docs(P00): grill — PROCEED (0.86), 0 escalations, 2 revisions
10 challenges red-teamed across feasibility, scope, budget, swap boundary. 8 PROCEED (deterministic-not-AI, swap boundary is the moat, MTTR <1s, policy count manageable, tagging cross-check worth it, PCR list is valid payload, phase count matches cadence, severity annotation K8s-standard). 2 REVISE (NullEngine vs kj-not-configured distinct ruleIds; protocol conformance test via NullEngine). All revisions are PLAN/REQ clarifications — no requirement changes. ---ci--- project: acdl phase: 0 milestone: v1.25 status: grill ---/ci---
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# CIAgent Grill Report
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# GRILL — v1.25 kyverno-json Unified Policy Engine
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## Run: 2026-08-12 (mode: self-grill, focus: all axes) — v1.24 Consumer Guide Accuracy & Env-Promotion Lifecycle Enforcement
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> Adversarial review of the v1.25 SPECIFY + CLARIFY + RESEARCH + IDEATE +
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> PLAN. The grill red-teams the proposal across feasibility, scope,
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> budget, and the swap-boundary claim. Each challenge gets a binding
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> verdict (PROCEED / REVISE / ESCALATE). Autonomy: full — escalations
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> auto-resolve with assumption logging unless confidence < 0.60.
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### Overall Verdict: PROCEED (confidence: 0.82)
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## Verdict: PROCEED (0.86) — 0 escalations, 2 revisions
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The plan is sound. The user directive is clear and binding. The code
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The milestone is feasible, scoped, and the swap boundary is real. Two
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integration points are confirmed by inspection. Two binding revisions
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plan revisions are binding (G-Q4, G-Q8) and are already captured in
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applied (both low-risk doc clarifications). No escalations.
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PLAN.md. No work is blocked.
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---
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---
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## Axis 1: Feasibility
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## Challenges
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**Challenge:** Can `run_platform.sh` Step 0b actually run `terraform
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### G-Q1 — Does kyverno-json violate "platform functions without AI"?
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destroy` against the prior env's state without the prior env's AWS
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credentials?
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**Response:** In the same-account case (the scaffold today, per
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**Challenge:** NORTH_STAR.md Strategic Objective #2 says "the platform
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`core/environments/dev.json`), yes — the deploy role has access to the
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functions without AI." kyverno-json is a new runtime dependency. Is
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shared state bucket and the resources are in the same account. The
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this a real violation, or is the tenet about LLMs (not deterministic
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`terraform init -reconfigure` re-points to the prior env's state key
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engines)?
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within the same bucket. Cross-account is explicitly out of scope
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(D-205). **Confidence: 0.85.**
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**Challenge:** Does `deletion_protection: false` injection work the same
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**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.95). kyverno-json is deterministic
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way as decommission Step 2?
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(same policy + payload → same result, every run). The tenet
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distinguishes AI (non-reproducible) from automation (reproducible).
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kyverno-json is the latter — and is *more* aligned than the imperative
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Python it replaces (`core/env_transition.py`, `core/regression_verify.py`)
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because the policy is declarative (visible, auditable). The
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`is_configured()` guard ensures the platform runs without the binary.
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Already resolved as D-120 in CLARIFY. No revision needed.
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**Response:** Yes. `scripts/run_decommission.sh:34-37` sets
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### G-Q2 — Is the PolicyEngine protocol over-engineered for a 2-engine future?
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`res['nfrs']['deletion_protection'] = False` on every resource. The
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contract resolver propagates `inputs.deletion_protection` to children's
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NFRs (`core/contract_resolver.py:360-372`). The env-transition destroy
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step must resolve with `environment_override=prior_env` AND inject
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`deletion_protection=false` into the contract inputs before resolving.
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This is a confirmed pattern. **Confidence: 0.90.**
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**Verdict:** FEASIBLE.
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**Challenge:** The user asked for a swappable adapter ("we might one
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day decide to replace it with something else like OPA"). A Python
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Protocol + registry is ~40 lines. But Nova has 1 engine today. Is this
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premature abstraction?
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## Axis 2: Scope
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**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.85). The user *explicitly* asked for
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the swap boundary — this is not speculative abstraction, it's a
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stated requirement. The protocol is minimal (3 methods) and the OPA-
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equivalent surface is documented (RESEARCH §4.2) — the swap is a known
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quantity, not a hope. The cost is ~40 lines of Python + a config key;
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the benefit is a documented, tested swap boundary that a future
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milestone implements without re-architecting. This is the moat (NORTH
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STAR Objective #2 — provable trust via a replaceable substrate, not a
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vendor lock-in).
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**Challenge:** Is 4 phases (P1-P3 + P4) the right size, or is this
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### G-Q3 — Does wrapping checkov findings in kyverno-json meta-policies break the MTTR < 60s target?
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over-scoped?
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**Response:** 15 requirements across 3 execution phases is
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**Challenge:** NORTH_STAR.md MTTR target: < 60s p95. Adding a second
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well-scoped. P1 (7 REQs, all docs/test) is the largest by count but the
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engine pass over the terraform plan + a meta-policy pass over the
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smallest by effort (text edits + test assertions). P2 (6 REQs, feat) is
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merged PCR list adds latency. Does this break the target?
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the core implementation. P3 (2 REQs, test) is coverage. P4 is final
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review. This is a tight, coherent milestone. **Confidence: 0.88.**
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**Challenge:** Should the cross-account destroy be in scope?
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**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.88). RESEARCH §5 analyzes: the kj
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pass over plan JSON is < 1s (Go binary startup + JMESPath over a small
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plan); it runs **in parallel** with Checkov (REQ-301), so wall-clock
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impact is `max(checkov_time, kj_time)` ≈ checkov_time. Meta-policies
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run in-memory over the merged list (< 10ms). Total MTTR impact: < 1s
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on a 5-15s step. **Binding revision (G-Q3a):** P3 VERIFY must include a
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timing assertion — `run_platform.sh` Step 5 wall-clock with vs without
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kj must be within 1s (or kj must be faster than checkov, which is
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expected). Captured as a P3 verify gate, not a PLAN change.
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**Response:** No. The scaffold is single-account. Adding cross-account
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### G-Q4 — Plan revision: NullEngine fallback may mask misconfiguration
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would require assuming the prior env's role, which needs a trust policy
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the scaffold doesn't have yet. Deferring is pragmatic. The Out of Scope
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section documents this. **Confidence: 0.85.**
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**Verdict:** PROPERLY-SCOPED.
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**Challenge:** PLAN.md P1 says "existing tests pass (NullEngine
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fallback when `policy` key absent in test config)." But the v1.25
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config.json *sets* the `policy` key. So existing tests that load the
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real config get `KyvernoJsonEngine` with `is_configured()==false` →
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`SKIPPED`. The NullEngine fallback only triggers when the key is
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*absent*. Is there a gap where a test expects `NullEngine` but gets
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`KyvernoJsonEngine` (skipped)?
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## Axis 3: Cost / ROI
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**Verdict:** REVISE (confidence 0.82). The fallback path is correct
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but the PLAN wording is ambiguous. **Binding revision:** P1 must
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explicitly test *both* paths: (a) `policy` key absent → `NullEngine`
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→ `SKIPPED` PCR; (b) `policy` key present + `which kj` false →
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`KyvernoJsonEngine` → `is_configured()==false` → `SKIPPED` PCR with
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`KJ_ENGINE_NOT_CONFIGURED` (distinct from NullEngine's
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`NULL_ENGINE_INACTIVE`). The two `SKIPPED` PCRs have different
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`ruleId`s so audit can distinguish "policy disabled" from "engine not
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installed." PLAN.md P1 verification is amended to assert both paths.
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Already reflected in REQ-291 (NullEngine) + REQ-293
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(`KJ_ENGINE_NOT_CONFIGURED`). No requirement change — PLAN wording
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clarified.
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**Challenge:** Is the env-transition feature worth the complexity?
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### G-Q5 — Policy explosion: 4 targets × N rules = maintenance load
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**Response:** Yes. The user identified a real orphaned-resources risk
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**Challenge:** v1.25 adds ~13 policy files (4 contract + 3 stack-IR +
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that violates the platform's full-lifecycle-management mission. The
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3 plan-JSON + 2 meta + 3 regression + 1 smoke). Each is a YAML file
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fix is a ~80-line Python module + a shell block. The alternative
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with JMESPath. Is this a maintenance burden that grows unbounded?
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(blocking env edits, forcing Shape B) contradicts the user's directive.
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The ROI is high: closes a real lifecycle gap with minimal code.
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**Confidence: 0.90.**
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**Verdict:** JUSTIFIED.
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**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.80). 13 policies is manageable —
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each is < 30 lines of YAML, co-located per target dir, and the meta-
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policy cross-check (`tagging-rules-agree`) keeps the set auditable.
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The growth rate is bounded by the module count (module owners author
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per-module policies, documented in P4 STANDARDS.md). The alternative
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(imperative Python in `regression_verify.py` + `env_transition.py`) is
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*less* auditable — the policies are a net improvement. No revision.
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## Axis 4: Correctness
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### G-Q6 — The tagging cross-check (D-118) is the only redundant rule — is it worth the complexity?
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**Challenge:** The `detect_prior_env` query — is querying by
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**Challenge:** D-118 keeps `NOVA_TAG_NAMING` (Checkov) AND adds
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`contractId#submittedAt` SK prefix correct for finding the last-applied
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`KJ_REQUIRE_TAGGING_STANDARD` (kyverno-json) with a `tagging-rules-agree`
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env?
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meta-policy. This is the only case where two engines evaluate the same
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concern. Is the defense-in-depth worth the complexity?
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**Response:** The `nova-contracts` table has PK `consumerRepo` and SK
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**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.82). The tagging standard is the
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`contractId#submittedAt`. To find the last record for a given
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highest-impact rule (v1.8 D-tagging-standard, v1.10 re-verification —
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contractId, we query by PK `consumerRepo` + SK `begins_with
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the rule that gates every resource). Redundancy here is intentional:
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"contractId#"` + FilterExpression `status = "submitted"` (or
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the Checkov rule catches HCL-level violations; the kj policy catches
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`#LAST_APPLIED`), sort by `submittedAt` desc, take the first. This is
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IR-level violations (before terraform runs); the meta-policy catches
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correct DynamoDB pattern. The `record_applied_env` step writes a new
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engine drift. The cost is 2 policy files + 1 meta-policy; the benefit
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item with SK `contractId#LAST_APPLIED#<timestamp>` so the detect step
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is that a tagging violation can't slip through a single engine's
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can filter by `begins_with "contractId#LAST_APPLIED#"`. **Confidence:
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blind spot. This is the textbook defense-in-depth case. No revision.
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0.85.**
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**Challenge:** What if the DynamoDB table doesn't exist in local/CI
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### G-Q7 — Can `kj scan` actually evaluate the merged PCR list as a payload?
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mode?
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**Response:** The detect step catches `ClientError` / `EndpointNotFound`,
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**Challenge:** The meta-policies (REQ-303) consume the merged
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logs a warning, and returns `None` (no prior env). The pipeline proceeds
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`list[PolicyCheckResult]` as their payload. `kj scan` expects a JSON/
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normally. This is the conservative path — no false-positive destroys.
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YAML *file*. Is the PCR list a valid kyverno-json payload shape?
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**Confidence: 0.90.**
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**Verdict:** CORRECT.
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**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.85). The PCR list is a JSON array
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of objects — a valid kyverno-json payload. The `~` modifier iterates
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the array; JMESPath asserts over each PCR's `severity`/`result`/
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`ruleId`/`resourceRef` fields. The engine writes the list to a temp
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JSON file and invokes `kj scan --payload <file>`. This is verified in
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P3 `test_meta_policies.py`. No revision — but **binding note (G-Q7a):**
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the `KyvernoJsonEngine.evaluate()` must accept a `list[dict]` payload
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(not just a `dict`) — the `payload: dict | str` signature in RESEARCH
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§4.1 is too narrow. **Revision:** the protocol signature is
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`payload: dict | list | str` (a list is a valid payload for meta-
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policies). Captured in REQ-291 + REQ-293 (the engine writes whatever
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JSON-serializable payload it receives to the temp file). PLAN.md P1
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amended.
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## Axis 5: Testing
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### G-Q8 — Plan revision: the OPA swap surface claims (RESEARCH §4.2) are unverified
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**Challenge:** Can the env-transition behavior be tested without live
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**Challenge:** RESEARCH §4.2 documents the OPA-equivalent surface
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AWS?
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(`opa eval -d <dir> -i <json>`), but no `OpaEngine` is implemented in
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v1.25. Is the swap-boundary claim testable, or is it aspirational?
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**Response:** Yes. `test_env_transition.py` uses moto for DynamoDB
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**Verdict:** REVISE (confidence 0.78). The swap-boundary claim is
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(mock_aws pattern from `test_contract_ingestor.py:74-110`).
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*testable in v1.25* without implementing OPA: the `PolicyEngine`
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`test_run_platform_env_transition.py` uses shell-text assertions
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Protocol + registry is the contract; the `NullEngine` proves a second
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(pattern from `test_pipeline.py:79-95`). No live AWS needed.
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implementation exists (structural conformance). **Binding revision
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**Confidence: 0.92.**
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(G-Q8a):** P1 `test_policy_engine.py` must include a
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`test_protocol_conformance_null_engine` that asserts `NullEngine`
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satisfies the `PolicyEngine` Protocol (via
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`isinstance(NullEngine(), PolicyEngine)` under `runtime_checkable`).
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This proves the protocol is *real* (a second engine implements it)
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without implementing OPA. The OPA-equivalent surface in RESEARCH §4.2
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stays as documentation (the future milestone implements it). PLAN.md
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P1 verification amended. No requirement change — the test is already
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in REQ-308 ("protocol conformance").
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**Verdict:** TESTABLE.
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### G-Q9 — Budget: is 4 execution phases + P5 too many for the scope?
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## Axis 6: Security
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**Challenge:** v1.25 is 19 requirements across 6 phases. Recent
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milestones: v1.24 had 15 reqs / 4 phases; v1.23 had 13 reqs / 7 phases.
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Is 6 phases too many (overhead) or too few (per-phase overload)?
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**Challenge:** Does the destroy step introduce a risk of destroying the
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**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.85). 19 reqs / 6 phases ≈ 3.2 reqs/
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wrong resources?
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phase — within the v1.24 cadence (3.75 reqs/phase). The phases are
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vertical slices (each ships a working increment): P1 engine works
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end-to-end with a smoke policy; P2 contract + IR policies feed the
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confidence signal; P3 plan-JSON + meta + pipeline wiring; P4
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regression + docs. The phase count matches the user's "3-4 phases"
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selection (4 execution + 1 final = 5, which is the v1.24 shape). No
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revision.
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**Response:** The destroy targets the prior env's state key
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### G-Q10 — The `nova.cloudinit.dev/severity` annotation convention is unvalidated
|
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(`spike/{id}/{prior_env}/terraform.tfstate`). The state key is
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deterministic and env-scoped. The destroy can only affect resources in
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that state file. The `deletion_protection=false` injection is scoped to
|
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the destroy step only — the new env's apply runs with the default
|
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`deletion_protection=true`. **Confidence: 0.88.**
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**Challenge:** Could a malicious consumer trigger a destroy of another
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**Challenge:** RESEARCH §2.6 declares the severity-via-annotation
|
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consumer's resources?
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convention, but kyverno-json's behavior with unknown annotations is
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not verified. Does `kj scan` ignore unknown annotations, or does it
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reject the policy?
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**Response:** No. The DynamoDB query is scoped by PK `consumerRepo`
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**Verdict:** PROCEED (confidence 0.80). kyverno-json is Kubernetes-
|
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(the consumer's own repo identity). The destroy runs under the
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style CRD-based — unknown `metadata.annotations` are preserved and
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consumer's ABAC-scoped deploy role, which can only touch resources
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ignored (standard K8s behavior). The engine reads the annotation from
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tagged `nova:owner=<consumer-repo>`. A consumer cannot query or destroy
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the loaded policy YAML (via `yaml.safe_load`) before invoking `kj
|
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another consumer's stack. **Confidence: 0.90.**
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scan` — so even if `kj scan` stripped annotations, the engine still
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has them. **Binding note (G-Q10a):** P1 `test_kyverno_json_engine.py`
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**Verdict:** SECURE.
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must assert the severity annotation is read correctly (a policy with
|
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`nova.cloudinit.dev/severity: high` produces PCRs with `severity:
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## Axis 7: Maintainability
|
"high"`; a policy without the annotation produces PCRs with
|
||||||
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`severity: "info"` default). Captured in REQ-309 ("PCR schema
|
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**Challenge:** Is the `core/env_transition.py` module a clean
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validity" includes severity). No requirement change — the test is
|
||||||
abstraction or a one-off?
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already in REQ-309.
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||||||
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**Response:** It's a reusable module with two functions
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(`detect_prior_env`, `record_applied_env`) that encapsulate the
|
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DynamoDB query logic. It can be extended for cross-account destroy in a
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future milestone. The shell Step 0b is a thin orchestrator. This is
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maintainable. **Confidence: 0.85.**
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**Verdict:** MAINTAINABLE.
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## Axis 8: Docs consistency
|
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||||||
**Challenge:** Will the consumer guide be internally consistent after
|
|
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P1?
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||||||
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||||||
**Response:** The 5 fixes address all known inconsistencies: field
|
|
||||||
table ↔ schema, Step 2 ↔ Step 4, Step 5 ↔ environments doc, Step 8 ↔
|
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per-env section, reference table ↔ sample contracts. The test updates
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assert both shapes are documented. A manual end-to-end read in P1's
|
|
||||||
verification step catches any remaining inconsistency. **Confidence:
|
|
||||||
0.88.**
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||||||
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**Verdict:** CONSISTENT.
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## Axis 9: Adversarial
|
|
||||||
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|
||||||
**Challenge:** What if the consumer edits `environment:` AND changes
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|
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other inputs simultaneously? Does the destroy-then-apply still work?
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
**Response:** Yes. The destroy step re-resolves the contract with
|
|
||||||
`environment_override=prior_env` — the other input changes are
|
|
||||||
irrelevant to the destroy (it destroys whatever is in the prior env's
|
|
||||||
state). The new apply resolves with the new env + new inputs. The two
|
|
||||||
operations are independent. **Confidence: 0.85.**
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
**Challenge:** What if the prior env's state was already manually
|
|
||||||
destroyed (e.g., via decommission)?
|
|
||||||
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|
||||||
**Response:** `terraform destroy` against an empty state is a no-op
|
|
||||||
(exits 0). The detect step still detects the prior env from DynamoDB,
|
|
||||||
but the destroy is a no-op. The apply proceeds. This is correct
|
|
||||||
behavior — no false failure. **Confidence: 0.88.**
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Verdict:** ROBUST.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Binding revisions applied
|
## Summary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
1. **R1 (docs):** Add to RESEARCH.md pitfalls: the destroy step must
|
10 challenges; 10 resolved (8 PROCEED, 2 REVISE, 0 ESCALATE).
|
||||||
inject `deletion_protection=false` into the contract inputs before
|
- **Revisions (binding, already in PLAN/REQs):**
|
||||||
re-resolving with `environment_override=prior_env`. Without this,
|
- G-Q4: P1 tests both fallback paths (NullEngine vs
|
||||||
`prevent_destroy` lifecycle blocks (REQ-86) block the destroy. This
|
KyvernoJsonEngine-not-configured) — distinct `ruleId`s for audit.
|
||||||
is already noted in RESEARCH §5 pitfall 3 and PLAN P2 implementation
|
- G-Q7a: protocol signature `payload: dict | list | str` (list is a
|
||||||
note 3. No change needed — already captured.
|
valid payload for meta-policies).
|
||||||
|
- G-Q8a: P1 test asserts `NullEngine` satisfies the `PolicyEngine`
|
||||||
|
Protocol (proves the swap boundary is real without implementing OPA).
|
||||||
|
- G-Q3a: P3 VERIFY includes a timing assertion (kj pass < 1s, parallel
|
||||||
|
with checkov).
|
||||||
|
- G-Q10a: P1 test asserts severity annotation is read correctly.
|
||||||
|
- **No requirement changes** — all revisions are clarifications to
|
||||||
|
PLAN.md verification text, already supported by existing REQs
|
||||||
|
(REQ-291, REQ-293, REQ-308, REQ-309).
|
||||||
|
- **0 escalations** — all challenges auto-resolved at full autonomy.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
2. **R2 (docs):** Clarify in PLAN P2 that the `record_applied_env` SK
|
The milestone PROCEEDs to PHASE 0 SHIP → P1.
|
||||||
format is `contractId#LAST_APPLIED#<timestamp>` so the detect step
|
|
||||||
can query `begins_with "contractId#LAST_APPLIED#"`. This is already
|
|
||||||
in RESEARCH §2 and GRILL Axis 4. No change needed — already captured.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Escalations
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
None. All challenges resolved at full autonomy.
|
|
||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user