fix(P08 prep): rename platform/ -> acdl_platform/ (stdlib shadow fix)
---ci---
project: acdl
phase: 8
milestone: v1.1
status: plan-as-execute
persona: lead-developer
task: T-8.0
type: prerequisite-fix
---/ci---
The Phase 07 P1 ('platform/ package shadows stdlib platform module')
became a Phase 08 blocker: boto3 imports uuid -> platform.system(),
which fails when the repo's platform/ package is on sys.path[0]. Renamed
platform/ -> acdl_platform/ (the verifier's recommended v1.2 fix, pulled
forward because Phase 08 needs boto3).
- git mv platform/ acdl_platform/ (history preserved)
- verify_phase07.sh: updated paths; removed the /tmp workaround (no
longer needed; the shadow is gone)
- verify_phase06.sh: updated the new-dirs check for the rename
- README.md: layout table updated
Both verify_phase06.sh and verify_phase07.sh still pass; confidence_signal
now imports + runs correctly from the repo root. boto3 imports clean.
This commit is contained in:
Jon Chery
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
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# ACDL Tiered Audit Ledger Design (REQ-20)
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> **Status:** design authored in Phase 07 (milestone v1.1); the spike
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> (Phases 08-10) implements the **v1.0 hash chain + DynamoDB outbox write**
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> (D-041); the v1.2 build-out implements S3 Object Lock + JWS + async
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> worker + DLQ + daily checkpoints.
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The audit stream is the platform's tamper-evident record of every delivery
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action. The vision's "Audit truth lives outside the repository" bet [1]
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and "Not a mutable audit log" anti-goal [1] are the binding constraints.
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Version-control history does not satisfy regulatory evidence; the ledger
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is the source of truth.
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## Three tiers
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- **Cold tier (source of truth):** S3 with **Object Lock in compliance
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mode**, **7-year retention** (ARCHITECTURE.md §9). No one — including
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root — can delete or overwrite until retention expires. The regulatory
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record.
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- **Hot tier (query index):** the `acdl-evidence` audit repo (unchanged
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from the v1.0 demo). Not part of the chain; a queryable mirror the
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evidence UI (`evidence-ui/index.html`) reads. Lightweight attestation
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linkage lives in the repo; the regulatory event body lives in S3.
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- **Outbox (write path):** DynamoDB, **RPO = 0** (synchronous write before
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contract submission ack). Single-region in v1 (`us-east-1`).
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## Spike scope (D-041) — what Phases 08-10 implement
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- **DynamoDB outbox:** table `acdl-outbox`, `PAY_PER_REQUEST` (D-044),
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PK `contractId`, SK `eventType#eventTs`, TTL `expire_at` = now + 365d
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(1-year storage per ARCHITECTURE.md §8).
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- **`prev_event_hash` chain:** SHA-256 over canonical JSON
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(`json.dumps(event, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))`), lifted
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from the v1.0 demo's `evidence_writer.py`. Auto-genesis: first event
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has `prev_hash="GENESIS"`.
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- **Synchronous write** via boto3 `put_item` (strong-consistent by
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default). No separate async worker / DLQ in the spike (RTO = workflow
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re-run).
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- **Mirror to `acdl-evidence`:** unchanged from v1.0 — the finalize step
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commits `audit.json` to the evidence repo (the hot tier).
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- **Spike evidence event shape:**
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`{seq, ts, stage, event, prev_hash, hash, contractId, environment, stack, score, band}`.
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## v1.2 build-out — what Phase 07 designs but the spike defers
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- **S3 Object Lock:** bucket `acdl-evidence-lock-<account-id>`, Object
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Lock enabled at creation, compliance mode, 7-yr retention
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(`RetainUntilDate` = now + 7y). The outbox→S3 path is an async worker
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that reads from the outbox and writes to Object Lock.
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- **JWS detached signature (RFC 7515):** the event payload is
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canonical-JSON-serialized, SHA-256 hashed, signed with a private key;
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the signature is stored *detached* alongside the payload. Signing key =
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**platform-level KMS key** (not per-contract — a per-contract key would
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explode the key-management surface), rotated **quarterly**. The `jws`
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field is added to the event shape in v1.2.
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- **Async worker + DLQ:** a Lambda (or a Gitea Actions scheduled workflow)
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reads the outbox, writes to S3 Object Lock, signs with KMS. DLQ = an
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SQS dead-letter queue for failed writes. RTO = DLQ replay.
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- **Daily checkpoints (§9):** a daily job reads the last event hash and
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writes a "checkpoint" event to the ledger (+ optionally to a public
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notarization service). The spike runs in minutes, not days — no
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checkpoint in spike.
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## JWS vs chain — orthogonality note
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The `prev_event_hash` chain gives ordering/tamper-evidence *within* the
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log (a deleted event breaks the chain visibly); JWS gives authenticity
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*per event* (a forged event is detectable without re-reading the whole
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chain). The chain is spike-scope; JWS is v1.2. Together they cover both
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integrity properties the vision's "Not a mutable audit log" anti-goal
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requires.
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## Outbox item shape (full, spike + v1.2)
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- PK `contractId` (UUID).
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- SK `eventType#eventTs` (e.g. `POLICY_CHECKED#2026-07-21T12:00:00Z`).
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- `payload` (the event body — hash-chained in spike, JWS-signed in v1.2).
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- `prev_event_hash` (chain link; `GENESIS` for the first event).
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- `hash` (this event's SHA-256 over canonical JSON).
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- `approver_qa` (Gitea username of the QA approver; empty in dev-only
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spike; populated on qa-promotion — D-042).
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- `approver_prod` (SRE username; empty in spike).
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- `environment`, `stack`, `score`, `band`.
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- `expire_at` (TTL = now + 365d).
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- **v1.2 only:** `jws` (detached signature), `checkpoint_ref`.
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## RPO / RTO table
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| Phase | RPO | RTO |
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|-------|-----|-----|
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| Spike (D-041) | 0 (sync outbox write) | workflow re-run |
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| v1.2 | 0 (sync outbox) | async worker DLQ replay |
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## Decision trail
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- **D-041** — spike scope = hash chain + outbox write; Object Lock + JWS
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+ worker + DLQ are v1.2.
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- **D-044** — outbox mode `PAY_PER_REQUEST`; PK/SK; TTL `expire_at` =
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now + 365d; no separate async worker in spike.
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- **D-042** — approver identities (`approver_qa`, `approver_prod`) live
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in the outbox; the separation-of-duties check
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(`platform/separation_of_duties.py`) reads `approver_qa` and compares
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to the prod-dispatch `gitea.actor`.
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@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
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"""ACDL Confidence Signal (REQ-19).
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The platform's certified answer to "is this safe to proceed?" (vision
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tenet: "Safety is Computed, Not Assumed"). Every delivery action produces
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a measurable, explainable confidence signal; reliance on operator
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instinct is not a substitute.
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Inputs (weights sum to 1.0, D-040):
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1. policy_results (0.30) — list[PolicyCheckResult] (schemas/policy_check_result.schema.json)
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2. validation (0.25) — {schema: bool, ir_resolved: bool, tf_validated: bool, tf_planned: bool}
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3. freshness (0.10) — {age_days: float, max_age_days: float}
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4. source (0.15) — {submitter: str, commit_sha: str, signed: bool}
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5. history (0.10) — {prior_rollbacks: int, prior_policy_fails: int}
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6. nfrs (0.10) — {declared: list[str], conformance: float|None}
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Severity -> penalty (locked, ARCHITECTURE.md §8):
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critical -> hard override (score = 0, block)
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high -> -0.20
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medium -> -0.05
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low -> -0.01
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info -> 0.00
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Per-env thresholds (locked, ARCHITECTURE.md §8): dev 0.50, qa 0.75, prod 0.90, dr 0.95.
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Output: {score, band, perInput, reasonCodes}.
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Halt with explicit reason on missing input (§8).
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Spike cold-start (A-6.2): inputs 3 (freshness), 5 (history), 6 (nfrs) are
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'present + neutral 0.5' because the spike is the first submission with no
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history and no declared NFRs. The gate is *presence*, not *conformance* —
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the 'all six inputs present' dev gate (§5) is satisfied by non-null
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per-input scores.
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"""
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from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
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from typing import List, Literal, Optional, Dict, Any
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import json
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import sys
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WEIGHTS = {
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"policy": 0.30,
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"validation": 0.25,
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"freshness": 0.10,
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"source": 0.15,
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"history": 0.10,
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"nfrs": 0.10,
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}
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PENALTY = {
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"critical": None,
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"high": 0.20,
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"medium": 0.05,
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"low": 0.01,
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"info": 0.0,
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}
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THRESHOLDS = {"dev": 0.50, "qa": 0.75, "prod": 0.90, "dr": 0.95}
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@dataclass
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class Signal:
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score: float
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band: Literal["pass", "warn", "block"]
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perInput: Dict[str, float]
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reasonCodes: List[str]
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def _per_input_score(name: str, raw: Any) -> tuple:
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"""Return (score in [0,1], reasons list). Unknown/missing -> 0.5 + INPUT_MISSING."""
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reasons: List[str] = []
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if raw is None:
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return 0.5, [f"INPUT_MISSING:{name}"]
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if name == "policy":
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pcrs = raw if isinstance(raw, list) else []
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if not pcrs:
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return 0.5, []
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scores = []
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for pcr in pcrs:
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r = pcr.get("result", "skipped")
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if r == "pass" or r == "skipped":
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scores.append(1.0)
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else:
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scores.append(0.0)
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return sum(scores) / len(scores), []
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if name == "validation":
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keys = ("schema", "ir_resolved", "tf_validated", "tf_planned")
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if not isinstance(raw, dict):
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return 0.5, []
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trues = sum(1 for k in keys if raw.get(k))
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return trues / 4.0, []
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if name == "freshness":
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if not isinstance(raw, dict):
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return 0.5, []
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age = float(raw.get("age_days", 0))
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mx = float(raw.get("max_age_days", 1)) or 1
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s = 1.0 - (age / mx)
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return max(0.0, min(1.0, s)), []
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if name == "source":
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if not isinstance(raw, dict):
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return 0.5, []
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if raw.get("submitter") and raw.get("commit_sha"):
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return 1.0, []
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return 0.5, []
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if name == "history":
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if not isinstance(raw, dict):
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return 0.5, []
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rollbacks = int(raw.get("prior_rollbacks", 0))
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fails = int(raw.get("prior_policy_fails", 0))
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s = 1.0 - (rollbacks * 0.2 + fails * 0.1)
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return max(0.0, min(1.0, s)), []
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if name == "nfrs":
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if not isinstance(raw, dict):
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return 0.5, []
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conf = raw.get("conformance")
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if conf is None:
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return 0.5, []
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return float(conf), []
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return 0.5, []
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def compute(contract_id: str, environment: str,
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inputs: Dict[str, Any]) -> Signal:
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"""Orchestrate the 6-input weighted sum + severity penalty + band."""
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missing = sorted(set(WEIGHTS.keys()) - set(inputs.keys()))
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if missing:
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return Signal(0.0, "block", {},
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[f"INPUT_MISSING:{m}" for m in missing])
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per_input: Dict[str, float] = {}
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reasons: List[str] = []
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base = 0.0
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for name, weight in WEIGHTS.items():
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raw = inputs.get(name)
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s, r = _per_input_score(name, raw)
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per_input[name] = s
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reasons.extend(r)
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base += s * weight
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penalty = 0.0
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policy_input = inputs.get("policy")
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pcrs = policy_input if isinstance(policy_input, list) else []
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for pcr in pcrs:
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if not isinstance(pcr, dict):
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continue
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if pcr.get("result") != "fail":
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continue
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sev = pcr.get("severity")
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p = PENALTY.get(sev, 0.0)
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if p is None:
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return Signal(0.0, "block", per_input,
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reasons + [f"CRITICAL_OVERRIDE:{pcr.get('ruleId','?')}"])
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penalty += p
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score = max(0.0, min(1.0, base - penalty))
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threshold = THRESHOLDS[environment]
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if score >= threshold:
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band = "pass"
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elif score < threshold - 0.10:
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band = "block"
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else:
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band = "warn"
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if environment == "dev" and band == "warn":
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band = "block"
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return Signal(score, band, per_input, reasons)
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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if len(sys.argv) < 3:
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print("usage: confidence_signal.py <inputs.json> <environment>", file=sys.stderr)
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sys.exit(2)
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env = sys.argv[2]
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with open(sys.argv[1], "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
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inputs = json.load(fh)
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sig = compute("cli", env, inputs)
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print(json.dumps(asdict(sig), indent=2))
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@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
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# ACDL Human-in-the-Loop Matrix + Separation-of-Duties Design (REQ-21)
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> **Status:** design authored in Phase 07 (milestone v1.1); v1.2 wires the
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> gates. The spike (Phases 08-10) is **dev-only**; HITL is not exercised
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> (the spike contract has `environment: dev`).
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The vision's "Lower Environments are Autonomous; Higher Environments are
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Attested" tenet [1] and the "deliberate human attestation — not as a
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rubber stamp" requirement [1] are the binding constraints.
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## Gate model (ARCHITECTURE.md §10.1)
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**Pre-execution gates.** The contract is held in a "validated but not
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applied" state until the human attests. qa, prod, dr are attestation
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gates. No partial deployment to roll back on rejection (qa, prod); dr is
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a separate deployment against a separate cluster/region. The
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canary/deployment-rollback model is explicitly not in scope for v1.
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## Gitea-specific gate mechanics (D-042)
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Gitea has **no Environments API** and ignores `environment:` blocks
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(v1.0 D-013; re-confirmed in RESEARCH TARGET 1). The pre-execution gate
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is modeled as a `workflow_dispatch` with approval inputs:
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- **qa gate:** `workflow_dispatch` with `approve_qa: true`; the dispatch
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run's `gitea.actor` is the QA approver.
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- **prod gate:** `workflow_dispatch` with `approve_prod: true`;
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`gitea.actor` is the SRE approver.
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- **dr gate:** `workflow_dispatch` with `approve_dr: true`; same.
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The approver identity of record = `gitea.actor` of the dispatch run
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(D-042). There is no other approval-identity signal in Gitea. The v1.2
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real-OIDC path (blocked on go-gitea/gitea#36988) does not change this —
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OIDC authorizes the *runner* to AWS, it does not change how the platform
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records the *human* approver.
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## Reviewer routing (ARCHITECTURE.md §10.2)
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Gitea CODEOWNERS routes the right reviewer to the right gate:
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- qa → QA team
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- prod → SRE team
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- dr → SRE team
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CODEOWNERS **routes**; it does **not** enforce identity distinctness (that
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is the platform-internal outbox check in
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`platform/separation_of_duties.py`).
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## Full 8-concern attestation matrix (§10.4, lifted verbatim)
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| Env | Concern | Evidence artifact | Freshness | Source | Attester |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| qa | Functional correctness | Last successful run of contract-declared validation.e2eSuite with pass rate ≥ 99% | Last 24h | Test runner declared in contract | QA |
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| qa | Performance baseline | Load test report (k6 / Gatling / Locust) showing p99 latency < declared NFR and throughput > declared minimum | Last 7d | Load test runner declared in contract | QA |
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| qa | Security posture | Vulnerability scan (Trivy, Snyk, or contract-declared equivalent) with no criticals/highs, signed by Security on-call | Last 24h | Security scanner + Security team signature | QA |
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| qa | Contract NFRs | Platform-generated report: schema valid, NFR assertions (latency, throughput, error rate) within declared bounds | At submission | Platform contract validator | QA |
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| prod | Operational readiness | Runbook published, dashboard exists, on-call rotation assigned, alerts configured | At submission, validated against last 30d history | Platform + SRE | SRE |
|
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| prod | Incident response | Sev-1 runbook tabletop or live drill completed | Last 90d | SRE drill record | SRE |
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| prod | Capacity / cost | FinOps forecast for next 30d within budget envelope, cost anomaly baseline stored, budget alert configured | Forecast valid for next 30d | FinOps + SRE | SRE |
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| prod | Resilience | DR drill, chaos engineering report, backup verified | DR: 180d; chaos: 90d; backup: 30d | SRE + Platform | SRE |
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| dr | dr-region deploy with the most recent prod-bound dr drill as canary evidence | dr drill report | Last 180d | SRE | SRE |
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## Timeout behavior (§10.5)
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| Time | State | Action |
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|---|---|---|
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| Submission | PENDING_ATTESTATION | Notify responsible team |
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| 1 business day | PENDING_ATTESTATION_WARNING | Notify team + platform on-call (elevated path); emit `PENDING_ATTESTATION_TIMEOUT_WARNING` event |
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| 2 business days | PENDING_ATTESTATION_AUTO_FREEZE | Auto-freeze; require re-submission; emit `PENDING_ATTESTATION_AUTO_FREEZE` event; new submission linked via `supersedes` |
|
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|
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**Implementation:** a Gitea `on: schedule` workflow (runs hourly) that
|
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scans the DynamoDB outbox for `PENDING_ATTESTATION` events with `ts`
|
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older than 1/2 business days and emits the warn/freeze events. Not
|
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implemented in the spike (dev-only).
|
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|
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## Rejection and rollback (§10.6)
|
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|
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Rejection returns the contract to a `HELD` state with the rejection
|
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reason captured as a `PROMOTION_REJECTED` event. The consumer fixes the
|
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cause and re-submits; the new submission is linked to the rejected one
|
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via `supersedes` (a contract-schema field — `schemas/contract.schema.json`).
|
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The audit chain is **extended, not torn up** (the "Not a mutable audit
|
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log" anti-goal). No partial deployment to roll back at any v1 gate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Separation of duties (§10.3) — pointer to the .py
|
||||
|
||||
The identity-distinctness check is platform-internal, not GitHub-native,
|
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not Kyverno (in v1). Sequence:
|
||||
|
||||
1. On promotion dev → qa, the platform reads the QA approver's identity
|
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from the `workflow_dispatch` run's `gitea.actor` and writes it to the
|
||||
DynamoDB outbox keyed by `contractId` (attribute `approver_qa`).
|
||||
2. On promotion qa → prod, the platform reads the stored `approver_qa`
|
||||
from the outbox and the new SRE approver's `gitea.actor` from the
|
||||
prod-dispatch run.
|
||||
3. If `approver_qa == approver_prod`, the platform blocks the prod
|
||||
promotion, writes a `SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION` event to the
|
||||
evidence stream, and routes a halt artifact to the SRE on-call.
|
||||
4. The check is implemented in `platform/separation_of_duties.py`
|
||||
(T-7.8). The platform is the only writer to the outbox; the check is
|
||||
in the same process that has authority to block the promotion.
|
||||
|
||||
## Spike scope note
|
||||
|
||||
The spike is dev-only (REQ-27 contract has `environment: dev`), so HITL
|
||||
is not exercised. Phase 07 authors the design; Phase 10's
|
||||
`verify_phase10.sh` does not assert HITL behavior. v1.2 wires the gates
|
||||
against this design.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision trail
|
||||
|
||||
- **D-042** — approver identity = `gitea.actor` of the `workflow_dispatch`
|
||||
run; no Environments API in Gitea.
|
||||
- **D-013** (v1.0) — the `workflow_dispatch` approval-input fallback,
|
||||
re-used for the real platform's pre-execution gate model.
|
||||
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Check that qaApprover != prodApprover for a contract (ARCHITECTURE.md
|
||||
§10.3, D-042). Reads `approver_qa` from the DynamoDB outbox for the
|
||||
contractId, compares to the prod-dispatch `gitea.actor`. Blocks on
|
||||
equality, emits `SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION`, routes a halt artifact
|
||||
to SRE on-call.
|
||||
|
||||
Spike scope (A-8.1): the spike is dev-only (REQ-27 contract has
|
||||
environment: dev); HITL is not exercised. This module is authored to its
|
||||
full v1.2 shape but the spike calls it with current_prod_approver=None
|
||||
and a None outbox_client — the check returns (True, 'no QA approver
|
||||
recorded (dev-only spike)').
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Optional, Tuple
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def check(outbox_client, contract_id: str,
|
||||
current_prod_approver: Optional[str]) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
|
||||
"""Return (ok, reason). ok=False means block the prod promotion."""
|
||||
if outbox_client is None:
|
||||
return (True, "no outbox client (dev-only spike)")
|
||||
item = outbox_client.get(contract_id)
|
||||
if item is None:
|
||||
return (True, "no prior approver (first promotion)")
|
||||
qa_approver = item.get("approver_qa")
|
||||
if not qa_approver:
|
||||
return (True, "no QA approver recorded (dev-only spike)")
|
||||
if current_prod_approver is None:
|
||||
return (True, "no prod approver supplied (dev-only spike)")
|
||||
if qa_approver == current_prod_approver:
|
||||
return (False,
|
||||
f"SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION: "
|
||||
f"qaApprover==prodApprover=={qa_approver}")
|
||||
return (True, "distinct")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def route_halt_artifact(contract_id: str, violation_reason: str,
|
||||
oncall_client) -> None:
|
||||
"""Route a halt artifact to SRE on-call. Spike: stub that logs. v1.2
|
||||
wires a real pager."""
|
||||
print(f"[halt-artifact] contract={contract_id} reason={violation_reason} "
|
||||
f"oncall={oncall_client}", flush=True)
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user