Praxis CI e39521d51d feat(P01): SLICE-03 operator auth — argon2id + signed cookies + rate limit ...

- TASK-03-01 server/auth/passwords.py: argon2id via argon2-cffi
  PasswordHasher (t=3, m=64MiB, p=4 — exceeds OWASP). hash/verify/
  needs_rehash; verify returns False on mismatch (uniform 401 path).
- TASK-03-02 server/auth/cookies.py: get_session_middleware_kwargs()
  → Starlette SessionMiddleware (itsdangerous HMAC-SHA256, D-056).
  Cookie praxis_op, httpOnly, SameSite=strict, max_age=28800 (8h).
  PRAXIS_COOKIE_SECURE default true; false logs WARNING (R-AUTH-01).
  G-031 reframe documented: k-anon defense-in-depth is the PRIMARY
  mitigation (sniffed cookie → no PII); secure flag is SECONDARY.
- TASK-03-03 server/auth/rate_limit.py: slowapi Limiter (in-memory,
  D-041), 5/minute per IP on login. reset_login_rate_limit() helper.
- TASK-03-04 server/auth/dependencies.py + models.py: current_operator
  Depends — reads signed-cookie session, fetches operator from PgStore,
  401 on missing/invalid/inactive (clears session), 503 if no Postgres.
  Never trusts the client (D-057).
- TASK-03-05 server/auth/routes.py: APIRouter(prefix=/api/operator)
  with POST /login (rate-limited, rehash-on-login), POST /logout
  (auth-gated, clears session), GET /me (auth-gated, React guard).
- TASK-03-06 tests/test_auth.py: 18 unit tests (mocked PgStore) —
  passwords, cookie config, rate limit, 401/503 cases, login/logout/me,
  rehash-on-login.
- pyproject.toml: added itsdangerous>=2.1 (SessionMiddleware dep).

---ci---
project: praxis
phase: 1
milestone: v0.4
status: execute
persona: security-engineer
task: 03-01,03-02,03-03,03-04,03-05,03-06
requirements:
  covered: [REQ-AUTH-01, REQ-NFR-AUTH-01]
  grill:
    - G-031 (R-AUTH-01 reframe: k-anon primary, secure flag secondary)
---/ci---

2026-08-04 00:52:16 +00:00

0 lines

0 B

Python

Raw Blame History

The file is empty.