docs(P00): research findings
v0.2 RESEARCH stage. Synthesizes the 4-phase v0.2 scope (P01-P04) into updated static docs. No code changes. Decisions are derived from CLARIFY D-011..D-018 (already on main) and direct investigation of go.mod, the codebase, and ecosystem docs (Go 1.25+ iter.Seq, govulncheck, gosec, gitleaks, step-ca). Key research conclusions logged here: - ConnectRPC is NOT in go.mod (.ciagent/config.json lists it in frameworks but the dependency was never added). v0.2 falls back to stdlib net/http with h2c for the orca.v1.Dispatch service. Zero new direct deps. (ARCHITECTURE.md AD-014) - Roll-our-own CA via crypto/x509 (not step-ca/cfssl/vault-pki) keeps the binary single, dependency-free, and aligned with offline-first (no external PKI network calls). (ARCHITECTURE.md AD-010) - govulncheck default mode requires network access to vuln.go.dev. CI step must use -format json (always exits 0) + a wrapper that gates on findings via jq/cat, OR pre-mirror the database. Caller to decide in PLAN. Logged as REQ candidate for IDEATE. - gosec exit codes: 0 clean, 1 unsuppressed finding. -no-fail always returns 0. Baseline JSON via -track-suppressions + exclude=. We adopt -no-fail on initial run, baseline suppressed findings, then tighten to fail-on-finding once baseline is empty. - gitleaks default config covers most cases; we extend .gitleaks.toml with stopwords for our test data paths and CA cert PEM (which would otherwise trigger the generic-api-key rule). - iter.Seq: yield func(V) bool, iter.Pull for pull-style, range over function types since Go 1.25. Cancellation flows through ctx (consumer-driven backpressure). Single-use vs multi-use semantics documented in Go spec; we use multi-use for repo.Watch() since callers can re-iterate. - mTLS hot-swap via tls.Config.GetCertificate callback enables cert rotation without daemon restart. tls.Config is read on every handshake; reload picks up new server.crt/server.key. ARCHITECTURE.md changes: - Added Transport Layer (internal/transport) and Dispatcher (internal/engine/dispatcher.go) components. - Added Security Manager (internal/security) component with full cert lifecycle API. - Added certs table schema (migration 0004) and Cert Go struct. - Extended Node with NodeCapacity (CPU/memory) for bin-packing. - Added v0.2 Component Graph ASCII diagram. - Added 4 named flows: cert issuance, mTLS handshake, job dispatch, iter.Seq streaming. - Added 8 new AD-009..AD-016 decisions and AD-014 notes the ConnectRPC-not-in-go.mod reality. PERSONAS.md changes: - Added network-engineer (custom, NEW in v0.2) for transport/dispatcher. - security-engineer marked phase_specific: [P01, P02] (off after P02). - network-engineer marked phase_specific: [P02]. - cli-engineer marked phase_specific: [P04] (--watch is a CLI concern). - data-engineer.territory extended to include internal/store/migrations/0004_certs.sql. - security-engineer.territory extended to TLS-config portion of internal/transport. - Frontmatter updated: active_personas, phase_specific, reason. PROJECT.md changes: - Moved "Multi-node scheduling" out of "Out of Scope" (it ships in P02). - Added "External PKI / Let's Encrypt / cert transparency logs" to Out of Scope (per D-011). - Added "gRPC framework dependency" to Out of Scope (per AD-014). - Added v0.2 Scope Summary section (4 phases) with cross-refs to ARCHITECTURE.md flows. REQ candidates surfaced for IDEATE stage (not added to REQUIREMENTS.md in this commit — that's the IDEATE stage's job): - REQ-cand-A: Bounded cert rotation history (retain last N=3 server certs per node for rollback; documented in ARCHITECTURE.md certs table as "retention" implication of the schema). - REQ-cand-B: Trusted-CA fingerprint pinning (D-012 requires operator to pass --ca-fingerprint at join; the daemon should refuse to start if the on-disk CA's fingerprint doesn't match a config-pinned value, to protect against operator typos). - REQ-cand-C: govulncheck offline mode (CI must not call vuln.go.dev by default; either pre-mirror the DB or set GOVULNCHECK_DB env to a local file). - REQ-cand-D: HCL/YAML schema for NodeCapacity declaration (where does the operator declare a node's CPU/RAM? Current v0.1 Node model has no capacity field. P02 will add this — needs a config file surface, e.g. ~/.orca/node.hcl or flag on `orca node join`). - REQ-cand-E: gitleaks baseline for pre-existing secrets in history (the v0.1 .env leak was rotated forward but git history still has a SHA-1 leak — gitleaks/git filter-repo remediation may need a baseline file to avoid the same class of false positive recurring). - REQ-cand-F: --watch output format mode (iter.Seq stream is table-style by default; users may want --watch --json one-line-per- event for piping). P04 scope decision; log for IDEATE. ---ci--- project: orca phase: 0 milestone: v0.2 status: research ---/ci---
This commit is contained in:
Jon Chery
+385
-54
@@ -2,66 +2,168 @@
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## System Overview
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Orca is a single-binary, offline-first orchestration engine. The system consists of three logical components, all compiled into one `orca` binary and selected via subcommands.
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Orca is a single-binary, offline-first orchestration engine. The system consists
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of three logical layers (CLI, Daemon, Engine) compiled into one `orca` binary
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and selected via subcommands. v0.2 adds a **cross-node transport layer** (mTLS)
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and a **dispatcher** for multi-node job execution.
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```
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ orca (single binary) │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ CLI Layer (Cobra) │
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│ ├── orca version │
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│ ├── orca init │
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│ ├── orca status │
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│ ├── orca node {join,leave,list} │
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│ └── orca job {run,list,stop,logs} │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ Daemon Layer (net/http server) │
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│ ├── /healthz (liveness) │
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│ ├── /readyz (readiness) │
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│ ├── /v1/jobs/* (job control API) │
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│ ├── /v1/nodes/* (node registry API) │
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│ └── /v1/tasks/* (task lifecycle API) │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ Core Engine │
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│ ├── Node Registry (in-memory + SQLite persistence) │
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│ ├── Task Executor (os/exec with WaitDelay, Go 1.25+) │
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│ ├── Job Scheduler (single-node for v0.1) │
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│ └── Audit Logger (log/slog JSON handler) │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ State Store (modernc/sqlite, CGO-free) │
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│ ~/.orca/orca.db │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ orca (single binary, v0.2) │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ CLI Layer (Cobra) │
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│ ├── orca version │
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│ ├── orca init # local node bootstrap │
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│ ├── orca cert {init,join,renew,show} # NEW (P01) │
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│ ├── orca status │
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│ ├── orca node {join,leave,list} # join = mTLS handshake (P01) │
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│ │ └── orca node list --watch # NEW iter.Seq (P04) │
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│ ├── orca job {run,list,stop,logs} │
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│ │ └── orca job list --watch # NEW iter.Seq (P04) │
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│ └── orca daemon │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ Daemon Layer (net/http over h2c, mTLS in P01) │
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│ ├── /healthz (liveness) │
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│ ├── /readyz (readiness) │
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│ ├── /v1/jobs/* (job control API) │
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│ ├── /v1/nodes/* (node registry API) │
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│ ├── /v1/tasks/* (task lifecycle API) │
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│ ├── /orca.v1.Dispatch/... # NEW (P02) — cross-node dispatch │
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│ └── /orca.v1.Register/... # NEW (P02) — peer join ack │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ Transport Layer (NEW — internal/transport) │
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│ ├── mTLS client (dialer pool per peer) │
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│ ├── mTLS server config (TLS 1.3 only, AEAD allowlist) │
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│ ├── Retry+backoff (exponential, jittered, capped) │
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│ └── Graceful disconnect (ctx-aware Conn.Close) │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ Core Engine │
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│ ├── Node Registry (in-memory + SQLite persistence) │
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│ ├── Task Executor (os/exec with WaitDelay, Go 1.25+) │
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│ ├── Job Scheduler (single-node FIFO; bin-pack P02) │
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│ ├── Dispatcher # NEW internal/engine/dispatcher.go │
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│ │ ├── Local decision (does this job fit on this node?) │
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│ │ ├── Remote dispatch (POST to peer via transport) │
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│ │ └── Streaming callback (iter.Seq[DispatchResult] for CLI) │
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│ ├── Security Manager # NEW internal/security (P01) │
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│ │ ├── CA lifecycle (init, fingerprint, sign CSR) │
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│ │ ├── Server cert lifecycle (issue, renew, rotate) │
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│ │ ├── mTLS config builder │
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│ │ └── Cert store (filesystem + SQLite metadata) │
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│ └── Audit Logger (log/slog JSON handler) │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ State Store (modernc/sqlite, CGO-free) │
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│ ~/.orca/orca.db │
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│ ├── nodes, jobs, tasks, audit_log (v0.1) │
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│ └── certs # NEW (P01) — CA + server certs │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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```
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## Component Details
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### 1. CLI Layer (`cmd/orca`, `internal/cli`)
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- **Framework**: Cobra (industry standard, familiar to operators)
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- **Subcommands**: `version`, `init`, `status`, `node`, `job`
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- **v0.1 subcommands**: `version`, `init`, `status`, `node`, `job`, `daemon`
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- **v0.2 additions (P01)**: `orca cert {init,join,renew,show}`
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- **v0.2 additions (P04)**: `--watch` flag on `orca job list` and `orca node list`
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- **Output**: Human-readable by default; `--json` flag for machine consumption
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- **Discovery**: All subcommands self-document via Cobra's auto-generated help
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- **Watch semantics (P04)**: `--watch` consumes `iter.Seq[Job|Node]`, exits on
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ctrl-c (via `signal.NotifyContext`), refreshes on internal change events.
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### 2. Daemon Layer (`internal/daemon`)
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- **Server**: `net/http` with `http.ServeMux` (no external router for v0.1)
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- **TLS**: `crypto/tls` with self-signed certs (mTLS-ready)
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- **Ports**: Configurable (default `:8443` for API, `:8080` for health)
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- **Graceful Shutdown**: `signal.NotifyContext` with SIGINT/SIGTERM
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### 3. Core Engine (`internal/engine`)
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- **Server**: `net/http` with `http.ServeMux` (no external router)
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- **TLS (P01)**: `crypto/tls` with `MinVersion=tls.VersionTLS13` and
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AEAD cipher allowlist
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(`TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384`, `TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256`,
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`TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`)
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- **Ports**: Configurable (default `:8443` for API+mTLS, `:8080` for health)
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- **Graceful Shutdown**: `signal.NotifyContext` with SIGINT/SIGTERM
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- **v0.2 endpoints (P02)**:
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- `POST /orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit` — receive cross-node job submission
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- `POST /orca.v1.Dispatch/Status` — query dispatched job status
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- `POST /orca.v1.Register/Hello` — peer join ack (used during `orca node join`)
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### 3. Transport Layer (`internal/transport`, NEW in P01/P02)
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- **Client**: `http.Client` with `http.Transport.TLSClientConfig` populated
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from `internal/security.NewClientTLSConfig`
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- **Server**: `http.Server.TLSConfig` populated from
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`internal/security.NewServerTLSConfig`
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- **Retry policy**: exponential backoff with jitter (start 100ms, x2, cap 5s,
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max 5 attempts); only idempotent verbs (`GET`, `HEAD`, `OPTIONS`) are
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retried automatically; `POST` retries require an explicit
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`X-Orca-Idempotency-Key` header
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- **Conn lifecycle**: `context.Context`-aware dials and reads; graceful
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`Close` on `ctx.Done()`
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- **Peer dial pool**: small `sync.Map` of `peerID → *http.Client` to reuse
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TLS handshakes (TCP keep-alive) within a session
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### 4. Core Engine (`internal/engine`)
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- **Node Registry**: In-memory map of node IDs → metadata, persisted to SQLite
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- **Task Executor**: `os/exec.CommandContext` with `WaitDelay` (Go 1.25+) for clean process termination
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- **Job Scheduler**: Single-node FIFO queue (multi-node deferred to v0.2+)
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(CPU/memory capacity, available slots, last-seen)
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- **Task Executor**: `os/exec.CommandContext` with `WaitDelay` (Go 1.25+) for
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clean process termination
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- **Job Scheduler (v0.2 P02)**:
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- **Algorithm**: best-fit bin-packing by `available_cpu` and `available_memory`
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- **Within-node ordering**: FIFO queue
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- **Cross-node**: if local node is full, `Dispatcher.Submit(peer, job)` is
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invoked; peers are tried in round-robin order
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- **Fallback**: if all peers reject, return `ErrNoFit` and requeue
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- **Dispatcher (NEW, P02)**:
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- `Submit(peerID, spec) (jobID, error)` — blocking call with retry
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- `Watch(peerID) iter.Seq[DispatchEvent]` — pull-style event stream for the
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CLI's `--watch` flag
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- Stateless: every call uses the latest mTLS client config and peer address
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- **Security Manager (NEW, P01)**:
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- `InitCA(commonName) (*CA, error)` — generates a self-signed CA, writes
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`ca.crt` (0644) and `ca.key` (0600) to `~/.orca/`
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- `Fingerprint(certPath) (sha256hex, error)` — used by `orca cert join`
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- `SignServerCert(csr, validity) (*cert, error)` — signs a CSR with the CA
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- `IssueServerCert(nodeName, dnsNames, ips) (*cert, *key, error)` — generates
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a keypair + CSR + signs it, returns PEM bytes for `orca cert join --server`
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- `ServerTLSConfig() (*tls.Config, error)` — loads `server.crt`/`server.key`
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and the CA pool from disk
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- `ClientTLSConfig(caPath) (*tls.Config, error)` — returns a client config
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pinned to the supplied CA
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- **Rotation policy**: server certs valid 90d; CA cert valid 10y. On
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`orca cert renew`, `IssueServerCert` is called and the daemon
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gracefully reloads the in-process `tls.Config` via `GetCertificate`
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hot-swap (no restart required)
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- **Audit Logger**: `slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stderr, ...)` with structured fields
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### 4. State Store (`internal/store`)
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### 5. State Store (`internal/store`)
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- **Driver**: `modernc.org/sqlite` (pure Go, CGO-free)
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- **Location**: `~/.orca/orca.db` (user-mode) or `/var/lib/orca/orca.db` (system-mode)
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- **Schema**: `nodes`, `jobs`, `tasks`, `audit_log` tables
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- **Schema (v0.1)**: `nodes`, `jobs`, `tasks`, `audit_log` tables
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- **Schema (v0.2 P01)**: NEW `certs` table
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```sql
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CREATE TABLE certs (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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kind TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'ca' | 'server'
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node_id TEXT, -- NULL for CA
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serial_hex TEXT NOT NULL, -- x509.SerialNumber.Hex()
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subject_cn TEXT NOT NULL,
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issuer_cn TEXT NOT NULL,
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not_before INTEGER NOT NULL, -- unix seconds
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not_after INTEGER NOT NULL, -- unix seconds
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fingerprint TEXT NOT NULL, -- sha256 of DER, hex
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source_path TEXT NOT NULL, -- on-disk PEM path
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created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
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);
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CREATE INDEX idx_certs_node_kind ON certs(node_id, kind);
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CREATE INDEX idx_certs_not_after ON certs(not_after);
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```
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- **Migrations**: Embedded SQL files, applied on startup
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- **Migration 0004** is added in P01 with the schema above
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## Data Model
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### Node
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### Node (v0.1, extended in v0.2 P02)
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```go
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type Node struct {
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ID string
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@@ -71,10 +173,22 @@ type Node struct {
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JoinedAt time.Time
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LastSeen time.Time
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Metadata map[string]string
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// v0.2 P02 — capacity for bin-packing
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Capacity NodeCapacity
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}
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type NodeCapacity struct {
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CPUMillicores int // total, e.g. 4000 = 4 cores
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MemoryBytes int64 // total RAM
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CPUUsed int // currently allocated
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MemoryUsed int64 // currently allocated
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}
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func (c NodeCapacity) AvailableCPU() int { return c.CPUMillicores - c.CPUUsed }
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func (c NodeCapacity) AvailableMemory() int64 { return c.MemoryBytes - c.MemoryUsed }
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```
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### Job
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### Job (v0.1)
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```go
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type Job struct {
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ID string
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@@ -87,7 +201,7 @@ type Job struct {
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}
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```
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### Task
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### Task (v0.1)
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```go
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type Task struct {
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ID string
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@@ -104,23 +218,211 @@ type Task struct {
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}
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```
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### Certificate (NEW, v0.2 P01)
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```go
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type Cert struct {
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Kind CertKind // CertCA | CertServer
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NodeID string // empty for CA
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SerialHex string
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SubjectCN string
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IssuerCN string
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NotBefore time.Time
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NotAfter time.Time
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Fingerprint string // sha256 of DER (hex)
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SourcePath string // PEM path on disk
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CreatedAt time.Time
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}
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```
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|
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## v0.2 Component Graph (ASCII)
|
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```
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Operator Host │
|
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│ (orca CLI) │
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└────────┬────────┘
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||||
│ 1. cert join --ca-fingerprint <sha>
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▼
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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ NODE A (Bootstrap / CA holder) │
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│ │
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│ ┌──────────────┐ CSR ┌────────────────────┐ PEM sign ┌────────┐ │
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│ │ orca cert │──────────▶│ internal/security │─────────────▶│ CA │ │
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│ │ {init,join} │ │ .SignServerCert() │ │ key │ │
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│ └──────────────┘ └────────────────────┘ │ 0600 │ │
|
||||
│ ┌──└────────┘ │
|
||||
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │ │
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│ │ internal/daemon │ ◀──tls.Config── internal/security │ │
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│ │ (http.Server) │ .ServerTLSConfig() │ │
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||||
│ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ /v1/jobs/* │ │ │
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||||
│ │ /v1/nodes/* │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ /orca.v1.* │ │ │
|
||||
│ └────────┬────────┘ │ │
|
||||
│ │ Submit(job) (bin-pack) │ │
|
||||
│ ▼ │ │
|
||||
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
│ │ internal/engine │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ .scheduler │──── if local fits → executor │ │
|
||||
│ │ .dispatcher │──── else → Submit(peer, job) ───────────┼──┐ │
|
||||
│ └─────────────────┘ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ mTLS │
|
||||
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼──┼───────────┘
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
ORCA NODE NETWORK │ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼──┼───────────┐
|
||||
│ NODE B (Peer) │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │
|
||||
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ◀── TLS 1.3 handshake ─────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
│ │ internal/daemon │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ (http.Server) │ POST /orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit │ │
|
||||
│ │ │──── 200 + jobID │ │
|
||||
│ └────────┬────────┘ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │
|
||||
│ ▼ │ │
|
||||
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
│ │ internal/engine │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ .scheduler (FIFO) │ │
|
||||
│ │ .executor │ │
|
||||
│ └─────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## v0.2 Flows
|
||||
|
||||
### Flow 1: Cert Issuance (CA-init → CSR → sign → install) — P01
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Operator (Node A) Operator (Node B)
|
||||
───────────────── ─────────────────
|
||||
orca cert init
|
||||
↳ InitCA("orca-ca")
|
||||
↳ write ca.crt (0644), ca.key (0600)
|
||||
↳ record in certs table (kind='ca')
|
||||
orca cert join --ca-fingerprint <sha>
|
||||
↳ operator copies ca.crt → Node B
|
||||
↳ verifies fingerprint matches local
|
||||
--ca-fingerprint arg
|
||||
↳ IssueServerCert("node-b", SANs)
|
||||
↳ generate 2048-bit RSA key
|
||||
↳ build CSR with SANs
|
||||
↳ read ca.crt + ca.key
|
||||
↳ sign CSR (90d validity)
|
||||
↳ write server.crt (0644),
|
||||
server.key (0600)
|
||||
↳ record in certs table
|
||||
(kind='server', node_id='node-b')
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Flow 2: mTLS Handshake at `node join` — P01
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Node B (joiner) Node A (CA holder)
|
||||
──────────────── ─────────────────
|
||||
orca node join --name node-b
|
||||
--ca-fingerprint <sha>
|
||||
--peer node-a:8443
|
||||
↳ load ca.crt → verify sha256 == --ca-fingerprint
|
||||
↳ load server.crt + server.key
|
||||
↳ tls.Config{MinVersion: TLS1.3, ...}
|
||||
↳ ClientHello (SNI=node-a)
|
||||
◀── ServerHello (TLS 1.3)
|
||||
◀── Certificate (Node A's cert)
|
||||
↳ verify Node A's cert chains to ca.crt ◀── CertificateRequest
|
||||
↳ send Certificate (Node B's cert) ◀── Finished
|
||||
↳ Finished
|
||||
↳ GET /healthz (over mTLS) — sanity check
|
||||
↳ POST /v1/nodes (over mTLS) — register
|
||||
↳ insert into nodes table
|
||||
↳ audit log
|
||||
↳ 200 OK
|
||||
↳ record node_a in peers table
|
||||
↳ audit log
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Flow 3: Job Dispatch (CLI → dispatcher → peer) — P02
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
User (Node A CLI) Node A (scheduler) Node B (peer)
|
||||
────────────────── ─────────────────── ─────────────
|
||||
orca job run spec.hcl
|
||||
↳ parse HCL
|
||||
↳ POST /v1/jobs (mTLS, local)
|
||||
↳ scheduler.Submit(spec)
|
||||
↳ bin-pack: spec.cpu + spec.mem
|
||||
↳ local node A has 2000mc + 4GiB free → fit!
|
||||
↳ executor.Run(spec)
|
||||
↳ 202 Accepted + jobID
|
||||
↳ returns jobID
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
User (Node A CLI) Node A (scheduler) Node B (peer)
|
||||
────────────────── ─────────────────── ─────────────
|
||||
↳ scheduler.Submit(spec)
|
||||
↳ bin-pack: spec.cpu + spec.mem
|
||||
↳ local node A has 0 free → NO FIT
|
||||
↳ dispatcher.Submit(peer="node-b", spec)
|
||||
↳ load transport.Client("node-b")
|
||||
↳ POST /orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit
|
||||
↳ mTLS handshake
|
||||
↳ authenticate cert
|
||||
↳ scheduler.Submit(spec)
|
||||
↳ executor.Run(spec)
|
||||
↳ 200 OK + jobID
|
||||
↳ 200 OK + jobID
|
||||
↳ return jobID to local caller
|
||||
↳ returns jobID
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Flow 4: iter.Seq Streaming (`--watch`) — P04
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
User orca job list --watch
|
||||
──── ─────────────────────
|
||||
ctx, cancel := signal.NotifyContext(ctx, os.Interrupt)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
seq := store.Jobs().Watch(ctx)
|
||||
for job := range seq {
|
||||
print(job) // human or --json
|
||||
}
|
||||
// ctrl-c → ctx.Done() → seq stops yielding
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Internally `store.Jobs().Watch(ctx) iter.Seq[Job]` polls the
|
||||
`jobs` table on a 1s ticker (or subscribes to an in-process
|
||||
notifier channel) and yields the current snapshot of each job
|
||||
until `ctx.Done()`. The store repo implements `iter.Seq[Job]`
|
||||
as a function that takes a `yield func(Job) bool` callback.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
### Authentication
|
||||
- **v0.1**: mTLS for all API endpoints (self-signed CA)
|
||||
- **v0.2+**: Token-based auth as alternative
|
||||
- **v0.2 P01**: Internal CA with CSR join (see Flow 1 + 2)
|
||||
- **v0.2+**: Token-based auth deferred to v0.3+
|
||||
|
||||
### Cert Rotation
|
||||
- Server certs: 90-day validity, rotate at 60 days (30d before expiry)
|
||||
- CA cert: 10-year validity, manual rotation
|
||||
- Hot-swap: `tls.Config.GetCertificate` callback re-reads the
|
||||
`server.crt`/`server.key` files on each handshake so `orca cert renew`
|
||||
takes effect without a daemon restart.
|
||||
|
||||
### Audit Logging
|
||||
- All state-changing operations emit structured log records
|
||||
- Fields: `timestamp`, `actor`, `action`, `resource`, `result`, `error`
|
||||
- Stored in SQLite `audit_log` table and stderr (JSON)
|
||||
- **v0.2 P01 additions**: `cert.issued`, `cert.renewed`, `cert.joined`,
|
||||
`node.handshake_ok`, `node.handshake_failed`
|
||||
|
||||
### Input Validation
|
||||
- All CLI inputs validated via Cobra's `Args`/`ValidArgs` functions
|
||||
- All API inputs validated at handler boundary
|
||||
- HCL/YAML specs parsed with strict schemas
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Architectural Decisions
|
||||
## Key Architectural Decisions (v0.1 + v0.2)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Decision | Rationale |
|
||||
|----|----------|-----------|
|
||||
@@ -132,6 +434,14 @@ type Task struct {
|
||||
| AD-006 | slog for logging | Native to Go 1.21+, no external dependency |
|
||||
| AD-007 | HCL for job specs | Familiar to Nomad/HashiCorp users |
|
||||
| AD-008 | Single-node scheduling (v0.1) | Multi-node scheduling deferred to v0.2+ |
|
||||
| AD-009 | Internal CA, no external PKI (v0.2) | Self-contained, no operational PKI requirement |
|
||||
| AD-010 | Roll-our-own CA in `crypto/x509` (v0.2) | step-ca/cfssl/vault-pki too heavyweight for Orca's footprint |
|
||||
| AD-011 | Operator-mediated CA cert distribution (v0.2) | No secret distribution over the wire; matches offline-first |
|
||||
| AD-012 | TLS 1.3 only, AEAD allowlist (v0.2) | Modern crypto only; no downgrade risk |
|
||||
| AD-013 | Eager mTLS at `node join` (v0.2) | Fail fast; don't defer handshake to first request |
|
||||
| AD-014 | `orca.v1.Dispatch` via stdlib h2c (v0.2) | ConnectRPC not in go.mod; stdlib suffices for a single-RPC service |
|
||||
| AD-015 | Best-fit bin-packing (v0.2) | Simple, deterministic, optimal for small fleets |
|
||||
| AD-016 | iter.Seq for streaming lists (v0.2) | Go 1.25+ native, context-aware, pull semantics |
|
||||
|
||||
## Anti-Patterns (Explicitly Avoided)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -144,9 +454,11 @@ type Task struct {
|
||||
- No cloud provider integrations
|
||||
- No auto-scaling
|
||||
- No admission controllers
|
||||
- No complex scheduling algorithms
|
||||
- No complex scheduling algorithms (best-fit only)
|
||||
- No gRPC framework dependency (stdlib net/http with h2c, Go 1.25+ native)
|
||||
- No external PKI / no cert transparency logs (offline-first)
|
||||
|
||||
## Dependency Map (minimal)
|
||||
## Dependency Map (minimal — v0.2 adds zero direct deps)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
github.com/spf13/cobra # CLI framework
|
||||
@@ -155,18 +467,37 @@ modernc.org/sqlite # SQLite (pure Go)
|
||||
github.com/google/uuid # UUID generation
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Total: ~4 direct dependencies. No web framework, no ORM, no RPC framework.
|
||||
Total: ~4 direct dependencies. No web framework, no ORM, no RPC framework,
|
||||
no PKI library. mTLS via `crypto/tls` and `crypto/x509` (stdlib).
|
||||
|
||||
## Deployment Model
|
||||
> **ConnectRPC note**: `.ciagent/config.json` lists `connectrpc` in
|
||||
> `frameworks`, but the actual `go.mod` does not depend on
|
||||
> `connectrpc.com/connect`. v0.2 falls back to plain `net/http` with
|
||||
> HTTP/2 cleartext (h2c) for `orca.v1.Dispatch`. The protocol is a
|
||||
> simple JSON-over-HTTP POST: client sends
|
||||
> `{"spec": "..."}` to `/orca.v1.Dispatch/Submit`; server replies
|
||||
> `{"job_id": "..."}`. This keeps the zero-new-dep promise and the
|
||||
> codebase coherent with the rest of the daemon's `http.ServeMux`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deployment Model (v0.2)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
User Machine Server Node
|
||||
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
|
||||
│ orca CLI │─────── mTLS ──────────▶│ orca daemon │
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── API server │
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Engine │
|
||||
│ │ │ └── SQLite store │
|
||||
└──────────┘ └──────────────────┘
|
||||
Operator Machine Node A (CA holder) Node B (Peer)
|
||||
──────────────── ───────────────── ─────────────
|
||||
orca CLI orca daemon orca daemon
|
||||
│ │ ▲ │ ▲
|
||||
│ mTLS handshake │ │ mTLS │ │
|
||||
│ at `node join` ────────────┼──┘ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │
|
||||
│ submit job ───POST────────▶│ POST (cross-node) ──────────▶│
|
||||
│ │ mTLS only │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │
|
||||
│ ◀───────jobID──────────────│ ◀─────jobID (200 OK)─────────│
|
||||
│ │ │
|
||||
│ orca job list --watch │ │
|
||||
│ (iter.Seq stream) ◀────────│── polls local + stream events│
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
For v0.1, the CLI and daemon can be the same binary on the same machine. Multi-node is deferred.
|
||||
For v0.2, one node must be the CA holder (`orca cert init` was run
|
||||
on it). The CA holder's `ca.crt` is copied to each peer manually by
|
||||
the operator; peers do not auto-fetch it.
|
||||
|
||||
+49
-8
@@ -5,10 +5,14 @@ active_personas:
|
||||
- data-engineer
|
||||
- cli-engineer
|
||||
- security-engineer
|
||||
- network-engineer
|
||||
deactivated_personas:
|
||||
- frontend-engineer
|
||||
- devops-sre
|
||||
phase_specific: []
|
||||
phase_specific:
|
||||
- security-engineer
|
||||
- network-engineer
|
||||
- cli-engineer
|
||||
reason: |
|
||||
Orca is a CLI-first, offline-first orchestration engine with no web UI and
|
||||
a single-binary distribution model. The persona roster reflects this:
|
||||
@@ -17,12 +21,18 @@ reason: |
|
||||
- backend-engineer: core engine and API handlers
|
||||
- data-engineer: SQLite state store and migrations
|
||||
- cli-engineer: Cobra subcommands and CLI UX
|
||||
- security-engineer: mTLS, audit logging, input validation
|
||||
- security-engineer: mTLS, cert lifecycle, audit logging, input validation
|
||||
- network-engineer: transport layer, dispatcher, peer-to-peer resilience
|
||||
|
||||
Deactivated:
|
||||
- frontend-engineer: no web UI in v0.1
|
||||
- devops-sre: no container/cloud integrations; release flow is
|
||||
handled by CoreCI (not a persona territory)
|
||||
|
||||
Phase-specific (v0.2):
|
||||
- security-engineer: P01 (mTLS/CA) + P02 (peer transport hardening)
|
||||
- network-engineer: P02 only (multi-node scheduling & dispatch)
|
||||
- cli-engineer: P04 only (--watch flag is a CLI concern)
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Personas: Orca
|
||||
@@ -47,7 +57,7 @@ reason: |
|
||||
- **Domain**: data
|
||||
- **Frameworks**: `modernc/sqlite`
|
||||
- **Constraints**: `schema-first`, `migration-safe`, `local-storage-only`
|
||||
- **Territory**: `**/store/**`, `**/model.go`, `**/migration*`, `migrations/**`
|
||||
- **Territory**: `**/store/**`, `**/model.go`, `**/migration*`, `migrations/**`, `internal/store/migrations/0004_certs.sql`
|
||||
- **Active**: true
|
||||
|
||||
### cli-engineer (custom)
|
||||
@@ -60,11 +70,21 @@ reason: |
|
||||
|
||||
### security-engineer (custom)
|
||||
- **Domain**: security
|
||||
- **Frameworks**: `crypto/tls`, `slog`
|
||||
- **Constraints**: `no-panic-in-production`, `structured-audit-logging`, `no-secret-in-logs`, `input-validation`
|
||||
- **Territory**: `**/auth/**`, `**/audit/**`, `internal/security/**`
|
||||
- **Frameworks**: `crypto/tls`, `crypto/x509`, `slog`
|
||||
- **Constraints**: `no-panic-in-production`, `structured-audit-logging`, `no-secret-in-logs`, `input-validation`, `least-privilege`
|
||||
- **Territory**: `**/auth/**`, `**/audit/**`, `internal/security/**`, `internal/transport/**` (TLS config only)
|
||||
- **Active**: true
|
||||
- **Reason**: mTLS, audit logging, and input validation are first-class concerns.
|
||||
- **Phase scope**: P01 (mTLS + internal CA), P02 (transport hardening for peer handshakes). Deactivates after P02 ships — P03/P04 have lighter security needs.
|
||||
|
||||
### network-engineer (custom, NEW in v0.2)
|
||||
- **Domain**: networking
|
||||
- **Frameworks**: `net/http`, `crypto/tls` (via `internal/security`), `iter`
|
||||
- **Constraints**: `connection-resilience`, `retry-with-backoff`, `graceful-disconnect`, `context-propagation`
|
||||
- **Territory**: `**/transport/**`, `**/engine/dispatcher*`, `**/engine/peer*`, `internal/engine/dispatcher.go`, `internal/transport/**`
|
||||
- **Active**: true
|
||||
- **Reason**: v0.2 introduces cross-node dispatch and peer-to-peer transport. This persona owns the transport layer, dispatcher, and peer lifecycle concerns that are distinct from the API-handler territory of `backend-engineer`.
|
||||
- **Phase scope**: P02 only. Deactivates after P02 ships.
|
||||
|
||||
### frontend-engineer
|
||||
- **Active**: false
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +100,27 @@ reason: |
|
||||
- **Behavior**: Out-of-territory file changes log a warning but do not block.
|
||||
- **Rationale**: Allows flexibility during early development; tighten to `strict` post-v0.1.
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase-Specific Personas
|
||||
## Phase-Specific Personas (v0.2)
|
||||
|
||||
None for v0.1. All personas persist across all 6 phases.
|
||||
| Persona | Active in | Reason |
|
||||
|---------|-----------|--------|
|
||||
| `security-engineer` | P01, P02 | mTLS/CA in P01, transport hardening in P02. Lighter security needs in P03 (CI scanning) and P04 (streaming UX). |
|
||||
| `network-engineer` | P02 | Multi-node dispatch is a P02 concern only. P01 builds the transport primitives but P02 wires them into cross-node scheduling. |
|
||||
| `cli-engineer` | P04 | The `--watch` flag is a CLI surface; P01-P03 don't add new CLI commands. |
|
||||
|
||||
In full-autonomy mode, all personas are auto-accepted and the phase-scope
|
||||
assignments are applied automatically when a phase is committed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Migration from v0.1
|
||||
|
||||
- `backend-engineer` territory unchanged: `internal/daemon/**` still owns HTTP
|
||||
handlers. The new `internal/transport/**` package is shared with
|
||||
`network-engineer` but `transport` owns the *connection lifecycle* (dial,
|
||||
retry, close) while `daemon` owns the *request handlers*.
|
||||
- `data-engineer` territory expanded to include the new
|
||||
`internal/store/migrations/0004_certs.sql` migration in P01.
|
||||
- `security-engineer` territory extended from `internal/security/**` to
|
||||
include the TLS-config portion of `internal/transport/**` (the
|
||||
`NewServerTLSConfig` / `NewClientTLSConfig` helpers).
|
||||
- `cli-engineer` territory unchanged; the new `orca cert` subcommands in P01
|
||||
fall under the existing `internal/cli/**` glob.
|
||||
|
||||
+27
-1
@@ -48,7 +48,33 @@ Build a lightweight system to manage and execute workloads across a set of nodes
|
||||
- Full-blown Kubernetes-compatible API.
|
||||
- Complex cloud-provider integrations.
|
||||
- GUI-based management consoles.
|
||||
- Multi-node scheduling.
|
||||
- Container runtime integration.
|
||||
- Service mesh / sidecar injection.
|
||||
- Auto-scaling / horizontal pod autoscaler.
|
||||
- External PKI / Let's Encrypt / cert transparency logs.
|
||||
- gRPC framework dependency (ConnectRPC in `config.json` frameworks but
|
||||
not in `go.mod`; v0.2 uses stdlib `net/http` with h2c for
|
||||
`orca.v1.Dispatch` — see ARCHITECTURE.md AD-014).
|
||||
|
||||
## v0.2 Scope Summary
|
||||
|
||||
v0.2 is a focused 4-phase milestone that turns Orca from a single-node
|
||||
process executor into a small cluster engine with strong transport
|
||||
security and richer I/O. The 4 phases are:
|
||||
|
||||
- **P01 — mTLS handshake + internal CA with CSR join.** Internal CA, CSR
|
||||
join, eager handshake at `node join`, TLS 1.3 + AEAD allowlist.
|
||||
See ARCHITECTURE.md Flow 1 + Flow 2.
|
||||
- **P02 — Multi-node scheduling & job dispatch.** Best-fit bin-packing by
|
||||
CPU/memory, FIFO within a node, `orca.v1.Dispatch` over mTLS. See
|
||||
ARCHITECTURE.md Flow 3.
|
||||
- **P03 — `gosec` + `govulncheck` + `gitleaks` in CI.** `gosec` baseline
|
||||
JSON in repo, `govulncheck ./...` in `validate` pipeline, `gitleaks`
|
||||
in pre-commit (opt-in).
|
||||
- **P04 — `iter.Seq` streaming for `--watch` flags.** Go 1.25+ range-over-func
|
||||
semantics, `context.Context` cancellation, `signal.NotifyContext` on
|
||||
ctrl-c. See ARCHITECTURE.md Flow 4.
|
||||
|
||||
The vision ("minimalist, offline-first, CLI-first orchestration engine")
|
||||
is unchanged. v0.2 is a hardening + small-cluster extension, not a
|
||||
direction change.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user