v0.2 IDEATE stage. 29 new ideas generated (10 Tier 1 mechanical + 11
Tier 2 backend-enriched + 8 Tier 3 cross-project) plus 6 research-stage
candidates (REQ-cand-A..F from commit 08d321f) = 35 considered. Under
full autonomy, all 35 with confidence >= 0.60 are auto-accepted; 1
explicitly deferred to v0.3 (I-308 pprof). 34 accepted into v0.2.
Resulting net-new REQs (REQ-025..REQ-040) span P01-P04:
- P01 (mTLS): REQ-025 (cert rotation history), REQ-026 (CA fingerprint
pinning), REQ-032 (orca doctor), REQ-033 (file mode enforcement),
REQ-034 (rotation alarm), REQ-035 (cert show redaction), REQ-036
(SAN validation), REQ-038 (mTLS failure log fields)
- P02 (multi-node): REQ-028 (NodeCapacity HCL schema, P02 enabler),
REQ-037 (X-Orca-Idempotency-Key)
- P03 (security CI): REQ-027 (govulncheck offline mode -- changes P03
scope: CI must not call vuln.go.dev), REQ-029 (gitleaks baseline for
pre-existing .env leak), REQ-039 (.gitleaks.toml stopwords),
REQ-040 (.golangci.yml)
- P04 (iter.Seq): REQ-030 (--watch --json mode)
- Cross-cutting: REQ-031 (go test -race)
Total v0.2 REQs: 20 (4 carried from v0.1 + 16 net-new).
ARCHITECTURE.md: added `internal/doctor/` component (§5) with
orca doctor {cert,network,db} subcommands; ASCII diagram updated.
ROADMAP.md: per-phase REQ coverage matrix added; P03 scope change
documented (govulncheck offline mode).
PROJECT.md: unchanged (vision is stable).
---ci---
project: orca
phase: 0
milestone: v0.2
status: ideate
---/ci---
30 KiB
Architecture: Orca
System Overview
Orca is a single-binary, offline-first orchestration engine. The system consists
of three logical layers (CLI, Daemon, Engine) compiled into one orca binary
and selected via subcommands. v0.2 adds a cross-node transport layer (mTLS)
and a dispatcher for multi-node job execution.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ orca (single binary, v0.2) │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ CLI Layer (Cobra) │
│ ├── orca version │
│ ├── orca init # local node bootstrap │
│ ├── orca cert {init,join,renew,show} # NEW (P01) │
│ ├── orca status │
│ ├── orca node {join,leave,list} # join = mTLS handshake (P01) │
│ │ └── orca node list --watch # NEW iter.Seq (P04) │
│ ├── orca job {run,list,stop,logs} │
│ │ └── orca job list --watch # NEW iter.Seq (P04) │
│ ├── orca doctor # NEW (P01) — diagnostics │
│ │ ├── orca doctor cert │
│ │ ├── orca doctor network │
│ │ └── orca doctor db │
│ └── orca daemon │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Daemon Layer (net/http over h2c, mTLS in P01) │
│ ├── /healthz (liveness) │
│ ├── /readyz (readiness) │
│ ├── /v1/jobs/* (job control API) │
│ ├── /v1/nodes/* (node registry API) │
│ ├── /v1/tasks/* (task lifecycle API) │
│ ├── /orca.v1.Dispatch/... # NEW (P02) — cross-node dispatch │
│ └── /orca.v1.Register/... # NEW (P02) — peer join ack │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Transport Layer (NEW — internal/transport) │
│ ├── mTLS client (dialer pool per peer) │
│ ├── mTLS server config (TLS 1.3 only, AEAD allowlist) │
│ ├── Retry+backoff (exponential, jittered, capped) │
│ └── Graceful disconnect (ctx-aware Conn.Close) │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Core Engine │
│ ├── Node Registry (in-memory + SQLite persistence) │
│ ├── Task Executor (os/exec with WaitDelay, Go 1.25+) │
│ ├── Job Scheduler (single-node FIFO; bin-pack P02) │
│ ├── Dispatcher # NEW internal/engine/dispatcher.go │
│ │ ├── Local decision (does this job fit on this node?) │
│ │ ├── Remote dispatch (POST to peer via transport) │
│ │ └── Streaming callback (iter.Seq[DispatchResult] for CLI) │
│ ├── Security Manager # NEW internal/security (P01) │
│ │ ├── CA lifecycle (init, fingerprint, sign CSR) │
│ │ ├── Server cert lifecycle (issue, renew, rotate) │
│ │ ├── mTLS config builder │
│ │ └── Cert store (filesystem + SQLite metadata) │
│ └── Audit Logger (log/slog JSON handler) │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ State Store (modernc/sqlite, CGO-free) │
│ ~/.orca/orca.db │
│ ├── nodes, jobs, tasks, audit_log (v0.1) │
│ └── certs # NEW (P01) — CA + server certs │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Component Details
1. CLI Layer (cmd/orca, internal/cli)
- Framework: Cobra (industry standard, familiar to operators)
- v0.1 subcommands:
version,init,status,node,job,daemon - v0.2 additions (P01):
orca cert {init,join,renew,show} - v0.2 additions (P04):
--watchflag onorca job listandorca node list - v0.2 additions (P01):
orca doctorsubcommand (see §5 below) - Output: Human-readable by default;
--jsonflag for machine consumption - Discovery: All subcommands self-document via Cobra's auto-generated help
- Watch semantics (P04):
--watchconsumesiter.Seq[Job|Node], exits on ctrl-c (viasignal.NotifyContext), refreshes on internal change events.
2. Daemon Layer (internal/daemon)
- Server:
net/httpwithhttp.ServeMux(no external router) - TLS (P01):
crypto/tlswithMinVersion=tls.VersionTLS13and AEAD cipher allowlist (TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) - Ports: Configurable (default
:8443for API+mTLS,:8080for health) - Graceful Shutdown:
signal.NotifyContextwith SIGINT/SIGTERM - v0.2 endpoints (P02):
POST /orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit— receive cross-node job submissionPOST /orca.v1.Dispatch/Status— query dispatched job statusPOST /orca.v1.Register/Hello— peer join ack (used duringorca node join)
3. Transport Layer (internal/transport, NEW in P01/P02)
- Client:
http.Clientwithhttp.Transport.TLSClientConfigpopulated frominternal/security.NewClientTLSConfig - Server:
http.Server.TLSConfigpopulated frominternal/security.NewServerTLSConfig - Retry policy: exponential backoff with jitter (start 100ms, x2, cap 5s,
max 5 attempts); only idempotent verbs (
GET,HEAD,OPTIONS) are retried automatically;POSTretries require an explicitX-Orca-Idempotency-Keyheader - Conn lifecycle:
context.Context-aware dials and reads; gracefulCloseonctx.Done() - Peer dial pool: small
sync.MapofpeerID → *http.Clientto reuse TLS handshakes (TCP keep-alive) within a session
4. Core Engine (internal/engine)
- Node Registry: In-memory map of node IDs → metadata, persisted to SQLite (CPU/memory capacity, available slots, last-seen)
- Task Executor:
os/exec.CommandContextwithWaitDelay(Go 1.25+) for clean process termination - Job Scheduler (v0.2 P02):
- Algorithm: best-fit bin-packing by
available_cpuandavailable_memory - Within-node ordering: FIFO queue
- Cross-node: if local node is full,
Dispatcher.Submit(peer, job)is invoked; peers are tried in round-robin order - Fallback: if all peers reject, return
ErrNoFitand requeue
- Algorithm: best-fit bin-packing by
- Dispatcher (NEW, P02):
Submit(peerID, spec) (jobID, error)— blocking call with retryWatch(peerID) iter.Seq[DispatchEvent]— pull-style event stream for the CLI's--watchflag- Stateless: every call uses the latest mTLS client config and peer address
- Security Manager (NEW, P01):
InitCA(commonName) (*CA, error)— generates a self-signed CA, writesca.crt(0644) andca.key(0600) to~/.orca/Fingerprint(certPath) (sha256hex, error)— used byorca cert joinSignServerCert(csr, validity) (*cert, error)— signs a CSR with the CAIssueServerCert(nodeName, dnsNames, ips) (*cert, *key, error)— generates a keypair + CSR + signs it, returns PEM bytes fororca cert join --serverServerTLSConfig() (*tls.Config, error)— loadsserver.crt/server.keyand the CA pool from diskClientTLSConfig(caPath) (*tls.Config, error)— returns a client config pinned to the supplied CA- Rotation policy: server certs valid 90d; CA cert valid 10y. On
orca cert renew,IssueServerCertis called and the daemon gracefully reloads the in-processtls.ConfigviaGetCertificatehot-swap (no restart required)
- Audit Logger:
slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stderr, ...)with structured fields
5. Doctor (internal/doctor, NEW in P01)
- Purpose: operator-facing diagnostics; runs read-only checks against the local state and reports PASS/WARN/FAIL.
- Subcommands:
orca doctor— runs all checksorca doctor cert— cert/CA health (file modes, expiry windows, SAN presence, fingerprint pinning match — see REQ-026, REQ-033, REQ-034, REQ-036)orca doctor network— peer reachability over mTLS (per-peer handshake sanity, last-seen delta)orca doctor db— SQLite integrity check (PRAGMA integrity_check)- migration version
- Output: human-readable by default;
--jsonfor machine consumption - No state changes: doctor is strictly read-only. It can be run while the daemon is down (where possible) or while it's up.
- Initial implementation in P01 (cert checks only);
networkanddbchecks land in subsequent phases as their state becomes available.
6. State Store (internal/store)
- Driver:
modernc.org/sqlite(pure Go, CGO-free) - Location:
~/.orca/orca.db(user-mode) or/var/lib/orca/orca.db(system-mode) - Schema (v0.1):
nodes,jobs,tasks,audit_logtables - Schema (v0.2 P01): NEW
certstableCREATE TABLE certs ( id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, kind TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'ca' | 'server' node_id TEXT, -- NULL for CA serial_hex TEXT NOT NULL, -- x509.SerialNumber.Hex() subject_cn TEXT NOT NULL, issuer_cn TEXT NOT NULL, not_before INTEGER NOT NULL, -- unix seconds not_after INTEGER NOT NULL, -- unix seconds fingerprint TEXT NOT NULL, -- sha256 of DER, hex source_path TEXT NOT NULL, -- on-disk PEM path created_at INTEGER NOT NULL ); CREATE INDEX idx_certs_node_kind ON certs(node_id, kind); CREATE INDEX idx_certs_not_after ON certs(not_after); - Migrations: Embedded SQL files, applied on startup
- Migration 0004 is added in P01 with the schema above
Data Model
Node (v0.1, extended in v0.2 P02)
type Node struct {
ID string
Name string
Address string
State string
JoinedAt time.Time
LastSeen time.Time
Metadata map[string]string
// v0.2 P02 — capacity for bin-packing
Capacity NodeCapacity
}
type NodeCapacity struct {
CPUMillicores int // total, e.g. 4000 = 4 cores
MemoryBytes int64 // total RAM
CPUUsed int // currently allocated
MemoryUsed int64 // currently allocated
}
func (c NodeCapacity) AvailableCPU() int { return c.CPUMillicores - c.CPUUsed }
func (c NodeCapacity) AvailableMemory() int64 { return c.MemoryBytes - c.MemoryUsed }
Job (v0.1)
type Job struct {
ID string
Name string
Spec string
Status string
CreatedAt time.Time
StartedAt *time.Time
EndedAt *time.Time
}
Task (v0.1)
type Task struct {
ID string
JobID string
Command string
Args []string
Env []string
PID int
ExitCode int
Status string
CreatedAt time.Time
StartedAt *time.Time
EndedAt *time.Time
}
Certificate (NEW, v0.2 P01)
type Cert struct {
Kind CertKind // CertCA | CertServer
NodeID string // empty for CA
SerialHex string
SubjectCN string
IssuerCN string
NotBefore time.Time
NotAfter time.Time
Fingerprint string // sha256 of DER (hex)
SourcePath string // PEM path on disk
CreatedAt time.Time
}
v0.2 Component Graph (ASCII)
┌─────────────────┐
│ Operator Host │
│ (orca CLI) │
└────────┬────────┘
│ 1. cert join --ca-fingerprint <sha>
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ NODE A (Bootstrap / CA holder) │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ CSR ┌────────────────────┐ PEM sign ┌────────┐ │
│ │ orca cert │──────────▶│ internal/security │─────────────▶│ CA │ │
│ │ {init,join} │ │ .SignServerCert() │ │ key │ │
│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────────┘ │ 0600 │ │
│ ┌──└────────┘ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │ │
│ │ internal/daemon │ ◀──tls.Config── internal/security │ │
│ │ (http.Server) │ .ServerTLSConfig() │ │
│ │ │ │ │
│ │ /v1/jobs/* │ │ │
│ │ /v1/nodes/* │ │ │
│ │ /orca.v1.* │ │ │
│ └────────┬────────┘ │ │
│ │ Submit(job) (bin-pack) │ │
│ ▼ │ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │ │
│ │ internal/engine │ │ │
│ │ .scheduler │──── if local fits → executor │ │
│ │ .dispatcher │──── else → Submit(peer, job) ───────────┼──┐ │
│ └─────────────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ mTLS │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼──┼───────────┘
│ │
ORCA NODE NETWORK │ │
│ │
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼──┼───────────┐
│ NODE B (Peer) │ │ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ◀── TLS 1.3 handshake ─────────────────┘ │ │
│ │ internal/daemon │ │ │
│ │ (http.Server) │ POST /orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit │ │
│ │ │──── 200 + jobID │ │
│ └────────┬────────┘ │ │
│ │ │ │
│ ▼ │ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │ │
│ │ internal/engine │ │ │
│ │ .scheduler (FIFO) │ │
│ │ .executor │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ │ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
v0.2 Flows
Flow 1: Cert Issuance (CA-init → CSR → sign → install) — P01
Operator (Node A) Operator (Node B)
───────────────── ─────────────────
orca cert init
↳ InitCA("orca-ca")
↳ write ca.crt (0644), ca.key (0600)
↳ record in certs table (kind='ca')
orca cert join --ca-fingerprint <sha>
↳ operator copies ca.crt → Node B
↳ verifies fingerprint matches local
--ca-fingerprint arg
↳ IssueServerCert("node-b", SANs)
↳ generate 2048-bit RSA key
↳ build CSR with SANs
↳ read ca.crt + ca.key
↳ sign CSR (90d validity)
↳ write server.crt (0644),
server.key (0600)
↳ record in certs table
(kind='server', node_id='node-b')
Flow 2: mTLS Handshake at node join — P01
Node B (joiner) Node A (CA holder)
──────────────── ─────────────────
orca node join --name node-b
--ca-fingerprint <sha>
--peer node-a:8443
↳ load ca.crt → verify sha256 == --ca-fingerprint
↳ load server.crt + server.key
↳ tls.Config{MinVersion: TLS1.3, ...}
↳ ClientHello (SNI=node-a)
◀── ServerHello (TLS 1.3)
◀── Certificate (Node A's cert)
↳ verify Node A's cert chains to ca.crt ◀── CertificateRequest
↳ send Certificate (Node B's cert) ◀── Finished
↳ Finished
↳ GET /healthz (over mTLS) — sanity check
↳ POST /v1/nodes (over mTLS) — register
↳ insert into nodes table
↳ audit log
↳ 200 OK
↳ record node_a in peers table
↳ audit log
Flow 3: Job Dispatch (CLI → dispatcher → peer) — P02
User (Node A CLI) Node A (scheduler) Node B (peer)
────────────────── ─────────────────── ─────────────
orca job run spec.hcl
↳ parse HCL
↳ POST /v1/jobs (mTLS, local)
↳ scheduler.Submit(spec)
↳ bin-pack: spec.cpu + spec.mem
↳ local node A has 2000mc + 4GiB free → fit!
↳ executor.Run(spec)
↳ 202 Accepted + jobID
↳ returns jobID
User (Node A CLI) Node A (scheduler) Node B (peer)
────────────────── ─────────────────── ─────────────
↳ scheduler.Submit(spec)
↳ bin-pack: spec.cpu + spec.mem
↳ local node A has 0 free → NO FIT
↳ dispatcher.Submit(peer="node-b", spec)
↳ load transport.Client("node-b")
↳ POST /orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit
↳ mTLS handshake
↳ authenticate cert
↳ scheduler.Submit(spec)
↳ executor.Run(spec)
↳ 200 OK + jobID
↳ 200 OK + jobID
↳ return jobID to local caller
↳ returns jobID
Flow 4: iter.Seq Streaming (--watch) — P04
User orca job list --watch
──── ─────────────────────
ctx, cancel := signal.NotifyContext(ctx, os.Interrupt)
defer cancel()
seq := store.Jobs().Watch(ctx)
for job := range seq {
print(job) // human or --json
}
// ctrl-c → ctx.Done() → seq stops yielding
Internally store.Jobs().Watch(ctx) iter.Seq[Job] polls the
jobs table on a 1s ticker (or subscribes to an in-process
notifier channel) and yields the current snapshot of each job
until ctx.Done(). The store repo implements iter.Seq[Job]
as a function that takes a yield func(Job) bool callback.
Security Architecture
Authentication
- v0.1: mTLS for all API endpoints (self-signed CA)
- v0.2 P01: Internal CA with CSR join (see Flow 1 + 2)
- v0.2+: Token-based auth deferred to v0.3+
Cert Rotation
- Server certs: 90-day validity, rotate at 60 days (30d before expiry)
- CA cert: 10-year validity, manual rotation
- Hot-swap:
tls.Config.GetCertificatecallback re-reads theserver.crt/server.keyfiles on each handshake soorca cert renewtakes effect without a daemon restart.
Audit Logging
- All state-changing operations emit structured log records
- Fields:
timestamp,actor,action,resource,result,error - Stored in SQLite
audit_logtable and stderr (JSON) - v0.2 P01 additions:
cert.issued,cert.renewed,cert.joined,node.handshake_ok,node.handshake_failed
Input Validation
- All CLI inputs validated via Cobra's
Args/ValidArgsfunctions - All API inputs validated at handler boundary
- HCL/YAML specs parsed with strict schemas
Key Architectural Decisions (v0.1 + v0.2)
| ID | Decision | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| AD-001 | Single binary with subcommands | Simpler distribution, aligns with simplicity pillar |
| AD-002 | modernc/sqlite (CGO-free) | Cross-compile friendly, no CGO toolchain needed |
| AD-003 | net/http (no framework) | Stdlib suffices; avoids external router dependency |
| AD-004 | os/exec with WaitDelay (Go 1.25+) | Clean process termination, native to Go |
| AD-005 | Cobra for CLI | Industry standard, familiar to operators |
| AD-006 | slog for logging | Native to Go 1.21+, no external dependency |
| AD-007 | HCL for job specs | Familiar to Nomad/HashiCorp users |
| AD-008 | Single-node scheduling (v0.1) | Multi-node scheduling deferred to v0.2+ |
| AD-009 | Internal CA, no external PKI (v0.2) | Self-contained, no operational PKI requirement |
| AD-010 | Roll-our-own CA in crypto/x509 (v0.2) |
step-ca/cfssl/vault-pki too heavyweight for Orca's footprint |
| AD-011 | Operator-mediated CA cert distribution (v0.2) | No secret distribution over the wire; matches offline-first |
| AD-012 | TLS 1.3 only, AEAD allowlist (v0.2) | Modern crypto only; no downgrade risk |
| AD-013 | Eager mTLS at node join (v0.2) |
Fail fast; don't defer handshake to first request |
| AD-014 | orca.v1.Dispatch via stdlib h2c (v0.2) |
ConnectRPC not in go.mod; stdlib suffices for a single-RPC service |
| AD-015 | Best-fit bin-packing (v0.2) | Simple, deterministic, optimal for small fleets |
| AD-016 | iter.Seq for streaming lists (v0.2) | Go 1.25+ native, context-aware, pull semantics |
Anti-Patterns (Explicitly Avoided)
- No controller/agent split (single binary)
- No CRDs / custom resource definitions
- No web UI (CLI-only)
- No service mesh
- No container runtime integration
- No multi-tenancy
- No cloud provider integrations
- No auto-scaling
- No admission controllers
- No complex scheduling algorithms (best-fit only)
- No gRPC framework dependency (stdlib net/http with h2c, Go 1.25+ native)
- No external PKI / no cert transparency logs (offline-first)
Dependency Map (minimal — v0.2 adds zero direct deps)
github.com/spf13/cobra # CLI framework
github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2 # HCL parser
modernc.org/sqlite # SQLite (pure Go)
github.com/google/uuid # UUID generation
Total: ~4 direct dependencies. No web framework, no ORM, no RPC framework,
no PKI library. mTLS via crypto/tls and crypto/x509 (stdlib).
ConnectRPC note:
.ciagent/config.jsonlistsconnectrpcinframeworks, but the actualgo.moddoes not depend onconnectrpc.com/connect. v0.2 falls back to plainnet/httpwith HTTP/2 cleartext (h2c) fororca.v1.Dispatch. The protocol is a simple JSON-over-HTTP POST: client sends{"spec": "..."}to/orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit; server replies{"job_id": "..."}. This keeps the zero-new-dep promise and the codebase coherent with the rest of the daemon'shttp.ServeMux.
Deployment Model (v0.2)
Operator Machine Node A (CA holder) Node B (Peer)
──────────────── ───────────────── ─────────────
orca CLI orca daemon orca daemon
│ │ ▲ │ ▲
│ mTLS handshake │ │ mTLS │ │
│ at `node join` ────────────┼──┘ │ │
│ │ │ │
│ submit job ───POST────────▶│ POST (cross-node) ──────────▶│
│ │ mTLS only │ │
│ │ │ │
│ ◀───────jobID──────────────│ ◀─────jobID (200 OK)─────────│
│ │ │
│ orca job list --watch │ │
│ (iter.Seq stream) ◀────────│── polls local + stream events│
For v0.2, one node must be the CA holder (orca cert init was run
on it). The CA holder's ca.crt is copied to each peer manually by
the operator; peers do not auto-fetch it.