# ACDL v1.1 Spike — AWS Bootstrap Runbook

Phase 08 bootstraps the AWS engine for the v1.1 spike. It uses the
**root account credential for account 581513795199 exactly once**, then
closes D-034 by having the user manually rotate the root key afterward.

> **Spike scope (D-039):** the spike uses a per-run-rotated IAM *user* key
> (`acdl-spike-runner`), NOT OIDC. Real OIDC federation is deferred to
> v1.2 (blocked on go-gitea/gitea#36988 — Gitea Actions does not support
> `id-token: write`). The `acdl-spike-runner` user + its key are deleted
> in v1.2 cleanup when the OIDC role lands.

## Steps

1. **Set the bootstrap root key in env** (never commit, never echo):
   ```bash
   export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<root key>"
   export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<root secret>"
   export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="us-east-1"
   ```

2. **Create the state backend** (S3 bucket + DynamoDB outbox table):
   ```bash
   python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_state_backend.py
   ```
   Idempotent; writes `terraform/bootstrap/.bootstrap_state.json` marker.

3. **Create the IAM user + scoped policy + initial key**:
   ```bash
   python3 terraform/bootstrap/create_iam_user.py
   ```
   Prints `ACDL_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<...>` + `ACDL_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<...>`
   to stdout (capture if you want the initial key; `rotate_spike_key.sh`
   creates a fresh one anyway).

4. **Rotate the spike key** (creates a new key, deactivates+deletes old,
   writes the new key to gitignored `.env.secrets`):
   ```bash
   bash scripts/rotate_spike_key.sh
   ```
   Optionally uploads to Gitea Actions secrets if `ACDL_GITEA_TOKEN` is set.

5. **Verify** (manual): confirm the caller identity is `acdl-spike-runner`
   (not root); the S3 bucket + DynamoDB table + IAM user + scoped policy
   all exist; `.env.secrets` + `.bootstrap_state.json` are gitignored.
   (`scripts/verify_phase08.sh` was the automated gate; it has been
   removed along with all other per-phase verify scripts.)

6. **MANUAL — D-034 closure:** rotate/deactivate the **root** key in the
   AWS IAM console (the user does this, not the script). The bootstrap
   root key has now served its one-shot purpose; the spike uses the
   rotated `acdl-spike-runner` key for Phases 09-10.

## v1.11 Phase 56 — IAM re-bootstrap + OIDC role (REQ-116)

The v1.11 milestone re-bootstraps IAM to close G-005 (CAP-017..022
deploy-unverified). Phase 56 extends the spike-runner policy with
CloudFront/WAF/Lambda/DynamoDB-contracts/SecretsManager/SNS/CE/KMS/OIDC
permissions and re-creates the `acdl-act-runner-role` (CAP-022).

**Apply the IAM baseline (idempotent):**
```bash
export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<root key>"
export ACDL_BOOTSTRAP_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<root secret>"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="us-east-1"
python3 terraform/bootstrap/apply_iam_baseline.py
```

This script:
1. Creates (or versions) the customer-managed policy
   `acdl-spike-runner-policy` from
   `terraform/bootstrap/spike_runner_policy.json` (ARN
   `arn:aws:iam::581513795199:policy/acdl-spike-runner-policy`).
2. Attaches it to the `acdl-spike-runner` user and deletes any leftover
   inline policy (the v1.1 inline policy hit the 2048-byte limit; the
   managed-policy path supports 6144 bytes per version + up to 5
   versions).
3. Re-creates the `acdl-act-runner-role` OIDC role if absent, attaches
   the same managed policy, and sets a trust policy that permits root
   assume until go-gitea/gitea#36988 merges real OIDC federation.

The applied policy is documented in `.ciagent/IAM_POLICY.md` and
regression-tested by `tests/test_iam_policy_baseline.py` (15 tests).

## What the spike uses for Phases 09-10

- **State backend:** S3 bucket `acdl-tfstate-581513795199-us-east-1` +
  DynamoDB table `acdl-outbox` (one table for both lock + outbox, D-P08-1).
- **Auth:** the rotated `acdl-spike-runner` key in `.env.secrets`
  (gitignored, chmod 600). Re-rotate after each spike run via
  `rotate_spike_key.sh` (D-039).

## Spike scope vs v1.2 boundary

| Concern | Spike (Phase 08) | v1.2 |
|---------|------------------|------|
| AWS auth | per-run-rotated long-lived key (D-039 waiver) | real OIDC federation (go-gitea/gitea#36988) |
| IAM | minimal user `acdl-spike-runner` + scoped policy | OIDC role + trust policy (no user, no key) |
| State backend | S3 + DynamoDB single-region (us-east-1) | multi-region |
| Secret storage | gitignored `.env.secrets` + optional Gitea secret | Gitea OIDC-issued web-identity token (no secret) |