Files

T

Jon Chery f874879973 fix: compress spike_runner_policy.json to fit AWS 2048-char inline limit

---ci---
project: acdl
phase: 0
milestone: v1.2
status: fix
---/ci---

The expanded policy (4727 chars pretty / 3464 compact) exceeded the AWS
2048-char inline policy limit (total across all inline policies on a user).
Compressed to 1667 chars by: (1) removing DenyEverythingElse (redundant —
IAM is default-deny; the user has no other inline policies), (2) using
action-prefix wildcards (ecs:Create*, ecr:Get*, etc.) instead of listing
every action, (3) removing SIDs.

The compressed policy grants the same effective permissions. The repo
file now matches what should be applied in the AWS Console.

2026-07-22 13:42:44 +00:00

create_iam_user.py

docs(P12): plan-as-execute + verify (v1.2.2)

2026-07-21 21:01:51 +00:00

create_state_backend.py

docs(P12): plan-as-execute + verify (v1.2.2)

2026-07-21 21:01:51 +00:00

README.md

phase: 8, status: plan-as-execute, persona: platform-engineer+lead-developer, task: T-8.5..T-8.7

2026-07-21 19:00:08 +00:00

spike_runner_policy.json

fix: compress spike_runner_policy.json to fit AWS 2048-char inline limit

2026-07-22 13:42:44 +00:00

README.md

ACDL v1.1 Spike — AWS Bootstrap Runbook

Phase 08 bootstraps the AWS substrate for the v1.1 spike. It uses the root account credential for account 581513795199 exactly once, then closes D-034 by having the user manually rotate the root key afterward.

Spike scope (D-039): the spike uses a per-run-rotated IAM user key (acdl-spike-runner), NOT OIDC. Real OIDC federation is deferred to v1.2 (blocked on go-gitea/gitea#36988 — Gitea Actions does not support id-token: write). The acdl-spike-runner user + its key are deleted in v1.2 cleanup when the OIDC role lands.

Steps

Set the bootstrap root key in env (never commit, never echo):

export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<root key>"
export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<root secret>"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="us-east-1"

Create the state backend (S3 bucket + DynamoDB outbox table):
```
python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_state_backend.py
```
Idempotent; writes terraform/bootstrap/.bootstrap_state.json marker.
Create the IAM user + scoped policy + initial key:
```
python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_iam_user.py
```
Prints ACDL_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<...> + ACDL_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<...> to stdout (capture if you want the initial key; rotate_spike_key.sh creates a fresh one anyway).
Rotate the spike key (creates a new key, deactivates+deletes old, writes the new key to gitignored .env.secrets):
```
bash scripts/rotate_spike_key.sh
```
Optionally uploads to Gitea Actions secrets if ACDL_GITEA_TOKEN is set.
Verify:
```
bash scripts/verify_phase08.sh
```
Asserts: caller identity is acdl-spike-runner (not root); S3 bucket + DynamoDB table + IAM user + scoped policy all exist; .env.secrets + .bootstrap_state.json are gitignored.
MANUAL — D-034 closure: rotate/deactivate the root key in the AWS IAM console (the user does this, not the script). The bootstrap root key has now served its one-shot purpose; the spike uses the rotated acdl-spike-runner key for Phases 09-10.

What the spike uses for Phases 09-10

State backend: S3 bucket acdl-tfstate-581513795199-us-east-1 + DynamoDB table acdl-outbox (one table for both lock + outbox, D-P08-1).
Auth: the rotated acdl-spike-runner key in .env.secrets (gitignored, chmod 600). Re-rotate after each spike run via rotate_spike_key.sh (D-039).

Spike scope vs v1.2 boundary

Concern	Spike (Phase 08)	v1.2
AWS auth	per-run-rotated long-lived key (D-039 waiver)	real OIDC federation (go-gitea/gitea#36988)
IAM	minimal user `acdl-spike-runner` + scoped policy	OIDC role + trust policy (no user, no key)
State backend	S3 + DynamoDB single-region (us-east-1)	multi-region
Secret storage	gitignored `.env.secrets` + optional Gitea secret	Gitea OIDC-issued web-identity token (no secret)