# ACDL Human-in-the-Loop Matrix + Separation-of-Duties Design (REQ-21)

> **Status:** design authored in Phase 07 (milestone v1.1); **v1.9 wires
> the gates** (Phase 42). The spike (Phases 08-10) was dev-only; HITL was
> not exercised then. v1.9 implements the qa/prod/dr pre-execution
> attestation gates, the 8-concern attestation matrix (offline-testable
> subset), and the outbox-based separation-of-duties check.

The vision's "Lower Environments are Autonomous; Higher Environments are
Attested" tenet [1] and the "deliberate human attestation — not as a
rubber stamp" requirement [1] are the binding constraints.

## Gate model (ARCHITECTURE.md §10.1)

**Pre-execution gates.** The contract is held in a "validated but not
applied" state until the human attests. qa, prod, dr are attestation
gates. No partial deployment to roll back on rejection (qa, prod); dr is
a separate deployment against a separate cluster/region. The
canary/deployment-rollback model is explicitly not in scope for v1.

## Forge-specific gate mechanics (D-042)

The dev forge has **no Environments API** and ignores `environment:` blocks
(v1.0 D-013; re-confirmed in RESEARCH TARGET 1). The pre-execution gate
is modeled as a `workflow_dispatch` with approval inputs:

- **qa gate:** `workflow_dispatch` with `approve_qa: true`; the dispatch
  run's `CI actor` is the QA approver.
- **prod gate:** `workflow_dispatch` with `approve_prod: true`;
  `CI actor` is the SRE approver.
- **dr gate:** `workflow_dispatch` with `approve_dr: true`; same.

The approver identity of record = `CI actor` of the dispatch run
(D-042). There is no other approval-identity signal in the dev forge. The real
OIDC path (blocked on upstream forge OIDC support) does not change this —
OIDC authorizes the *runner* to AWS, it does not change how the platform
records the *human* approver.

On GitHub, the equivalent is `CI actor` of the `workflow_dispatch`
run; GitHub Environments with required reviewers are the native gate,
but the `workflow_dispatch` approval-input fallback is used for
byte-identical across forges.

## Reviewer routing (ARCHITECTURE.md §10.2)

CODEOWNERS routes the right reviewer to the right gate:

- qa → QA team
- prod → SRE team
- dr → SRE team

CODEOWNERS **routes**; it does **not** enforce identity distinctness (that
is the platform-internal outbox check in
`core/separation_of_duties.py`).

## Full 8-concern attestation matrix (§10.4)

The matrix is implemented in v1.9 as `core/attestation_matrix.py`
(REQ-109, D-084). The concerns split into two tiers:

**Offline-testable concerns** (run for real, no operator input):
- Contract NFRs (the platform's own contract validator).
- Schema validity (jsonschema).
- Policy pass (Checkov/Wiz/Kyverno `PolicyCheckResult` records).

**Operator-supplied concerns** (require an uploaded signed evidence
artifact, validated for freshness + schema per D-084):
- Functional correctness (e2e suite report).
- Performance baseline (k6 / Gatling / Locust load test report).
- Security posture (Trivy / Snyk / contract-declared scan + Security
  on-call signature).
- Operational readiness (runbook published, dashboard exists, on-call
  rotation assigned, alerts configured).
- Incident response (Sev-1 runbook tabletop or live drill completed).
- Capacity / cost (FinOps forecast for next 30d within budget envelope).
- Resilience (DR drill, chaos engineering report, backup verified).
- dr-region deploy (most recent prod-bound dr drill as canary evidence).

The full table (lifted verbatim from §10.4):

| Env | Concern | Evidence artifact | Freshness | Source | Attester |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| qa | Functional correctness | Last successful run of contract-declared validation.e2eSuite with pass rate ≥ 99% | Last 24h | Test runner declared in contract | QA |
| qa | Performance baseline | Load test report (k6 / Gatling / Locust) showing p99 latency < declared NFR and throughput > declared minimum | Last 7d | Load test runner declared in contract | QA |
| qa | Security posture | Vulnerability scan (Trivy, Snyk, or contract-declared equivalent) with no criticals/highs, signed by Security on-call | Last 24h | Security scanner + Security team signature | QA |
| qa | Contract NFRs | Platform-generated report: schema valid, NFR assertions (latency, throughput, error rate) within declared bounds | At submission | Platform contract validator | QA |
| prod | Operational readiness | Runbook published, dashboard exists, on-call rotation assigned, alerts configured | At submission, validated against last 30d history | Platform + SRE | SRE |
| prod | Incident response | Sev-1 runbook tabletop or live drill completed | Last 90d | SRE drill record | SRE |
| prod | Capacity / cost | FinOps forecast for next 30d within budget envelope, cost anomaly baseline stored, budget alert configured | Forecast valid for next 30d | FinOps + SRE | SRE |
| prod | Resilience | DR drill, chaos engineering report, backup verified | DR: 180d; chaos: 90d; backup: 30d | SRE + Platform | SRE |
| dr | dr-region deploy with the most recent prod-bound dr drill as canary evidence | dr drill report | Last 180d | SRE | SRE |

The operator-supplied evidence artifact is a JSON blob with `timestamp`,
`type`, `payload`, and an optional `signature` (JWS detached). Freshness
is validated against the window above. Signature verification runs when
`NOVA_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID` is set; it is skipped + logged when
unset (dev/CI — D-089). The matrix fails loud if an operator-supplied
concern is missing or expired for prod/dr.

## Timeout behavior (§10.5)

| Time | State | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Submission | PENDING_ATTESTATION | Notify responsible team |
| 1 business day | PENDING_ATTESTATION_WARNING | Notify team + platform on-call (elevated path); emit `PENDING_ATTESTATION_TIMEOUT_WARNING` event |
| 2 business days | PENDING_ATTESTATION_AUTO_FREEZE | Auto-freeze; require re-submission; emit `PENDING_ATTESTATION_AUTO_FREEZE` event; new submission linked via `supersedes` |

**Implementation:** an `on: schedule` workflow (runs hourly) that
scans the DynamoDB outbox for `PENDING_ATTESTATION` events with `ts`
older than 1/2 business days and emits the warn/freeze events. Not
implemented in v1.9 (roadmap item; the attestation gates themselves are
wired, the timeout scanner is future work).

## Rejection and rollback (§10.6)

Rejection returns the contract to a `HELD` state with the rejection
reason captured as a `PROMOTION_REJECTED` event. The consumer fixes the
cause and re-submits; the new submission is linked to the rejected one
via `supersedes` (a contract-schema field — `schemas/contract.schema.json`).
The audit chain is **extended, not torn up** (the "Not a mutable audit
log" anti-goal). No partial deployment to roll back at any v1 gate.

## Separation of duties (§10.3) — pointer to the .py

The identity-distinctness check is platform-internal, not GitHub-native,
not Kyverno (in v1). Sequence:

1. On promotion dev → qa, the platform reads the QA approver's identity
   from the `workflow_dispatch` run's `CI actor` 
   and writes it to the DynamoDB outbox keyed by `contractId` (attribute
   `approver_qa`).
2. On promotion qa → prod, the platform reads the stored `approver_qa`
   from the outbox and the new SRE approver identity from the
   prod-dispatch run.
3. If `approver_qa == approver_prod`, the platform blocks the prod
   promotion, writes a `SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES_VIOLATION` event to the
   evidence stream, and routes a halt artifact to the SRE on-call.
4. The check is implemented in `core/separation_of_duties.py`
   (T-7.8). The platform is the only writer to the outbox; the check is
   in the same process that has authority to block the promotion.

v1.9 implements `route_halt_artifact` as a real SNS publish (topic
`acdl-sod-halt`, ARN from `NOVA_SOD_HALT_TOPIC_ARN`) with an outbox-event
fallback when the topic ARN is unset (REQ-107). The attestation gate
itself is `core/hitl_gates.py` (`attest(contract_id, env, approver,
evidence)`), which records the approver to the outbox, runs the SoD
check on prod, invokes the attestation matrix, and returns `(ok, reason)`.

## v1.9 wiring

v1.9 (Phase 41 + Phase 42) wires the gates end-to-end:

- **Phase 41** ships the per-environment CI job structure: one job per
  environment (dev/qa/prod/dr), each pointing at its respective contract
  (or the same contract + the `environment` workflow_call input). The
  qa/prod/dr caller workflows use `workflow_dispatch` with the approval
  inputs above; dev is autonomous (no gate). Promotion = running the
  matching job; no `environment:` field editing (D-082).
- **Phase 42** implements `core/hitl_gates.py` (the attestation gate),
  `core/attestation_matrix.py` (the 8-concern matrix), and the real
  `route_halt_artifact` (SNS + outbox fallback). `scripts/run_platform.sh`
  calls `hitl_gates.attest` before apply for qa/prod/dr (dev skips).

## Decision trail

- **D-042** — approver identity = `CI actor` of the `workflow_dispatch`
  run; no Environments API in the dev forge.
- **D-013** (v1.0) — the `workflow_dispatch` approval-input fallback,
  re-used for the real platform's pre-execution gate model.
- **D-084** (v1.9) — 8-concern attestation matrix: offline-testable
  concerns run for real; operator-supplied concerns accept signed
  evidence artifacts validated for freshness + schema.
- **D-089** (v1.9) — attestation artifact signature verification is
  skipped when `NOVA_ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY_ID` is unset (dev/CI);
  required for prod/dr.