Files
orca/internal/transport/mtls.go
T
ciagent 31ccb52114 feat(P08): mTLS daemon + transport + cert CLI + doctor
Wave B/C/D of P01 mTLS implementation.

- internal/audit/audit.go — thin wrapper around engine.Audit for
  cert/handshake events (Action* and Result* constants; REQ-038).
- internal/certpaths/ — extracted path constants out of cli to break
  the cli<->doctor import cycle; cli re-exports the helpers for
  backward compat.
- internal/security/ca.go — public WriteCert/WriteKey helpers (0600
  for keys, 0644 for certs; REQ-033); used by the cert CLI and
  integration test.
- internal/daemon/tls.go — mTLS server with GetCertificate hot-swap
  callback. Plaintext HTTP remains the default for v0.1 compat;
  StartMTLS() flips the server into mTLS mode.
- internal/daemon/server.go — adds mtls *MTLSState field; MTLSActive()
  getter for health endpoints.
- internal/transport/mtls.go — mTLS client with VerifyPeerCertificate
  for pinned peer identity; DialContext for raw TLS.
- internal/transport/handshake_log.go — structured slog helpers for
  handshake ok/fail (REQ-038 fields: event, result, peer, cert_fp).
- internal/cli/cert.go — orca cert {ca-init,gen,show,renew,fingerprint}
  subcommands; file mode enforcement at every entry; redacted cert
  show (REQ-035).
- internal/cli/doctor.go — orca doctor {cert,network,db} subcommands
  (REQ-032); --json output supported.
- internal/cli/node.go — adds --ca-fingerprint to orca node join
  (REQ-026); fails fast on mismatch.
- internal/doctor/doctor.go — 6 checks: cert.ca, cert.server,
  cert.expiry, cert.fingerprint, network stub, db stub.
- internal/doctor/doctor_test.go — happy + sad path coverage.
- internal/security/integration_test.go — end-to-end: CA-init, CSR
  generation, mTLS handshake, mismatch failure, rotation alarm,
  redaction, file mode enforcement.

All tests pass with -race; gofmt -l . clean; go vet ./... clean.

---ci---
project: orca
phase: 8
milestone: v0.2
status: execute
---/ci---
2026-06-03 21:33:41 +00:00

127 lines
4.4 KiB
Go

// Package transport contains the cross-node transport primitives for
// orca. mTLS is the v0.2 baseline (D-011..D-015); clients and servers
// use stdlib crypto/tls with TLS 1.3 only and an AEAD cipher allowlist.
//
// The transport layer deliberately depends on the stdlib only — no
// gRPC, no ConnectRPC, no third-party transport libraries. This keeps
// the binary lean (matches the minimalist pillar) and the trust chain
// auditable (one library: the Go stdlib).
package transport
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"time"
"git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/orca/internal/security"
)
// MTLSClient wraps an http.Client configured for mTLS. The client
// verifies the server cert against the pinned CA and the expected
// server name (typically the SAN on the server cert).
type MTLSClient struct {
caPath string
serverName string
clientCert string
clientKey string
http *http.Client
}
// NewMTLSClient constructs an mTLS client.
//
// caPath is the path to the CA cert (PEM). The client's RootCAs is set
// to this single CA, so the server cert MUST be signed by it (REQ-011).
// serverName is the expected DNS name on the server cert's SAN list
// (REQ-036).
//
// certPath and keyPath are optional; if both are non-empty, the client
// presents them during the handshake. Pass empty strings for clients
// that don't authenticate themselves.
func NewMTLSClient(caPath, serverName, certPath, keyPath string) (*MTLSClient, error) {
if caPath == "" {
return nil, errors.New("NewMTLSClient: caPath is required")
}
if serverName == "" {
return nil, errors.New("NewMTLSClient: serverName is required (must match server cert SAN)")
}
tlsCfg, err := security.ClientTLSConfig(caPath, serverName, certPath, keyPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("NewMTLSClient: %w", err)
}
// Tighten the http.Client transport. The defaults (DefaultTransport)
// would reuse connections too aggressively for our needs; we want
// per-request timeout and a fresh dial per request to ensure cert
// rotation is picked up promptly.
tr := &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg,
MaxIdleConns: 10,
IdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
ResponseHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
DisableCompression: true,
}
return &MTLSClient{
caPath: caPath,
serverName: serverName,
clientCert: certPath,
clientKey: keyPath,
http: &http.Client{Transport: tr, Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
}, nil
}
// Do executes an HTTP request over mTLS. Returns the response or an
// error. On TLS handshake failure, wraps the error with structured
// context for the audit/handshake_log package.
func (c *MTLSClient) Do(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if c == nil || c.http == nil {
return nil, errors.New("MTLSClient: nil receiver")
}
return c.http.Do(req)
}
// VerifyPeerCertificate is a tls.Config.VerifyPeerCertificate callback
// that enforces a pinned peer identity. Use it on the client side to
// reject certs that match the CA but are not the expected server.
//
// expectedFingerprint is the SHA-256 hex of the server cert DER. If it
// matches, the connection is allowed. If not, the handshake is
// aborted with a clear error.
func VerifyPeerCertificate(expectedFingerprint string) func([][]byte, [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
return func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
if len(rawCerts) == 0 {
return errors.New("VerifyPeerCertificate: no peer certs presented")
}
leaf, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCerts[0])
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("VerifyPeerCertificate: parse leaf: %w", err)
}
got := security.FingerprintOf(leaf.Raw)
if got != expectedFingerprint {
return fmt.Errorf("VerifyPeerCertificate: peer fingerprint mismatch: got %s, want %s",
got, expectedFingerprint)
}
return nil
}
}
// DialContext dials a TCP address over raw TLS (no HTTP). Returns a
// tls.Conn. Used for low-level handshake tests; the mTLS client above
// is what production code uses.
func DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr, caPath, serverName string) (net.Conn, error) {
if caPath == "" {
return nil, errors.New("DialContext: caPath is required")
}
tlsCfg, err := security.ClientTLSConfig(caPath, serverName, "", "")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DialContext: %w", err)
}
d := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
return tls.DialWithDialer(d, network, addr, tlsCfg)
}