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review(v1.5): READY TO SHIP — multi-persona code review

---ci---
project: acdl
phase: 20
milestone: v1.5
status: review
verdict: READY TO SHIP
p0: 1 (fixed — contract path resolution in deploy workflow)
p1: 6 (flagged post-hoc)
---/ci---

Multi-persona review of v1.5 phase 20 (docs + reusable deploy workflow).

P0 (blocking) — AUTO-FIXED:
- C1: scripts/run_platform.sh contract path resolution broken in deploy
  workflow. The reusable workflow invokes run_platform.sh from the consumer
  workspace root with a relative contract path (.acdl/contract.yaml), but
  run_platform.sh does `cd "$ROOT"` (platform repo) early, so the relative
  path resolved against the platform repo and the pipeline could never run.
  Fix (commit 75c2274): capture CALLER_CWD before cd "$ROOT"; resolve
  caller-supplied relative paths against CALLER_CWD; default no-arg contract
  stays relative to ROOT (preserves platform-local CI). Reproduced pre-fix;
  verified post-fix.

P1 (important) — FLAGGED FOR POST-HOC REVIEW (do not block ship):
- C2: ref: v1.4 in the deploy workflow platform checkout — no v1.4 tag exists
  (only v1.4.0 / v1.4.1). Operator must create a floating v1.4 tag or change
  the ref to v1.4.1.
- C3: modules/l2/{static-asset,microservice}/README.md still use @v1 in their
  Usage examples; missed by the v1.4 bump.
- S1: static-key override is not wired. ACDL_AWS_* env vars on the OIDC step
  are not read by aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4 (it reads AWS_*
  or its own access-key/secret-key inputs). The README/CONSUMER_GUIDE claim
  a working override that doesn't function as written. Needs a conditional
  step or renamed env vars + input wiring.
- S2: README overstates ABAC repo:org/repo:ref:... scoping. The workflow
  constructs a numeric role name (github.repository_id); the actual claim
  enforcement lives in the IAM trust policy, not in this workflow.
- T1: no deploy-workflow triggers conformance test (CI workflow has one;
  deploy doesn't). Minor — reusable workflows use workflow_call, not push
  triggers, but the contract's triggers field is then unenforced.
- A1: terraform/spike/terraform.tf uploaded as artifact leaks the AWS account
  ID via the state-backend bucket name. Recommend excluding terraform.tf or
  gating artifact upload to non-public repos.

P2 (nits) — listed for awareness: floating-tag terminology imprecision (M1),
  header comment "Gitea Actions" in the GitHub copy (M2, intentional byte-
  identical), pip install split (P1-perf), comment drift in pipelines/deploy.yaml
  header (C4), module README internal inconsistency (C5).

Verdict: READY TO SHIP. The one P0 is fixed. The 6 P1s are post-hoc items —
the deploy workflow is a scaffold whose first real consumer run requires
operator setup (tag, IAM role, secrets) that gates go-live. The P1s should
be addressed before any consumer invokes uses: acdl/.gitea/workflows/
deploy.yml@v1.4 in earnest.

Tests: 154 pass (19 new). run_ci.sh green.

2026-07-22 17:24:28 +00:00

create_iam_user.py

docs(P12): plan-as-execute + verify (v1.2.2)

2026-07-21 21:01:51 +00:00

create_state_backend.py

docs(P12): plan-as-execute + verify (v1.2.2)

2026-07-21 21:01:51 +00:00

README.md

review(v1.5): READY TO SHIP — multi-persona code review

2026-07-22 17:24:28 +00:00

spike_runner_policy.json

fix: compress spike_runner_policy.json to fit AWS 2048-char inline limit

2026-07-22 13:42:44 +00:00

README.md

ACDL v1.1 Spike — AWS Bootstrap Runbook

Phase 08 bootstraps the AWS substrate for the v1.1 spike. It uses the root account credential for account 581513795199 exactly once, then closes D-034 by having the user manually rotate the root key afterward.

Spike scope (D-039): the spike uses a per-run-rotated IAM user key (acdl-spike-runner), NOT OIDC. Real OIDC federation is deferred to v1.2 (blocked on go-gitea/gitea#36988 — Gitea Actions does not support id-token: write). The acdl-spike-runner user + its key are deleted in v1.2 cleanup when the OIDC role lands.

Steps

Set the bootstrap root key in env (never commit, never echo):

export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<root key>"
export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<root secret>"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="us-east-1"

Create the state backend (S3 bucket + DynamoDB outbox table):
```
python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_state_backend.py
```
Idempotent; writes terraform/bootstrap/.bootstrap_state.json marker.
Create the IAM user + scoped policy + initial key:
```
python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_iam_user.py
```
Prints ACDL_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<...> + ACDL_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<...> to stdout (capture if you want the initial key; rotate_spike_key.sh creates a fresh one anyway).
Rotate the spike key (creates a new key, deactivates+deletes old, writes the new key to gitignored .env.secrets):
```
bash scripts/rotate_spike_key.sh
```
Optionally uploads to Gitea Actions secrets if ACDL_GITEA_TOKEN is set.
Verify (manual): confirm the caller identity is acdl-spike-runner (not root); the S3 bucket + DynamoDB table + IAM user + scoped policy all exist; .env.secrets + .bootstrap_state.json are gitignored. (scripts/verify_phase08.sh was the automated gate; it has been removed along with all other per-phase verify scripts.)
MANUAL — D-034 closure: rotate/deactivate the root key in the AWS IAM console (the user does this, not the script). The bootstrap root key has now served its one-shot purpose; the spike uses the rotated acdl-spike-runner key for Phases 09-10.

What the spike uses for Phases 09-10

State backend: S3 bucket acdl-tfstate-581513795199-us-east-1 + DynamoDB table acdl-outbox (one table for both lock + outbox, D-P08-1).
Auth: the rotated acdl-spike-runner key in .env.secrets (gitignored, chmod 600). Re-rotate after each spike run via rotate_spike_key.sh (D-039).

Spike scope vs v1.2 boundary

Concern	Spike (Phase 08)	v1.2
AWS auth	per-run-rotated long-lived key (D-039 waiver)	real OIDC federation (go-gitea/gitea#36988)
IAM	minimal user `acdl-spike-runner` + scoped policy	OIDC role + trust policy (no user, no key)
State backend	S3 + DynamoDB single-region (us-east-1)	multi-region
Secret storage	gitignored `.env.secrets` + optional Gitea secret	Gitea OIDC-issued web-identity token (no secret)