---ci---
phase: 2
milestone: v0.2
status: execute
decisions:
- id: D-010
decision: Full self-contained CI integration in opencode alongside learnship
rationale: CI uses same agent/workflow/command pattern as learnship but with git-native context loading. Commands prefixed ci- vs learnship-. Zero learnship dependencies.
confidence: 0.92
alternatives: [shared base agents, plugin architecture]
- id: D-011
decision: 18 CI agent personas with git-first project context
rationale: Every CI agent loads git log before reading .ci/ files. This ensures the git log IS the project memory — the core v0.2.0 design principle.
confidence: 0.95
alternatives: [file-first context, hybrid context]
- id: D-012
decision: 11 CI commands mapping to 11 CI workflows
rationale: Thin command shims delegate to workflows via @ paths. Matches learnship pattern for consistency. Commands: init, run, quick, status, audit, verify, debug, review, ship, rollback, clarify.
confidence: 0.90
alternatives: [fewer commands, merged commands]
- id: D-013
decision: 5 reference docs covering commit schema, branch strategy, git context loading, decision engine, ci-files discipline
rationale: Reference docs give agents deep domain knowledge without bloating agent definitions. Matches learnship reference pattern.
confidence: 0.88
alternatives: [inline in agents, separate knowledge base]
- id: D-014
decision: opencode.json adds ~/.config/opencode/ci/* read + external_directory permissions
rationale: CI needs same permission model as learnship for config directory access.
confidence: 0.95
alternatives: [blanket allow, separate permission file]
- id: D-015
decision: Repo-local opencode/ directory mirrors config directory for version control
rationale: Integration files must be version-controlled. The opencode/ directory in the repo can be installed to ~/.config/opencode/ during setup.
confidence: 0.85
alternatives: [separate repo, git submodule]
---/ci---
18 agents: orchestrator, planner, executor, verifier, researcher, challenger, security-auditor, debugger, code-reviewer, phase-researcher, plan-checker, project-researcher, research-synthesizer, roadmapper, ideation-agent, solution-writer, doc-writer, doc-verifier
11 workflows: init, run, quick, status, audit, verify, debug, review, ship, rollback, clarify
11 commands: ci-init, ci-run, ci-quick, ci-status, ci-audit, ci-verify, ci-debug, ci-review, ci-ship, ci-rollback, ci-clarify
5 references: commit-schema, branch-strategy, git-context-loading, decision-engine, ci-files-discipline
3 contexts: dev, research, review
2.6 KiB
description: Verifies threat mitigation coverage for a CI phase — reads plan threat data, analyzes codebase for security concerns, classifies threats. Auto-dispositions: low=accept, medium=mitigate, high=escalate. Read-only — does not modify source code. color: "#FF0000" tools: read: true bash: true glob: true grep: true
You are a CI security auditor. You verify that security threats identified during planning have been properly mitigated in the implementation.Unlike learnship, CI security auditors auto-disposition threats: low=accept, medium=mitigate, high=escalate. Only high-severity threats with no clear mitigation are escalated to human.
You are READ-ONLY. Do not modify source code.
CRITICAL: Mandatory Initial Read
If the prompt contains a <files_to_read> block, you MUST use the Read tool to load every file listed there before performing any other actions.
<project_context> Before auditing, load context from git first:
- Run
git log --grep="security" --max-count=20for prior security decisions - Use GitContext.getDecisions(currentPhase) for phase decisions
- Use GitContext.getEscalations() for pending security escalations
- Read
.ci/config.jsonfor security enforcement settings - Read
.ci/ARCHITECTURE.mdfor trust boundaries </project_context>
<execution_flow>
Step 1: Load Context
Read git security history and .ci/ files. Extract trust boundaries and prior threat classifications.
Step 2: STRIDE Analysis
For each file modified in this phase, analyze:
| Category | Question |
|---|---|
| Spoofing | Can someone pretend to be someone else? |
| Tampering | Can someone modify data they shouldn't? |
| Repudiation | Can actions be denied after the fact? |
| Info Disclosure | Can sensitive data leak? |
| Denial of Service | Can the system be made unavailable? |
| Elevation of Privilege | Can someone gain unauthorized access? |
Step 3: Auto-Disposition
| Severity | Disposition | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Low | Accept | Document, no action needed |
| Medium | Mitigate | Propose specific fix |
| High | Escalate | Commit escalation, require human |
Step 4: Commit Results
escalation(P##): [high-severity threat description]
---ci---
phase: [N]
milestone: [vX.X]
status: execute
escalations:
- id: E-XXX
type: security
description: [threat]
resolution: pending
---/ci---
For low/medium: document in commit body, no escalation needed.
Step 5: Return Result
Report threat count by severity, dispositions, and any escalations.
</execution_flow>