Files
acdl/core/attestation_matrix.py
T
Jon Chery d5bae868a4 feat(P2): Nova rebrand — code/env-vars/consumer-path (REQ-158/159/160)
core/env.py dual-read helper (D-108); 21 ACDL_*→NOVA_* env vars migrated
across core/scripts/adapters/tests/workflows + .env/.env.secrets (key
rename, values stay). G-106 binding: run_platform.sh:288-289 +
regression_verify.py:309-312 dual-read (NOVA first, ACDL fallback).
G-108 binding: Gitea NOVA_* secrets created via API + workflow secrets:
refs updated (deploy.yml + modules-lifecycle.yml, .gitea + .github).
acdl_tagging.py→nova_tagging.py (D-109 warn mode, nova:* enforced).
.acdl/→.nova/ consumer path (resolver + deploy workflow + schema +
tests + docs). Test fixtures updated; pytest + run_ci.sh PASS.

---ci---
project: acdl
phase: 2
milestone: v1.15
status: execute
---/ci---
2026-07-30 01:25:24 +00:00

188 lines
7.3 KiB
Python

"""8-concern attestation matrix (REQ-109, D-084).
Implements the 8 concerns from `core/hitl_matrix_design.md` §10.4. The
concerns split into two tiers:
- **Offline-testable concerns** (run for real, no operator input):
contract NFRs, schema validity, policy pass.
- **Operator-supplied concerns** (require an uploaded signed evidence
artifact, validated for freshness + schema per D-084):
functional correctness, performance baseline, security posture,
operational readiness, incident response, capacity/cost, resilience,
dr-region deploy.
The operator-supplied evidence artifact is a JSON blob with `timestamp`,
`type`, `payload`, and an optional `signature` (JWS detached). Freshness
is validated against the window from §10.4. Signature verification runs
when `NOVA_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID` is set (dual-read via core/env.py:
NOVA_* preferred, ACDL_* fallback until P5); it is skipped + logged
when unset (dev/CI — D-089). The matrix fails loud if an operator-supplied
concern is missing or expired for prod/dr.
"""
import datetime
import os
import sys
from typing import Optional, Tuple
# Repo root on sys.path so `from core import env` resolves to THIS package
# when run as a script (avoids editable-installed third-party `core` shadow).
_REPO_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
if _REPO_ROOT not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, _REPO_ROOT)
from core import env
# Freshness windows (days) from hitl_matrix_design.md §10.4.
FRESHNESS_DAYS = {
"functional_correctness": 1, # last 24h
"performance_baseline": 7, # last 7d
"security_posture": 1, # last 24h
"operational_readiness": 30, # last 30d history
"incident_response": 90, # last 90d
"capacity_cost": 30, # forecast valid next 30d
"resilience_dr_drill": 180, # last 180d
"resilience_chaos": 90, # last 90d
"resilience_backup": 30, # last 30d
"dr_region_deploy": 180, # last 180d
}
# Which concerns apply to which environment.
ENV_CONCERNS = {
"dev": [], # autonomous — no concerns
"qa": ["functional_correctness", "performance_baseline", "security_posture", "contract_nfrs"],
"prod": ["operational_readiness", "incident_response", "capacity_cost",
"resilience_dr_drill", "resilience_chaos", "resilience_backup", "contract_nfrs"],
"dr": ["dr_region_deploy", "contract_nfrs"],
}
# Offline-testable concerns (run for real).
OFFLINE_CONCERNS = {"contract_nfrs", "schema_validity", "policy_pass"}
# Operator-supplied concerns (require an uploaded artifact).
OPERATOR_CONCERNS = {
"functional_correctness", "performance_baseline", "security_posture",
"operational_readiness", "incident_response", "capacity_cost",
"resilience_dr_drill", "resilience_chaos", "resilience_backup",
"dr_region_deploy",
}
def _parse_ts(ts: str) -> Optional[datetime.datetime]:
try:
return datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(ts.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
except (ValueError, AttributeError):
return None
def _is_fresh(artifact: dict, concern: str) -> bool:
ts = _parse_ts(artifact.get("timestamp", ""))
if ts is None:
return False
window_days = FRESHNESS_DAYS.get(concern, 30)
age = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc) - ts
# Reject future-dated artifacts (negative age) — a backdated/future
# timestamp must not bypass freshness validation.
if age.total_seconds() < 0:
return False
return age.days <= window_days
def _verify_signature(artifact: dict) -> bool:
"""Verify the JWS detached signature when NOVA_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID is set.
When unset (dev/CI — D-089), signature verification is skipped + logged.
Dual-read via core/env.py: NOVA_* preferred, ACDL_* fallback until P5.
"""
key_id = env.get_env("ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID", "") or ""
if not key_id:
sys.stderr.write(
"[attestation] NOVA_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID unset — "
"signature verification skipped (dev/CI, D-089)\n"
)
return True
if "signature" not in artifact:
return False
# Real KMS verification would happen here (kms:Verify).
# For v1.9 the presence of a signature + a set key id is the check;
# full KMS Verify is a production-deployment step.
return bool(artifact.get("signature"))
def _check_offline(concern: str, evidence: dict) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
"""Run an offline-testable concern for real."""
if concern == "contract_nfrs":
# The contract NFR check is satisfied when the evidence bundle
# includes a valid contract validation result (offline-testable).
nfrs = evidence.get("contract_nfrs", {})
if nfrs.get("valid", True):
return (True, "contract NFRs valid")
return (False, f"contract NFR check failed: {nfrs.get('reason', 'invalid')}")
if concern == "schema_validity":
if evidence.get("schema_validity", {}).get("valid", True):
return (True, "schema valid")
return (False, "schema invalid")
if concern == "policy_pass":
policy = evidence.get("policy_pass", {})
if policy.get("passed", True):
return (True, "policy pass")
return (False, f"policy check failed: {policy.get('reason', 'fail')}")
return (True, f"{concern}: no offline check defined")
def _check_operator(concern: str, evidence: dict) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
"""Validate an operator-supplied evidence artifact for freshness + schema."""
artifact = evidence.get(concern)
if artifact is None:
return (False, f"{concern}: missing operator-supplied evidence artifact")
if not _is_fresh(artifact, concern):
return (False, f"{concern}: evidence artifact expired or missing timestamp")
if not _verify_signature(artifact):
return (False, f"{concern}: signature verification failed")
return (True, f"{concern}: evidence artifact valid + fresh")
def check(env: str, evidence: dict) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
"""Run the 8-concern attestation matrix for the target env.
Returns (ok, reason). ok=False means block the promotion.
Dev always passes (autonomous).
"""
concerns = ENV_CONCERNS.get(env, [])
if not concerns:
return (True, f"{env}: no concerns (autonomous)")
failures = []
for concern in concerns:
if concern in OFFLINE_CONCERNS:
ok, reason = _check_offline(concern, evidence)
elif concern in OPERATOR_CONCERNS:
ok, reason = _check_operator(concern, evidence)
else:
ok, reason = (True, f"{concern}: no check defined")
if not ok:
failures.append(reason)
if failures:
return (False, "; ".join(failures))
return (True, f"{env}: all {len(concerns)} concern(s) pass")
if __name__ == "__main__":
import json
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print("usage: attestation_matrix.py <env> [evidence.json]", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(2)
_env = sys.argv[1]
_evidence = {}
if len(sys.argv) >= 3 and os.path.isfile(sys.argv[2]):
with open(sys.argv[2]) as f:
_evidence = json.load(f)
ok, reason = check(_env, _evidence)
if ok:
print(f"ATTESTATION PASS: {reason}")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print(f"ATTESTATION BLOCK: {reason}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)