||
- **Citizen developer** — declares intent in plain language; an AI agent produces a contract that passes the **same** safety envelope as a senior engineer's. <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- **Upstream is anything** — your IDE, an agentic SDLC, or vibe coding on a laptop. ACDL doesn't care how the contract was produced.
|
||||
- **ACDL is infrastructure only** — it provisions and governs AWS resources. Application deployment is upstream.
|
||||
|
||||
The platform is **opinionated in what it accepts, regardless of who is declaring.** There is no "citizen developer mode" with weaker checks.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the thesis of the deck. The two surfaces are *parallel*, not a progression — a citizen developer doesn't "graduate" to the developer surface. Both produce a contract; both get the same treatment. The leadership takeaway: we expand who can ship safely without lowering the bar.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the thesis of the deck. The two surfaces are *parallel*, not a progression — a citizen developer doesn't "graduate" to the developer surface. Both produce a contract; both get the same treatment. The scope boundary matters: anything upstream of the contract is out of ACDL's concern — ACDL is the infrastructure layer that takes a contract and governs the AWS resources. The leadership takeaway: we expand who can ship safely without lowering the bar.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 2 — What a Developer Actually Does
|
||||
## Slide 3 — The Contract — The Entire Consumer Surface
|
||||
|
||||
Story beat: Now let's look at what a consumer actually writes — it's tiny.
|
||||
|
||||
Three things. That is the entire consumer-side surface.
|
||||
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
A["1. App code<br/>(top level of the repo)"] --> D["Push to main"]
|
||||
B["2. Contract<br/>(.acdl/contract.yaml)"] --> D
|
||||
C["3. CI definition<br/>(.github/workflows/deploy.yml<br/>— one 'uses:' line)"] --> D
|
||||
D --> E["Platform does the rest"]
|
||||
1. **App code** — the consumer's service, at the top level of the repo
|
||||
2. **A contract** — a single YAML file: module, environment, inputs
|
||||
3. **A one-line CI definition** — a thin `uses:` wrapper pointing at a versioned platform workflow
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
uses: acdl/pipelines/deploy.yaml@v1.6
|
||||
module: microservice
|
||||
environment: dev
|
||||
inputs:
|
||||
cpu: 256
|
||||
memory: 512
|
||||
desired_count: 2
|
||||
port: 8080
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The developer does **not**:
|
||||
@@ -50,16 +73,196 @@ The developer does **not**:
|
||||
- Hold cloud credentials.
|
||||
- Maintain a state backend, a VPC, or a runner.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Hold this slide. The audience should sit with how small the consumer surface is. Every item in the "does not" list is a category of toil the platform removes. For the Head of DevOps: this is the lever for throughput — the bottleneck moves off the platform team's ticket queue.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Hold this slide. The audience should sit with how small the consumer surface is. Every item in the "does not" list is a category of toil the platform removes. The contract is the API — deliberately tiny so that it can be reviewed, validated, and audited. For the Head of DevOps: this is the lever for throughput — the bottleneck moves off the platform team's ticket queue.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 3 — The Citizen Developer Experience
|
||||
## Slide 4 — The Developer Feedback Loop
|
||||
|
||||
A non-technical consumer ships a production deployment **by declaring intent** — without authoring a workflow, a configuration file, or an infrastructure module.
|
||||
Story beat: Once you push, here's what you see — in real time, in your own logs.
|
||||
|
||||
Developers see **what the platform is doing**, in real time. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Streamed output by default** — the infrastructure plan, policy-check results, and each check record flow to stdout.
|
||||
- **PR comments after every successful pipeline stage** — a developer always knows where they stand without refreshing a dashboard.
|
||||
- **Clear, explainable halt reasons** — a policy violation, an insufficient confidence signal, or a missing attestation. **Never an opaque debugging exercise.**
|
||||
- **Connection strings posted as PR comments** — human-readable, no hunting. Runtime secrets go to encrypted Parameter Store (KMS-encrypted, namespaced), never to logs.
|
||||
- **Errors become GitHub issues, automatically** — a failed deploy opens an issue on the platform repo. The consumer's only grant is the onboarding-granted Lambda-invoke permission — no separate `issues: write` scope on the consumer side.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This directly answers "but developers hate platforms that hide what they're doing." The platform is opinionated about *what* runs, not *opaque* about *that* it runs. The PR-comment-after-each-stage pattern is a small thing that compounds into trust. The "errors become issues" point is a DX win that also helps the platform team — every consumer failure is a tracked, queryable artifact, not a lost log line. The Head of DevOps should hear: the platform closes the feedback loop, it doesn't just push a green/red status.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 5 — Versioned, Predictable Releases
|
||||
|
||||
Story beat: You control when you absorb platform improvements — no surprise upgrades.
|
||||
|
||||
Consumers control **when** they absorb platform improvements. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Floating MAJOR + MINOR tags** (e.g. `@v1.6`) — a consumer automatically receives patch updates within the line.
|
||||
- **Semantic versioning with a clear contract:** interface → MAJOR, behavior → MINOR, lifecycle → PATCH.
|
||||
- **A consumer can pin to an exact version** for maximum stability, or float on MAJOR only (`@v1`) to absorb new features on their own cadence.
|
||||
- **Unversioned references (`@main`, bare) are discouraged** — the versioned tag is the only immutability lever a consumer has.
|
||||
- **Automated release job** computes the next semver on merge to main, creates the tag, and updates the floating tags.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the "no surprise upgrades" story. Leadership hears two things: (1) consumers aren't forced to chase the platform, (2) the platform isn't forced to support N forks of every workflow. The versioning discipline is what makes both true.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 6 — Friendly Onboarding
|
||||
|
||||
Story beat: First impressions matter — the platform fails gracefully, not opaquely.
|
||||
|
||||
First impressions of a platform are made **when it fails for the first time.** The platform fails gracefully. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
When no environment is bound, the platform emits a **user-friendly onboarding prompt** instead of failing opaquely. The prompt tells the consumer:
|
||||
|
||||
1. That no environment is bound to their repo yet.
|
||||
2. What the platform will provision on their behalf (account, network, state, role).
|
||||
3. The expected turnaround for the platform team to grant the environment.
|
||||
4. How to request an environment.
|
||||
|
||||
The pipeline then **exits without attempting a deployment** — no partial state, no confusing errors.
|
||||
|
||||
<span class="badge planned">Citizen developer onboarding path: planned</span>
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This looks like a small thing; it's actually a cultural one. The platform's posture is "help me get started," not "you should have known." For the Head of DevOps: this is what drives adoption. Platforms that fail opaquely on first run get routed around.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 7 — Safe Promotion Path
|
||||
|
||||
Story beat: Promotion is a workflow choice, not a contract edit — and the bar rises automatically.
|
||||
|
||||
The contract is environment-agnostic. The platform raises the bar automatically.
|
||||
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
DEV["dev<br/>autonomous"] -->|raise the bar| QA["qa<br/>QA attests"]
|
||||
QA -->|raise the bar| PROD["prod<br/>SRE attests"]
|
||||
PROD -->|raise the bar| DR["dr<br/>SRE attests + DR drill"]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach A — One contract, one job per environment.** A single contract is referenced by multiple jobs; the environment is passed by each job and interpolated at runtime. The contract itself never changes.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
dev:
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.6
|
||||
with: { contract: .acdl/contract.yaml, environment: dev }
|
||||
qa:
|
||||
needs: dev
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.6
|
||||
with: { contract: .acdl/contract.yaml, environment: qa }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach B — Environment-specific contracts.** When inputs genuinely differ per environment, each job points at its own contract file. The pipeline, policy, and confidence model stay identical.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
dev:
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.6
|
||||
with: { contract: .acdl/contract-dev.yaml }
|
||||
qa:
|
||||
needs: dev
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.6
|
||||
with: { contract: .acdl/contract-qa.yaml }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Whichever approach a team picks, the platform applies the same rising bar:
|
||||
|
||||
| Environment | What the platform adds | Maturity |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| dev | Confidence ≥ 0.50, fully autonomous | <span class="badge testing">Testing</span> |
|
||||
| qa | QA human attestation + confidence ≥ 0.75 | <span class="badge planned">Planned</span> |
|
||||
| prod | SRE human attestation + confidence ≥ 0.90 | <span class="badge planned">Planned</span> |
|
||||
| dr | SRE human attestation + confidence ≥ 0.95 + a disaster-recovery drill reference | <span class="badge planned">Planned</span> |
|
||||
|
||||
- **No staging environment** — the design deliberately removes the "staging is basically prod but not really" anti-pattern. Dev is the only autonomous environment.
|
||||
- **Separation of duties is enforced** — the QA approver cannot be the prod approver.
|
||||
- **Timeout discipline** — 1 business day = warn + escalate; 2 business days = auto-freeze + re-submit.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Promotion is a workflow choice, not a contract mutation — this matters because it means a promotion can be reviewed as a *diff in the workflow*, not as a rewritten contract. Approach A keeps the single source of truth; Approach B lets teams whose inputs genuinely vary keep that variation explicit and reviewable. For leadership: the DX win is that the contract stays stable across environments; the safety win is that the platform raises the threshold and attestation bar automatically based on the target environment the job declares. The consumer can't bypass the gates — they pick *which* environment to target, and the platform applies the right bar. Be honest about maturity: dev is tested and pilot-ready; qa/prod/dr wiring is planned.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 8 — Safe Decommission
|
||||
|
||||
Story beat: Tearing down is as deliberate as deploying — and just as gated.
|
||||
|
||||
Tearing down a stack is **as deliberate as deploying one.** <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.8
|
||||
with:
|
||||
contract: .acdl/contract.yaml
|
||||
mode: decommission
|
||||
changeRequestId: "CHG0678912"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A 2-step pipeline with **two SRE human-attestation gates**:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Validate the change request** — the platform queries the CMDB and asserts the CR is `approved` and matches the consumer repo. No CR, no decommission.
|
||||
2. **Disable deletion protection** → **SRE approves** → **Zero all counts + destroy** → **a second SRE approves.**
|
||||
|
||||
The per-stack encryption key enters a **grace window** (default 30 days) so encrypted data remains recoverable. The key is permanently deleted only after the window expires.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The counter-argument to "deletion protection makes cleanup impossible" is this slide. Decommission is a first-class, gated, two-approval flow — not a lock with no key, and not an ungated `terraform destroy`. For the Head of Infrastructure: the CMDB validation means decommission is auditable, not just possible.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 9 — Self-Service Module Catalog
|
||||
|
||||
Story beat: You don't author infrastructure — you pick from pre-built, security-reviewed building blocks.
|
||||
|
||||
Developers pick from **pre-built, security-reviewed building blocks.** <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Primitives** — single-purpose resources (S3, VPC, ECS, IAM, load balancer, container registry, CloudFront, WAF, RDS). Each has documented inputs/outputs, usage, compliance extension points, and versioning.
|
||||
- **Modules** — composed patterns (a static site with CDN + WAF; a microservice with VPC + ECS + load balancer + registry).
|
||||
- **Validated examples per module** — `simple.yaml` + `complex.yaml` + variation files, validated against the contract schema in CI. Examples cannot drift from the schema silently.
|
||||
- **Auto-promotion of patterns** — auto-promoted to the catalog after 3 observed usages. <span class="badge planned">Planned</span> <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- **Compliance extension points** — each module lists where GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA controls will wire in. <span class="badge planned">Planned</span>
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The catalog is what makes "declare intent" practical — you can only declare a module that exists. For leadership: the catalog is the leverage. One well-reviewed module serves every consumer; a fix to the module serves every consumer on the next run. This is the compounding asset.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 10 — The Desired Outcomes
|
||||
|
||||
Story beat: Here's what this delivers to the organization.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Velocity without sacrificing safety.** Speed is in the ergonomics (a simple contract, a one-line `uses:`); safety is in the gates the consumer cannot bypass.
|
||||
- **Security, observability, and compliance as platform defaults** — not per-team effort, not post-hoc remediation. Encryption, deletion protection, uptime monitoring, policy checks, and evidence are on by construction.
|
||||
- **Auditability as a byproduct, not a project.** Every production change is traceable to a human attestation and a tamper-evident evidence event — captured during the deploy, not reconstructed for the audit.
|
||||
- **Blast radius contained by design.** Zero-trust OIDC + ABAC means a consumer can only touch its own tagged resources. One consumer can never affect another.
|
||||
- **The bottleneck moves off the platform team's ticket queue.** A merged change progresses through lower environments without a platform engineer joining a thread. The platform team invests in the platform, not in per-deployment hand-holding.
|
||||
- **Infrastructure as a utility, not a craft.** Teams consume infrastructure, they don't maintain it — and the platform compounds value over time by learning from recurring patterns.
|
||||
- **A path to the citizen developer.** The same safety envelope that serves a senior engineer will serve a non-technical consumer. <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Close on the strategic frame. The platform is not "a CI/CD tool" — it is the organizational lever for shipping safely at the pace the business demands, with the security and audit posture the regulators require. Invite questions; the companion deck ("How the Platform Works") covers the internal mechanics in more depth.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix — Contents
|
||||
|
||||
For deep dives — these slides cover details omitted from the main 10.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **A1 — The Citizen Developer Experience** (full)
|
||||
2. **A2 — No Platform Code, No Cloning** (detail)
|
||||
3. **A3 — Local Reproducibility** (detail)
|
||||
4. **A4 — The Road to the North Star** (phased roadmap)
|
||||
5. **A5 — Glossary**
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** These are backup slides for Q&A. Use them when the audience asks for the detail behind a main-slide claim. Don't walk through them in the main talk unless time permits.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A1 — The Citizen Developer Experience
|
||||
|
||||
A non-technical consumer ships a production deployment **by declaring intent** — without authoring a workflow, a configuration file, or an infrastructure module. Think of this as **vibe coding on a laptop** — the consumer describes what they want; an AI agent turns that into a contract that the platform treats identically to a senior engineer's.
|
||||
|
||||
- The consumer opens an issue describing what they need (e.g. "a web API for the pricing service").
|
||||
- An agent maps the intent to a contract referencing a module from the **reviewed skill catalog.**
|
||||
- An AI agent maps the intent to a contract referencing a module from the **reviewed skill catalog.** <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
- The contract enters the **same pipeline** and must clear the **same confidence gate** before promotion.
|
||||
|
||||
**Guardrails that make this safe:**
|
||||
@@ -67,54 +270,15 @@ A non-technical consumer ships a production deployment **by declaring intent**
|
||||
- Skills are **versioned, signed, and reviewed for sensitive data before release** (Infra & Ops owns the review — it is the mandatory release gate).
|
||||
- Agents are **stateless** — all state lives in the platform. The platform does not run the skill blindly; it trusts and **always verifies** on the platform side.
|
||||
- The agent's trace and submission confidence are captured in the contract (`profile: agentic`), so a reviewer can see *how* the contract was produced.
|
||||
- **Initial skill catalog:** web API, worker, scheduled job, static asset, basic observability bootstrap. *(Catalog is planned; the agentic surface is on the roadmap.)*
|
||||
- **Initial skill catalog:** web API, worker, scheduled job, static asset, basic observability bootstrap.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Be honest about maturity: the *mechanism* (agent → contract → same pipeline) is designed and the stub was proven in the v1.0 demo; the full skill catalog and real agent runtime are planned. But the design point matters to leadership now: we are building for a world where more of the org can ship safely, not where more of the org has to become a platform engineer.
|
||||
<span class="badge planned">Skill catalog + real agent runtime: planned</span> <span class="badge agentic">Agentic</span>
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Be honest about maturity: the *mechanism* (agent → contract → same pipeline) is designed and the stub was proven in the v1.0 demo; the full skill catalog and real agent runtime are planned. The "vibe coding on a laptop" framing is intentional — it meets the citizen developer where they already are, but every submission still passes the same safety envelope. The design point matters to leadership now: we are building for a world where more of the org can ship safely, not where more of the org has to become a platform engineer.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 4 — The Contract
|
||||
|
||||
A 5-line YAML file. This is the entire consumer-facing interface to production.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# .acdl/contract.yaml — a static site
|
||||
uses: acdl/pipelines/deploy.yaml@v1.6
|
||||
module: static-assets
|
||||
environment: dev
|
||||
inputs:
|
||||
bucket_name: my-static-site-assets
|
||||
region: us-east-1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# .acdl/contract.yaml — a microservice
|
||||
uses: acdl/pipelines/deploy.yaml@v1.6
|
||||
module: microservice
|
||||
environment: dev
|
||||
inputs:
|
||||
image: my-registry/my-microservice:latest
|
||||
port: 8080
|
||||
env:
|
||||
LOG_LEVEL: info
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Four fields:
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Meaning |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `uses` | The central pipeline, pinned to a versioned tag |
|
||||
| `module` | A name from the module catalog |
|
||||
| `environment` | `dev`, `qa`, `prod`, or `dr` |
|
||||
| `inputs` | The handful of values that vary per deployment |
|
||||
|
||||
An invalid contract (missing field, unknown module, wrong type) **fails fast at validation** with a clear error — not an opaque failure three stages in.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The contract is the API. It is deliberately tiny so that it can be reviewed, validated, and audited. For leadership: this is what makes "declare intent" concrete — it's a one-screen file, not a 300-line Terraform root module.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 5 — No Platform Code, No Cloning
|
||||
## A2 — No Platform Code, No Cloning
|
||||
|
||||
Consumers `uses:` a **versioned** central workflow. The platform fetches itself at run time. The consumer **never touches platform internals.**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -131,158 +295,51 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
- The runner checks out the consumer repo, then checks out the platform repo into the workspace.
|
||||
- The platform installs its own runtime dependencies. The consumer installs nothing.
|
||||
- The consumer **never clones the platform repo, never invokes platform scripts locally** (optional `--check-only` validation is available but not required for the happy path).
|
||||
- When the platform ships a fix, every consumer on a floating MAJOR.MINOR tag gets it on their next run — no per-repo upgrade project.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The Head of Cloud cares about this: there is no "platform code in every consumer repo" problem. When the platform ships a fix, every consumer on a floating MAJOR.MINOR tag gets it on their next run — no per-repo upgrade project.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The Head of Cloud cares about this: there is no "platform code in every consumer repo" problem. The version-pinned `uses:` line is the *only* coupling, and it's a coupling that updates itself within the line.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 6 — Versioned, Predictable Releases
|
||||
## A3 — Local Reproducibility
|
||||
|
||||
Consumers control **when** they absorb platform improvements.
|
||||
The entire CI pipeline runs **from the shell**, not just in CI. <span class="badge testing">Testing</span>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Floating MAJOR + MINOR tags** (e.g. `@v1.6`) — a consumer on `@v1.6` automatically receives patch updates within the 1.6 line.
|
||||
- **Semantic versioning with a clear contract:** interface changes → MAJOR, behavior changes → MINOR, lifecycle fixes → PATCH.
|
||||
- **A consumer can pin to an exact version** for maximum stability, or float on MAJOR only (`@v1`) to absorb new features on their own cadence.
|
||||
- **Unversioned references (`@main`, bare) are discouraged** — the versioned tag is the only immutability lever a consumer has.
|
||||
- **Automated release job** computes the next semver on merge to main, creates the tag, and updates the floating tags. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the "no surprise upgrades" story. Leadership hears two things: (1) consumers aren't forced to chase the platform, (2) the platform isn't forced to support N forks of every workflow. The versioning discipline is what makes both true.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 7 — Instant Feedback
|
||||
|
||||
Developers see **what the platform is doing**, in real time, in their own run logs.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Streamed output by default** — the infrastructure plan, policy-check results, and each `PolicyCheckResult` record (severity, rule ID, pass/fail) flow to stdout. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **PR comments after every successful pipeline stage** — a developer always knows where they stand without refreshing a dashboard. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Clear, explainable halt reasons** — a policy violation, an insufficient confidence signal, or a missing attestation. **Never an opaque, manual-debugging exercise.**
|
||||
- **A `--quiet` mode** suppresses streaming for log-only contexts.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This directly answers "but developers hate platforms that hide what they're doing." The platform is opinionated about *what* runs, not *opaque* about *that* it runs. The PR-comment-after-each-stage pattern is a small thing that compounds into trust.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 8 — Deploy Outputs That Just Work
|
||||
|
||||
After a successful deploy, the developer gets their connection information **without hunting for it** — and without secrets leaking into logs.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Human-readable connection strings** posted as a structured GitHub PR comment / job summary. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Runtime-injectable values** written to encrypted Parameter Store (`SecureString`, KMS-encrypted, namespaced `/acdl/{env}/{contractId}/{output_name}`). *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **No raw secrets in logs** — the platform enforces this by construction.
|
||||
- **Errors become GitHub issues, automatically** — a failed deploy reports through the platform Lambda, which opens (or comments on) an issue on the platform repo. The consumer's only grant is the onboarding-granted Lambda-invoke permission — no separate `issues: write` scope on the consumer side. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The "errors become issues" point is a DX win that also helps the platform team — every consumer failure is a tracked, queryable artifact, not a lost log line. The Head of DevOps should hear: the platform closes the feedback loop, it doesn't just push a green/red status.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 9 — Local Reproducibility
|
||||
|
||||
The entire CI pipeline runs **from the shell**, not just in CI.
|
||||
|
||||
- `scripts/run_ci.sh` mirrors the CI pipeline locally — the same three stages (lint → test → check-only) in sequence. Exits 0 with "CI PIPELINE OK." *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- `scripts/run_platform.sh --check-only` runs the platform offline — **no AWS, no policy engine, no outbox required.** Validates a contract end-to-end before pushing. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- `scripts/run_ci.sh` mirrors the CI pipeline locally — the same three stages (lint → test → check-only) in sequence.
|
||||
- `scripts/run_platform.sh --check-only` runs the platform **offline** — no AWS, no policy engine, no outbox required. Validates a contract end-to-end before pushing.
|
||||
- `--plan-only` runs through the infrastructure plan without applying.
|
||||
- The CI and deploy pipelines are defined by **declarative contracts** (YAML instances validated against JSON Schemas) — a single source of truth that both the GitHub and Gitea workflows implement. A test asserts conformance.
|
||||
- The CI and deploy pipelines are defined by **declarative contracts** (YAML instances validated against JSON Schemas) — a single source of truth that both workflows implement.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the "no 'works on my machine' for CI" slide. A developer can reproduce the exact CI behavior locally before pushing. For the Head of Engineering: this shrinks the PR-cycle time because failures are caught pre-push, and it makes the pipeline itself a reviewable artifact (the YAML contract), not tribal workflow code.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is the "no surprises before you push" story. A consumer can validate their contract offline, run the plan offline, and only push when they're confident. The same declarative contract drives both the local tooling and CI — there's no "works on my machine, fails in CI" gap.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 10 — Friendly Onboarding
|
||||
## A4 — The Road to the North Star
|
||||
|
||||
First impressions of a platform are made **when it fails for the first time.** The platform fails gracefully.
|
||||
*Proposed phasing — not formally planned.*
|
||||
|
||||
- When a consumer pipeline runs for the first time and **no environment is bound**, the platform detects this and emits a **user-friendly onboarding prompt** instead of failing opaquely. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- The prompt tells the consumer:
|
||||
1. That no environment is bound to their repo yet.
|
||||
2. What the platform will provision on their behalf (account, network, state, role).
|
||||
3. The expected turnaround for the platform team to grant the environment.
|
||||
4. How to request an environment.
|
||||
- The pipeline then **exits without attempting a deployment** — no partial state, no confusing errors.
|
||||
- **Both onboarding paths end in a sandbox dev submission that must pass the confidence gate** before the consumer is promoted. *(Developer path shipped; citizen developer path planned.)*
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This looks like a small thing; it's actually a cultural one. The platform's posture is "help me get started," not "you should have known." For the Head of DevOps: this is what drives adoption. Platforms that fail opaquely on first run get routed around.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 11 — Safe Promotion Path
|
||||
|
||||
Promoting to a higher environment is **changing one field** — and the platform raises the bar automatically.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# dev → qa: change one line
|
||||
uses: acdl/pipelines/deploy.yaml@v1.6
|
||||
environment: qa # QA attestation + confidence >= 0.75
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
P1["Phase 1<br/>Core platform<br/>(contract, catalog, evidence)"] --> P2["Phase 2<br/>Safe promotion<br/>qa/prod/dr wiring"]
|
||||
P2 --> P3["Phase 3<br/>Agentic surface<br/>(skill catalog + agents)"]
|
||||
P3 --> P4["Phase 4<br/>North star<br/>citizen developer GA"]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Environment | What the platform adds |
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** This is a proposed phasing, not a formally committed plan — call that out explicitly. Phase 1 is what's tested today. Phase 2 is the next milestone (qa/prod/dr wiring). Phase 3 introduces the agentic surface. Phase 4 is the north star: citizen developer GA on the same safety envelope. Use this only when an audience member asks "how do you get from here to there."
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## A5 — Glossary
|
||||
|
||||
| Term | Meaning |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| dev | Confidence ≥ 0.50, fully autonomous |
|
||||
| qa | QA human attestation + confidence ≥ 0.75 |
|
||||
| prod | SRE human attestation + confidence ≥ 0.90 |
|
||||
| dr | SRE human attestation + confidence ≥ 0.95 + a disaster-recovery drill reference |
|
||||
| **OIDC** | OpenID Connect — federation protocol for short-lived tokens, no long-lived credentials |
|
||||
| **ABAC** | Attribute-Based Access Control — access scoped by resource tags + repo identity, not roles |
|
||||
| **CMK** | Customer-Managed Key — per-stack encryption key, 90-day rotation, no shared keys |
|
||||
| **CMDB** | Configuration Management Database — validates change requests for decommission |
|
||||
| **RPO** | Recovery Point Objective — RPO = 0 means evidence is written synchronously, no data loss |
|
||||
| **HITL** | Human-in-the-Loop — deliberate human attestation required for qa/prod/dr environments |
|
||||
| **VCS** | Version Control System — the git hosting platform (GitHub, Gitea, GitLab) |
|
||||
| **NFR** | Non-Functional Requirement — encryption, tagging, observability standards |
|
||||
|
||||
- **No staging environment** — the design deliberately removes the "staging is basically prod but not really" anti-pattern. Dev is the only autonomous environment.
|
||||
- **Separation of duties is enforced** — the QA approver cannot be the prod approver. *(Design shipped; wiring for qa/prod/dr is planned.)*
|
||||
- **Timeout discipline** — 1 business day = warn + escalate; 2 business days = auto-freeze + re-submit.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The one-field promotion is the DX win; the automatic threshold + attestation raise is the safety win. They are the same feature. For leadership: this is how the platform makes "move fast" and "be safe" stop being a trade-off — the speed is in the ergonomics, the safety is in the gates the consumer can't bypass.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 12 — Safe Decommission
|
||||
|
||||
Tearing down a stack is **as deliberate as deploying one** — and just as gated.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# Consumer's deploy workflow call
|
||||
uses: acdl/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@v1.8
|
||||
with:
|
||||
contract: .acdl/contract.yaml
|
||||
mode: decommission
|
||||
changeRequestId: "CR-2026-001"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A 2-step pipeline with **two SRE human-attestation gates** *(available today)*:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Validate the change request** — the platform queries the CMDB and asserts the CR is `approved` and matches the consumer repo. No CR, no decommission.
|
||||
2. **Disable deletion protection** (resolve with `deletion_protection: false`, plan + apply) → **SRE approves.**
|
||||
3. **Zero all counts + destroy** (the platform zeroes every scalable count, plan + apply) → **a second SRE approves.**
|
||||
4. **Confirmation** — the platform confirms the stack is destroyed.
|
||||
|
||||
**After decommission:**
|
||||
|
||||
- The per-stack encryption key enters a **grace window** (default 30 days) so encrypted data remains recoverable. The key is permanently deleted only after the window expires.
|
||||
- Uptime monitoring is **not** automatically destroyed — it can be left running to watch the decommissioned endpoints go dark, or destroyed separately.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The counter-argument to "deletion protection makes cleanup impossible" is this slide. Decommission is a first-class, gated, two-approval flow — not a lock with no key, and not an ungated `terraform destroy`. For the Head of Infrastructure: the CMDB validation means decommission is auditable, not just possible.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 13 — Self-Service Module Catalog
|
||||
|
||||
Developers pick from **pre-built, security-reviewed building blocks** — they don't author infrastructure from scratch.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Primitives** — single-purpose resources (S3, VPC, ECS cluster, ECS service, IAM role, load balancer, container registry, CloudFront, WAF, RDS). Each has documented inputs, outputs, usage, compliance extension points, and versioning. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Modules** — composed patterns (a static site with CDN + WAF; a microservice with VPC + ECS + load balancer + registry). *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Validated examples per module** — every module ships `simple.yaml` + `complex.yaml` + variation files, validated against the contract schema in CI. Examples cannot drift from the schema silently. *(Available today.)*
|
||||
- **Auto-promotion of patterns** — a thin-composition layer is auto-promoted to the catalog after 3 observed usages. *(Mechanism planned.)*
|
||||
- **Compliance extension points** — each module lists where GDPR, SOX, SOC2, HIPAA, DORA controls will wire in. *(Compliance milestone is planned.)*
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** The catalog is what makes "declare intent" practical — you can only declare a module that exists. For leadership: the catalog is the leverage. One well-reviewed module serves every consumer; a fix to the module serves every consumer on the next run. This is the compounding asset.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Slide 14 — The Outcome for Leadership
|
||||
|
||||
What this platform delivers to the organization:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Velocity without sacrificing safety.** The speed is in the ergonomics (a 5-line contract, a one-line `uses:`); the safety is in the gates the consumer cannot bypass.
|
||||
- **Security, observability, and compliance as platform defaults** — not per-team effort, not post-hoc remediation. Encryption, deletion protection, uptime monitoring, policy checks, and evidence are on by construction.
|
||||
- **Auditability as a byproduct, not a project.** Every production change is traceable to a human attestation and a tamper-evident evidence event — captured during the deploy, not reconstructed for the audit.
|
||||
- **Blast radius contained by design.** Zero-trust OIDC + ABAC means a consumer can only touch its own tagged resources. One consumer can never affect another.
|
||||
- **The bottleneck moves off the platform team's ticket queue.** A merged change progresses through lower environments without a platform engineer joining a thread. The platform team invests in the platform, not in per-deployment hand-holding.
|
||||
- **A path to the citizen developer.** The same safety envelope that serves a senior engineer is the one that will serve a non-technical consumer — expanding who can ship safely without lowering the bar.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Close on the strategic frame. The platform is not "a CI/CD tool" — it is the organizational lever for shipping safely at the pace the business demands, with the security and audit posture the regulators require. Invite questions; the companion deck ("How the Platform Works") covers the internal mechanics in more depth.
|
||||
> **Speaker notes:** Keep this slide in your back pocket for the audience member who asks "what does ABAC actually mean?" Don't read it aloud.
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Consumers declare intent; the platform delivers safe production deployment throu
|
||||
## 3. Core Tenets
|
||||
|
||||
* **Operations are Declared, Not Executed.** Consumers define what they need — workload shape, dependencies, non-functional requirements, policy constraints. The platform handles reconciliation, provisioning, and environment progression. The execution burden moves from the human to the platform.
|
||||
* **The Delivery Lifecycle is a Sovereign Boundary.** The platform governs the infrastructure and delivery substrate. It does not penetrate upstream product or software development lifecycles. Integration happens exclusively through validated, published contracts.
|
||||
* **The Delivery Lifecycle is a Sovereign Boundary.** The platform governs the infrastructure and delivery engine. It does not penetrate upstream product or software development lifecycles. Integration happens exclusively through validated, published contracts.
|
||||
* **Lower Environments are Autonomous; Higher Environments are Attested.** Progression through lower environments proceeds through zero-touch agentic automation. Promotion to higher-stakes environments requires deliberate human attestation — not as a rubber stamp, but as a policy-mandated act of accountability.
|
||||
* **Safety is Computed, Not Assumed.** Every delivery action produces a measurable, explainable confidence signal aggregating policy conformance, validation evidence, and historical behavior. The signal is the platform's certified answer to "is this safe to proceed?" Reliance on operator instinct or tenure is not a substitute.
|
||||
* **Infrastructure is Consumed, Not Maintained.** Compute is abstract, containerized, or serverless. The platform does not manage node, OS, or bare-metal lifecycles. Infrastructure is treated as a utility, not a craft.
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ This vision is purchased with deliberate sacrifices:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Not an upstream development platform.** No management of product backlogs, sprint ceremonies, IDE extensions, or code authorship workflows.
|
||||
* **Not a general-purpose AI.** The platform is not an open-ended conversational assistant. Autonomy is narrow, scoped to delivery and infrastructure reconciliation, and bounded by strict policy envelopes.
|
||||
* **Not a legacy infrastructure bridge.** No management of VMs, bare metal, or OS lifecycles. The substrate will not extend to non-cloud-native patterns.
|
||||
* **Not a legacy infrastructure bridge.** No management of VMs, bare metal, or OS lifecycles. The engine will not extend to non-cloud-native patterns.
|
||||
* **Not a permissive delivery highway.** No escape hatches to bypass the confidence framework or the human attestation requirements at higher environments. Speed is a byproduct of confidence and policy compliance, not an override.
|
||||
* **Not a mutable audit log.** Version control history does not satisfy regulatory evidence. Auditability requires an immutable, externally-stored stream.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ L1 primitive MUST declare `deletion_protection` and `encryption_enabled`
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
Resources this module could be extended with for the future compliance
|
||||
milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, HIPAA, DORA). Not implemented yet — listed
|
||||
milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA). Not implemented yet — listed
|
||||
so the redesign can plan for them.
|
||||
|
||||
- **<area>** — <what could be added, e.g. KMS key for encryption>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ There are two kinds of module:
|
||||
deploy a complete stack (e.g. an ECS Fargate microservice). Each module
|
||||
has a `composition.json` declaring its children and wires.
|
||||
|
||||
The substrate adapter (`adapters/terraform/adapter.py`) compiles a
|
||||
The engine adapter (`adapters/terraform/adapter.py`) compiles a
|
||||
module instance to infrastructure. Each module's README documents which
|
||||
resources it creates.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Standards for authoring and reviewing ACDL modules. These standards
|
||||
govern the two module tiers — **L1 primitives** (single cloud resource
|
||||
or small group of related resources) and **L2 modules** (compositions
|
||||
that reference L1 primitives to deploy a complete stack) — and the
|
||||
substrate adapter that compiles them to Terraform. They are written for
|
||||
engine adapter that compiles them to Terraform. They are written for
|
||||
**platform engineers** and **AI agents** that author or review new
|
||||
modules against the existing corpus (12 L1 primitives and 2 L2 modules
|
||||
shipped in v1.8).
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ modules `static-assets` and `microservice`). They exist so that:
|
||||
- platform engineers can review a new module against a fixed checklist;
|
||||
- AI agents authoring modules produce code that passes review without
|
||||
iteration; and
|
||||
- the substrate adapter (`adapters/terraform/adapter.py`) can compile a
|
||||
- the engine adapter (`adapters/terraform/adapter.py`) can compile a
|
||||
module instance with no module-specific code in the adapter beyond the
|
||||
three tables in §8.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ bump and requires a migration plan.
|
||||
|
||||
An L1 primitive is a single cloud resource or a small group of related
|
||||
resources (e.g. a VPC with subnets and a route table). It is declared by
|
||||
an `interface.json` and realized by the substrate adapter; it does not
|
||||
an `interface.json` and realized by the engine adapter; it does not
|
||||
own Terraform code.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 Required files
|
||||
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Every L1 primitive MUST contain, at minimum:
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Purpose |
|
||||
|------|---------|
|
||||
| `interface.json` | Substrate-agnostic declaration: inputs, outputs, NFRs, optional multi-resource graph. |
|
||||
| `interface.json` | Angine-agnostic declaration: inputs, outputs, NFRs, optional multi-resource graph. |
|
||||
| `instance.json` | A concrete instance used as the adapter regression baseline. |
|
||||
| `README.md` | Plain-language documentation following `README-TEMPLATE.md` (see §7). |
|
||||
| `examples/simple.yaml` | A minimal contract that uses the primitive with required inputs only. |
|
||||
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ declares intra-refs from the subnet and route table to the VPC's
|
||||
- `aws:wafv2:webacl`
|
||||
- `aws:rds:instance`
|
||||
- `aws:kms:key`, `aws:kms:alias`
|
||||
- The substrate adapter's `TYPE_MAP` is the registry of stack types the
|
||||
- The engine adapter's `TYPE_MAP` is the registry of stack types the
|
||||
adapter can compile (see §8). A new stack type requires a `TYPE_MAP`
|
||||
entry before the primitive can be deployed.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ accidental teardown of production infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Every L1 MUST declare a `deletion_protection` NFR (boolean, default
|
||||
`true`) in `interface.json`. See §2.5.
|
||||
2. When `deletion_protection` is `true`, the substrate adapter emits a
|
||||
2. When `deletion_protection` is `true`, the engine adapter emits a
|
||||
`lifecycle { prevent_destroy = true }` block on the corresponding
|
||||
Terraform resource. A `terraform destroy` against a protected
|
||||
resource fails with an error naming the resource.
|
||||
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ Every module README MUST follow the structure of
|
||||
7. `## Usage` — a concrete snippet showing how a consumer references
|
||||
the module in a contract.
|
||||
8. `## Compliance extension points` — resources or behaviors that could
|
||||
be added for the future compliance milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, HIPAA,
|
||||
be added for the future compliance milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2,
|
||||
DORA). Not implemented yet; listed so the redesign can plan for them.
|
||||
9. `## Examples` — links to `examples/simple.yaml` and
|
||||
`examples/complex.yaml` with a one-line description of each.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ The `target_group_arn` output is referenced by `ecs-service` as its
|
||||
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **TLS / HTTPS listener** — add `aws_acm_certificate` + `ssl_policy` + `certificate_arn` for encryption in transit (SOC2 CC6.1, PCI-DSS 4.1, HIPAA §164.312(e)(1), GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **TLS / HTTPS listener** — add `aws_acm_certificate` + `ssl_policy` + `certificate_arn` for encryption in transit (SOC2 CC6.1, PCI-DSS 4.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Access logs** — add `access_logs { bucket = ..., prefix = ... }` to the load balancer (SOX, SOC2 CC7.2, DORA ICT audit trail).
|
||||
- **Security group rules** — add ingress/egress rules restricting traffic to known sources (SOC2 CC6.6, PCI-DSS 1.2).
|
||||
- **Health check** — add a `health_check` block to the target group (SOC2 CC7.3 monitoring, DORA operational resilience).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:elbv2:loadbalancer",
|
||||
"description": "Application Load Balancer primitive (substrate-agnostic stack types aws:elbv2:loadbalancer + aws:elbv2:listener + aws:elbv2:targetgroup; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_lb/aws_lb_listener/aws_lb_target_group).",
|
||||
"description": "Application Load Balancer primitive (engine-agnostic stack types aws:elbv2:loadbalancer + aws:elbv2:listener + aws:elbv2:targetgroup; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_lb/aws_lb_listener/aws_lb_target_group).",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"name": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ inside a module composition (see `modules/l2/static-assets`).
|
||||
- **Logging** — CloudFront access logs to an S3 bucket for auditability
|
||||
(SOC2 CC7.2, DORA audit trail).
|
||||
- **Field-level encryption** — add field-level encryption for PII fields
|
||||
in POST bodies (HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv), GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
in POST bodies (GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
|
||||
## Examples
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:cloudfront:distribution",
|
||||
"description": "CloudFront distribution primitive (substrate-agnostic stack types aws:cloudfront:distribution + aws:cloudfront:originaccesscontrol; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_cloudfront_distribution + aws_cloudfront_origin_access_control).",
|
||||
"description": "CloudFront distribution primitive (engine-agnostic stack types aws:cloudfront:distribution + aws:cloudfront:originaccesscontrol; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_cloudfront_distribution + aws_cloudfront_origin_access_control).",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"bucket_regional_domain_name": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ The `repository_url` output is used to build the `image` input for
|
||||
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **Image scanning** — add `image_scanning_configuration { scan_on_push = true }` for vulnerability scanning (SOC2 CC7.6, DORA ICT risk testing, HIPAA security monitoring).
|
||||
- **Encryption** — add `encryption_configuration { encryption_type = "KMS", kms_key = ... }` with a customer-managed key (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv), GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Image scanning** — add `image_scanning_configuration { scan_on_push = true }` for vulnerability scanning (SOC2 CC7.6, DORA ICT risk testing, security monitoring).
|
||||
- **Encryption** — add `encryption_configuration { encryption_type = "KMS", kms_key = ... }` with a customer-managed key (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Image tag immutability** — add `image_tag_mutability = "IMMUTABLE"` to prevent tag overwriting (SOX §802, SOC2 CC6.1 integrity, DORA audit integrity).
|
||||
- **Lifecycle policy** — add `aws_ecr_lifecycle_policy` to enforce image retention / cleanup (GDPR Art.5(2) data minimization, SOC2 CC5.2).
|
||||
- **Access policy** — add a repository policy restricting pull/push to known roles (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.308(a)(4)).
|
||||
- **Access policy** — add a repository policy restricting pull/push to known roles (SOC2 CC6.1.
|
||||
|
||||
## Examples
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:ecr:repository",
|
||||
"description": "ECR repository primitive (substrate-agnostic stack type aws:ecr:repository; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_ecr_repository).",
|
||||
"description": "ECR repository primitive (engine-agnostic stack type aws:ecr:repository; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_ecr_repository).",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"name": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ The `cluster_arn` output is referenced by `ecs-service` as its
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **Container Insights** — add `configuration { container_insights = "enabled" }` for observability (SOC2 CC7.3, DORA ICT risk monitoring).
|
||||
- **CloudWatch Logs** — add a log group with retention policy for cluster-level audit logs (SOX, SOC2 CC7.2, HIPAA §164.312(b)).
|
||||
- **Encryption** — add `settings { name = "containerInsights", value = "enabled" }` and KMS-based encryption for container data (HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv), GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **CloudWatch Logs** — add a log group with retention policy for cluster-level audit logs (SOX, SOC2 CC7.2.
|
||||
- **Encryption** — add `settings { name = "containerInsights", value = "enabled" }` and KMS-based encryption for container data (GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
|
||||
## Examples
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:ecs:cluster",
|
||||
"description": "ECS Fargate cluster primitive (substrate-agnostic stack type aws:ecs:cluster; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_ecs_cluster).",
|
||||
"description": "ECS Fargate cluster primitive (engine-agnostic stack type aws:ecs:cluster; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_ecs_cluster).",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"name": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ provided.
|
||||
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **CloudWatch Logs** — add `logConfiguration` to the container definition with a log group + retention policy (SOX, SOC2 CC7.2, HIPAA §164.312(b), DORA ICT incident logging).
|
||||
- **CloudWatch Logs** — add `logConfiguration` to the container definition with a log group + retention policy (SOX, SOC2 CC7.2, DORA ICT incident logging).
|
||||
- **Task execution role separation** — add a separate `aws_iam_role` for execution vs. the task role (SOC2 CC6.3 segregation of duties at runtime).
|
||||
- **Secrets injection** — add `secrets` block referencing AWS Secrets Manager / SSM Parameter Store with KMS encryption (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv)).
|
||||
- **Secrets injection** — add `secrets` block referencing AWS Secrets Manager / SSM Parameter Store with KMS encryption (SOC2 CC6.1.
|
||||
- **Execute command** — add `enable_execute_command` with KMS encryption for session audit (SOC2 CC7.2).
|
||||
- **Deployment circuit breaker** — add `deployment_circuit_breaker` block for resilience (SOC2 CC9.1, DORA operational resilience).
|
||||
- **Health check** — add a `health_check` block to the target group (currently missing despite the contract schema having a healthcheck field).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:ecs:task_definition",
|
||||
"description": "ECS Fargate service primitive (substrate-agnostic stack types aws:ecs:task_definition + aws:ecs:service; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_ecs_task_definition/aws_ecs_service).",
|
||||
"description": "ECS Fargate service primitive (engine-agnostic stack types aws:ecs:task_definition + aws:ecs:service; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_ecs_task_definition/aws_ecs_service).",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"image": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ into the Terraform `assume_role_policy` argument. The
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **Permissions boundary** — add `permissions_boundary` to enforce least-privilege guardrails (SOC2 CC6.1, SOX ITGC, DORA ICT access control).
|
||||
- **Inline policy** — add `aws_iam_role_policy` for fine-grained least-privilege instead of broad managed policies (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.308(a)(4)).
|
||||
- **MFA conditions** — add `condition` blocks requiring MFA for assume-role (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.312(d)).
|
||||
- **Inline policy** — add `aws_iam_role_policy` for fine-grained least-privilege instead of broad managed policies (SOC2 CC6.1.
|
||||
- **MFA conditions** — add `condition` blocks requiring MFA for assume-role (SOC2 CC6.1.
|
||||
- **Source IP / region conditions** — add `aws:SourceIp` / `aws:RequestedRegion` conditions for data residency enforcement (GDPR Art.44-49, DORA ICT third-party risk).
|
||||
- **Access Analyzer** — add `aws_accessanalyzer_analyzer` to verify least-privilege (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Role separation** — add a separate task role vs. execution role (SOC2 CC6.3 segregation of duties).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:iam:role",
|
||||
"description": "IAM role primitive (substrate-agnostic stack type aws:iam:role; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_iam_role).",
|
||||
"description": "IAM role primitive (engine-agnostic stack type aws:iam:role; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_iam_role).",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"role_name": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ pipeline as the regression baseline).
|
||||
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **Key rotation** — automatic key rotation enabled by default (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv), GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Key rotation** — automatic key rotation enabled by default (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Deletion protection** — pending deletion window prevents accidental destruction (SOC2 CC7.2).
|
||||
- **Key policy** — restrict key usage to the stack's IAM roles (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Audit logging** — CloudTrail logs all KMS API calls (SOC2 CC7.2, DORA audit trail).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
An RDS database instance. Supports multiple database engines (postgres,
|
||||
mysql, mariadb, sqlserver, oracle) via the `engine` input. The adapter
|
||||
translates the substrate-agnostic `aws:rds:instance` stack type to the
|
||||
translates the engine-agnostic `aws:rds:instance` stack type to the
|
||||
Terraform `aws_db_instance` resource.
|
||||
|
||||
## Resources
|
||||
@@ -72,18 +72,17 @@ as the regression baseline).
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **KMS encryption** — add a customer-managed KMS key for storage
|
||||
encryption (`kms_key_id` argument) (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv),
|
||||
encryption (`kms_key_id` argument) (SOC2 CC6.1,
|
||||
GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Automated backups** — the `backup_retention_period` NFR controls
|
||||
automated backup retention; extend with backup windows + copy tags to
|
||||
another region for DR (SOX ITGC, DORA operational resilience).
|
||||
- **Audit logging via CloudTrail** — RDS does not emit CloudTrail events
|
||||
for data-plane access; add `aws_db_instance_automated_backups_replication`
|
||||
+ CloudWatch Logs for database audit (SOX, SOC2 CC7.2, HIPAA
|
||||
§164.312(b)).
|
||||
+ CloudWatch Logs for database audit (SOX, SOC2 CC7.2).
|
||||
- **IAM database authentication** — add `iam_database_authentication_enabled
|
||||
= true` so IAM users/roles can authenticate to the database without
|
||||
long-lived passwords (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.308(a)(4)).
|
||||
long-lived passwords (SOC2 CC6.1).
|
||||
- **Read replicas** — add `aws_db_instance` with `replicate_source_db` for
|
||||
read scaling and DR failover (SOC2 CC9.1, DORA operational resilience).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:rds:instance",
|
||||
"description": "RDS database instance primitive (substrate-agnostic stack type aws:rds:instance; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_db_instance). Supports multiple engines (postgres, mysql, etc.) via the engine input.",
|
||||
"description": "RDS database instance primitive (engine-agnostic stack type aws:rds:instance; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_db_instance). Supports multiple engines (postgres, mysql, etc.) via the engine input.",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"engine": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ pipeline as the regression baseline).
|
||||
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **Encryption at rest** — add `aws_s3_bucket_server_side_encryption_configuration` with a customer-managed KMS key (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv), GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Encryption at rest** — add `aws_s3_bucket_server_side_encryption_configuration` with a customer-managed KMS key (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Object Lock** — add `aws_s3_bucket_object_lock_configuration` in compliance mode with 7-year retention for immutable evidence (SOX §802, DORA audit trail).
|
||||
- **Access logging** — add `aws_s3_bucket_logging` to a target logging bucket (SOC2 CC7.2).
|
||||
- **Public access block** — add `aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block` to prevent data exfiltration (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **Lifecycle policy** — add `aws_s3_bucket_lifecycle_configuration` for retention enforcement (GDPR Art.5(2), HIPAA §164.530(j)).
|
||||
- **Lifecycle policy** — add `aws_s3_bucket_lifecycle_configuration` for retention enforcement (GDPR Art.5(2).
|
||||
|
||||
## Examples
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:s3:bucket",
|
||||
"description": "S3 bucket primitive (substrate-agnostic stack type aws:s3:bucket; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_s3_bucket).",
|
||||
"description": "S3 bucket primitive (engine-agnostic stack type aws:s3:bucket; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_s3_bucket).",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"bucket_name": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ pipeline as the regression baseline).
|
||||
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **KMS encryption for EFS** — encrypt the EFS volume that persists uptime-kuma state with a customer-managed KMS key (SOC2 CC6.1, HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv), GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **KMS encryption for EFS** — encrypt the EFS volume that persists uptime-kuma state with a customer-managed KMS key (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **HTTPS/TLS for the ALB** — attach an ACM certificate and HTTPS listener to the ALB so the dashboard is served over TLS (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
- **WAF in front of uptime dashboard** — place a WAF web ACL in front of the ALB to protect the dashboard from common exploits (SOC2 CC7.2).
|
||||
- **Secrets Manager for alert webhook URLs** — store Teams webhook URLs and other credentials in AWS Secrets Manager rather than plaintext inputs (SOC2 CC6.1, GDPR Art.32).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ modules reference `subnet_ids` for their network placement.
|
||||
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
- **VPC Flow Logs** — add `aws_flow_log` + CloudWatch Logs group / S3 destination (SOX ITGC, SOC2 CC7.2, HIPAA §164.312(b), DORA ICT risk logging).
|
||||
- **Private subnets + NAT gateway** — add private subnets with a NAT gateway so ECS tasks don't need public IPs (SOC2 CC6.6, PCI-DSS 1.3, HIPAA network isolation).
|
||||
- **VPC Flow Logs** — add `aws_flow_log` + CloudWatch Logs group / S3 destination (SOX ITGC, SOC2 CC7.2, DORA ICT risk logging).
|
||||
- **Private subnets + NAT gateway** — add private subnets with a NAT gateway so ECS tasks don't need public IPs (SOC2 CC6.6, PCI-DSS 1.3, network isolation).
|
||||
- **VPC endpoints** — add S3, ECR, KMS, DynamoDB, CloudWatch interface/gateway endpoints to keep traffic off the public internet (SOC2 CC6.7, GDPR Art.32(1)(a), DORA ICT third-party risk).
|
||||
- **Security groups** — add `aws_security_group` as a first-class sub-resource (currently missing; needed for all regulated deployments) (SOC2 CC6.6, PCI-DSS 1.2).
|
||||
- **Network ACLs** — add `aws_network_acl` for subnet-level segmentation (PCI-DSS 1.3).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:ec2:vpc",
|
||||
"description": "VPC primitive (substrate-agnostic stack types aws:ec2:vpc + aws:ec2:subnet + aws:ec2:routetable; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_vpc/aws_subnet/aws_route_table).",
|
||||
"description": "VPC primitive (engine-agnostic stack types aws:ec2:vpc + aws:ec2:subnet + aws:ec2:routetable; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_vpc/aws_subnet/aws_route_table).",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"cidr": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"kind": "l1",
|
||||
"type": "aws:wafv2:webacl",
|
||||
"description": "WAFv2 Web ACL primitive for CloudFront (substrate-agnostic stack type aws:wafv2:webacl; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_wafv2_web_acl). CloudFront-scoped WAF is always in us-east-1.",
|
||||
"description": "WAFv2 Web ACL primitive for CloudFront (engine-agnostic stack type aws:wafv2:webacl; the Terraform adapter translates to aws_wafv2_web_acl). CloudFront-scoped WAF is always in us-east-1.",
|
||||
"inputs": {
|
||||
"name": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ inputs:
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
The pattern can wire compliance resources across primitives when the
|
||||
compliance milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, HIPAA, DORA) lands:
|
||||
compliance milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA) lands:
|
||||
|
||||
- **KMS key** — shared encryption key referenced by S3, ECR, CloudWatch Logs, and Secrets Manager.
|
||||
- **CloudTrail** — management-plane audit trail for the entire stack.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ READMEs for the underlying primitives.
|
||||
## Compliance extension points
|
||||
|
||||
The pattern can wire compliance resources when the compliance
|
||||
milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, HIPAA, DORA) lands:
|
||||
milestone (GDPR, SOX, SOC2, DORA) lands:
|
||||
|
||||
- **KMS key** — shared encryption key for S3 SSE.
|
||||
- **S3 access logs** — access logging to a separate audit bucket.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
|
||||
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
|
||||
"$id": "https://acdl.cloudinit.dev/schemas/stack.schema.json",
|
||||
"title": "ACDL Target Stack",
|
||||
"description": "Substrate-neutral description of a target stack: resources with typed inputs/outputs/NFRs, relationships (single parent per child), composition tree (max depth 5), and policy hooks. The L1 registry, L2 composition tree, contract YML, and PolicyCheckResult schema are all defined against this stack schema. Substrate adapters (the Terraform adapter in v1) are the only substrate-specific code.",
|
||||
"$comment": "v1 ships one adapter (Terraform). The stack is nearly isomorphic to Terraform in v1 (ARCHITECTURE.md §12.1); the adapter compiles resource.module -> module block, resource.inputs -> variable + arg, resource.outputs -> output, relationship.kind=uses_output -> interpolation, relationship.kind=parent -> composition ordering hint. As more adapters appear (v2+), the stack gains expressiveness; the L1 content + contract YML + composition tree do not change. The schema body is substrate-agnostic: no Terraform block keywords (variable/output/resource as blocks) and no aws_ provider prefixes in the schema keywords; type values are stack types (aws:s3:bucket), not Terraform resource types (aws_s3_bucket).",
|
||||
"description": "Angine-neutral description of a target stack: resources with typed inputs/outputs/NFRs, relationships (single parent per child), composition tree (max depth 5), and policy hooks. The L1 registry, L2 composition tree, contract YML, and PolicyCheckResult schema are all defined against this stack schema. Angine adapters (the Terraform adapter in v1) are the only engine-specific code.",
|
||||
"$comment": "v1 ships one adapter (Terraform). The stack is nearly isomorphic to Terraform in v1 (ARCHITECTURE.md §12.1); the adapter compiles resource.module -> module block, resource.inputs -> variable + arg, resource.outputs -> output, relationship.kind=uses_output -> interpolation, relationship.kind=parent -> composition ordering hint. As more adapters appear (v2+), the stack gains expressiveness; the L1 content + contract YML + composition tree do not change. The schema body is engine-agnostic: no Terraform block keywords (variable/output/resource as blocks) and no aws_ provider prefixes in the schema keywords; type values are stack types (aws:s3:bucket), not Terraform resource types (aws_s3_bucket).",
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"required": ["version", "stack", "resources"],
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
"type": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "Stack-typed resource identifier (substrate-agnostic), e.g. 'aws:s3:bucket'. NOT a Terraform resource type ('aws_s3_bucket'); the adapter translates stack type -> substrate type."
|
||||
"description": "Stack-typed resource identifier (engine-agnostic), e.g. 'aws:s3:bucket'. NOT a Terraform resource type ('aws_s3_bucket'); the adapter translates stack type -> engine type."
|
||||
},
|
||||
"module": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
"outputs": {
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"description": "Typed output contract. The adapter translates this to a substrate output block (e.g. Terraform output).",
|
||||
"description": "Typed output contract. The adapter translates this to a engine output block (e.g. Terraform output).",
|
||||
"additionalProperties": {"$ref": "#/$defs/outputSpec"}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nfrs": {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# scripts/sync_to_gl.sh - copy ~/acdl contents to ~/gl/acdl and push.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Copies the ACDL source tree into the GitLab mirror at ~/gl/acdl.
|
||||
# Hidden files/dirs are NOT copied EXCEPT for .github (so GitLab CI
|
||||
# workflows stay current) and .gitignore. The terraform/ tree is
|
||||
# omitted entirely, and .gitignore patterns are honored. The
|
||||
# destination's existing .git directory is preserved untouched.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# After syncing, commits any changes on the current branch with a
|
||||
# timestamped message and pushes it to its upstream (origin/main).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Run manually:
|
||||
# bash scripts/sync_to_gl.sh # sync + commit + push
|
||||
# bash scripts/sync_to_gl.sh -v # verbose (list copied files)
|
||||
# bash scripts/sync_to_gl.sh --no-push # sync + commit only, no push
|
||||
# bash scripts/sync_to_gl.sh --dry-run # show what would happen
|
||||
# SRC=~/acdl DST=~/gl/acdl bash scripts/sync_to_gl.sh
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
SRC="${SRC:-$HOME/acdl}"
|
||||
DST="${DST:-$HOME/gl/acdl}"
|
||||
VERBOSE=0
|
||||
NO_PUSH=0
|
||||
DRY_RUN=0
|
||||
|
||||
for arg in "$@"; do
|
||||
case "$arg" in
|
||||
-v|--verbose) VERBOSE=1 ;;
|
||||
--no-push) NO_PUSH=1 ;;
|
||||
--dry-run) DRY_RUN=1 ;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
sed -n '2,21p' "$0"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*) echo "FAIL: unknown argument: $arg" >&2; exit 1 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
run() {
|
||||
if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "1" ]; then
|
||||
echo " [dry-run] $*"
|
||||
else
|
||||
"$@"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
[ -d "$SRC" ] || fail "source not found: $SRC"
|
||||
[ -d "$DST" ] || fail "destination not found: $DST (create it first)"
|
||||
[ -d "$DST/.git" ] || fail "destination has no .git: $DST/.git (restore it first)"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== sync_to_gl ==="
|
||||
echo "source: $SRC"
|
||||
echo "destination: $DST"
|
||||
[ "$NO_PUSH" = "1" ] && echo "mode: sync + commit (no push)"
|
||||
[ "$DRY_RUN" = "1" ] && echo "mode: dry-run (no changes made)"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
# Sanity: refuse if DST is not inside ~/gl or is the same as SRC.
|
||||
case "$DST" in
|
||||
"$HOME"/gl/*) : ;;
|
||||
*) fail "destination must live under ~/gl (got $DST)" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
[ "$SRC" != "$DST" ] || fail "source and destination are identical"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- sync (rsync) -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# Build rsync exclude list: every hidden entry in SRC except .github
|
||||
# and .gitignore.
|
||||
EXCLUDES=()
|
||||
for hidden in "$SRC"/.*; do
|
||||
name="$(basename "$hidden")"
|
||||
case "$name" in
|
||||
.|...) continue ;;
|
||||
.github|.gitignore) continue ;; # keep
|
||||
esac
|
||||
EXCLUDES+=("--exclude=/$name")
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# Never touch the destination's .git. "protect" makes rsync skip it
|
||||
# entirely (neither transfer nor delete) even under --delete; this is
|
||||
# stronger than --exclude, which --delete-excluded would wipe out.
|
||||
# Drop it from the transfer set too.
|
||||
EXCLUDES+=("--exclude=/.git")
|
||||
|
||||
# Omit the terraform/ tree entirely.
|
||||
EXCLUDES+=("--exclude=/terraform")
|
||||
|
||||
# rsync filters: protect .git, then honor per-directory .gitignore
|
||||
# via dir-merge (:-) semantics so patterns anchor like git does.
|
||||
FILTERS=(
|
||||
"--filter=P .git"
|
||||
"--filter=:- .gitignore"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Use --delete (prune extras in the synced tree) but NOT --delete-excluded:
|
||||
# that would wipe destination paths covered by our --exclude rules, which
|
||||
# is exactly what must NOT happen for .git.
|
||||
RSYNC_ARGS=(-a --delete)
|
||||
[ "$VERBOSE" = "1" ] && RSYNC_ARGS+=(-v)
|
||||
|
||||
echo "rsync excludes: ${EXCLUDES[*]}"
|
||||
echo "rsync filters: ${FILTERS[*]}"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "1" ]; then
|
||||
echo "[dry-run] rsync would run:"
|
||||
printf ' %q ' rsync "${RSYNC_ARGS[@]}" "${FILTERS[@]}" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" "$SRC/" "$DST/"; echo
|
||||
else
|
||||
rsync "${RSYNC_ARGS[@]}" "${FILTERS[@]}" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" "$SRC/" "$DST/"
|
||||
echo "rsync: OK"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
# --- git commit + push ------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
cd "$DST"
|
||||
|
||||
# Refuse to run inside a merge/rebase/conflict state.
|
||||
git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree >/dev/null
|
||||
git_dir_state() {
|
||||
local f
|
||||
for f in MERGE_HEAD CHERRY_PICK_HEAD REVERT_HEAD BISECT_LOG; do
|
||||
[ -e ".git/$f" ] && return 1
|
||||
done
|
||||
[ -d ".git/rebase-merge" -o -d ".git/rebase-apply" ] && return 1
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
git_dir_state || fail "destination .git is mid-operation (merge/rebase/etc); resolve it then re-run"
|
||||
|
||||
branch="$(git symbolic-ref --quiet --short HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
[ -n "$branch" ] || fail "HEAD is detached; checkout a branch first (got $(git rev-parse --short HEAD))"
|
||||
|
||||
# Stage everything in the working tree (including deletions).
|
||||
run git add -A
|
||||
|
||||
# Commit only if there is something staged.
|
||||
if git diff --cached --quiet; then
|
||||
echo "git: no changes to commit on branch '$branch'"
|
||||
else
|
||||
ts="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%d\ %H:%M\ UTC)"
|
||||
msg="chore: sync from source mirror $ts"
|
||||
echo "git: committing on branch '$branch'"
|
||||
[ "$VERBOSE" = "1" ] && git diff --cached --stat
|
||||
run git commit -m "$msg"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Push (current branch to its upstream) unless suppressed.
|
||||
if [ "$NO_PUSH" = "1" ]; then
|
||||
echo "git: --no-push set, skipping push"
|
||||
PUSHED=0
|
||||
else
|
||||
upstream="$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref --symbolic-full-name '@{u}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
if [ -z "$upstream" ]; then
|
||||
fail "no upstream configured for branch '$branch'; set one with: git -C $DST branch --set-upstream-to=origin/$branch $branch"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "1" ]; then
|
||||
echo " [dry-run] git push to $upstream"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "git: pushing '$branch' to $upstream"
|
||||
git push
|
||||
echo "git: push OK"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "=== sync_to_gl OK ==="
|
||||
echo "copied $SRC -> $DST"
|
||||
[ "$DRY_RUN" = "1" ] && echo "(dry-run: nothing actually written or pushed)"
|
||||
[ "$NO_PUSH" = "1" ] && echo "(no-push: changes committed but not pushed)"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# ACDL v1.1 Spike — AWS Bootstrap Runbook
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 08 bootstraps the AWS substrate for the v1.1 spike. It uses the
|
||||
Phase 08 bootstraps the AWS engine for the v1.1 spike. It uses the
|
||||
**root account credential for account 581513795199 exactly once**, then
|
||||
closes D-034 by having the user manually rotate the root key afterward.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ class TestValidateChangeRequest:
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Insert an approved CR
|
||||
table.put_item(Item={
|
||||
"changeRequestId": "CR-001",
|
||||
"changeRequestId": "CHG0678912",
|
||||
"submittedAt": "2026-07-22T10:00:00Z",
|
||||
"consumerRepo": "acdl/consumer-a",
|
||||
"contractId": "contract-001",
|
||||
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ class TestValidateChangeRequest:
|
||||
})
|
||||
# Insert a pending CR
|
||||
table.put_item(Item={
|
||||
"changeRequestId": "CR-002",
|
||||
"changeRequestId": "CHG0678913",
|
||||
"submittedAt": "2026-07-22T11:00:00Z",
|
||||
"consumerRepo": "acdl/consumer-b",
|
||||
"contractId": "contract-002",
|
||||
@@ -471,30 +471,30 @@ class TestValidateChangeRequest:
|
||||
yield
|
||||
|
||||
def test_validates_approved_cr(self, moto_change_requests_table):
|
||||
payload = {"changeRequestId": "CR-001", "consumerRepo": "acdl/consumer-a"}
|
||||
payload = {"changeRequestId": "CHG0678912", "consumerRepo": "acdl/consumer-a"}
|
||||
result = ingestor._validate_change_request(payload)
|
||||
assert result["status"] == "approved"
|
||||
assert result["changeRequestId"] == "CR-001"
|
||||
assert result["changeRequestId"] == "CHG0678912"
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rejects_non_approved_cr(self, moto_change_requests_table):
|
||||
payload = {"changeRequestId": "CR-002", "consumerRepo": "acdl/consumer-b"}
|
||||
payload = {"changeRequestId": "CHG0678913", "consumerRepo": "acdl/consumer-b"}
|
||||
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="status is 'requested'"):
|
||||
ingestor._validate_change_request(payload)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rejects_nonexistent_cr(self, moto_change_requests_table):
|
||||
payload = {"changeRequestId": "CR-NONEXIST", "consumerRepo": "acdl/consumer-a"}
|
||||
payload = {"changeRequestId": "CHG9999999", "consumerRepo": "acdl/consumer-a"}
|
||||
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not found in CMDB"):
|
||||
ingestor._validate_change_request(payload)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rejects_repo_mismatch(self, moto_change_requests_table):
|
||||
payload = {"changeRequestId": "CR-001", "consumerRepo": "acdl/wrong-repo"}
|
||||
payload = {"changeRequestId": "CHG0678912", "consumerRepo": "acdl/wrong-repo"}
|
||||
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="consumerRepo mismatch"):
|
||||
ingestor._validate_change_request(payload)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_lambda_handler_routes_validate_change_request(self, moto_change_requests_table):
|
||||
event = {"body": json.dumps({
|
||||
"action": "validate_change_request",
|
||||
"changeRequestId": "CR-001",
|
||||
"changeRequestId": "CHG0678912",
|
||||
"consumerRepo": "acdl/consumer-a",
|
||||
})}
|
||||
resp = ingestor.lambda_handler(event, None)
|
||||
|
||||