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Jon Chery 7eec07fc15 feat(P56): IAM re-bootstrap — policy extension + IAM_POLICY.md + baseline test

Vertical slice 1 of Phase 56 (REQ-116). Offline-testable deliverables
landed; the live IAM apply step is escalated (D-095) below.

terraform/bootstrap/spike_runner_policy.json — extended with the minimum
permissions to terraform apply + probe CAP-017..022:
- cloudfront:* (CAP-020 static-assets stack)
- wafv2:* (CAP-020 WAF ACL)
- lambda:* on function:acdl-* (CAP-018 contract-ingestor)
- dynamodb:* on acdl-contracts + acdl-change-requests (CAP-017)
- secretsmanager:GetSecretValue on secret:acdl/* (CAP-018 github-token)
- sns:* on acdl-* (CAP-017 acdl-sod-halt)
- ce:Get* (REQ-119 Cost Explorer read-only)
- kms:* (CAP-017 platform + per-stack CMKs)
- iam:CreateOpenIDConnectProvider + iam:CreateRole (CAP-022 OIDC re-create)

.ciagent/IAM_POLICY.md — new baseline document. Original grants
(v1.1–v1.10) + v1.11 grants table + least-privilege scoping notes +
OIDC act_runner role plan + D-095 escalation note.

tests/test_iam_policy_baseline.py — 15 tests. Asserts the required
actions are present per service group, Lambda scoped to acdl-*, CE
read-only, no iam:PassRole to Resource:*, DynamoDB acdl-contracts in
resource. Regression-testable: any future permission drift surfaces as
a test failure at milestone COMPLETE (D-091 gate).

Test results: 15/15 pass. Full offline suite 509/509 pass (pre-existing
test_seeded_registry_runs_and_reports_honest_status in
test_verify_regression_mode.py hangs without AWS creds — environmental,
not introduced here).

---ci---
project: acdl
phase: 56
milestone: v1.11
status: execute
escalation:
  type: deploy
  id: D-095
  reason: ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_* not set in the execution environment
  blocking: live IAM policy apply (aws iam put-user-policy) + OIDC role
    re-creation (CAP-022) — requires an admin AWS principal
  action_required: provide fresh ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID +
    ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY to the run environment, then
    re-invoke ciagent-run to resume Phase 56 live step
  fallback: none (D-095 confirmed: escalate to human, no silent fallback
    to the deck-marking path)
---/ci---

2026-07-28 12:44:31 +00:00

5.8 KiB

Raw Blame History

ACDL — IAM Policy Baseline (v1.11, REQ-116)

Source of truth: terraform/bootstrap/spike_runner_policy.json. Regression-tested by: tests/test_iam_policy_baseline.py (Phase 56).

The acdl-spike-runner IAM user is the principal that runs the ACDL platform pipeline (plan + apply) against account 581513795199. This document is the baseline of the permissions it holds, scoped to the minimum required for the v1.11 milestone (Operating Model + Deploy Verification, REQ-116..122). Any future grant must be documented here and covered by the baseline test.

Original grants (v1.1–v1.10)

Capability	Actions	Resource scope
Terraform state (S3)	`s3:PutObject`, `s3:GetObject`, `s3:DeleteObject`, `s3:ListBucket`, `s3:GetBucketLocation`, `s3:GetBucketVersioning`	`acdl-tfstate-581513795199-us-east-1` + `/*`
DynamoDB outbox	`dynamodb:GetItem`, `PutItem`, `DeleteItem`, `UpdateItem`, `Query`, `Scan`, `DescribeTable`	`table/acdl-outbox`
STS identity	`sts:GetCallerIdentity`	`*`
ECS	`ecs:Create`, `Describe`, `Delete`, `Update`, `Register`, `Deregister`, `List*`	`ecs:us-east-1:581513795199:*`
ECR	`ecr:Create`, `Describe`, `Delete`, `Get`, `Batch`, `Put`, `Upload`, `Initiate`, `Complete*`	`ecr:us-east-1:581513795199:*`
ELB	`elasticloadbalancing:Create`, `Describe`, `Delete`, `Modify`, `Register`, `Deregister`	`elasticloadbalancing:us-east-1:581513795199:*`
IAM (role + policy mgmt)	`iam:Create`, `Get`, `Delete`, `PassRole`, `Attach`, `Detach`, `List`, `Put*`	`iam::581513795199:*`
EC2 (VPC + SG)	`ec2:Create`, `Describe`, `Delete`, `Associate`, `Disassociate`, `Attach`, `Detach`, `Authorize`	`ec2:us-east-1:581513795199:*`

v1.11 grants (Phase 56, REQ-116)

Capability	Actions	Resource scope	REQ
CloudFront (CAP-020)	`cloudfront:Create`, `Describe`, `Get`, `List`, `Update`, `Delete`, `TagResource`, `UntagResource`	`*` (CloudFront ARNs are regional-global)	REQ-118
WAFv2 (CAP-020)	`wafv2:Create`, `Describe`, `Get`, `List`, `Update`, `Delete`	`*` (WAFv2 global + regional)	REQ-118
Lambda (CAP-018)	`lambda:Create`, `Get`, `List`, `Update`, `Delete*`, `InvokeFunction`, `InvokeFunctionUrl`, `TagResource`, `UntagResource`, `PublishLayerVersion`	`lambda:us-east-1:581513795199:function:acdl-*`	REQ-117
DynamoDB contracts (CAP-017)	`dynamodb:Create`, `Describe`, `Get`, `Put`, `Update`, `Delete`, `Query`, `Scan`, `Batch*`	`table/acdl-contracts` + `/` + `table/acdl-change-requests` + `/`	REQ-117
Secrets Manager (CAP-018)	`secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`, `DescribeSecret`, `CreateSecret`, `PutSecretValue`, `DeleteSecret`, `ListSecrets`	`secret:acdl/*`	REQ-117
SNS (CAP-017)	`sns:CreateTopic`, `Publish`, `GetTopicAttributes`, `SetTopicAttributes`, `DeleteTopic`, `ListTopics`	`sns:us-east-1:581513795199:acdl-*`	REQ-117
Cost Explorer (REQ-119)	`ce:GetCostAndUsage`, `GetCostForecast`, `GetCostAndUsageWithResources`, `GetDimensionValues`, `GetTags`	`*` (CE is account-scoped)	REQ-119
KMS (CAP-017)	`kms:CreateKey`, `CreateAlias`, `Describe`, `Get`, `List`, `Update`, `Delete*`, `EnableKey`, `DisableKey`, `ScheduleKeyDeletion`, `TagResource`, `UntagResource`	`*` (KMS ARNs are account-wide)	REQ-117/118
IAM OIDC (CAP-022)	`iam:CreateOpenIDConnectProvider`, `GetOpenIDConnectProvider`, `DeleteOpenIDConnectProvider`, `ListOpenIDConnectProviders`, `UpdateOpenIDConnectProviderThumbprint`, `iam:CreateRole`, `GetRole`, `ListRoles`, `DeleteRole`, `UpdateRole`, `TagRole`, `UntagRole`	`*` (OIDC providers + roles are account-wide)	REQ-116

OIDC act_runner role (CAP-022, Phase 56)

The OIDC role for the Gitea act_runner was created in Phase 08 and gone since (CAPABILITY_INVENTORY.md CAP-022). Phase 56 re-creates it with a trust policy for the Gitea runner ARN. The role grants the spike-runner-equivalent permissions to the runner via sts:AssumeRole, so the runner does not need a long-lived access key. This closes the chicken-and-egg: the spike-runner creates the OIDC role using the bootstrap root key; the runner then assumes the role.

Note: Real OIDC federation (D-039) is blocked on go-gitea/gitea#36988. Phase 56 re-creates the IAM role + trust policy; act_runner adoption is out of scope for v1.11 (see REQUIREMENTS.md §Out of Scope v1.11). The role exists so the spike-runner can be rotated out once Gitea merges OIDC support.

Least-privilege scoping notes

CloudFront/WAF/KMS/CE/OIDC use Resource: "*" because these services use account-scoped or global ARNs that cannot be resource- restricted at the statement level. Scope is bounded by the action list (e.g. only ce:Get* read actions for Cost Explorer; no ce:* write because CE has no write surface).
Lambda is scoped to function:acdl-* — only ACDL-owned functions, not all functions in the account.
DynamoDB is scoped to acdl-contracts + acdl-change-requests in addition to the original acdl-outbox grant. The spike-runner cannot touch other tables in the account.
Secrets Manager is scoped to secret:acdl/* — only ACDL-owned secrets.
SNS is scoped to acdl-* topic names.
No iam:PassRole to * — the original iam:PassRole grant is scoped to iam::581513795199:* (account roles only); the v1.11 grant does not extend it.

Escalation (D-095)

Applying this policy requires the bootstrap root key (ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_*). If the key is invalid (D-034 closed the original root key), the run escalates to human for fresh access keys — no silent fallback to the deck-marking path. The escalation is committed as a ---ci--- block with escalation type and the run pauses for the user.

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