 Jon Chery
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5232fcb808
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fix(P04): wire ACL enforcement + WebAuthn reg auth + audit actor (REQ-153)
R-023: Zero-trust enforcement operationally wired.
ACL enforcement (C-45 staged rollout):
- acl.Check wired into all 5 daemon handlers (dispatch/jobs/nodes/tasks)
- health endpoints exempt (liveness probes not gated)
- ACL log-only mode default (config acl.enforce=false); enforce after
bootstrap ACL verified
- sshpush auth: ORCA_OIDC_TOKEN validated against JWKS before apply
- txn apply: Authorize hook validates OIDC token before running pull
- acl.json mode 0600 (was 0644)
- flock on acl.json for concurrent grant/revoke
- bootstrap ACL: init grants cluster-admin to orca-admins group + SVID
Audit actor identity:
- currentActor reads OIDC sub from credentials.json (was hardcoded "cli")
- threaded through all audit.Record calls via context
WebAuthn registration auth:
- BeginRegistration/FinishRegistration require authenticated session
- fail-closed 401 when no authFunc configured
New files: internal/daemon/acl.go, internal/cli/authactor.go,
internal/engine/actor.go, internal/identity/authtoken.go,
internal/sshpush/auth.go, internal/txn/auth_test.go
---ci---
project: orca
phase: 4
milestone: v0.13
status: complete
requirements:
covered: [153]
---/ci---
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2026-08-07 20:33:39 +00:00 |
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Jon Chery
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5a43cb8538
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test(P26): security integration test suite (REQ-141, C-33)
---ci---
project: orca
phase: 26
milestone: v0.12
status: execute
---/ci---
tests/security_integration_test.go: umbrella test documenting the
security invariant coverage across packages (R-021, F1-F25). The
individual invariants are tested in their respective packages:
injection (runtime), traversal (ns/cli), symlink (backup),
tamper-evidence (store), ACL deny (acl), SVID chain (identity),
master key seal (seal), drift auth (drift), password rejection (cli).
This gate ensures the suite is wired (C-33). Build + test green.
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2026-08-07 11:33:39 +00:00 |
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