fix(P10): audit log tamper-evidence (REQ-125, F2)

---ci---
project: orca
phase: 10
milestone: v0.12
status: execute
---/ci---

Migration 0008: add prev_hash + entry_hash columns + append-only
triggers (UPDATE/DELETE blocked with ABORT).
audit_repo.go: Append computes hash chain (sha256(prev_hash ||
timestamp || actor || action || resource || result || error ||
metadata)). VerifyChain recomputes from first entry, detects
tampering.
2 new tests: VerifyChain (5-entry chain verifies), TamperDetection
(UPDATE + DELETE blocked by trigger). All store tests pass.

internal/store/audit_repo.go

@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ package store
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
 	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"time"
@@ -27,6 +29,45 @@ func NewAuditRepo(db *sql.DB) *AuditRepo {
 	return &AuditRepo{db: db}
 }
 
+// computeEntryHash computes sha256(prev_hash || timestamp || actor ||
+// action || resource || result || error || metadata) for the hash
+// chain (REQ-125, F2). The prev_hash is the entry_hash of the most
+// recent prior entry (empty string for the first entry).
+func computeEntryHash(prevHash, timestamp, actor, action, resource, result, errMsg, metaJSON string) string {
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write([]byte(prevHash))
+	h.Write([]byte{0})
+	h.Write([]byte(timestamp))
+	h.Write([]byte{0})
+	h.Write([]byte(actor))
+	h.Write([]byte{0})
+	h.Write([]byte(action))
+	h.Write([]byte{0})
+	h.Write([]byte(resource))
+	h.Write([]byte{0})
+	h.Write([]byte(result))
+	h.Write([]byte{0})
+	h.Write([]byte(errMsg))
+	h.Write([]byte{0})
+	h.Write([]byte(metaJSON))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+// getLastEntryHash returns the entry_hash of the most recent audit_log
+// entry, or "" if the table is empty.
+func (r *AuditRepo) getLastEntryHash(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
+	var prevHash string
+	err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT entry_hash FROM audit_log ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1`).Scan(&prevHash)
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("get last entry hash: %w", err)
+	}
+	return prevHash, nil
+}
+
 func (r *AuditRepo) Append(ctx context.Context, e *AuditEntry) error {
 	if e.Timestamp.IsZero() {
 		e.Timestamp = time.Now().UTC()
@@ -35,24 +76,65 @@ func (r *AuditRepo) Append(ctx context.Context, e *AuditEntry) error {
 		e.Actor = "system"
 	}
 	metaJSON, _ := json.Marshal(e.Metadata)
-	if e.Error == "" {
+	tsStr := e.Timestamp.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
-		_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+
-			`INSERT INTO audit_log (timestamp, actor, action, resource, result, metadata) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+	// Compute the hash chain (REQ-125, F2).
-			e.Timestamp, e.Actor, e.Action, e.Resource, e.Result, string(metaJSON))
+	prevHash, err := r.getLastEntryHash(ctx)
-		if err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("insert audit: %w", err)
-		}
-		return nil
-	}
-	_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`INSERT INTO audit_log (timestamp, actor, action, resource, result, error, metadata) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
-		e.Timestamp, e.Actor, e.Action, e.Resource, e.Result, e.Error, string(metaJSON))
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("insert audit (with error): %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("audit hash chain: %w", err)
+	}
+	entryHash := computeEntryHash(prevHash, tsStr, e.Actor, e.Action, e.Resource, e.Result, e.Error, string(metaJSON))
+
+	_, err = r.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO audit_log (timestamp, actor, action, resource, result, error, metadata, prev_hash, entry_hash) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+		e.Timestamp, e.Actor, e.Action, e.Resource, e.Result, e.Error, string(metaJSON), prevHash, entryHash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("insert audit: %w", err)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
+// VerifyChain recomputes the hash chain from the first entry and
+// returns an error if any entry's entry_hash does not match. Used by
+// `orca doctor audit` (REQ-125).
+func (r *AuditRepo) VerifyChain(ctx context.Context) error {
+	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT id, timestamp, actor, action, resource, result, COALESCE(error, ''), COALESCE(metadata, ''), prev_hash, entry_hash FROM audit_log ORDER BY id ASC`)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("verify chain: query: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	prevHash := ""
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var (
+			id         int64
+			ts         time.Time
+			actor      string
+			action     string
+			resource   string
+			result     string
+			errMsg     string
+			metaJSON   string
+			storedPrev string
+			storedHash string
+		)
+		if err := rows.Scan(&id, &ts, &actor, &action, &resource, &result, &errMsg, &metaJSON, &storedPrev, &storedHash); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("verify chain: scan: %w", err)
+		}
+		// Verify the prev_hash link.
+		if storedPrev != prevHash {
+			return fmt.Errorf("verify chain: entry %d prev_hash mismatch (expected %q, got %q)", id, prevHash, storedPrev)
+		}
+		// Recompute the entry hash.
+		expected := computeEntryHash(prevHash, ts.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), actor, action, resource, result, errMsg, metaJSON)
+		if expected != storedHash {
+			return fmt.Errorf("verify chain: entry %d hash mismatch (entry may have been tampered)", id)
+		}
+		prevHash = storedHash
+	}
+	return rows.Err()
+}
+
 func (r *AuditRepo) List(ctx context.Context, limit int) ([]*AuditEntry, error) {
 	if limit <= 0 {
 		limit = 100

internal/store/audit_repo_test.go

@@ -149,3 +149,56 @@ func TestAuditRepo_ListDefaultLimit(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("List(-1): got %d, want 5", len(entries))
 	}
 }
+
+// --- REQ-125 / F2 audit tamper-evidence tests ---
+
+// TestAuditRepo_VerifyChain verifies the hash chain verifies after append.
+func TestAuditRepo_VerifyChain(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openAuditTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
+		if err := repo.Append(ctx, &AuditEntry{
+			Action:   "test.action",
+			Resource: "res",
+			Result:   "success",
+			Actor:    "user",
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Append %d: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := repo.VerifyChain(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("VerifyChain: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuditRepo_TamperDetection verifies VerifyChain detects a modified
+// entry. We use raw SQL to UPDATE (which the trigger should block).
+func TestAuditRepo_TamperDetection(t *testing.T) {
+	repo, cleanup := openAuditTestDB(t)
+	defer cleanup()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if err := repo.Append(ctx, &AuditEntry{
+		Action: "cert.issued", Resource: "node1", Result: "success", Actor: "system",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Append: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Verify chain is intact.
+	if err := repo.VerifyChain(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("VerifyChain before tamper: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Attempt UPDATE — the trigger should block it.
+	_, err := repo.db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE audit_log SET actor='hacker' WHERE id=1`)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("UPDATE should be blocked by append-only trigger (REQ-125)")
+	}
+	// Attempt DELETE — also blocked.
+	_, err = repo.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE id=1`)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("DELETE should be blocked by append-only trigger (REQ-125)")
+	}
+	// Chain still verifies (nothing was modified).
+	if err := repo.VerifyChain(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("VerifyChain after blocked tamper: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/store/migrate_test.go

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ func TestMigrationVersion(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("migration version: %v", err)
 	}
-	if version != "0007_certs_serial_unique.sql" {
+	if version != "0008_audit_tamper_evidence.sql" {
-		t.Errorf("MigrationVersion = %q, want 0007_certs_serial_unique.sql", version)
+		t.Errorf("MigrationVersion = %q, want 0008_audit_tamper_evidence.sql", version)
 	}
 
 	// Empty the migrations table → should return ("", nil).

internal/store/migrations/0008_audit_tamper_evidence.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-- REQ-125 / F2: audit log tamper-evidence.
+-- Add hash-chain columns + append-only trigger blocking UPDATE/DELETE.
+ALTER TABLE audit_log ADD COLUMN prev_hash TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE audit_log ADD COLUMN entry_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '';
+
+-- Append-only trigger: block UPDATE and DELETE on audit_log.
+-- A tampered entry (UPDATE) or deleted entry (DELETE) is rejected.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS audit_log_no_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_log
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'audit_log is append-only (REQ-125)');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS audit_log_no_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON audit_log
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'audit_log is append-only (REQ-125)');
+END;