docs(P00): clarify v0.2 ambiguities (8 decisions, full autonomy)

v0.2 CLARIFY stage. Resolves 8 ambiguities introduced by the deferred
v0.2 scope (mTLS, scheduling, scanning, streaming). All decisions taken
under full autonomy (config.json autonomy.level: full) at confidence
>= 0.85, which is above the decision_confidence_threshold of 0.60.

- D-011: Internal CA with CSR join (vs. self-signed per-node or SPIFFE).
- D-012: Operator-mediated CA cert distribution with fingerprint verify
  (no automated secret distribution — matches offline-first principle).
- D-013: 90d server certs, 10y CA cert, 30d pre-expiry rotation.
- D-014: Eager mTLS handshake at  time.
- D-015: TLS 1.3 minimum, AEAD cipher allowlist (no TLS 1.2 fallback).
- D-016: gosec+govulncheck in  pipeline of .coreci.yml;
  gitleaks in pre-commit hook (opt-in).
- D-017: iter.Seq for  and .
- D-018: Bin-packing by CPU/memory with FIFO within node; ConnectRPC
  orca.v1.Dispatch for cross-node.

RESEARCH and IDEATE follow.

---ci---
project: orca
phase: 0
milestone: v0.2
status: clarify
---/ci---
This commit is contained in:
ciagent
2026-06-03 20:52:42 +00:00
parent 907f25e20d
commit b48f5cfde6
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@@ -35,6 +35,14 @@ Build a lightweight system to manage and execute workloads across a set of nodes
| D-008 | Container runtime? | **Direct process execution (no container runtime) for v0.1** | Avoids the Docker/container dependency. Pure process management. | 0.85 |
| D-009 | Configuration file location? | **`~/.orca/config.hcl` and `/etc/orca/orca.hcl`** | Standard XDG-style paths. | 0.90 |
| D-010 | Logging format? | **Structured JSON via `log/slog`** | Native Go 1.21+ slog, no external dependency. | 0.95 |
| D-011 | v0.2 mTLS cert authority model? | **Internal CA with CSR join** | One node bootstraps a local CA; peers generate CSRs and submit them to the CA for signing. CA cert is the trust anchor. More secure than self-signed per-node (single trust root) without the operational complexity of an external PKI. | 0.92 |
| D-012 | v0.2 CA bootstrap & cert distribution? | **Operator-mediated, fingerprint-verified** | Bootstrap node writes `~/.orca/ca.crt` and `~/.orca/ca.key` (mode 0600). Operator copies `ca.crt` to peers; peers verify by SHA-256 fingerprint at `orca node join --ca-fingerprint <sha256>`. No automated secret distribution. | 0.85 |
| D-013 | v0.2 cert validity & rotation? | **Server certs 90 days, CA cert 10 years, rotate 30 days before expiry** | Server certs are short-lived (compromise window small); CA is long-lived (manual rotation is expensive). `orca cert renew` reissues server certs automatically. | 0.90 |
| D-014 | v0.2 mTLS handshake timing? | **Eager — at `orca node join` time** | Fail fast on bad certs, misconfigurations, or CA mismatches. Lazy handshake would let stale configs run until first request, complicating debugging. | 0.88 |
| D-015 | v0.2 minimum TLS version & cipher suites? | **TLS 1.3 only; AEAD cipher allowlist** | MinVersion=tls.VersionTLS13, CipherSuites limited to TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. No TLS 1.2 fallback. | 0.92 |
| D-016 | v0.2 security-scanning placement? | **`validate` pipeline of `.coreci.yml`, gates merges to main** | `gosec` baseline JSON checked into repo; new findings fail the build. `govulncheck ./...` exit-on-known. Pre-commit hook with `gitleaks` is opt-in (developer machine). | 0.85 |
| D-017 | v0.2 `iter.Seq` API surface? | **`orca job list --watch` and `orca node list --watch`** | Pull-based `iter.Seq[Job]` / `iter.Seq[Node]`; cancellation via `context.Context`; `signal.NotifyContext` on ctrl-c. Backpressure is implicit (consumer-driven). | 0.90 |
| D-018 | v0.2 multi-node scheduling algorithm? | **Bin-packing by available CPU/memory, FIFO within a node** | Simple, deterministic, matches D-004 minimalism. Cross-node dispatch via ConnectRPC `orca.v1.Dispatch` service. Retry on transient failures with exponential backoff. | 0.85 |
## Out of Scope
- Full-blown Kubernetes-compatible API.