From cf8aa53c8dafa6b1cc0a0cc4dbfcb30b7e1333c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Chery Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2026 21:20:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?docs(P00):=20grill=20=E2=80=94=20v1.26=20advers?= =?UTF-8?q?arial=20review=20(9=20challenges,=20PROCEED=200.84,=202=20revis?= =?UTF-8?q?ions)?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit ---ci--- project: acdl phase: 0 milestone: v1.26 status: grill verdict: PROCEED confidence: 0.84 revisions: [G-Q4 REQ-322 to P2 W0, G-Q6 enforcement-deferred note, G-Q9 key-split future item] ---/ci--- --- .ciagent/CHECKPOINT.json | 4 +- .ciagent/GRILL.md | 355 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- .ciagent/PLAN.md | 25 ++- 3 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 177 deletions(-) diff --git a/.ciagent/CHECKPOINT.json b/.ciagent/CHECKPOINT.json index 4915114..52b76fe 100644 --- a/.ciagent/CHECKPOINT.json +++ b/.ciagent/CHECKPOINT.json @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ { "phase": 0, - "stage": "plan", + "stage": "grill", "milestone": "v1.26", "phase_role": "pre_execution", "attempts": 0, - "updated_at": "2026-08-12T21:15:00Z", + "updated_at": "2026-08-12T21:16:00Z", "project": "acdl", "projects": ["acdl", "nova-blockchain-exchange"], "active_milestone": "v1.26", diff --git a/.ciagent/GRILL.md b/.ciagent/GRILL.md index 929414b..08a4734 100644 --- a/.ciagent/GRILL.md +++ b/.ciagent/GRILL.md @@ -1,14 +1,15 @@ -# GRILL — v1.25 kyverno-json Unified Policy Engine +# GRILL — v1.26 Live Pilot Estate Activation -> Adversarial review of the v1.25 SPECIFY + CLARIFY + RESEARCH + IDEATE + +> Adversarial review of the v1.26 SPECIFY + CLARIFY + RESEARCH + IDEATE + > PLAN. The grill red-teams the proposal across feasibility, scope, -> budget, and the swap-boundary claim. Each challenge gets a binding -> verdict (PROCEED / REVISE / ESCALATE). Autonomy: full — escalations -> auto-resolve with assumption logging unless confidence < 0.60. +> budget, and the domain claims (homegrown blockchain, pilot estate, +> metric grounding). Each challenge gets a binding verdict +> (PROCEED / REVISE / ESCALATE). Autonomy: full — escalations auto- +> resolve with assumption logging unless confidence < 0.60. -## Verdict: PROCEED (0.86) — 0 escalations, 2 revisions +## Verdict: PROCEED (0.84) — 0 escalations, 2 revisions -The milestone is feasible, scoped, and the swap boundary is real. Two +The milestone is feasible, scoped, and the domain claims hold. Two plan revisions are binding (G-Q4, G-Q8) and are already captured in PLAN.md. No work is blocked. @@ -16,201 +17,209 @@ PLAN.md. No work is blocked. ## Challenges -### G-Q1 — Does kyverno-json violate "platform functions without AI"? +### G-Q1 — Is a homegrown PoA blockchain viable for a pilot, or is it reckless? -**Challenge:** NORTH_STAR.md Strategic Objective #2 says "the platform -functions without AI." kyverno-json is a new runtime dependency. Is -this a real violation, or is the tenet about LLMs (not deterministic -engines)? +**Challenge:** Authoring a blockchain (even a minimal PoA ledger) is a +non-trivial domain. A homegrown chain could have correctness bugs (hash +chain breaks, non-deterministic blocks, settlement-finality race +conditions). Why not use a proven chain (Ethereum L2, Solana, Hyperledger +Fabric)? -**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.95). kyverno-json is deterministic -(same policy + payload → same result, every run). The tenet -distinguishes AI (non-reproducible) from automation (reproducible). -kyverno-json is the latter — and is *more* aligned than the imperative -Python it replaces (`core/env_transition.py`, `core/regression_verify.py`) -because the policy is declarative (visible, auditable). The -`is_configured()` guard ensures the platform runs without the binary. -Already resolved as D-120 in CLARIFY. No revision needed. +**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.88). The pilot's purpose is to +exercise the Nova platform's deploy/policy/attestation gates over a +real consumer estate — not to build a production blockchain. A +homegrown PoA ledger is the minimal viable chain: append-only blocks, +single validator, SHA-256 hash chain, deterministic block production. +This is ~200 lines of Python (block + ledger + validator). The chain +needs to be real enough to record transactions + produce a settlement- +finality signal for the kyverno-json policy (REQ-315) — not to solve +Byzantine consensus. A proven chain (Ethereum/Solana/Hyperledger) would +be the *consumer app's* choice, not the platform's; the platform is +chain-agnostic. For the pilot, the homegrown chain avoids a heavyweight +external dependency (a full node, smart contracts, gas models) that +would obscure the platform-gates demonstration. REQ-310 tests cover +chain integrity, hash determinism, genesis, append/verify — the +correctness surface is bounded. Multi-validator BFT is a future +milestone (D-201). No revision needed. -### G-Q2 — Is the PolicyEngine protocol over-engineered for a 2-engine future? +### G-Q2 — Does "all types of securities" scope-explode the milestone? -**Challenge:** The user asked for a swappable adapter ("we might one -day decide to replace it with something else like OPA"). A Python -Protocol + registry is ~40 lines. But Nova has 1 engine today. Is this -premature abstraction? +**Challenge:** The user said "offering all types of securities." Equities +(D-200, pilot scope) is one type. Bonds (T+2), derivatives (varying), +options (exercise models) have very different settlement models. Does +the equities-only deferral betray the user's intent? -**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.85). The user *explicitly* asked for -the swap boundary — this is not speculative abstraction, it's a -stated requirement. The protocol is minimal (3 methods) and the OPA- -equivalent surface is documented (RESEARCH §4.2) — the swap is a known -quantity, not a hope. The cost is ~40 lines of Python + a config key; -the benefit is a documented, tested swap boundary that a future -milestone implements without re-architecting. This is the moat (NORTH -STAR Objective #2 — provable trust via a replaceable substrate, not a -vendor lock-in). +**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.85). The user *chose* equities-only +pilot (Q4 in the plan discussion, answer "A to all 3 questions" — the +recommended scope). "All types of securities" is the *product vision*; +v1.26 is the *pilot* (equities first). The roadmap documents the +deferral. The pilot demonstrates the Nova platform's gates over the +simplest settlement model (T+1); expanding to other security types is +a straightforward extension (new settlement-service branches + new +kyverno-json policies) once the platform-gates pattern is proven. No +revision needed — the scope decision is the user's, not the grill's. -### G-Q3 — Does wrapping checkov findings in kyverno-json meta-policies break the MTTR < 60s target? +### G-Q3 — Does the consumer-repo-as-2nd-project break single-project tooling? -**Challenge:** NORTH_STAR.md MTTR target: < 60s p95. Adding a second -engine pass over the terraform plan + a meta-policy pass over the -merged PCR list adds latency. Does this break the target? +**Challenge:** CIAgent has been single-project since v1.0. v1.26 +activates multi-project mode (2 projects: `acdl` + +`nova-blockchain-exchange`). Does this break assumptions in the +CIAgent tooling (branch naming, `.ciagent/` paths, commit `---ci---` +blocks)? -**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.88). RESEARCH §5 analyzes: the kj -pass over plan JSON is < 1s (Go binary startup + JMESPath over a small -plan); it runs **in parallel** with Checkov (REQ-301), so wall-clock -impact is `max(checkov_time, kj_time)` ≈ checkov_time. Meta-policies -run in-memory over the merged list (< 10ms). Total MTTR impact: < 1s -on a 5-15s step. **Binding revision (G-Q3a):** P3 VERIFY must include a -timing assertion — `run_platform.sh` Step 5 wall-clock with vs without -kj must be within 1s (or kj must be faster than checkov, which is -expected). Captured as a P3 verify gate, not a PLAN change. +**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.90). `run.md` Step 0 explicitly +specifies multi-project mode: `projects[]` with length > 0, +`active_projects` array, `.ciagent//` subdirectory paths, branch +prefixes `/`. The `---ci---` block gains a `project: ` +field (already in the v1.26 commits). The consumer's project files +live in `.ciagent/nova-blockchain-exchange/`. The platform's existing +flat `.ciagent/` files remain the primary set (the platform is the +default project). Branch naming: the consumer's phases use +`nova-blockchain-exchange/phase/01-...`; the platform's phases use +`acdl/phase/03-...` (or flat `phase/03-...` for platform-level work). +No tooling change needed — the multi-project spec is already in +`run.md`. D-206 records this. No revision needed. -### G-Q4 — Plan revision: NullEngine fallback may mask misconfiguration +### G-Q4 — Does the P2 contract reference a `dynamodb` module that doesn't exist until P3? -**Challenge:** PLAN.md P1 says "existing tests pass (NullEngine -fallback when `policy` key absent in test config)." But the v1.25 -config.json *sets* the `policy` key. So existing tests that load the -real config get `KyvernoJsonEngine` with `is_configured()==false` → -`SKIPPED`. The NullEngine fallback only triggers when the key is -*absent*. Is there a gap where a test expects `NullEngine` but gets -`KyvernoJsonEngine` (skipped)? +**Challenge:** The original plan had REQ-322 (DynamoDB primitive) in +P3, but the P2 contract (REQ-313) references `dynamodb` in its +`infrastructure` block. If the primitive doesn't exist until P3, the +P2 contract's `dynamodb` block can't resolve at registry time — only +at schema time (the schema is open). Is this a vertical-slice +violation (P2 ships a contract that can't fully resolve)? -**Verdict:** REVISE (confidence 0.82). The fallback path is correct -but the PLAN wording is ambiguous. **Binding revision:** P1 must -explicitly test *both* paths: (a) `policy` key absent → `NullEngine` -→ `SKIPPED` PCR; (b) `policy` key present + `which kj` false → -`KyvernoJsonEngine` → `is_configured()==false` → `SKIPPED` PCR with -`KJ_ENGINE_NOT_CONFIGURED` (distinct from NullEngine's -`NULL_ENGINE_INACTIVE`). The two `SKIPPED` PCRs have different -`ruleId`s so audit can distinguish "policy disabled" from "engine not -installed." PLAN.md P1 verification is amended to assert both paths. -Already reflected in REQ-291 (NullEngine) + REQ-293 -(`KJ_ENGINE_NOT_CONFIGURED`). No requirement change — PLAN wording -clarified. +**Verdict:** REVISE (confidence 0.92). This is a real vertical-slice +violation. PLAN.md already revised: REQ-322 moves to P2 W0 (before the +contract). The revised mapping (PLAN.md "Revised: REQ-322 → P2 W0") +makes P2 self-contained: the primitive + the contract + the deploy +invocation all land in P2. This is a binding revision — the original +P3 placement is superseded. ROADMAP.md is already updated (REQ-322 in +P2). No further revision needed — the plan self-corrected. -### G-Q5 — Policy explosion: 4 targets × N rules = maintenance load +### G-Q5 — Does live-AWS pilot break the MTTR < 60s target? -**Challenge:** v1.25 adds ~13 policy files (4 contract + 3 stack-IR + -3 plan-JSON + 2 meta + 3 regression + 1 smoke). Each is a YAML file -with JMESPath. Is this a maintenance burden that grows unbounded? +**Challenge:** NORTH_STAR.md MTTR target: < 60s p95. The pilot runs +`terraform apply` (creating real AWS resources: ECS + DynamoDB + S3). +Apply latency for a 3-resource stack is typically 2-5 minutes (ECS +service creation is the slow step). Does this break the MTTR target? -**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.80). 13 policies is manageable — -each is < 30 lines of YAML, co-located per target dir, and the meta- -policy cross-check (`tagging-rules-agree`) keeps the set auditable. -The growth rate is bounded by the module count (module owners author -per-module policies, documented in P4 STANDARDS.md). The alternative -(imperative Python in `regression_verify.py` + `env_transition.py`) is -*less* auditable — the policies are a net improvement. No revision. +**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.86). The MTTR target is for +*platform-detected + platform-remediated incidents* (apply.failed → +successful retry), not for first-time apply latency. The pilot's +first apply is a deployment, not an incident-remediation. The MTTR +metric measures the retry path: if the apply fails (e.g. IAM +permission), the platform retries — the retry MTTR is the time from +`apply.failed` to `apply.succeeded`, which is < 60s for a retry (the +resources are already partially created; the retry completes the +remaining steps). The pilot's apply latency is a deployment metric +(lead time), not an MTTR metric. RESEARCH §1.2 (v1.25 grill G-Q3) +analyzed this same question for the kyverno-json pass — the same +reasoning applies. No revision needed. -### G-Q6 — The tagging cross-check (D-118) is the only redundant rule — is it worth the complexity? +### G-Q6 — Is the settlement-finality policy (REQ-315) over-engineering for a pilot? -**Challenge:** D-118 keeps `NOVA_TAG_NAMING` (Checkov) AND adds -`KJ_REQUIRE_TAGGING_STANDARD` (kyverno-json) with a `tagging-rules-agree` -meta-policy. This is the only case where two engines evaluate the same -concern. Is the defense-in-depth worth the complexity? +**Challenge:** A kyverno-json policy asserting settlement finality +(`all_committed: true`) before promotion is a securities-specific +extension of v1.25's policy engine. Is this over-engineering for a +pilot that only runs in `dev` (autonomous, no promotion to qa/prod/dr +in v1.26 per D-208)? -**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.82). The tagging standard is the -highest-impact rule (v1.8 D-tagging-standard, v1.10 re-verification — -the rule that gates every resource). Redundancy here is intentional: -the Checkov rule catches HCL-level violations; the kj policy catches -IR-level violations (before terraform runs); the meta-policy catches -engine drift. The cost is 2 policy files + 1 meta-policy; the benefit -is that a tagging violation can't slip through a single engine's -blind spot. This is the textbook defense-in-depth case. No revision. +**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.80). The policy is *authored* in +v1.26 (P3) but its *enforcement* activates when a promotion to qa/prod +happens — which is a *future* milestone (D-208: qa/prod/dr stay +placeholder this milestone). The policy is tested (passing + failing +fixtures; skip when `kj` absent) in P3, but it doesn't gate a `dev` +apply (the pilot-readiness policy REQ-320 gates `dev`; the settlement- +finality policy gates promotions). Authoring + testing the policy in +v1.26 is the right thing: it (a) proves the kyverno-json engine can +assert a domain invariant, (b) ships the policy artifact so a future +milestone that binds qa/prod/dr can enable it without re-architecting, +(c) extends v1.25's moat (the policy engine is swappable + extensible +to new domains). The cost is ~1 policy file + 1 test file. No revision +needed — but the POLICY IS NOT ENFORCED in v1.26 (it's authored + +tested, enforcement is future). PLAN.md should note this. **Minor +revision: PLAN.md P3 W4 Task 4.1 should note "policy authored + tested; +enforcement deferred to the milestone that binds qa/prod/dr."** Already +implicit in the plan (the policy gates promotions, not dev applies); +making it explicit is a documentation refinement, not a scope change. -### G-Q7 — Can `kj scan` actually evaluate the merged PCR list as a payload? +### G-Q7 — Is D-083 deferral defensible for a pilot with real money-like flows? -**Challenge:** The meta-policies (REQ-303) consume the merged -`list[PolicyCheckResult]` as their payload. `kj scan` expects a JSON/ -YAML *file*. Is the PCR list a valid kyverno-json payload shape? +**Challenge:** The pilot is a stock exchange — securities trading. D-083 +(S3 Object Lock / JWS tamper-evident ledger) is deferred (D-204). The +SQLite hash-chain + DynamoDB outbox is the audit record. Is this +defensible for a domain where audit integrity is legally mandated? -**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.85). The PCR list is a JSON array -of objects — a valid kyverno-json payload. The `~` modifier iterates -the array; JMESPath asserts over each PCR's `severity`/`result`/ -`ruleId`/`resourceRef` fields. The engine writes the list to a temp -JSON file and invokes `kj scan --payload `. This is verified in -P3 `test_meta_policies.py`. No revision — but **binding note (G-Q7a):** -the `KyvernoJsonEngine.evaluate()` must accept a `list[dict]` payload -(not just a `dict`) — the `payload: dict | str` signature in RESEARCH -§4.1 is too narrow. **Revision:** the protocol signature is -`payload: dict | list | str` (a list is a valid payload for meta- -policies). Captured in REQ-291 + REQ-293 (the engine writes whatever -JSON-serializable payload it receives to the temp file). PLAN.md P1 -amended. +**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.82). The pilot is a *technical +demonstration*, not a production trading system. No real money, no real +securities, no real investors — the "securities" are test tokens on a +homegrown chain. The audit integrity requirement (SEC Rule 17a-4, FINRA +retention) applies to *production* trading systems, not to a pilot +exercising a platform's deploy/policy/attestation gates. The SQLite +hash-chain + DynamoDB outbox is a tamper-*evident* record (any tampering +breaks the hash chain) — it's just not tamper-*resistant* (S3 Object +Lock + JWS would make it tamper-resistant). For a pilot, tamper-evident +suffices. D-083 lift is a future milestone (when the pilot becomes a +production system). D-204 records this. No revision needed. -### G-Q8 — Plan revision: the OPA swap surface claims (RESEARCH §4.2) are unverified +### G-Q8 — Does the outcome-backfill emitter (REQ-317) touch the PCR schema? -**Challenge:** RESEARCH §4.2 documents the OPA-equivalent surface -(`opa eval -d -i `), but no `OpaEngine` is implemented in -v1.25. Is the swap-boundary claim testable, or is it aspirational? +**Challenge:** REQ-317 wires `apply.completed`/`apply.failed` → +`fact_decision.outcome`. The v1.25 hard constraint says "DO NOT change +`schemas/policy_check_result.schema.json`." Does the backfill touch the +PCR schema? -**Verdict:** REVISE (confidence 0.78). The swap-boundary claim is -*testable in v1.25* without implementing OPA: the `PolicyEngine` -Protocol + registry is the contract; the `NullEngine` proves a second -implementation exists (structural conformance). **Binding revision -(G-Q8a):** P1 `test_policy_engine.py` must include a -`test_protocol_conformance_null_engine` that asserts `NullEngine` -satisfies the `PolicyEngine` Protocol (via -`isinstance(NullEngine(), PolicyEngine)` under `runtime_checkable`). -This proves the protocol is *real* (a second engine implements it) -without implementing OPA. The OPA-equivalent surface in RESEARCH §4.2 -stays as documentation (the future milestone implements it). PLAN.md -P1 verification amended. No requirement change — the test is already -in REQ-308 ("protocol conformance"). +**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.95). D-211 (CLARIFY) already +resolved this: the outcome backfill touches the *metrics cold store* +(`fact_decision` table in `metrics/nova_metrics.db`), not the PCR +schema. The backfill reads run-manifest events (not PCRs) and updates +the decision's outcome column. The PCR schema is unchanged. This +respects the v1.25 hard constraint. No revision needed. -### G-Q9 — Budget: is 4 execution phases + P5 too many for the scope? +### G-Q9 — Does the `NOVA_AWS_*` root-equivalent key create a security risk? -**Challenge:** v1.25 is 19 requirements across 6 phases. Recent -milestones: v1.24 had 15 reqs / 4 phases; v1.23 had 13 reqs / 7 phases. -Is 6 phases too many (overhead) or too few (per-phase overload)? +**Challenge:** D-207 says `NOVA_AWS_*` has root-equivalent permissions +(confirmed empirically: the bootstrap created the S3 bucket + DynamoDB +table). Using a root key for the pilot's `terraform apply` is a +security risk — a key compromise gives full account access. Should the +pilot use a least-privilege key? -**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.85). 19 reqs / 6 phases ≈ 3.2 reqs/ -phase — within the v1.24 cadence (3.75 reqs/phase). The phases are -vertical slices (each ships a working increment): P1 engine works -end-to-end with a smoke policy; P2 contract + IR policies feed the -confidence signal; P3 plan-JSON + meta + pipeline wiring; P4 -regression + docs. The phase count matches the user's "3-4 phases" -selection (4 execution + 1 final = 5, which is the v1.24 shape). No -revision. - -### G-Q10 — The `nova.cloudinit.dev/severity` annotation convention is unvalidated - -**Challenge:** RESEARCH §2.6 declares the severity-via-annotation -convention, but kyverno-json's behavior with unknown annotations is -not verified. Does `kj scan` ignore unknown annotations, or does it -reject the policy? - -**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.80). kyverno-json is Kubernetes- -style CRD-based — unknown `metadata.annotations` are preserved and -ignored (standard K8s behavior). The engine reads the annotation from -the loaded policy YAML (via `yaml.safe_load`) before invoking `kj -scan` — so even if `kj scan` stripped annotations, the engine still -has them. **Binding note (G-Q10a):** P1 `test_kyverno_json_engine.py` -must assert the severity annotation is read correctly (a policy with -`nova.cloudinit.dev/severity: high` produces PCRs with `severity: -"high"`; a policy without the annotation produces PCRs with -`severity: "info"` default). Captured in REQ-309 ("PCR schema -validity" includes severity). No requirement change — the test is -already in REQ-309. +**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.78). The risk is real but bounded: +(a) the pilot runs in a single account (`581513795199`) with no +production workloads (the v1.11 teardown left it empty; the pilot is +the only workload), (b) the key is in `.env.secrets` (gitignored, never +committed), (c) the deploy workflow uses OIDC by default (the static +key is the override, not the primary path). A future hardening +milestone should split `NOVA_AWS_*` into a root `NOVA_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_*` ++ a least-privilege `NOVA_AWS_*` runner key (the spike-runner pattern). +For v1.26, the single key suffices (pilot scope). D-207 records this. +**Minor revision: PLAN.md should note the key-split as a future +hardening item.** Already implicit in D-207; making it explicit in the +plan is a documentation refinement. --- ## Summary -10 challenges; 10 resolved (8 PROCEED, 2 REVISE, 0 ESCALATE). -- **Revisions (binding, already in PLAN/REQs):** - - G-Q4: P1 tests both fallback paths (NullEngine vs - KyvernoJsonEngine-not-configured) — distinct `ruleId`s for audit. - - G-Q7a: protocol signature `payload: dict | list | str` (list is a - valid payload for meta-policies). - - G-Q8a: P1 test asserts `NullEngine` satisfies the `PolicyEngine` - Protocol (proves the swap boundary is real without implementing OPA). - - G-Q3a: P3 VERIFY includes a timing assertion (kj pass < 1s, parallel - with checkov). - - G-Q10a: P1 test asserts severity annotation is read correctly. -- **No requirement changes** — all revisions are clarifications to - PLAN.md verification text, already supported by existing REQs - (REQ-291, REQ-293, REQ-308, REQ-309). -- **0 escalations** — all challenges auto-resolved at full autonomy. +9 challenges; 0 escalations; 2 binding revisions (G-Q4, G-Q6/G-Q9 +minor). Overall verdict: PROCEED (confidence 0.84). -The milestone PROCEEDs to PHASE 0 SHIP → P1. \ No newline at end of file +**Binding revisions:** +- **G-Q4:** REQ-322 moves to P2 W0 (already revised in PLAN.md + ROADMAP.md). +- **G-Q6:** PLAN.md P3 W4 Task 4.1 should note the settlement-finality + policy is authored + tested in v1.26 but *enforcement* is deferred to + the milestone that binds qa/prod/dr (documentation refinement). +- **G-Q9:** PLAN.md should note the `NOVA_AWS_*` key-split as a future + hardening item (documentation refinement). + +**No work is blocked.** The milestone is feasible, scoped, and the +domain claims hold. The homegrown PoA blockchain is a minimal viable +chain (~200 lines), not a production consensus protocol. The equities- +only scope is the user's choice. The multi-project mode is specified in +`run.md`. The P2→P3 dependency is resolved (REQ-322 → P2 W0). The +MTTR target is for incident-remediation, not first-time apply. The +settlement-finality policy is authored + tested, enforcement is future. +D-083 deferral is defensible for a technical pilot. The PCR schema is +unchanged. The root-equivalent key is a bounded risk with a documented +future hardening path. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.ciagent/PLAN.md b/.ciagent/PLAN.md index f6d6095..6ac1645 100644 --- a/.ciagent/PLAN.md +++ b/.ciagent/PLAN.md @@ -195,7 +195,10 @@ policy-engineer (kyverno-json policies). - **Task 4.1** (policy-engineer): `adapters/kyverno-json/policies/settlement-finality/all-matches-committed.json` — kyverno-json policy over settlement-service status JSON (asserts - `all_committed: true`). + `all_committed: true`). **Note (G-Q6):** the policy is authored + + tested in v1.26; *enforcement* is deferred to the milestone that + binds qa/prod/dr (D-208 — the policy gates promotions, not dev + applies). - **Task 4.2** (policy-engineer): `adapters/kyverno-json/policies/pilot-readiness/no-placeholder-account.json` — kyverno-json policy over env JSON (asserts @@ -386,4 +389,22 @@ schema time. This makes P2 self-contained: the primitive + the contract | REQ-321 (docs) | P4 | W2 | lead-developer | This revision is a binding plan decision (G-Q8 in the grill may -challenge it). \ No newline at end of file +challenge it). + +--- + +## Future Hardening Items (not in v1.26 scope, documented per grill G-Q9) + +- **`NOVA_AWS_*` key-split:** v1.26 uses a single `NOVA_AWS_*` key with + root-equivalent permissions (D-207, confirmed empirically by the + bootstrap). A future hardening milestone should split this into a + `NOVA_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_*` root key (bootstrap only) + a least-privilege + `NOVA_AWS_*` runner key (the spike-runner pattern). The pilot scope + (single account, no production workloads, OIDC default) bounds the + risk. +- **Multi-account landing zone:** qa/prod/dr on separate accounts (D-208 + keeps them placeholder in v1.26). +- **D-083 lift:** S3 Object Lock + JWS tamper-evident ledger (when the + pilot becomes a production system, D-204). +- **Multi-validator BFT consensus:** D-201. +- **Other security types:** bonds (T+2), derivatives, options (D-200). \ No newline at end of file