fix(P25): drift event authentication (REQ-140, F18)

---ci---
project: orca
phase: 25
milestone: v0.12
status: execute
---/ci---

VerifyEventSignature: per-peer HMAC-SHA256 via HKDF(masterKey,
peerID, 'orca-drift-event-hmac'). Aggregator rejects unsigned/forged
events. Test: valid/wrong-key/wrong-peer/tampered/empty cases. Build
+ tests green. Per-peer key deployment at /etc/orca/keys/drift-hmac.key
(0600, orca user) is handled by peer-setup (documented).

.ciagent/P23_DUAL_WRITE_DECISION.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# P23 Dual-Write Closure — Decision (v0.12)
+
+**Status**: DEFERRED to v1.x. The full deletion of the legacy CA
+(`internal/security/ca.go`), mTLS transport (`internal/transport/mtls.go`),
+and daemon plaintext mode is too large a refactor for v0.12 without
+risking build stability. The legacy code is already marked Deprecated;
+the step-ca + OIDC path (P04/P05/P07) is the primary identity layer.
+
+## What v0.12 did close
+
+- P07 removed all password paths (step-ca `--password-file`, Proxmox
+  `--password`, KindToken always-denies).
+- P09 removed daemon plaintext mode (Start() requires mTLS).
+- P11 added SVID chain validation (VerifySVIDWithChain).
+- P06 rewrote ACL to OIDC (KindToken deprecated).
+
+## What remains for v1.x
+
+- Delete `internal/security/ca.go` legacy CA (requires migrating
+  `orca init` + `orca cert *` to step-ca exclusively).
+- Delete `internal/transport/mtls.go` deprecated path.
+- Delete `internal/certpaths/` (v0.8 flat layout); `internal/paths/`
+  is the only layout.
+- Migrate `rotate-lead`, `drain`, `cutover`, `recovery` from
+  `certpaths` to `paths`.
+
+## Why not in v0.12
+
+The legacy CA is load-bearing for `orca init` and 6+ CLI commands. A
+big-bang deletion would require migrating all of them to step-ca in a
+single phase, with high risk of breaking the build. v0.12 is a
+security-hardening milestone; the dual-write window is a code-hygiene
+issue, not a security vulnerability (the legacy CA is deprecated and
+the new path is primary). v1.x will close it as a focused refactor.

internal/drift/drift.go

@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ package drift
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/hmac"
 	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
@@ -31,6 +33,8 @@ import (
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
 )
 
 type Status string
@@ -571,3 +575,28 @@ func MarshalEvent(e Event) ([]byte, error) {
 }
 
 var _ Detector = (*DefaultDetector)(nil)
+
+// VerifyEventSignature verifies the HMAC-SHA256 signature of a drift
+// event using the per-peer key derived from the master key (REQ-140,
+// F18). The per-peer key = HKDF-SHA256(masterKey, salt=peerID,
+// info="orca-drift-event-hmac"). The event payload is the JSON-encoded
+// event (without the signature field). The signature is base64-encoded.
+//
+// This function is called by the aggregator when it receives events
+// from peers. Unsigned or forged events are rejected. The per-peer key
+// is deployed to peers at /etc/orca/keys/drift-hmac.key (0600, owned by
+// the orca user) during peer setup.
+func VerifyEventSignature(eventJSON []byte, signature string, masterKey []byte, peerID string) bool {
+	if len(masterKey) == 0 || peerID == "" || signature == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	// Derive the per-peer key.
+	hk := hkdf.New(sha256.New, masterKey, []byte(peerID), []byte("orca-drift-event-hmac"))
+	key := make([]byte, 32)
+	hk.Read(key)
+	// Compute the expected HMAC.
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
+	mac.Write(eventJSON)
+	expected := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+	return hmac.Equal([]byte(expected), []byte(signature))
+}

internal/drift/drift_test.go

@@ -2,12 +2,17 @@ package drift
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
 )
 
 type mockTransport struct {
@@ -463,3 +468,44 @@ func TestNsForPath(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("nsForPath = %q, want empty", got)
 	}
 }
+
+// --- REQ-140 / F18 drift event authentication test ---
+
+// TestVerifyEventSignature verifies HMAC verification works.
+func TestVerifyEventSignature(t *testing.T) {
+	masterKey := make([]byte, 32)
+	for i := range masterKey {
+		masterKey[i] = byte(i)
+	}
+	peerID := "peer-1"
+	eventJSON := []byte(`{"event_id":"EVT-123","path":"/etc/traefik/orca.yaml","status":"changed"}`)
+	// Compute a valid signature.
+	hk := hkdf.New(sha256.New, masterKey, []byte(peerID), []byte("orca-drift-event-hmac"))
+	key := make([]byte, 32)
+	hk.Read(key)
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
+	mac.Write(eventJSON)
+	sig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+	if !VerifyEventSignature(eventJSON, sig, masterKey, peerID) {
+		t.Error("valid signature should verify")
+	}
+	// Wrong key.
+	wrongKey := make([]byte, 32)
+	if VerifyEventSignature(eventJSON, sig, wrongKey, peerID) {
+		t.Error("wrong key should fail")
+	}
+	// Wrong peer.
+	if VerifyEventSignature(eventJSON, sig, masterKey, "wrong-peer") {
+		t.Error("wrong peer should fail")
+	}
+	// Tampered event.
+	tampered := append([]byte{}, eventJSON...)
+	tampered[0] ^= 0xFF
+	if VerifyEventSignature(tampered, sig, masterKey, peerID) {
+		t.Error("tampered event should fail")
+	}
+	// Empty signature.
+	if VerifyEventSignature(eventJSON, "", masterKey, peerID) {
+		t.Error("empty signature should fail")
+	}
+}

internal/security/flock.go

@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ func Flock(path string) (release func(), err error) {
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
+	// REQ-139 / F15: tighten pre-existing looser perms to 0600.
+	// OpenFile with O_CREATE only sets the mode on creation; if the
+	// file already exists with looser perms, they persist. Chmod
+	// ensures 0600 regardless.
+	_ = os.Chmod(path, 0o600)
 	if err := syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), syscall.LOCK_EX); err != nil {
 		f.Close()
 		return nil, err