Files
acdl/terraform/bootstrap
Jon Chery 1d5c4d2ae7 phase: 8, status: plan-as-execute, persona: platform-engineer+lead-developer, task: T-8.5..T-8.7
---ci---
project: acdl
phase: 8
milestone: v1.1
status: plan-as-execute
persona: platform-engineer+lead-developer
task: [T-8.5, T-8.6, T-8.7]
requirements.covered: [REQ-23]
---/ci---

Waves 3+4: rotation script + verify script + README + .gitignore.

- T-8.5 (platform): scripts/rotate_spike_key.sh - boto3 with bootstrap
  root key from env (ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_*); creates new key for
  acdl-spike-runner, deactivates+deletes old, writes new to gitignored
  .env.secrets (chmod 600); idempotent (re-run ends with exactly 1
  active key); optional Gitea secret upload if ACDL_GITEA_TOKEN set;
  does NOT rotate the root key (D-034 closure = manual user step).

- T-8.6 (lead): scripts/verify_phase08.sh - loads rotated key from
  .env.secrets, asserts caller identity is acdl-spike-runner (not root),
  S3 bucket + DynamoDB table + IAM user + scoped policy with
  DenyEverythingElse all present, .env.secrets + .bootstrap_state.json
  gitignored. Uses heredoc python to avoid bash quoting issues.

- T-8.7 (lead): terraform/bootstrap/README.md runbook (6 steps incl.
  manual D-034 root-key rotation) + .gitignore (.env.secrets +
  .bootstrap_state.json). Spike vs v1.2 boundary table.

bash -n + gitignore checks pass.
2026-07-21 19:00:08 +00:00
..

ACDL v1.1 Spike — AWS Bootstrap Runbook

Phase 08 bootstraps the AWS substrate for the v1.1 spike. It uses the root account credential for account 581513795199 exactly once, then closes D-034 by having the user manually rotate the root key afterward.

Spike scope (D-039): the spike uses a per-run-rotated IAM user key (acdl-spike-runner), NOT OIDC. Real OIDC federation is deferred to v1.2 (blocked on go-gitea/gitea#36988 — Gitea Actions does not support id-token: write). The acdl-spike-runner user + its key are deleted in v1.2 cleanup when the OIDC role lands.

Steps

  1. Set the bootstrap root key in env (never commit, never echo):

    export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<root key>"
    export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<root secret>"
    export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="us-east-1"
    
  2. Create the state backend (S3 bucket + DynamoDB outbox table):

    python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_state_backend.py
    

    Idempotent; writes terraform/bootstrap/.bootstrap_state.json marker.

  3. Create the IAM user + scoped policy + initial key:

    python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_iam_user.py
    

    Prints ACDL_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<...> + ACDL_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<...> to stdout (capture if you want the initial key; rotate_spike_key.sh creates a fresh one anyway).

  4. Rotate the spike key (creates a new key, deactivates+deletes old, writes the new key to gitignored .env.secrets):

    bash scripts/rotate_spike_key.sh
    

    Optionally uploads to Gitea Actions secrets if ACDL_GITEA_TOKEN is set.

  5. Verify:

    bash scripts/verify_phase08.sh
    

    Asserts: caller identity is acdl-spike-runner (not root); S3 bucket + DynamoDB table + IAM user + scoped policy all exist; .env.secrets + .bootstrap_state.json are gitignored.

  6. MANUAL — D-034 closure: rotate/deactivate the root key in the AWS IAM console (the user does this, not the script). The bootstrap root key has now served its one-shot purpose; the spike uses the rotated acdl-spike-runner key for Phases 09-10.

What the spike uses for Phases 09-10

  • State backend: S3 bucket acdl-tfstate-581513795199-us-east-1 + DynamoDB table acdl-outbox (one table for both lock + outbox, D-P08-1).
  • Auth: the rotated acdl-spike-runner key in .env.secrets (gitignored, chmod 600). Re-rotate after each spike run via rotate_spike_key.sh (D-039).

Spike scope vs v1.2 boundary

Concern Spike (Phase 08) v1.2
AWS auth per-run-rotated long-lived key (D-039 waiver) real OIDC federation (go-gitea/gitea#36988)
IAM minimal user acdl-spike-runner + scoped policy OIDC role + trust policy (no user, no key)
State backend S3 + DynamoDB single-region (us-east-1) multi-region
Secret storage gitignored .env.secrets + optional Gitea secret Gitea OIDC-issued web-identity token (no secret)