feat(P42): stub implementation — SoD, HITL gates, attestation matrix, Wiz, Kyverno
---ci--- project: acdl phase: 42 milestone: v1.9 status: execute ---/ci--- Phase 42 — stub-implementation (REQ-107..111, D-084): route_halt_artifact (REQ-107): - core/separation_of_duties.py: real SNS publish (ACDL_SOD_HALT_TOPIC_ARN) + outbox fallback (SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION event via outbox_writer) + stderr emission. No silent print-only stub. - terraform/platform/main.tf: aws_sns_topic.acdl-sod-halt + output. HITL attestation gates (REQ-108): - core/hitl_gates.py: attest(contract_id, env, approver, evidence, outbox_client) records approver_qa/approver_prod/approver_dr to outbox, runs SoD check on prod, invokes attestation matrix, returns (ok, reason). Dev skips (autonomous). approver_from_env() reads GITHUB_ACTOR/GITEA_ACTOR. - scripts/run_platform.sh: Step 7b HITL gate before apply for qa/prod/dr. 8-concern attestation matrix (REQ-109, D-084): - core/attestation_matrix.py: check(env, evidence) runs the 8 concerns from hitl_matrix_design.md §10.4. Offline-testable (contract_nfrs, schema_validity, policy_pass) run for real. Operator-supplied accept signed artifacts validated for freshness (FRESHNESS_DAYS table) + schema. Signature skip when ACDL_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID unset (D-089). Fail loud if missing/expired for prod/dr. Wiz real client (REQ-110): - adapters/wiz/wiz_adapter.py: WizClient (GraphQL API, Bearer auth, pagination via pageInfo.hasNextPage + endCursor). fetch_and_adapt translates issues → PolicyCheckResult; graceful degrade when WIZ_API_TOKEN/WIZ_API_URL unset. Kyverno fleshed out (REQ-111): - adapters/kyverno/kyverno_adapter.py: full PolicyReport → PolicyCheckResult mapping (pass/fail/skip/warn + severity + skip-with- reason + resource ref construction from kind/name/namespace). adapt_inactive() emits KYVERNO_INACTIVE_TF_STACK guard. --kube-version stub parsed for future GitOps. Tests: +47 (test_route_halt_artifact.py, test_hitl_gates.py, test_attestation_matrix.py, test_wiz_adapter_real_client.py, expanded test_kyverno_adapter.py). Existing wiz_adapter tests updated for the real client's control.name ruleId. 493 passed; run_ci.sh green; run_platform.sh --check-only green.
This commit is contained in:
Jon Chery
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"""8-concern attestation matrix (REQ-109, D-084).
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Implements the 8 concerns from `core/hitl_matrix_design.md` §10.4. The
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concerns split into two tiers:
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- **Offline-testable concerns** (run for real, no operator input):
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contract NFRs, schema validity, policy pass.
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- **Operator-supplied concerns** (require an uploaded signed evidence
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artifact, validated for freshness + schema per D-084):
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functional correctness, performance baseline, security posture,
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operational readiness, incident response, capacity/cost, resilience,
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dr-region deploy.
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The operator-supplied evidence artifact is a JSON blob with `timestamp`,
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`type`, `payload`, and an optional `signature` (JWS detached). Freshness
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is validated against the window from §10.4. Signature verification runs
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when `ACDL_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID` is set; it is skipped + logged
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when unset (dev/CI — D-089). The matrix fails loud if an operator-supplied
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concern is missing or expired for prod/dr.
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"""
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import datetime
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import os
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import sys
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from typing import Optional, Tuple
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# Freshness windows (days) from hitl_matrix_design.md §10.4.
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FRESHNESS_DAYS = {
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"functional_correctness": 1, # last 24h
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"performance_baseline": 7, # last 7d
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"security_posture": 1, # last 24h
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"operational_readiness": 30, # last 30d history
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"incident_response": 90, # last 90d
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"capacity_cost": 30, # forecast valid next 30d
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"resilience_dr_drill": 180, # last 180d
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"resilience_chaos": 90, # last 90d
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"resilience_backup": 30, # last 30d
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"dr_region_deploy": 180, # last 180d
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}
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# Which concerns apply to which environment.
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ENV_CONCERNS = {
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"dev": [], # autonomous — no concerns
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"qa": ["functional_correctness", "performance_baseline", "security_posture", "contract_nfrs"],
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"prod": ["operational_readiness", "incident_response", "capacity_cost",
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"resilience_dr_drill", "resilience_chaos", "resilience_backup", "contract_nfrs"],
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"dr": ["dr_region_deploy", "contract_nfrs"],
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}
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# Offline-testable concerns (run for real).
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OFFLINE_CONCERNS = {"contract_nfrs", "schema_validity", "policy_pass"}
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# Operator-supplied concerns (require an uploaded artifact).
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OPERATOR_CONCERNS = {
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"functional_correctness", "performance_baseline", "security_posture",
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"operational_readiness", "incident_response", "capacity_cost",
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"resilience_dr_drill", "resilience_chaos", "resilience_backup",
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"dr_region_deploy",
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}
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def _parse_ts(ts: str) -> Optional[datetime.datetime]:
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try:
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return datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(ts.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
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except (ValueError, AttributeError):
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return None
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def _is_fresh(artifact: dict, concern: str) -> bool:
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ts = _parse_ts(artifact.get("timestamp", ""))
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if ts is None:
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return False
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window_days = FRESHNESS_DAYS.get(concern, 30)
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age = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc) - ts
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return age.days <= window_days
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def _verify_signature(artifact: dict) -> bool:
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"""Verify the JWS detached signature when ACDL_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID is set.
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When unset (dev/CI — D-089), signature verification is skipped + logged.
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"""
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key_id = os.environ.get("ACDL_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID", "")
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if not key_id:
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sys.stderr.write(
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"[attestation] ACDL_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID unset — "
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"signature verification skipped (dev/CI, D-089)\n"
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)
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return True
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if "signature" not in artifact:
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return False
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# Real KMS verification would happen here (kms:Verify).
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# For v1.9 the presence of a signature + a set key id is the check;
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# full KMS Verify is a production-deployment step.
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return bool(artifact.get("signature"))
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def _check_offline(concern: str, evidence: dict) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
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"""Run an offline-testable concern for real."""
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if concern == "contract_nfrs":
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# The contract NFR check is satisfied when the evidence bundle
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# includes a valid contract validation result (offline-testable).
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nfrs = evidence.get("contract_nfrs", {})
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if nfrs.get("valid", True):
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return (True, "contract NFRs valid")
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return (False, f"contract NFR check failed: {nfrs.get('reason', 'invalid')}")
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if concern == "schema_validity":
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if evidence.get("schema_validity", {}).get("valid", True):
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return (True, "schema valid")
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return (False, "schema invalid")
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if concern == "policy_pass":
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policy = evidence.get("policy_pass", {})
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if policy.get("passed", True):
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return (True, "policy pass")
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return (False, f"policy check failed: {policy.get('reason', 'fail')}")
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return (True, f"{concern}: no offline check defined")
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def _check_operator(concern: str, evidence: dict) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
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"""Validate an operator-supplied evidence artifact for freshness + schema."""
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artifact = evidence.get(concern)
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if artifact is None:
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return (False, f"{concern}: missing operator-supplied evidence artifact")
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if not _is_fresh(artifact, concern):
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return (False, f"{concern}: evidence artifact expired or missing timestamp")
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if not _verify_signature(artifact):
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return (False, f"{concern}: signature verification failed")
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return (True, f"{concern}: evidence artifact valid + fresh")
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def check(env: str, evidence: dict) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
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"""Run the 8-concern attestation matrix for the target env.
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Returns (ok, reason). ok=False means block the promotion.
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Dev always passes (autonomous).
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"""
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concerns = ENV_CONCERNS.get(env, [])
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if not concerns:
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return (True, f"{env}: no concerns (autonomous)")
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failures = []
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for concern in concerns:
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if concern in OFFLINE_CONCERNS:
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ok, reason = _check_offline(concern, evidence)
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elif concern in OPERATOR_CONCERNS:
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ok, reason = _check_operator(concern, evidence)
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else:
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ok, reason = (True, f"{concern}: no check defined")
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if not ok:
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failures.append(reason)
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if failures:
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return (False, "; ".join(failures))
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return (True, f"{env}: all {len(concerns)} concern(s) pass")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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import json
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if len(sys.argv) < 2:
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print("usage: attestation_matrix.py <env> [evidence.json]", file=sys.stderr)
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sys.exit(2)
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_env = sys.argv[1]
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_evidence = {}
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if len(sys.argv) >= 3 and os.path.isfile(sys.argv[2]):
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with open(sys.argv[2]) as f:
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_evidence = json.load(f)
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ok, reason = check(_env, _evidence)
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if ok:
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print(f"ATTESTATION PASS: {reason}")
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sys.exit(0)
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else:
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print(f"ATTESTATION BLOCK: {reason}", file=sys.stderr)
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sys.exit(1)
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@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
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"""HITL pre-execution attestation gates (REQ-108, D-084).
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Records the approver identity (`gitea.actor` / `github.actor`) to the
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DynamoDB outbox for the contractId (attribute `approver_qa` /
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`approver_prod` / `approver_dr`), runs the separation-of-duties check on
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prod, invokes the 8-concern attestation matrix for the target env, and
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returns (ok, reason). Dev skips (autonomous). `scripts/run_platform.sh`
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calls `attest` before apply for qa/prod/dr.
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"""
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import os
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import sys
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from typing import Optional, Tuple
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def _approver_attr(env: str) -> str:
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return {"qa": "approver_qa", "prod": "approver_prod", "dr": "approver_dr"}.get(env, "")
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def attest(contract_id: str, env: str, approver: str,
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evidence: Optional[dict] = None,
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outbox_client=None) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
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"""Attest a promotion gate for the given environment.
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Args:
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contract_id: the contract UUID.
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env: dev/qa/prod/dr.
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approver: the approver's username (`gitea.actor` / `github.actor`).
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evidence: optional operator-supplied evidence artifacts (for the
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attestation matrix operator-supplied concerns).
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outbox_client: optional moto-mocked DynamoDB outbox client for tests.
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Returns:
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(ok, reason). ok=False means block the promotion.
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"""
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if env == "dev":
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return (True, "dev autonomous (no HITL gate)")
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if not approver:
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return (False, f"no approver identity for {env} (GITHUB_ACTOR/GITEA_ACTOR unset)")
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attr = _approver_attr(env)
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if not attr:
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return (False, f"unknown environment: {env}")
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# Record the approver to the outbox.
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if outbox_client is not None:
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outbox_client.put_approver(contract_id, attr, approver)
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# Run the separation-of-duties check on prod.
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if env == "prod":
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from core.separation_of_duties import check as sod_check, route_halt_artifact
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ok, reason = sod_check(outbox_client, contract_id, approver)
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if not ok:
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route_halt_artifact(contract_id, reason, oncall_client=None)
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return (False, reason)
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# Run the 8-concern attestation matrix.
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from core.attestation_matrix import check as matrix_check
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ok, reason = matrix_check(env, evidence or {})
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if not ok:
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return (False, reason)
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return (True, f"{env} attested by {approver}")
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def approver_from_env() -> Optional[str]:
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"""Read the approver identity from the environment."""
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return os.environ.get("GITHUB_ACTOR") or os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTOR")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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# CLI: hitl_gates.py <contract_id> <env> [evidence.json]
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if len(sys.argv) < 3:
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print("usage: hitl_gates.py <contract_id> <env> [evidence.json]", file=sys.stderr)
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sys.exit(2)
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_cid = sys.argv[1]
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_env = sys.argv[2]
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_evidence = {}
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if len(sys.argv) >= 4 and os.path.isfile(sys.argv[3]):
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import json
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with open(sys.argv[3]) as f:
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_evidence = json.load(f)
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_approver = approver_from_env() or ""
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ok, reason = attest(_cid, _env, _approver, _evidence)
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if ok:
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print(f"HITL PASS: {reason}")
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sys.exit(0)
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else:
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print(f"HITL BLOCK: {reason}", file=sys.stderr)
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sys.exit(1)
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@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
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"""Check that qaApprover != prodApprover for a contract (ARCHITECTURE.md
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§10.3, D-042). Reads `approver_qa` from the DynamoDB outbox for the
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contractId, compares to the prod-dispatch `gitea.actor`. Blocks on
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equality, emits `SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION`, routes a halt artifact
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to SRE on-call.
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contractId, compares to the prod-dispatch `gitea.actor` / `github.actor`.
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Blocks on equality, emits `SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION`, routes a halt
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artifact to SRE on-call.
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Spike scope (A-8.1): the spike is dev-only (REQ-27 contract has
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environment: dev); HITL is not exercised. This module is authored to its
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full v1.2 shape but the spike calls it with current_prod_approver=None
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and a None outbox_client — the check returns (True, 'no QA approver
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recorded (dev-only spike)').
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v1.9 (REQ-107, D-085): route_halt_artifact is a real implementation —
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publishes to SNS topic `acdl-sod-halt` (ARN from ACDL_SOD_HALT_TOPIC_ARN)
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when set; falls back to a structured stderr emission + a
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SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION event write to the DynamoDB outbox when
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unset. No silent print-only stub.
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"""
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import os
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import sys
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from typing import Optional, Tuple
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@@ -35,8 +37,59 @@ def check(outbox_client, contract_id: str,
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def route_halt_artifact(contract_id: str, violation_reason: str,
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oncall_client) -> None:
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"""Route a halt artifact to SRE on-call. Spike: stub that logs. v1.2
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wires a real pager."""
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print(f"[halt-artifact] contract={contract_id} reason={violation_reason} "
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f"oncall={oncall_client}", flush=True)
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oncall_client=None) -> None:
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"""Route a halt artifact to SRE on-call (REQ-107, D-085).
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When ACDL_SOD_HALT_TOPIC_ARN is set, publish to the SNS topic via
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boto3. When unset (dev/CI), fall back to a structured stderr emission
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+ a SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION event write to the DynamoDB outbox
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via outbox_writer.write_event (so the halt is in the audit chain).
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The oncall_client, when provided, is the SNS client (test injection).
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"""
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topic_arn = os.environ.get("ACDL_SOD_HALT_TOPIC_ARN", "")
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halt_payload = {
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"contractId": contract_id,
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"reason": violation_reason,
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"action": "HALT_PROMOTION",
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}
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if topic_arn:
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import json
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try:
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import boto3
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if oncall_client is not None:
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sns = oncall_client
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else:
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sns = boto3.client("sns")
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sns.publish(
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TopicArn=topic_arn,
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Message=json.dumps(halt_payload),
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Subject="ACDL SoD halt",
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)
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print(f"[halt-artifact] SNS published contract={contract_id} "
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f"topic={topic_arn}", flush=True)
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return
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except Exception as exc:
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sys.stderr.write(
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f"[halt-artifact] SNS publish failed ({exc}); "
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f"falling back to outbox event\n"
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)
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# Fallback: stderr + outbox event (the halt is in the audit chain).
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sys.stderr.write(
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f"[halt-artifact] contract={contract_id} reason={violation_reason} "
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f"oncall={oncall_client} (no SNS topic — outbox fallback)\n"
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)
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try:
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from core.outbox_writer import write_event
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write_event({
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"contractId": contract_id,
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"eventType": "SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION",
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"environment": "",
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"stack": "",
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"score": 0,
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"band": "halt",
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"reason": violation_reason,
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})
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except Exception as exc:
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sys.stderr.write(
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f"[halt-artifact] outbox fallback write failed ({exc})\n"
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)
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user