Praxis CI
e39521d51d
- TASK-03-01 server/auth/passwords.py: argon2id via argon2-cffi
PasswordHasher (t=3, m=64MiB, p=4 — exceeds OWASP). hash/verify/
needs_rehash; verify returns False on mismatch (uniform 401 path).
- TASK-03-02 server/auth/cookies.py: get_session_middleware_kwargs()
→ Starlette SessionMiddleware (itsdangerous HMAC-SHA256, D-056).
Cookie praxis_op, httpOnly, SameSite=strict, max_age=28800 (8h).
PRAXIS_COOKIE_SECURE default true; false logs WARNING (R-AUTH-01).
G-031 reframe documented: k-anon defense-in-depth is the PRIMARY
mitigation (sniffed cookie → no PII); secure flag is SECONDARY.
- TASK-03-03 server/auth/rate_limit.py: slowapi Limiter (in-memory,
D-041), 5/minute per IP on login. reset_login_rate_limit() helper.
- TASK-03-04 server/auth/dependencies.py + models.py: current_operator
Depends — reads signed-cookie session, fetches operator from PgStore,
401 on missing/invalid/inactive (clears session), 503 if no Postgres.
Never trusts the client (D-057).
- TASK-03-05 server/auth/routes.py: APIRouter(prefix=/api/operator)
with POST /login (rate-limited, rehash-on-login), POST /logout
(auth-gated, clears session), GET /me (auth-gated, React guard).
- TASK-03-06 tests/test_auth.py: 18 unit tests (mocked PgStore) —
passwords, cookie config, rate limit, 401/503 cases, login/logout/me,
rehash-on-login.
- pyproject.toml: added itsdangerous>=2.1 (SessionMiddleware dep).
---ci---
project: praxis
phase: 1
milestone: v0.4
status: execute
persona: security-engineer
task: 03-01,03-02,03-03,03-04,03-05,03-06
requirements:
covered: [REQ-AUTH-01, REQ-NFR-AUTH-01]
grill:
- G-031 (R-AUTH-01 reframe: k-anon primary, secure flag secondary)
---/ci---
34 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
34 lines
1.1 KiB
Python
"""Login rate limiting (TASK-03-03, D-041).
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slowapi Limiter with an in-memory backend (single-instance — D-041).
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5 login attempts per minute per client IP. On exceed → 429 + Retry-After.
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R-AUTH-03 (in-memory counter lost on restart) is an accepted pilot risk
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(RESEARCH-v0.4 §2.5) — a restart at most resets the counter, which slightly
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widens the brute-force window but does not enable it (argon2id + 5/min is
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still the binding control). A hand-rolled counter is the documented
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fallback if slowapi is ever removed.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from slowapi import Limiter
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from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
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limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address, storage_uri="memory://")
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def reset_login_rate_limit() -> None:
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"""Clear the in-memory rate-limit counters (test helper + restart-safe)."""
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try:
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limiter.reset()
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except Exception:
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pass
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def rate_limit_login():
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"""Decorator factory: 5 login attempts per minute per IP (D-041)."""
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return limiter.limit("5/minute")
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__all__ = ["limiter", "rate_limit_login", "reset_login_rate_limit"] |