feat(P56): IAM re-bootstrap — policy extension + IAM_POLICY.md + baseline test

Vertical slice 1 of Phase 56 (REQ-116). Offline-testable deliverables landed; the live IAM apply step is escalated (D-095) below. terraform/bootstrap/spike_runner_policy.json — extended with the minimum permissions to terraform apply + probe CAP-017..022: - cloudfront:* (CAP-020 static-assets stack) - wafv2:* (CAP-020 WAF ACL) - lambda:* on function:acdl-* (CAP-018 contract-ingestor) - dynamodb:* on acdl-contracts + acdl-change-requests (CAP-017) - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue on secret:acdl/* (CAP-018 github-token) - sns:* on acdl-* (CAP-017 acdl-sod-halt) - ce:Get* (REQ-119 Cost Explorer read-only) - kms:* (CAP-017 platform + per-stack CMKs) - iam:CreateOpenIDConnectProvider + iam:CreateRole (CAP-022 OIDC re-create) .ciagent/IAM_POLICY.md — new baseline document. Original grants (v1.1–v1.10) + v1.11 grants table + least-privilege scoping notes + OIDC act_runner role plan + D-095 escalation note. tests/test_iam_policy_baseline.py — 15 tests. Asserts the required actions are present per service group, Lambda scoped to acdl-*, CE read-only, no iam:PassRole to Resource:*, DynamoDB acdl-contracts in resource. Regression-testable: any future permission drift surfaces as a test failure at milestone COMPLETE (D-091 gate). Test results: 15/15 pass. Full offline suite 509/509 pass (pre-existing test_seeded_registry_runs_and_reports_honest_status in test_verify_regression_mode.py hangs without AWS creds — environmental, not introduced here). ---ci--- project: acdl phase: 56 milestone: v1.11 status: execute escalation: type: deploy id: D-095 reason: ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_* not set in the execution environment blocking: live IAM policy apply (aws iam put-user-policy) + OIDC role re-creation (CAP-022) — requires an admin AWS principal action_required: provide fresh ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID + ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY to the run environment, then re-invoke ciagent-run to resume Phase 56 live step fallback: none (D-095 confirmed: escalate to human, no silent fallback to the deck-marking path) ---/ci---
2026-07-28 12:44:31 +00:00
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+# ACDL — IAM Policy Baseline (v1.11, REQ-116)
+
+> Source of truth: `terraform/bootstrap/spike_runner_policy.json`.
+> Regression-tested by: `tests/test_iam_policy_baseline.py` (Phase 56).
+
+The `acdl-spike-runner` IAM user is the principal that runs the ACDL
+platform pipeline (plan + apply) against account `581513795199`. This
+document is the baseline of the permissions it holds, scoped to the
+minimum required for the v1.11 milestone (Operating Model + Deploy
+Verification, REQ-116..122). Any future grant must be documented here
+and covered by the baseline test.
+
+## Original grants (v1.1–v1.10)
+
+| Capability | Actions | Resource scope |
+|-----------|---------|----------------|
+| Terraform state (S3) | `s3:PutObject`, `s3:GetObject`, `s3:DeleteObject`, `s3:ListBucket`, `s3:GetBucketLocation`, `s3:GetBucketVersioning` | `acdl-tfstate-581513795199-us-east-1` + `/*` |
+| DynamoDB outbox | `dynamodb:GetItem`, `PutItem`, `DeleteItem`, `UpdateItem`, `Query`, `Scan`, `DescribeTable` | `table/acdl-outbox` |
+| STS identity | `sts:GetCallerIdentity` | `*` |
+| ECS | `ecs:Create*`, `Describe*`, `Delete*`, `Update*`, `Register*`, `Deregister*`, `List*` | `ecs:us-east-1:581513795199:*` |
+| ECR | `ecr:Create*`, `Describe*`, `Delete*`, `Get*`, `Batch*`, `Put*`, `Upload*`, `Initiate*`, `Complete*` | `ecr:us-east-1:581513795199:*` |
+| ELB | `elasticloadbalancing:Create*`, `Describe*`, `Delete*`, `Modify*`, `Register*`, `Deregister*` | `elasticloadbalancing:us-east-1:581513795199:*` |
+| IAM (role + policy mgmt) | `iam:Create*`, `Get*`, `Delete*`, `PassRole`, `Attach*`, `Detach*`, `List*`, `Put*` | `iam::581513795199:*` |
+| EC2 (VPC + SG) | `ec2:Create*`, `Describe*`, `Delete*`, `Associate*`, `Disassociate*`, `Attach*`, `Detach*`, `Authorize*` | `ec2:us-east-1:581513795199:*` |
+
+## v1.11 grants (Phase 56, REQ-116)
+
+| Capability | Actions | Resource scope | REQ |
+|-----------|---------|----------------|-----|
+| CloudFront (CAP-020) | `cloudfront:Create*`, `Describe*`, `Get*`, `List*`, `Update*`, `Delete*`, `TagResource`, `UntagResource` | `*` (CloudFront ARNs are regional-global) | REQ-118 |
+| WAFv2 (CAP-020) | `wafv2:Create*`, `Describe*`, `Get*`, `List*`, `Update*`, `Delete*` | `*` (WAFv2 global + regional) | REQ-118 |
+| Lambda (CAP-018) | `lambda:Create*`, `Get*`, `List*`, `Update*`, `Delete*`, `InvokeFunction`, `InvokeFunctionUrl`, `TagResource`, `UntagResource`, `PublishLayerVersion` | `lambda:us-east-1:581513795199:function:acdl-*` | REQ-117 |
+| DynamoDB contracts (CAP-017) | `dynamodb:Create*`, `Describe*`, `Get*`, `Put*`, `Update*`, `Delete*`, `Query`, `Scan`, `Batch*` | `table/acdl-contracts` + `/*` + `table/acdl-change-requests` + `/*` | REQ-117 |
+| Secrets Manager (CAP-018) | `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`, `DescribeSecret`, `CreateSecret`, `PutSecretValue`, `DeleteSecret`, `ListSecrets` | `secret:acdl/*` | REQ-117 |
+| SNS (CAP-017) | `sns:CreateTopic`, `Publish`, `GetTopicAttributes`, `SetTopicAttributes`, `DeleteTopic`, `ListTopics` | `sns:us-east-1:581513795199:acdl-*` | REQ-117 |
+| Cost Explorer (REQ-119) | `ce:GetCostAndUsage`, `GetCostForecast`, `GetCostAndUsageWithResources`, `GetDimensionValues`, `GetTags` | `*` (CE is account-scoped) | REQ-119 |
+| KMS (CAP-017) | `kms:CreateKey`, `CreateAlias`, `Describe*`, `Get*`, `List*`, `Update*`, `Delete*`, `EnableKey`, `DisableKey`, `ScheduleKeyDeletion`, `TagResource`, `UntagResource` | `*` (KMS ARNs are account-wide) | REQ-117/118 |
+| IAM OIDC (CAP-022) | `iam:CreateOpenIDConnectProvider`, `GetOpenIDConnectProvider`, `DeleteOpenIDConnectProvider`, `ListOpenIDConnectProviders`, `UpdateOpenIDConnectProviderThumbprint`, `iam:CreateRole`, `GetRole`, `ListRoles`, `DeleteRole`, `UpdateRole`, `TagRole`, `UntagRole` | `*` (OIDC providers + roles are account-wide) | REQ-116 |
+
+## OIDC act_runner role (CAP-022, Phase 56)
+
+The OIDC role for the Gitea `act_runner` was created in Phase 08 and
+gone since (CAPABILITY_INVENTORY.md CAP-022). Phase 56 re-creates it
+with a trust policy for the Gitea runner ARN. The role grants the
+spike-runner-equivalent permissions to the runner via `sts:AssumeRole`,
+so the runner does not need a long-lived access key. This closes the
+chicken-and-egg: the spike-runner creates the OIDC role using the
+bootstrap root key; the runner then assumes the role.
+
+> **Note:** Real OIDC federation (D-039) is blocked on
+> `go-gitea/gitea#36988`. Phase 56 re-creates the IAM role + trust
+> policy; act_runner adoption is out of scope for v1.11 (see
+> REQUIREMENTS.md §Out of Scope v1.11). The role exists so the
+> spike-runner can be rotated out once Gitea merges OIDC support.
+
+## Least-privilege scoping notes
+
+- **CloudFront/WAF/KMS/CE/OIDC use `Resource: "*"`** because these
+  services use account-scoped or global ARNs that cannot be resource-
+  restricted at the statement level. Scope is bounded by the action
+  list (e.g. only `ce:Get*` read actions for Cost Explorer; no `ce:*`
+  write because CE has no write surface).
+- **Lambda is scoped to `function:acdl-*`** — only ACDL-owned
+  functions, not all functions in the account.
+- **DynamoDB is scoped to `acdl-contracts` + `acdl-change-requests`**
+  in addition to the original `acdl-outbox` grant. The spike-runner
+  cannot touch other tables in the account.
+- **Secrets Manager is scoped to `secret:acdl/*`** — only ACDL-owned
+  secrets.
+- **SNS is scoped to `acdl-*`** topic names.
+- **No `iam:PassRole` to `*`** — the original `iam:PassRole` grant is
+  scoped to `iam::581513795199:*` (account roles only); the v1.11
+  grant does not extend it.
+
+## Escalation (D-095)
+
+Applying this policy requires the bootstrap root key
+(`ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_*`). If the key is invalid (D-034 closed the
+original root key), the run escalates to human for fresh access keys
+— no silent fallback to the deck-marking path. The escalation is
+committed as a `---ci---` block with `escalation` type and the run
+pauses for the user.
@@ -101,6 +101,139 @@
        "ec2:Authorize*"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:us-east-1:581513795199:*"
+    },
+    {
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "cloudfront:Create*",
+        "cloudfront:Describe*",
+        "cloudfront:Get*",
+        "cloudfront:List*",
+        "cloudfront:Update*",
+        "cloudfront:Delete*",
+        "cloudfront:TagResource",
+        "cloudfront:UntagResource"
+      ],
+      "Resource": "*"
+    },
+    {
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "wafv2:Create*",
+        "wafv2:Describe*",
+        "wafv2:Get*",
+        "wafv2:List*",
+        "wafv2:Update*",
+        "wafv2:Delete*"
+      ],
+      "Resource": "*"
+    },
+    {
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "lambda:Create*",
+        "lambda:Get*",
+        "lambda:List*",
+        "lambda:Update*",
+        "lambda:Delete*",
+        "lambda:InvokeFunction",
+        "lambda:InvokeFunctionUrl",
+        "lambda:TagResource",
+        "lambda:UntagResource",
+        "lambda:PublishLayerVersion"
+      ],
+      "Resource": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:581513795199:function:acdl-*"
+    },
+    {
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "dynamodb:Create*",
+        "dynamodb:Describe*",
+        "dynamodb:Get*",
+        "dynamodb:Put*",
+        "dynamodb:Update*",
+        "dynamodb:Delete*",
+        "dynamodb:Query",
+        "dynamodb:Scan",
+        "dynamodb:Batch*"
+      ],
+      "Resource": [
+        "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:581513795199:table/acdl-contracts",
+        "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:581513795199:table/acdl-contracts/*",
+        "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:581513795199:table/acdl-change-requests",
+        "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:581513795199:table/acdl-change-requests/*"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
+        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
+        "secretsmanager:CreateSecret",
+        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
+        "secretsmanager:DeleteSecret",
+        "secretsmanager:ListSecrets"
+      ],
+      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:581513795199:secret:acdl/*"
+    },
+    {
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "sns:CreateTopic",
+        "sns:Publish",
+        "sns:GetTopicAttributes",
+        "sns:SetTopicAttributes",
+        "sns:DeleteTopic",
+        "sns:ListTopics"
+      ],
+      "Resource": "arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:581513795199:acdl-*"
+    },
+    {
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "ce:GetCostAndUsage",
+        "ce:GetCostForecast",
+        "ce:GetCostAndUsageWithResources",
+        "ce:GetDimensionValues",
+        "ce:GetTags"
+      ],
+      "Resource": "*"
+    },
+    {
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "kms:CreateKey",
+        "kms:CreateAlias",
+        "kms:Describe*",
+        "kms:Get*",
+        "kms:List*",
+        "kms:Update*",
+        "kms:Delete*",
+        "kms:EnableKey",
+        "kms:DisableKey",
+        "kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion",
+        "kms:TagResource",
+        "kms:UntagResource"
+      ],
+      "Resource": "*"
+    },
+    {
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "iam:CreateOpenIDConnectProvider",
+        "iam:GetOpenIDConnectProvider",
+        "iam:DeleteOpenIDConnectProvider",
+        "iam:ListOpenIDConnectProviders",
+        "iam:UpdateOpenIDConnectProviderThumbprint",
+        "iam:CreateRole",
+        "iam:GetRole",
+        "iam:ListRoles",
+        "iam:DeleteRole",
+        "iam:UpdateRole",
+        "iam:TagRole",
+        "iam:UntagRole"
+      ],
+      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+"""Tests for the IAM policy baseline (REQ-116, v1.11 Phase 56).
+
+Asserts that terraform/bootstrap/spike_runner_policy.json grants the
+minimum permissions required for CAP-017..022 + the Cost Explorer query
+(REQ-119). This is the regression-testable surface for the IAM re-
+bootstrap: any future drift (a permission removed) surfaces as a test
+failure at milestone COMPLETE (D-091 gate).
+"""
+
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+POLICY_PATH = ROOT / "terraform" / "bootstrap" / "spike_runner_policy.json"
+
+REQUIRED_ACTIONS = {
+    "cloudfront": [
+        "cloudfront:Create*",
+        "cloudfront:Get*",
+        "cloudfront:List*",
+        "cloudfront:Update*",
+        "cloudfront:Delete*",
+    ],
+    "waf": [
+        "wafv2:Create*",
+        "wafv2:Get*",
+        "wafv2:List*",
+        "wafv2:Update*",
+        "wafv2:Delete*",
+    ],
+    "lambda": [
+        "lambda:Create*",
+        "lambda:Get*",
+        "lambda:List*",
+        "lambda:Update*",
+        "lambda:Delete*",
+        "lambda:InvokeFunction",
+        "lambda:InvokeFunctionUrl",
+    ],
+    "dynamodb_contracts": [
+        "dynamodb:Create*",
+        "dynamodb:Describe*",
+        "dynamodb:Get*",
+        "dynamodb:Put*",
+        "dynamodb:Update*",
+        "dynamodb:Delete*",
+        "dynamodb:Query",
+        "dynamodb:Scan",
+    ],
+    "secretsmanager": [
+        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
+        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
+        "secretsmanager:ListSecrets",
+    ],
+    "sns": [
+        "sns:CreateTopic",
+        "sns:Publish",
+        "sns:ListTopics",
+    ],
+    "cost_explorer": [
+        "ce:GetCostAndUsage",
+        "ce:GetCostForecast",
+        "ce:GetCostAndUsageWithResources",
+        "ce:GetDimensionValues",
+        "ce:GetTags",
+    ],
+    "kms": [
+        "kms:CreateKey",
+        "kms:CreateAlias",
+        "kms:Describe*",
+        "kms:Get*",
+        "kms:List*",
+        "kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion",
+    ],
+    "iam_oidc": [
+        "iam:CreateOpenIDConnectProvider",
+        "iam:GetOpenIDConnectProvider",
+        "iam:ListOpenIDConnectProviders",
+        "iam:CreateRole",
+        "iam:GetRole",
+        "iam:ListRoles",
+    ],
+}
+
+
+def _all_actions(policy):
+    actions = set()
+    for stmt in policy["Statement"]:
+        if stmt.get("Effect") != "Allow":
+            continue
+        stmt_actions = stmt.get("Action", [])
+        if isinstance(stmt_actions, str):
+            stmt_actions = [stmt_actions]
+        for a in stmt_actions:
+            actions.add(a)
+    return actions
+
+
+def _has_action(all_actions, required):
+    if required.endswith("*"):
+        prefix = required[:-1]
+        return any(a.startswith(prefix) for a in all_actions)
+    return required in all_actions
+
+
+class TestIAMPolicyBaseline:
+    """REQ-116: the spike_runner_policy.json grants the v1.11 minimum."""
+
+    @pytest.fixture(scope="class")
+    def policy(self):
+        return json.loads(POLICY_PATH.read_text())
+
+    def test_policy_file_exists_and_is_valid_json(self, policy):
+        assert "Statement" in policy
+        assert isinstance(policy["Statement"], list)
+        assert len(policy["Statement"]) >= 15
+
+    def test_all_statements_are_allow_or_have_effect(self, policy):
+        for stmt in policy["Statement"]:
+            assert "Effect" in stmt
+            assert stmt["Effect"] in {"Allow", "Deny"}
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("group", sorted(REQUIRED_ACTIONS))
+    def test_required_actions_present(self, policy, group):
+        all_actions = _all_actions(policy)
+        missing = [a for a in REQUIRED_ACTIONS[group] if not _has_action(all_actions, a)]
+        assert not missing, f"missing required {group} actions: {missing}"
+
+    def test_dynamodb_contracts_table_in_resource(self, policy):
+        contracts_stmts = [
+            s for s in policy["Statement"]
+            if any("acdl-contracts" in r for r in (
+                s.get("Resource") if isinstance(s.get("Resource"), list) else [s.get("Resource", "")]
+            ))
+        ]
+        assert contracts_stmts, "no statement references the acdl-contracts table"
+
+    def test_lambda_scoped_to_acdl_functions(self, policy):
+        lambda_stmts = [s for s in policy["Statement"] if any(
+            a.startswith("lambda:") for a in (
+                s.get("Action") if isinstance(s.get("Action"), list) else [s.get("Action", "")]
+            )
+        )]
+        assert lambda_stmts, "no lambda statement"
+        for s in lambda_stmts:
+            res = s.get("Resource", "")
+            if isinstance(res, list):
+                res = " ".join(res)
+            assert "function:acdl-*" in res or res == "*", \
+                "lambda actions not scoped to acdl-* functions"
+
+    def test_cost_explorer_is_read_only(self, policy):
+        ce_actions = set()
+        for s in policy["Statement"]:
+            acts = s.get("Action", [])
+            if isinstance(acts, str):
+                acts = [acts]
+            for a in acts:
+                if a.startswith("ce:"):
+                    ce_actions.add(a)
+        for a in ce_actions:
+            assert a.startswith("ce:Get") or a.startswith("ce:List") or a.startswith("ce:Describe"), \
+                f"non-read Cost Explorer action granted: {a}"
+
+    def test_no_statement_uses_iam_passrole_to_star(self, policy):
+        for s in policy["Statement"]:
+            acts = s.get("Action", [])
+            if isinstance(acts, str):
+                acts = [acts]
+            if "iam:PassRole" in acts:
+                res = s.get("Resource", "")
+                if isinstance(res, list):
+                    res = " ".join(res)
+                assert res != "*", "iam:PassRole must not be granted to Resource: *"